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ABSTRACT
This sfaufy attempts to delineate how power—both institutional and representational—has 
been perceived in American fiction from the post-war period to the present Representa­
tive novelists are examined and a number of individual works analyzed in their historical 
context In the first part, socio-political theories of power form the theoretical background 
for how it is perceived in the novels. The second part discusses the post-war political 
novel, and the fictions o f Gore Vidal and Norman Mailer. The third part examines 
postmodernist authors including, among others, William S. Burroughs, John Barth, Thomas 
Pynchon, and Don DeLillo. It is seen that a Weberian (adversarial) model of the novelists 
of the second part gives way to aFoucaultian (insidiously pervasive) one of the novelists 
of die third part, which corresponds to die transformation of contemporary society, its 
politics and culture, under multinational capitalism during and after the 1960s.
RESUMO:
Este estudo tenta delinear como o poder - tanto institutional quanto representacional - e percebido 
na ficcao norte-americana do periodo pos-guerra ate o presente. O trabalho examina romancistas 
representativos e analisa uma serie de trabalhos individuais dentro de seu conteúdo hístorico. Na 
primeiraparte, teorias socio-poiiticos sobre o poder fornecem o suporte teorico para detectar 
como o poder e visto nos romances. A segunda parte discute o romance politico pos-guerra, Gore 
Vidal e Norman Mailer, entre outros. Contata-se que umapercepcao de poder Weberiana 
(adversarial) de poder por parte dos romancistas da segunda parte e substuida por uma visao 
Foucanltiana (poder insidiosamente filtrado) por parte dos romancistas da terceira parte, o que 
corresponde a transformacao da sociedade contemporanea, sua politica e cultura no capitalismo 
multinacional, durante e depois dos anos 60.
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INTRODUCTION 
Section I: Literature and Power 
a
The United States since the Second World War has been marked by two interrelated de­
velopments important not only for that country but for the world as a whole: die rise to inter­
national military, political, and economic power, and the rise of an affluent, post-industrial 
society. These two broad developments have determined not only the social structure of the 
United States but also its relations with the rest of the world, relations that owing to its vast 
power and influence have often been problematic. Within American society these develop­
ments have been accompanied by a tendency to separate public and private life that has had 
consequences for all levels of culture. For example, the post-war novel, along with other ex­
pressions of social and cultural life, has been marked by “a retreat from the political” 
(Molesworth, ’’Culture” 1023), the eschewing of an engagement with public issues for a 
nearly exclusive concentration on the private problems and fantasies of individuals, as if  the 
two realms were completely divorced.
Prose fiction has had difficulty in adjusting to the new realities. The writing of the older mod­
ern masters Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, even the more politicized John Dos Passos 
and John Steinbeck have seemed, as one literary historian put it, to some extent “detached” 
from die post-war world “with its sense of historical disaster, of changed destiny, of nuclear 
threat, accumulating mass society, growing materialism, and technological transformation” 
(Bradbury, ‘‘Neorealist Fiction” 1131). Yet, the realist writers who emerged after the war 
continued to be fascinated by an isolated sel£ an alienated and somewhat comically absurd 
individual dealing with what was perceived as an increasingly distant and indifferent system
(1134). “The recurring stance of die modern fictional hero,” another critic noted in 1967, re­
flected “alienation”: “The common pattern of action which recurred was the pattern of the 
quest..The nightmare world, alienation and nausea, the quest for identity, and the comic 
doomsday vision—these are die elements that characterize recent American fiction” (James E. 
Miller 30). Hie Sartrean terminology aside, it is worthy of note that these are the characteris­
tics that modern criticism has discovered as most typical of Huckleberry Finn, a text that does 
not shrink, as the ones the critic was discussing, from trenchant social analysis (Hill 231-44). 
Hie 19th century American society depicted in Twain’s novel, to take one exanq>le, is shown 
to take “a tissue of bookish assumptions and artificial forms’* for reality itself (Poirier, World 
Elsewhere 145).
Twain, it is worthy of note, who has been called and indeed called himself die most 
American of writers, wrote a series of excoriating letters, later collected into a bode, 
against die American military adventurism and imperialism of die end of the 19th century. 
Frank Lentricchia thinks (hat the "main line” of American literature has always in feet been 
political aid “stands in harsh judgment against..that sod humanist underbelly of American 
literature” of recent decades: “a realism of domestic setting whose characters play out 
their little dramas of ordinary event and feeling in an America miraculously free from the 
environment and disasters of contemporary technology, untouched by racial and gender 
tensions, and blissfully unaware of political power” (6). The tendency itself suggests an 
interrelation between historical reality and fictional creation. It is as if  the immense 
changes brought about by die war and die newly emergent institutions and technologies 
were too great to be grasped by American writers except indirectly. For example, social 
class conflicts, when they were admitted at all, tended after the war to be transformed in
fiction into psychological dramas and existential angst. Many poets and novelists tended to 
“project back” from their personal or artistic experience to society and politics, abandon­
ing other representations of power found in history and philosophy (Molesworth 1037).
This, Thomas Schaub has cogently argued, was apart o f the “new liberalism” among crit­
ics and writers in search of a politics that had long become disillusioned with socialism 
and yet was determined to remain aloof from the reactionary forces emerging with die onset 
of the Cold War. In die process, “liberalism itself became conservative,” as it served to 
help form what Geoffrey Hodgson calls “the false consensus” of the Fifties (Schaub 9,15; 
Hodgson 17). With the erosion of old sources of moral authority, die retreat into the self 
could take hold in both fiction and criticism.
This argument, which will be expanded in later chapters, implies that there is a correla­
tion between the thought and events of a period and its literary production that cannot, I think, 
be seriously doubted, although the precise connection is complex and problematic and shall 
be provisionally addressed in the second section of this Introduction For a very recent ex­
ample, it has been observed that there has been in contemporary fiction a return to realist 
modes (sometimes referred to as “neo-realism”) after the linguistic preoccupations of post­
modernist fiction in die 1970s and 1980s. Son» critics have hailed this as a return to “real 
life” after what is sometimes referred to contemptuously as mere “word games,” as if  even 
more traditional realist fictions are somehow not, after all, linguistic constructions. One such 
critic assured me a few years ago that the American novel is now back where it has always 
belonged, to the traditional realism of our fiction (Melville? Hawthorne?). Others more 
skeptically perceive this return, if  that is what it is, as an acquiescence in die “conservative” 
turn of American society with the advent of Presidents Reagan and Bush and their reactionary
social project ( McCaffery, “Fictions of Present” 1162), a perception that assumes that fiction 
mirrors official ideologies in an unproblematic way. It can be shown, 1 think, that this does 
not necessarily happen, except perhaps in die kind of novel that frequently appears on best­
seller lists. For example, there are die 1960s, a turbulent and questioning decade from which 
emerged a postmodernist fiction that overthrew traditional methods, techniques, and modes of 
thought At the same time, serious works of so-called psychological realism continued to be 
produced in abundance. On the other hand, the 1950s, a politically conservative even reac­
tionary decade, also managed to produce stylistically and thematically innovative works 
(William Gaddis, William S. Burroughs, Kurt Vonnegut, Norman Mailer, Jack Kerouac) that 
radically questioned the socio-political context of that time.
Serious fiction of the {»«sent, by which I mean novels not written primarily for the mass 
market, cannot now return to s i  unquestioning representation of an assumed stable world; die 
radical departures of the writers mentioned above and those of die newer postmodernist 
novelists and critics, whatever their more gimmicky excesses, have made that impossible.
Hie return to realism, to be sire, includes novels o f the so-called new regionalism 
(irreverently, ‘luck chic”) or numerous analyses o f domestic life, what Don DeLillo has 
called the “around-the-house-and-in-the-yard” type of novel (R. Harris 26), from writers like 
Reynolds Price, Anne Tyler, Bobbie Ann Mason, even the darker Raymond Carver 
(Lentricchia’s examples). But this return may be nothing more than a retreat from a certain 
kind of overly self-reflexive postmodernism (Ronald Sukenik, Steve Katz). Serious novelists 
working today as diverse as Toni Morrison, Don DeLillo, Joyce Carol Oates, Tim O’Brien, 
William Kennedy, Ted Mooney, and T. Coraghessan Boyle, for example, may be said to work 
in a recognizably realist mode (their novels have narrative plot, characters of a sort, etc. and
5they tend to eschew die kind of authorial intervention and metafictionaJ game-playing that is 
associated with John Barth), but none of these writers have entirely abandoned die fable- 
making tendencies of postmodernism or returned to an outmoded attempt to create a falsely 
transparent language that might serve as a vehicle for some unexamined objective reality.
There even seems to be die blend, which Alan Wilde calls “midfiction,” of realism and ex- 
perimentalism, exemplified by writers like Stanley Elkin, Max Apple, and Donald Barthelme. 
Hie novel is evidently still very much alive (reports o f its demise, to paraphrase Mark Twain, 
have been exaggerated) and still remains aflexible genre, adapting and changing, questioning 
itself as well as the world.
Within this large, varied, ever-changing body o f fiction are afew writers who, in contrast 
to the old-guard novelists and their contemporary epigones who continue to probe the middle* 
class psyche in contemporary America, have been writing novels that attempt to see American 
society in a larger, more public context (or the public-within-the-private, of which more be­
low), who are, to simplify things a little, more politically oriented insofar as they perceive the 
multiple problems of American society as centered around the notion of public power. The 
central but difficult concept of power has, unsurprisingly, been much discussed in political 
and social theory. Once perceived as always involving some form of domination or control 
by one specific group over others, since the work ofMichel Foucault and others, new ways of 
looking at power have evolved that complicate this general notion. Foucault, for example, 
does not see knowledge and power as separate.
In an 1848 essay on Pope, the English writer Thomas DeQuincey once made a distinction 
between die literature of knowledge and die literature of power: “The function of the first is— 
to teach; the function of the second is-to move: the first is a rudder, the second an oar or a
sail” (qtd. by Cuddon, 526). While DeQuincey’s binary distinction doubtless alludes to the 
classical duality oidulce et utile, his nautical metaphor makes it unintentionally clear that 
knowledge and power are both on the same boat.
To anticipate the theoretical discussion somewhat, traditional political theory has viewed 
power as something possessed by someone, whether an individual (Machiavelli, Hobbes) or 
a class (Marx). For Foucault, power is not possessed as such but functions in and through 
discursive strategies, “through the identities produced in die forms of knowledge and interpre­
tation that normalize human subjectivity in various historical periods” (Shapiro 3-4). The 
linking of knowledge »id interpretation in this formulation points up the importance of litera­
ture and criticism in the formation of human identity in our era, along with science and reposi­
tories of knowleclge such as universities, political institutions, the mass media, die law, and 
other familiar forms of power. None of these, not even language itself have been seen as in­
nocent, neutral or disinterested—perhaps since Marxism. Foucault’s question, "‘What histori­
cal knowledge is possible of a history that itself produces the true-false distinction on which 
such knowledge depends?” (Baynes et al. I ll) , suggests that even the “truth,” ihat transcen­
dental notion of disinterested humanism, is arrived at through the discursive practices, institu­
tions and instruments of power and, of course, employed for ends by no means covered by the 
traditional and comfortable notions of the “love of wisdom” or “disinterested truth.”
Given these new perceptions, questions of power have become central in contemporary 
literary and cultural studies, most recently in die fields of ethnic, feminist, and gay literatures, 
and in die thriving field of postcolonial literature and theory, but radical new readings of even 
established canonical authors and the most unlikely works have proliferated to such an extent 
that it seems that any or all works can be read from this perspective (Riebling 177). It is
somewhat surprising, therefore, that less attention has been given to the nature and exercise of 
power in American society by contemporary writers who have been most concerned with it 
This study is an attempt to address die relationship between this concern and these writers.
b.
Hie novel has since its beginnings been a social genre and continues to function as an im­
portant source of information, as Lionel Trilling once remarked (.Liberal 63), on power, 
money, and class in modern society, but, of course, a student o f literature is not only con­
cerned with the novel as a source but as an object of study in its own right Novels illuminate 
reality (how they do so or even if  they do is a topic of theoretical discussion, but here I shall 
just assume that they do). My contention is that our contemporary novelists have contributed 
to our understanding of power—or in some cases actually obscured that understanding— 
through die creation of literary representations that offer insights distinct from more abstract 
and conceptual social theories, in the novel, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, social and politi­
cal events acquire meaning in connection with private life. Hie “essence” of events as purely 
social and political may remain outside the novel, as it were, but they are “illuminated” in 
their relation to private fates (Bakhtin, “Forms” 109). And from a politicized perspective, we 
servants must be clear, Richard Sennet has said, about how die power of the masters is lim­
ited. At the risk of invoking a now fashionable paranoia, only our knowledge of its complex­
ity can avoid or prevent unshakable images of power that can only ultimately increase the 
masters’ control. My concern in this study, accordingly, is to suggest the ways that power is 
perceived in contemporary fiction in the United States, or, to put it another way, delineate the 
different ways in which die literary artists of die world’s most powerful nation discern how 
power has been exercised since the Second World War.
8It can be assumed that relations of power are important in any system broadly defined as 
political. Raymond Aron says, for example, that “[a]s apolitical concept, power...designates 
a relationship between men” (257), so that a society without power would be a contradiction 
in terms, i.e. a mere aggregate of individuals, as Thomas Hobbes long ago recognized. Ana­
lysts have differed, however, in assigning power its relative importance. A minimalist view, 
surely inadequate, is that power is simply (me among other features in apolitical system. 
Another view, defended by Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, who were concerned with 
defining a central concept in their field of study, is that the study of power is what properly 
constitutes apolitical science (II: 14). A more radical position, widely held today, is that 
power underlies all human relationships at every level, but if  this wording suggests that power 
is something distinct from the people involved, Foucault reminds us that “power is co­
extensive with die social body” (qtd. in Gordon 142).
Political theory has devoted itself for centuries to two main aspects of power: die notion 
of authority and the use of “allocative” or economic resources. Up to about die 19th century, 
theory was generally concerned with the power of the state and its legitimacy, i.e. authority. 
Hie importance of economic resources was at least implicitly recognized in early theories but 
the great power of market forces only began to be seriously examined in the wake of the Indus­
trial Revolution. In our own century, the theory of power Iras continued to investigate these 
two major areas but has inquired more deeply into the nature of power in both general and 
specific contexts. For example, it is studied in analyses of organizations, bureaucracies, po­
litical elites, and government at national, regional and local levels, and of international rela­
tions, die proper subject of political science as Laswell and Kaplan conceive it There have 
been many recent attempts of philosophers and social scientists to understand power both at a
more abstract, conceptual level, and by way of empirical studies (e.g. Dahl, Who Governs?). 
Major conceptual theories will be examined in Chapter 1.
On reflection, it is perhaps not too difficult to accept the idea that some kind of power 
comprehends or is co-extensive with all social relationships: from tint even between indi­
viduals, like love or family attachments, to institutions connected with the family but extending 
beyond it, such as clubs, churches, and other social or recreational groups, as well as working 
and professional associations of every kind, all the way up to the more consciously acknowl­
edged areas of power in military, corporate, and labor organizations, md at all levels of gov­
ernment—municipal, state, national, and international. Power has therefore been of interest to 
thinkers and scholars in a number of disciplines, such as history, political theory, moral phi­
losophy, sociology, psychology, and economics, and, more recently, literary theory and criti­
cism.. Writing is an act o f power, “an act by which reality is seized and dominated” (Poirier, 
World 82), and that at least as far bade as William Burroughs's Naked Lunch (1959), it was 
perceived that the dominant discourses of contemporary society must be exposed and resisted 
by oppositional ones. Minority and post-colonial literatures, for example, oifer to do this in 
their contention that the (social and politically) powerless have a story to tell but not the op­
portunity to tell it, since they are not recognized as having a story to tell.
Barbara Packer says that American authors have always been fascinated by power: Em­
erson, for example, uses the language of power, military and corporate, when he discusses in 
“The American Scholar” a tradition which ‘'tyrannizes” and an inspiration which 
“monopolizes” (Elliott, Lit. Hist, o f US 3876). Power relations have often been central in 
American fictional representations. To cite only canonical novelists, Hawthorne, Melville, 
Howells, Twain, Crane, Wharton, and Dreiser have all written fictional works in which the
characters find themselves diminished by powerful environments. Even Henry James, the 
master of psychological realism, published (in 1886) two novels about revolutionaries, The 
Bostonians and The Princess Casamassima. And, recently contesting the liberal critic John 
Bayley’s reading of James’s last novel, The Golden Bowl (1904), as a work essentially about 
“love,” Gore Vidal pointed out that it is rather about “force” (i.e. power), exerted by Adam 
and Maggie in die form o£ first, money, then knowledge. Vidal added that Henry's brother 
William, the philosopher, once mused that the basis o f civil society is force, a Hobbesian no­
tion widely accepted by political theorists (‘‘Letted’ 49).
c.
This study is made up of dree main parts. The literary analyses are to be found in Parts 
Two and Three (of which more below). The first part, Power and Society, consists of a sin­
gle chapter which analyzes power in the light of contemporary social and political theoiy.
The first section of this chapter discusses meanings  definitions, and related concepts and their 
attendant difficulties. Hie purpose is to suggest something of the sheer complexity of the con­
cepts and to offer a general discussion to serve as a basis for what follows. Hie second sec­
tion examines major modern theories of power, namely, those of Weber and Foucault, with 
some reference to related thinkers.
Max Weber is the first important attempt to go beyond die classical theories of the state 
toward more abstract and broadly applicable conceptions of power and domination. He de­
fines power basically as one party being in a position to exercise its will on another despite 
resistance, which implies an assymetrical, with super ordinate and subordinate parties, and an 
essentially conflictual relation, with power as something to be possessed and exercised as a 
matter of will. This view is shared by most modem thinkers before Foucault and, as I hope to
10
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show in my chapters on the novels, unconsciously at least by those novelists I discuss in Part 
I  Like classical theorists, Weber also sought to distinguish between legitimate and illegiti­
mate forms of power; he recognized traditional, charismatic, and rational/legal types of 
authority. Like earlier theorists Weber recognized the ultimate resort to force, but he also 
called attention to the importance of discipline and obedience. In this respect, he has also had 
great influence on later theory in his discussion of the rationalized but often, paradoxically, ir­
rational power of bureaucracy, which has been the subject of recent fiction like that of Heller, 
Mailer, and especially Pynchon.
Michel Foucault’s work has been important for poststructuralist thought and finds a 
certain resonance in postmodernist fiction, which tends to confirm Foucault’s view of power 
as something increasingly difficult to identify. Power in this view is not unitary, something 
outside us but constitutive of the individual to begin with. He breaks with the classical notion 
that power consists in some substantive instance or agency of sovereignty, it is not a fixed 
quantity but a flux flowing through individuals and societies, bound up with systems and or­
ganizations, whose mechanisms are distributed along different points and not unified at a sin­
gle one like the state. He therefore does not seek to define its essence, what it is, but rather 
how it exercised
Foucault also wants to understand power as positive and enabling, occurring whenever 
one wishes to direct another’s behavior, and as implying freedom (and in these points re­
sembling other theories), as something other than domination of the master-slave type, since if  
it were only that people would not obey it so willingly. When there is domination it tends not 
to be top-down but within “lateral” relations, multiple forms of subjugation that have a place 
and function within a social organism. To identify these relations, he has analyzed the insidi-
12
ous “capillaiy” network of power relations, the social, political, and technical conditions of 
possibility, in order to reconstruct in his historical “genealogies” the interlocking but contin­
gently connected relations and their effects.
Foucault said that he wished to create ahistory of the different ways human beings are 
made subjects. Hie recognition that one’s personal identity cannot be separated from the fate 
of humanity, both of which are historically constructed, would argue against the tendency I 
have pointed out of so many postwar novelists to “psychologize” individual identity and 
evade some of die more subtle and invisible aspects o f power in contemporary life. The ab­
stract conception of who we are, determined ideologically and economically by the state, cor­
porations, and the media, must be resisted by new forms of subjectivity, to which literature 
undoubtedly makes a unique contribution. One of die methods Foucault identifies that modern 
civilization has found to mold individuals is a system of disciplinary power, to punish devia­
tion more efficiently and thoroughly, since disciplinary systems, with the cooperation of edu­
cation and the hranam sciences, have been inserted more deeply into the social fabric. The 
technology of normalization became inseparable from knowledge of man and this power was 
and is exercised through invisibility: as opposed to older forms of power, the subjects and 
not the leaders are observed, a situation that in a technologically advanced society like the 
United States perhaps goes some way toward explaining the ubiquity of paranoia in contempo­
rary American fiction.
Political and social theories of power are as numerous as their object is important, but 
there need not be any necessaiy link between such theories and any supposed “applications” 
in literary works. Literature, for a number of reasons, resists being transformed into philo­
sophical or sociological texts, even when there is enough philosophy or sociology in them.
13
When they have been (forcibly) transformed in this way, they often spring back into a life not 
foreseen by the theories meant to contain them~this much the deconstructionists have labored 
to explain. On the other hand, literary works are not independent of the material world and 
the climate of ideas from which they spring and it might be expected that theories of society 
might have something to say about texts that also, though in different ways, comment on soci­
ety. Socio-political critics have in fact obtained considerable mileage from political readings 
of literary texts. Raymond Williams, Terry Eagleton, and Frederic Jameson, to mention three 
exemplary Marxist literary critics, have forcefiilly argued in a number of books that die social 
and political aspects of fiction are not peripheral bid essential, without a slighting of formal or 
what used to be thought o f as purely “literary” aspects of a given text, since even aesthetic 
considerations have a social component Nor is my own interest and emphasis in this study at 
all divorced from die social and political, as the centrality of the concept of power would in­
dicate. I hope that the second main section of this Introduction, which examines the relation 
between fictional and historical reality, and my readings in subsequent chapters of selected 
novels, will demonstrate this concern with text and context, the literary work as a social pro- 
duction.
What does need saying, however, is that there is no automatic correspondence between 
formal theories of power and its thematic treatment in works of fiction, although I have out­
lined above possible parallel lines between major theories and novelist practice. There is a 
need, I think, to take a look at perceptions of power over several decades of American fiction. 
If this study occasionally reads like a brief post-war history of the novel, it is because the 
connections between writers and die reality they experience and between the reality of differ­
ent texts reacting among one another must be constantly made. The difficulty, at least for me,
14
of making direct correspondences between political and social theory and fictional texts, 
however, is why this study has not been organized differently, say, into chapters in which a 
certain theory is first proposed and discussed and then “illustrated” with fictional examples 
selected specifically for that purpose. I have rather chosen to examine what I have found to be 
the main theoretical statements and then analyzed a number of novels chosen to see how they 
perceive power, an analysis which includes whether or not they show any correspondence 
with Ate theoretical statements and how far such statements may go to explain what is happen­
ing in die texts. My concern, therefore, is primarily with the literary works. Despite die ne­
cessity of a rather extensive preliminary theoretical exposition, the movement is from the 
novels back to it, whenever relevant, and not deductively, or reductively, from it to them.
Another reason why social theory is difficult to connect with specific literaiy works, as 
perhaps opposed to connecting it with “literature” in general (where there must be some cor­
respondence between two modes of cultural production in a given epoch), is the familiar one 
that theory is generalizing aid abstract, while a literary work like a novel h  particularizing 
and concrete, as in Balditin’s notion of society-in-the-individual. One may object that, if that 
is so, then even literary theory would seem to have little to do with specific works. In fact, 
this seems to be more and more the case, as English Studies and even more so, Critical The­
ory, take over what used to be English or American etc. literature and criticism, and as nov­
els, plays, poems, and essays recede almost unheeded into die background. Literary theory it­
self seems to have receded into a sub-category of social theory, or is it the other way round?
Another problem less often remarked is that while the concreteness of fiction makes it 
readily accessible to contextual izati on, die specific social and political contexts of philo­
sophical and critical theories are often forgotten, so that theoretical models sometimes tend to
15
be universalized As John Carlos Rowe, writing on postmodernist studies, puts it: “One nega­
tive consequence of the reading lists in critical theory was the often mechanical application of 
these theoretical texts to specific literary works without much consideration for the historical 
differences between theory and literary practice” (195).
Yet another reason is related to the first and can be stated in the form “Literature does not 
articulate theories but disarticulates them” (Menand, “Eliot” 7), which seems to mean that lit­
erature its elf may exert a deconstruct! ve function on how social phenomena are perceived I 
believe that this in fact is one of its important roles. To the possible charge o f aradical post­
modernist or new historicist critic that in privileging novels, I am upholding “a discredited 
myth of literary value” that is no more Aim just another “discourse” (Kermode 41), at die ex­
pense of other cultural productions, one might appeal to this notion of literature’s critical po­
tential historically, since the way it problematizes culture is familiar from a long traditioa 
Even the canonical American writers, Frank Lentricchia says, “those who conservatives say 
best embody American values” (and have perhaps therefore recently been under fire from 
feminist, ethnic, and other critics), “are adversary critics of our culture” (5). What it may 
come down to, however, is that novels happen to be the cultural form that interest me most; 
others may prefer, or at least choose for analysis, television, pop music, fashion, ads (or, to 
cite Don DeLillo’s comically suggestive examples in White Noise, cereal boxes or car crash 
movies). Television, at least, is probably more influential in shaping mass opinion than any 
other cultural production aid there are recent signs that it is taking over the critical concerns 
of people who used to be interested primarily in literature.
An argument in favor of the choice of literary texts for cultural work has been proposed 
by Brook Thomas in his study of the New Historicists, for whom, according to its leading
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proponent Stephen Greenblatt, die relation between past and present is one of “negotiation” 
and “exchange” and for whom ahistorical appeals to the transcendent authority of literature, as 
espoused by the (old) New Critics, are irrelevant (Kermode 41). Thomas thinks that literature 
has in fact lost much of its critical potential, that it is either complicit with an extending power 
or marginalized to a form of“re creation” (Thomas 199-200). For him, however, this does not 
necessarily trivialize literary texts since they have “transformative potential” (167) as forms 
of play, or as possible resistances to particular ideologies. Since literature occupies a freer 
space than, for example, die law, to play with alternatives, including alternative ways of 
reading (like political readings), literature is a form of discourse that “can provoke us to re­
flect on our historical situation” (172). As Salman Rushdie succinctly put it, “the novel is a 
privileged arena” (103). Following Wolfgang Iser’s theory of reading, Thomas argues that the 
text makes the reader anecessary component in the construction of die text’s world, a 
“construction” of a world that has no prior existence and not a re-construction of an absent 
original presence (209). Therefore, as readers “we can negotiate an exchange with texts from 
die past that can give us a sense of die otherness of our own point of view, thus provoking us 
to grope for alternative ways of world-making” (211). Specifically, owing to literature’s 
status as play, reconstructions of institutional structures can be imagined without the costs of 
their historical realization, “since die literary provides a space in which possible costs can be 
played out” (216). The value of this theory, I think, is that it provides for apolitical criticism 
that need not neglect literature’s imaginative power or concern with aesthetic structure.
d.
It might be proposed that not theoretical disquisitions but empirical studies of how power 
works in specific social locales would be die appropriate parallel for fictional perceptions of
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the same. There does appear to be a rough correspondence between such empirical studies, 
which have appeared in the political science literature in the United States, and, say, novels of 
the first half of the century (e.g. “muckrakers” like Upton Sinclair, as well as the “naturalist” 
fiction of Sherwood Anderson, Richard Wright, John Steinbeck, James T. Farrell), or even 
earlier (Theodore Dreiser, William D. Howells, Edith Wharton), works which carefully de­
lineate the social and political structures of power in city, region, or segment o f society, and 
which firmly expose the characters who pull the strings of domination. Such a sociological- 
literary comparative study might well prove of interest, bid making such parallels would be of 
much more limited value in contemporary fiction, for power in contemporary society tends to 
be more insidious, both more pervasive aid more difficult to identity. Contemporary fiction 
has, I think, evolved to respond more effectively to the social and political charges that have 
brought this situation about I have found it necessary therefore to examine varied perceptions 
of power over several decades.
Paris Two and Three of ibis study, accordingly, examine a fair number of novels. Each 
part contains an introductory section which serves as historical and critical background for the 
individual novelists and the critical readings of works in the chapters that follow. There might 
be a temptation, in glancing at the table of contents, to progressively classify die novels dis­
cussed as realist, modernist, and postmodernist While such a classification is indeed sug­
gested by my division—it will be observed that there is a break between the more traditional 
type of text examined in Part Two and the postmodernist texts in Part Three--it would not be 
entirely accurate. For one thing, while some critics (Rowe, Jameson, Hassan) find postmod­
ernism to be a “period concept” referring to a number of works of art that emerged in die 
1960s, others (Chabot) think it is not an all-encompassing term in die way modernism is. Still
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others point out that die different kinds of works co-exist (Hassan, Paracriticisms 47; Chabot 
30): thus, realists (Gore Vidal, John Updike, Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, J.F. Powers, etc.) and 
neo-realists (Russell Banks, Joyce Carol Oates, T. Choraghessan Boyle, Raymond Carver, 
Ann Tyler, Larry McMurtry) are contemporary with those novelists (Walker Percy, Thomas 
McGuane, Toni Morrison, Stephen Millhauser, William Gass) mainly inspired by the pre-war 
modernist masters, as well as those invariably identified as postmodernists (Thomas Pynchon, 
John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Robert Coover, Ishmael Reed, Samuel Delany, William Gib­
son). Hie terminology is further complicated by the feet that some of the writers I have listed 
as belonging to one category may be placed without undo violence in another (Morrison? 
Oates?), and that still other writers (Barth, Delany) have over their extended careers seem to 
have changed or merged categories.
Norman Mailer is an exemplary case. His long and prolific career spans the limits of my 
inquiry—the fifty years since the end of the war till the present—and his work shares features 
defined as belonging to all three terms. For example, his first novel, Tne Naked and the Dead 
(1941) depicts the gritty life of infantry grunts (realism), insists on the determinism of chance 
and natural forces (naturalism), and employs die modernist device, borrowed from John Dos 
Passos, of biographical flash-backs (“TTie Time-Machine”). Hie novels of both the Fifties 
and Sixties feature die quintessential^ modernist themes of self-discovery and identity and die 
tension between knowledge and experience, while stylistically eschewing the modernist ob­
session with formal unity and aesthetic wholes in favor of a realist concern with linking text 
and historical experience—even an old-fashioned realist preoccupation with the seamier side 
of life. His novels of the Sixties introduce elements of fantasy and mix history and fiction 
within the text, regarded as post-modernist features. A quite recent novel, Harlot's Ghost
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(1991), in its use of mixed genres, embedded manuscripts, historical and fictional characters, 
and refusal of closure, can be and has been called a postmodernist novel. Nevertheless, I 
have included Mailer in the second part, as I think he shows more affinities with respect to his 
perceptions of power with the novelists discussed there than with the postmodernists of the 
third.
Despite the problems with historical and even descriptive features of these terms, and die 
insistence of some critics to employ them only as a convenient shorthand, they often tend to 
solidify into quasi-metaphysicai categories and their taxonomic convenience fades into die 
drawing of conclusions about a work on the basis of its being so classified. Since what con­
stitutes postmodernism is an on-going debate and since the novelists discussed in my last three 
chapters, and, somewhat more problematically, in Chapter 5, are said to be bona-fide post­
modernists, 1 have discussed this problem and its relation to my topic in the introduction to 
Part Hree. TTiere is no attempt to establish definitive categories (if indeed that can be done) 
but to discuss relevant concerns, since it is increasingly likely that we cannot do wiifeout such 
terms and still avoid awkwardness, and—this is the reason for die division—there do seem to 
be essential differences in perceptions of power in the novelists o f chapters 5 to 8 and those 
discussed in chapters 2 to 4.
Another objection may be that I do not discuss, or even mention, a good many novelists 
that are also concerned with power and that, in any case, I am begging the question, since the 
lands of power that novelists deal with have not been determined. Granted these objections, I 
may advance die information at this point that I am mainly concerned with political and insti­
tutional power in American society and government in a more general (though not universal) 
sense rather than, say, the institutional and social pressures specifically implicated in racism
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or sexism or other kinds of discriminatory social phenomena, although these social phenomena 
are doubtless negative consequences of the kinds of power this study is concerned with. In die 
more recent works discussed, also, perceptions of more insidious kinds of power such as die 
media need to be addressed, although doubtless these kinds, too, are implicated in both blatant 
and subtle forms of discrimination and domination.
I am well aware that multiple aspects of power and domination have effectively been 
treated in books and articles written by and about people of ethnic or sexual minorities and 
women, people who have a lot to say about the politics aid institutions of the white, hetero­
sexual, patriarchal United States and have been saying so, in some cases since the 19th cen­
tury, in both literary and critical works. Nor would 1 presume to say any such things for them. 
H eir exclusion in these pages, which is doubtless glaring to some readers, is to a certain ex­
tent a practical matter. Each of these literary and critical tendencies has developed, espe­
cially in recent years, into a whole field of its own, requiring a special expertise that I do not 
possess and a particular emphasis that I do not wish to give. This is in the way of explanation 
of nay discussing only works by white male (but in nearly all cases, still living) authors in 
Parts Two and Three. My ignoring black, ethnic, or female authors should not be interpreted 
as ignoring die importance of their contribution to any discussion of power in American soci­
ety. Mary McCarthy, Joan Didion, Toni Morrison, Ishmael Reed, Samuel Delany, to mention 
some authors I would consider relevant (there are others, as well as white males like Robert 
Coover and Walter Abish), would doubtless enrich die topic but would also considerably en­
large a study in which a large number of novels are already examined Furthermore, and this is 
die main point, the authors and works I do discuss have been chosen for their special focus, 
which is not on the effects on particular groups excluded by the power structure but on that
very structure itself, both in its more evident and more recondite modes of subjugation, a focus 
that comprehends and concerns all Americans (even white males of the humbler sort) and, by 
extension, given the expansive realities of American power, die rest of the world. The focus 
is, therefore, both grander and narrower.
e.
As a final note to this first section, let me offer a brief gloss on the terms of die title. By 
“contemporary,“ 1 mean not necessarily that the authors of the texts discussed herein are living 
and writing today, although nearly all of them are, but in the accepted sense, at least in Ameri­
can literary studies, of works published since the Second World War, an historical context 
that is, as shall be seen, all-important By “American,” I mean novels written in English 
(although American fiction has works written in other languages) by writers from die United 
States (although some American writers were born abroad), wherever they were actually 
written (some American writers live more or less permanently abroad) or published (some 
notable novels were, for reasons of alleged obscenity, originally published in less puritanical 
places like Paris). This national qualification might seem unnecessary, but this study is being 
written in Brazil, for a Brazilian university, where people are aware that “America” has an 
even wider reference than that spacious and populous country situated between Canada and 
Mexico—which country is, accordingly, referred to herein as the United States, or simply the 
US. The adjective “American” has been retained to avoid clumsy locutions, but it should be 
added that the notion of “American Literature” has currently expanded to include literatures 
of other parts of die Americas. Id the admirable Columbia History o f the American Novel 
(1991), for example, there are chapters on Canadian, Caribbean, and Latin American fiction
and it is a healthy sign of the times that these literatures have received considerable critical 
attention in the last few years.
By “novel,” I mean more or less lengthy texts of fiction (i. e. roughly, over a hundred 
pages to over a thousand); I shall generally ignore short stories, essays, and other productions 
by the authors chosen for the simple reason that the subject is already large enough. I am 
aware that the traditional term “novel” is often repudiated in contemporary critical discourse 
in favor of the terms “fiction” and. “text,” which seems to be a repudiation of replication 
models of fiction and a corresponding enq>hasis on the literary work as a construct, something 
made (fiction), a verbal fabric (text), rather than something whose primary feature is novelty. 
Yet, as someone pointed out, if  one takes “novel” simply to mean a new making or new con­
struct rather than novel content (which may not be so novel after all), the traditional term may 
be retained, along with die newer ones. As to what constitutes fiction, as opposed to non- 
fiction, that is a more complicated question that I am unable to pronounce on but one which die 
novel itself is developing and continually questioning in new and interesting kinds of texts.
Section II: Fiction and History 
As the shifting perceptions of power in die contemporary American novel are, or at 
least I take them to be, directly related to the historical changes that have taken place since the 
Second World War, it behooves me in die second section of this Introduction to examine 
briefly some of the ways in which a novel is taken to be related to the historical period in 
which it is produced. I use die word “produced” to a purpose. Although novels are of course 
written by individual men and women, they, like other works of art—and being preeminently 
socially, even topically, oriented, perhaps even more so--are not often thought any more to be 
creations ex nihilo of transcendent individual genius (“...the long-since counterfeit wealth of
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creative personality,” as Walter Benjamin puts it, 232) but conceived of to a great extent as 
social productions.1 Canonical literary texts, for example, are in circulation through die 
power of certain institutions, like education, law, and the publishing and advertising busi­
nesses. The literary artist does not work in isolation from society or outside of history, even 
though, like Thomas Pynchon, he may be a total recluse, nor can literary works be easily iso­
lated from other kinds of texts. It follows that hard and clear distinctions between text and 
context cannot always be maintained (Greenblatt and Gunn 3-4).
Hie problem, then, to put it initially in die most general terms, is how fiction relates to 
“real life” (and putting tentative quotation marks round that phrase illustrates the questioning 
of die traditional distinction between reality and representation). Does art, as they used to 
say, imitate life, or, as Oscar Wilde proposed and the Elizabethans seem to have recognized, 
does life imitate art? Or, as a postmodernist tendency would have it, is die distinction irrele­
vant in a world now dominated by representations? Philip Roth lamented in the name of those 
novelists working in realist modes how contemporary reality constantly outstrips fiction in the 
invention of the outrageous. American reality, he said, is “a kind of embarrassment to one’s 
own meager imaginatioa” For example, if Richard Nixon had not happened, he asked, could 
anyone have imagined him? (Roth 34). Roth cannot mean reality in the sense of unstructured 
events, or even data occurring in time, but die narratively structured and spatially organized 
“reality” presented in die media, a reality that is (in more than one sense) “mediated” What 
Roth seems to be lamenting, therefore, is how difficult it is to produce imaginative texts that 
can credibly compete with factual ones. In such circumstances, it is justifiable to suppose that 
despite the continuing vitality of realist modes in fiction, many novelists have simply stopped 
trying to compete, have given up any pretense at replicating contemporary experience and re­
sorted to the fictional “strategies” usually known as postmodernist: intricate language games, 
metafiction, rewritten classics, weird points-of-view, mixed genres, a penchant for fantasy, 
science fiction, and so forth (cf Patricia Waugh).
The problem of what novelists (theoretically) do still remains, however: What is die 
relation between life and art, or, as it is posed in the contemporary jargon, between world and 
text? From its beginnings, the novel has been both worldly and fictional, ambivalent about its 
(meta)fictional status (Davis 225). Don Quixote, to cite a familiar, even hackneyed example, 
is a parody of even older fictions of knight-errantry. Parodies and stylizations of established 
genres occur throughout the history of die novel, even when that history is stretched, as it is by 
Mikhail Bakhtin, all the way back to antiquity (“Prehistory ofNovelistic Discourse”). On its 
side, Bakhtin says, the novel has even “novelized” other genres, giving them an indeterminacy, 
a contact with “unfinished, still-evolving contemporary reality (the open-ended present)” 
(“Epic and Novel” 6-7). Conversely, early novels often used documentary materials to give 
the fiction authenticity; Robinson Crusoe, for example, is said to be based on the real-life ex­
perience of a marooned Scottish sailor. As Bakhtin explains, since die novel is “constructed 
in a zone of contact with the incomplete events of a particular present,” it often crosses the 
boundaries of strictly fictional literature, employing, for example, letters, diaries, moral con­
fessions, philosophical tracts, political manifestoes— in other words, non-literary literature 
(33).
Hie precise nature of die contact of the novel with an “incomplete present,” however, 
remains somewhat vague. The connection used to be thought of as specular, as older theories 
about Realism sought to explain the emergence of that kind of fiction. Whatever the merits of 
classical Realism in practice, and they are undoubtedly great, a theory of fiction that perceives
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the novel as representing life “as it is” now hardly seems possible, if it has seemed possible 
for some time. Hie desire of modernist aesthetics, for example, to go beyond the surface data 
of classical Realism, to express an interior experience closer to what was felt as a “truer” 
reality, the lived subjective experience of the self, meant the rejection of a naive realist meta­
physic. In a recent version of the anti-realist argument, Robert Scholes explains that it is be­
cause life can no longer be recorded that realism, presumably even die newer “psychological 
realism” of the modernist aesthetic, is dead. One cannot imitate die world (how, indeed, 
would that be ontologically possible?), only construct versions of it: “There is no mimesis, 
only poesis,” Scholes says (‘Tictional Criticism” 8), the theory that is now identifiable as 
“postmodernist,” of which more in a later chapter. Yet, this does not dispose of the problem, 
for what after all would constitute a “version”? Even Scholes’s formula seems to imply 
some metaphysically distinct world that fictional versions would somehow relate to.
It may well be that, in relating metaphysically distinct entities, one cannot but select die 
most aesthetically pleasing metaphor (not, that is, the “most precise” one, since that would 
again imply a knowledge of die essence of the two entities for which the metaphor is supposed 
to be die link). How can reality be understood except by comparing one thing to another? 
(Hayles 99). As Richard Roily puts it, “...the world does not provide us with any criterion of 
choice between alternative metaphors...we only compare languages or metaphors with one 
another, not with something beyond language called ‘fact’” (20). For its part, what the novel 
often does, according to Bakhtin, is offer a variety of languages that either compete or enter 
into something like a conversation with each other.
In theoretical discussions of the world-text relation, it is seen that a number of meta­
phors are commonly employed that suggest a wide range of experience: “portray” (painting,
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photography), “imitate” (acting, mimicry), “reflect” (optics), “interact with” (psychology). 
Even the terms I have been using, “relate to,” or most problematic, “represent” may be other 
occluded metaphors. Indeed, the metaphorical relation itself suggests the world-text relation. 
There is in both a relation of identification, with formal and semantic components. The meta­
phorical relation, however, is between distinct categories within language, while the world- 
text relation is between wholly different ontological levels of experience.
It might be useful to look for a moment at the notion of representation. As one might ex­
pect in a period which rejected the older Realism, the representation of events (Scholes’s 
mimesis) has not been aesthetically obligatory since the advent of modernism This has been 
known, according to Hans Robert Jauss, since the Russian Formalists, and he cites especially 
Victor Shklovsky’s theory of “deautomization,” in which die chain of habitual associations is 
broken by die form, freeing art from die classical function of mere recognition of things (173, 
a  49). Jauss adds that the substantialist metaphysics, or knowledge of essences, underlying 
the representational theory has also become obsolete. Shklovsky’s narrative poetics, for that 
matter, posits a sequence of narrative events (fabula) “behind” the discursive text, which does 
not imply any metaphysical relation between the sequence of events and real events but does 
suggest that the first term is merely hypothetical, in that one always has a presentation (i.e. a 
re-presentation of the fabula, in Shklovsky’s theory) rather than a representation (mimesis). 
That is to say, one always has a “version” which is, in literature, the text The problem is 
again that using a term like “version” suggests something that is a variation or illustration of 
something else beyond itself
Contemporary theories, as Scholes affirms, will have no truck with mimesis. Linda 
Hutcheon even defines postmodernism as a critique of representation as reflective of reality
rather than as constitutive of it (18). Roland Barthes says that to depict is not to copy from 
nature but from one code to another. Realism is therefore a “secondary mimesis,” since it 
“consists not in copying the real but in copying a (depicted) copy” (S/Z 55). Lennard Davis 
maintains that novels “depict” life as it is represented by ideology, where ideology is taken in 
the contemporary sense of how culture represents itself to itself, making what is cultural (i.e. 
historically constituted) “natural” (Davis 24; Hutcheon 49). Representation reappears in 
these formulations, but with a difference: it does not reflect some distinct reality in a neutral 
way but is the veiy stuff of reality and is far from being innocently neutral. A number of theo­
rists have insisted that realism functions ideologically, offering itself as a neutral reflection of 
the world (Saldivar 521). To adapt a phrase from Roland Barthes, “where politics begins is 
where imitation ceases” (Barthes 154).
Postmodernist theories of representation are often derived from or owe something to 
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction theory, which concerns itself with “demystifying” or expos­
ing ideologically naturalized, or unconscious, dichotomies in Western thought, a vice he says 
goes back to Plato but is even less subtle and critical in Saussure. For Derrida, metaphysics is 
binary thinking and he wants to challenge such naturalized oppositions as external/internal, 
image/reality, and representation/presence, by showing how the axes function to ratify the 
centrality of a dominant term by marginalizing an inessential one (Derrida 33; Jameson,
Pot. Uncons. 114). Thus, in Saussure, the image is excluded without damage from reality, and 
speech is valued over the representation of writing as embodying an overvalued metaphysical 
notion of presence. For Derrida, language is “differential,” registering both difference and 
deferral, without simple presence or absolute reference.
Further repudiation of replication models in fiction can be seen in the preference in 
critical discourse for the terms “fiction” and “text” over “woric“ and “novel” that I have noted 
above (sec.Ie), which indicates a critical change of focus from the signified to the process of 
signification (Greenbiait & Gunn 3). One is reminded of John Barth’s contention in “the Lit­
erature of Exhaustion” that contemporary fiction has been “exhausted,” its content in fact emp­
tied of novelty, so that literary texts are no longer created but are rather reworked In this 
case, this new work is not a transcription of something outside itself but a production and, as 
such, tending to negate a  static or passive theory of simple reflection, since representations, 
like meanings, are not fixed but somewhat fluid in the interactive dynamics of social use 
through time. Finally, the reflective theory has been further undermined, as suggested above, 
by deconstructive theories that have cast doubt on the ontological categories on which mimetic 
theories ultimately depend. Fictional narratives in this view do not mirror what happens or 
merely recount changes of state; they explore what can happen, and they constitute and inter­
pret these changes (Prince 60).
To write, Raymond Federman says, is to produce meaning, not to reproduce an already 
existing meaning, a statement that recalls rather closely Richard Rorty’s two kinds of philoso­
phy: that which attempts to represent or express what is already there, some posited world, 
and that which attempts to make something new, undreamed of before (13). Rorty says he 
prefers the second: we don’t need any more theories to explain the world, as we have enough 
of those already and all are somehow inadequate, but we do need “narratives which connect 
the present with the past” and with utopian futures (xvi)— in short, histories and novels. Fed­
erman goes beyond Barth in insisting that novels, die verbal tissues of a newly created reality, 
are not even the re-creation of older texts, as Barth would have it, but “an autonomous reality
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whose only relationship with the real world is to improve that world” (8). Although Federman 
seems to be talking about a certain kind of postmodern novel (“surfiction”), his basic notion 
that the novel.invents its own reality becomes, paradoxically, a return to the modernist aes­
thetic of the artist as supreme creator and art as an autonomous, unconditioned sphere (Connor 
116).
If Federman’s statement were true of any novel, fiction would be cut loose from a 
ground in any other reality but its own language. This dilemma is rather like “coherence” 
theories of truth in analytic philosophy, which, rejecting die “correspondence” of propositions 
with facts (mimetic realism, in our terms), claim that what constitutes truth is merely the co­
herence of propositions with one another. Yet, there may be a number of systems, of, say, ge­
ometry, each of which may consist of coherent propositions but all of which cannot be true of 
die world At some point, die cohering propositions must have a relation to something outside 
themselves (Hospers 116-17). Language is not mathematics, in any case. It does not spring 
whole, like Athena, from the writer’s brain but is learned and employed in highly specific 
social contexts. Whatever claims of autonomy it has within a consciously structured text, it 
cannot wholly escape “correspondences” with the world, even if the notion of correspondence 
is yet one more metaphor.
Federman’s statement also recalls the older notion of moral criticism: of literature as 
an “improvement” on life. Yet, one might take a clue from E.D. Hirsch Jr., who thinks that al­
though life’s mysteries remain mysterious, fictions which we know to be artificial and arbi­
trary offer a respite from uncertainty and incoherence. One can think of a number of contem- 
porary fictions that give no respite whatever from uncertainly and incoherence, but Hirsch’s 
suggestion makes it possible to take Federman’s meaning not as the moral improvement of
Leavisite criticism, but improvement as a kind of tidying up of the anarchy of experience, a 
necessary restructuring of the world so that it can be understood, or even a making of connec­
tions of past, present, and future, in Rorty’s sense.
Marxist critics understandably reject any “free-floating” interpretation of the text, such 
as Federman’s statement suggests, in favor of die text’s relationship with some context or 
ground in the material world, which in the more sophisticated versions means the socially ne­
gotiated world (cf note 1). For Frederic Jameson, the problem is whether texts replicate die 
ground ideologically in a “political unconscious” or have some autonomous force in which 
they can be seen as negating the context (Pol. Uncons. 38). The terms of argument have been 
shifted here by moving the autonomous force of the text toward either a reinforcement of the 
status quo or a genuinely subversive potential. I have already discussed in Section I Brook 
Thomas’s idea of fiction as a construction of possible worlds, which would make it poten­
tially critical of real ones. Herbert Marcuse (48), similarly, has said that the norms of the or­
der of art are not those of reality but of its negation, not an idealist negation, but die power of 
the imagination to question the status quo in its proposal of alternative worlds (48). But 
Jameson’s question raises the alternative possibilities of a textual “replication” or negation of 
the ideological subtext This seems to agree with Lennard Davis’s view of fiction (cited 
above) as life depicted as it is represented by ideology, and would leave open possibilities 
for either the de-mystification or an even more subtle and insidious mystification of reality. 
Literature appears in what Raymond Williams calls “the emergent sector of culture,” that is, 
that which embodies new meanings and values, but it can also be a “residual” product whose 
values belong to and (sometimes unconsciously) seek to preserve values whose time has 
passed (“Problems” 44-45). It cannot in any case be seen as neutral. It may feign neutrality
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but it is “the lack of neutrality that inheres in every human decision, even the decision to re­
main neutral” (Budick 6-7). Thai there are these alternative possibilities becomes clear 
enough when one turns to specific novels, but there is a third possibility as well, that a given 
text may, unconsciously, both affirm and negate the ground, which Jameson himself explores 
with considerable critical sophistication in The Political Unconscious (1981), a work that 
places the ideology of modernism in histoiy (Donongho 179). For Jameson, even form and 
style are encodings of a materialist history, die economic mode of production and its social 
relations (Donongho 179)
Referring to Richard Goddens’ Fictions o f Capital (1990), John Whalen-Bridge, in 
another variation of this argument, says that writers may create both “symptoms” and 
“doctors.” A novel may exemplify symptoms (i.e. of social ills) when it promotes 
“reification,” while a diagnostic novel demystifies capitalist ideology (195). In certain cases, 
Jameson (and Marcuse) would not seem to be in disagreement with Federman after all. Fic­
tional texts may in some cases, and may not in others, “improve” the world (in this radical 
perspective) in their potential to expose (“unmask” seems to be the favorite critical term) “the 
rhetorical and political nature of all writing about human experience, ‘fictional’ or 
‘historical’” (Elliott, Gen.Introd, Col.Lit. Hist, o f US, xviii). As Foucault says, discourse can 
be both an instrument and effect of power but also a hindrance and point of resistance to it: 
“Discourse transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes 
it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart if’ (Hist, o f Sexuality \  100-101). In any 
case, literary like other kinds of texts “constitute a society’s ideological practice” (Kavanaugh 
319).
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Fictional differ from non-fictional texts that are explicitly critical perhaps in their effort 
at both a wider and deeper level of understanding, a level which engages emotional and 
imaginative responses as well as rational ones. In trying to explain, for example, why novel­
ists are often reluctant to discuss their work critically, Don DeLillo said: “If you’re able to 
be straightforward and penetrating about this invention of yours, it’s almost as though you’re 
saying it wasn’t altogether necessary. Hie sources weren’t deep enough” (“Interview,” Le- 
Clair 20). This greater effort at a more complete meaning, responses to more than a rational 
argument, is also, of course, what both makes fictional texts difficult to interpret and brings on 
all the arguments about whether such-and-such a work is reactionary or subversive. It may 
well be both.
The complex and politically ambivalent way that such a critique can function may be 
briefly illustrated with respect to one of my favorite fictions. Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, a 
book that librarians find hard to classify (political novel, fantastic fiction, children’s fable, 
non-fictional satire, all of the above?). To take only Book I (the Voyage to Liliiput), one can 
see Swift attempting to reproduce a fantastic though recognizably contemporary (i.e. 18th 
century English) society by means of apolitical allegory: Whigs and Tories, French and Eng­
lish, Catholics and Protestants, etc. In his historico-fictional construction, he also attempts to 
expose the social falsity, bad faith, and political short-sightedness of a society through exag­
geration, parody, caricature, telling juxtapositions, and other satirical devices, as well as the 
gross reduction of scale in which “little people” show how small their vision really is. The 
text, that is, attempts to “negate” the posited historical world in the process of making it ri­
diculous. At die same time, die text ironically entertains (and inconspicuously inserts) some 
alternative possibilities that Swift evidently wishes to suggest in all seriousness, a method he
also employs to great effect in his pseudo-reformist essay, “A Modest Proposal.” A fictional 
world that is parallel to the historical world is therefore constructed, negated, and recon­
structed: a “production” in literal and figurative senses, which simultaneously negates and 
affirms its context, although with an affirmation/negation that is not to be directly identified 
with Swift’s Tory political sympathies and the ineptitude of the Whig government he is satiriz­
ing. Hie work is a prime example of Brook Thomas’s proposal of how fiction can provide a 
space in which social transformation can be played out
Returning to the question of fictional-historical correspondence in realist texts, one 
might mention Terry Eagleton’s updated theory of literary realism, in which realism does not 
create texts that refer to real objects but rather “displays particular modes of signification 
which entail a greater foregrounding of the ‘pseudo-real’,” or the signifiers within die text 
Hie imaginary object in die text is not comparable to areal object, for it exists as a represen­
tational process that signifies not die object but ways in which a particular period signifies the 
object (Criticism and Ideology 64-99). Other, non-Marxist, radical theories would seem to 
sever the text from any real ground. In Jean Beaudrillard’s theory of simulacra, the sign as 
representation goes through four stages, from reflecting reality, to masking reality, to masking 
the absence of reality, to becoming, finally, a simulacrum with no connection to reality at all— 
a perfect copy of something that does not exist (“Simulacra” 170-71). Such theories leave, 
with the disappearance of the referent, free-floating signifiers and the resulting gap between 
work and world that make it difficult to see how the two realms of being can ever be bridged. 
At this point, one might offer another metaphor for the world-text relation: an ontology of lines 
running parallel to each other, distinct but inseparable, or better, since parallel lines never 
meet, waves that intersect at certain points, affecting each other in a constant interaction.
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Historical reality breaks into fiction, helping to bring it into being through content and context, 
while fiction is often a model text for historical experience.
Williams says that Marx himself noted that materialism had failed to see that reality 
was not to be understood merely as an object of thought but as “sensuous human activity or 
practice” (qtd. in Marx, and Lit. 30). Language, Williams argues, should have been associ­
ated with this emphasis on practice, what I have called above the interaction of social use 
through time, but instead the idea of activity was projected by thinkers on to either the idea of 
language as self-creative but separate from a (subsequent) social practice (i.e. Hegelian ideal­
ism), or to an abstracted “creative individual” (i.e. Romanticism) (Williams, Marx, and Lit. 
30-2). Williams says that Bakhtin took die strong points of these two tendencies, incomplete 
in themselves: language as activity, from idealism, and language as system, from the objectiv- 
ist linguistics developed in response to the idea of a purely individual creation of meaning. 
Signs are die products of die activity of speech between real individuals, but, crucially, not 
just past or fixed products, as in language system accounts, but part of a process of individuals 
in ongoing social relationships. Language is therefore not a reflection of material reality but 
(in Williams’ formulation) “a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world,” or “a 
constitutive element of material social practice” (37-8, his italics; 165).
Bakhtin introduces die concept of “chronotope” (lit time-space, in which neither is 
privileged) as “an optic for reading texts as x-rays of die forces at work in die culture system 
from which they spring” (Holquist 425): “Out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which 
serve as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and created chronotopes of the 
world represented in the work (in die text)” (Bakhtin, “Forms” 253, his emphasis). Emphasiz­
ing the creative aspect of fictional worlds, Bakhtin steers a middle course. The represented
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world must not be confused with the world outside the text, as in the false correspondence of 
naive realism, and yet the two worlds are not so radically separate either, since they "find 
themselves in continual mutual interactioa” Their points of intersection are perhaps less like 
the lifeless schema of intersecting waves I have proposed above than (in Bakhtin’s suggestive 
metaphor) like a living organism that neither fuses with its environment nor can live outside it. 
Hie work enters and enriches the world as a text commenting on the world, and die world en­
ters and enriches the work as part both of its process of creation and its subsequent life “in a 
continual renewing of the work through the creative perception of its listeners and readers” 
(254). Hie novel is the only genre that is still developing—the others being more or less fixed 
in the tradition of their histories-and only that which is developing can comprehend devel­
opment as a process. From the point of view of reception, Jauss also argues that literature is 
not a static object but interpreted anew by readers at different times. It has therefore a dia­
logic character with the reader seeking to complete his knowledge of the object “as a moment 
of new understanding” (Jauss 165-66). Hie experience of reading, he says, can liberate one 
from the “prejudices and predicaments of a lived praxis in that it compels one to a new per­
ception of things” (180).
‘Texts are worldly,” Edward Said says, since “to some degree they are events and, 
even when they appear to deity it, they are nevertheless apart of the social world, human life, 
and, of course, the historical moments in which they are located and interpreted” (Adam and 
Searle 607). Said goes on to point to another direction where text and world intersect, litera­
ture as commodity production: “Hie realities of power and authority—as well as the resis- 
tances-are die realities that make texts possible” (Ibid.). Literary texts as both events and 
products are produced by their historical moment but also add something to that moment that
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was not there before.2 As social productions, products plus events, they are not complete in 
themselves, as Jauss suggests, but come to a fullness of meaning, which may never be total, in 
the course of their readings. History can be said to exercise its influence even on what may be 
considered the personal element of style.
Hiis theory of language in and of the world is not identical wife but ties in with theories 
of literature that see not a  world to be reflected but mediated through language, with mediation 
in Jameson’s sense of “transcoding,” the process of articulating two different structural levels 
of reality (Pol. Uncon. 40). Text and material reality for Bakhtin and Jameson don’t have a 
direct connection but are mediated by an already existing ideological world of discourse. Hie 
text does not refer but is a mediated version of a world that has already been textualized 
ideologically. As Jameson puts it, we do not confront a text as a “thing-in-itself ’ but as 'the 
always-already-read,” even when it is new, for then we read it through “sedimented” habits 
and categories developed by inherited traditions of interpretation (9). This implies both that 
texts are not totally new creations and feat we have no direct access to reality (a notion famil­
iar in philosophy since Kant). Hie text is, as it were, twice removed, since it is a text that 
comments on another text, although the text it comments on is of a different semiotic order.
And yet this “new” text is not severed either from fee “old” text, or context, since the dis­
courses feat fee literary text is related to are socially and historically grounded (Stam- 
Burgoyne 217).
Bakhtin also theorizes fee novel as both critical and self-critical discourse. Like Witt­
genstein, he denies fee abstract essentiality of language. Power attempts to centralize lan­
guage in dominant and exclusive forms. In literature, by contrast, this tendency is subverted 
by fee now famous concept of fee “dialogic” of multiple voices (Bakhtin, Problems 87-113;
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Connor 203). The dominant discourse of a given culture is “reflected as more or less 
bounded, typical and characteristic of a particular era, aging, dying, ripe for change and re­
newal” (Bakhtin, “Prehistory” 60), while the “evolving heteroglossia” of the novel represents 
the culture in all its fullness, in which language is transformed from an “impermeable mono- 
glossia” into “a working hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality” (61). Novel- 
istic discourse, furthermore, both represents and is represented; it always criticizes itself in a 
system of languages that “mutually and ideologically interanimate each other” (47).
Through some such contextual approach, it becomes possible to re-write the life-world 
(which seems to be die new word for reality), unknowable in its unstructured state, as history, 
thus reducing the original problem, though not its difficulty, to entities on a similar ontological 
plane, writing as representation in history and fiction. Williams’s, Bakhtin’s, and Jameson’s 
theories may be called “historicizing,” but die tendency at least is not absent in either neo- 
realist or radical separatist theories. Eagleton, for example, argues that objects are histori­
cally signified through die period, and Beaudrillard’s four stages must be not an ontological 
but an historical process, in which he is talking about a progression in representation from 
realism to postmodernism.
There seems to be an emphasis in both current fiction and theory on the similarities of 
fact and fiction via the common vehicle of narrative in preference to the common-sense notion 
of a radical difference between what is somehow given as true and what is merely invented.
(It is worth remembering that die root word for both “fact” and “fiction is the Latin verb 
faceo, -ere, which means most generally “make” or “do,” neatly summarizing the two notions 
of construct and performance discussed above). Hie return to historical narrative, the so- 
called New Journalism, the common mix of historical and fictional characters, and the ambi­
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guities of real and invented historical documents in contemporary novels are some of the liter­
ary practices that illustrate this emphasis. Facts, as Williams usefully points out, are not the 
static, passive, disinterested and empirically available totality they are often taken to be 
(Problems 16), which, again, becomes clear as soon as one reflects on how facts become ac­
cessible, i.e. via some spoken, written, filmed or, more increasingly, electronically transmit­
ted text The whole question of the status of fact has been radically problematized: “A fact is 
a theoretically constituted proposition, supported by theoretically mediated evidence and put 
forward as part of a theoretical formulation of reality” (Mary Hawkesworth, qtd. in Easterlin 
& Riebling 64). And words, in this formulation, cannot be taken to be rooted in intention, ex­
perience [i.e. empiricism], or mind or, as Catherine Belsey says, “guaranteed by reason, sci­
ence or law,” but are “die material of ideology, produced in the interests of power, and open 
to contest in the interests of politic^’ (27).
The historiographer R.G. Collingwood, commenting on Hegel, noted that process in na­
ture is different from process in history because in the latter die historian re-enacts in his mind 
the motives of the agents whose actions he narrates. A succession of events is historical only 
when it constitutes actions whose motives can at least in principle be re-enacted (115). Hie 
historian, creator of a workable narrative, therefore transforms events into acts, giving “what 
happens” sequential structure and intelligible meaning. Hie authority of this historical account, 
therefore, depends on die persuasive power of the narrative to convince die reader of its truth; 
hence, it is, like fiction, “a rhetorical performance.” Jameson, who insists that history has a 
referent that is real and not merely imagined, admits, however, that it is only available in tex­
tual form. In his formulation, it can be approached by “passing through its prior textualiza- 
tions” to its function as die “absent cause” of social effects in the present, experienced as
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“Necessity”(35). His theory of the political unconscious in literature has its function in detect­
ing and restoring the repressed reality of the master-narrative (i.e. for him as Marxist, the 
history of the class-struggle).
Hayden White is the critic who has most insistently put forward the view that historians 
and novelists, the latter of whose productions are a fortiori rhetorical performances, have 
narrative in common though their referent is of a different order, since in fiction events are 
selected both from real life and from die imagination of the novelist, or some combination 
and/or transformation of both.3 The historian transforms, or better, translates events into 
facts; the context is, so to speak, in the text itselfj the historian’s own historical experience in­
scribed within it, which is why there are competing versions of the past There may be com­
mon agreement on facts, but that some historical representations are more acceptable or some­
how preferable to others has to do with the relationship between text and its producer and 
consumer, historian and readers. Beyond the narrative content, what is said to have happened 
and when, is die form, which can also be said to have a content, since form (like objective- 
type realist narrative) can give an appearance of reality. Why does the story seem real?,
White asks. The answer is to be found in die formal functions of the text, not the historian’s 
stated intentions: ‘I t  seems possible that the conviction of the historian that he has ‘found” the 
form of his narrative in the events themselves rather than imposed it upon them, in die way the 
poet does, is a result of a certain lack of linguistic self-consciousness which obscures the ex­
tent to which description of events already constitute interpretations of their nature” (Adams 
& Searle 404, his emphasis). A perception is “clarified by being cast in a figurative mode 
different from that in which it has come encoded by convention, authority, or custom” (405). 
The Aristotelian distinction between art and history, in which the former is the representation
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of the imaginable and the latter the representation of the actual gives way in this view to a 
recognition of their common constructed narrative ground.
hi fiction as well, the context is inscribed in the text, beyond the markers of time and 
place (whether “chronotopes” or “setting” in the older vocabulary), since communicative 
codes are shared by writer and reader. The difference between historical and fictional narra­
tives in White’s theory, is therefore not between real and imaginary, since reality is always 
interpreted, but in the codes used, die level of presentation, and die degree of self- 
consciousness. As Foucault says, the possibility exists “for fiction to work within truth, for a 
fictive discourse to induce effects of truth, and... that a true discourse engenders or ‘fabricates’ 
something that does not yet exist, that is, ‘fictions’ if’ (qtd. by Miller 211). History is, of 
course, not totally subjective since it deals with measurable, quantifiable events, but since it 
is made by a particular person at a particular time and place, it cannot be objective or 
“scientific,” although it may use scientific techniques. Historians that construct models and 
reject narratives do not avoid an ideological component; at some time the model must be 
applied and the historian will find in his model what he has put into it What is more to the 
point for the present purpose is that fiction is not totally subjective either, since it deals with 
aspects of reality (ideas and emotions, as well as events), but ones that are not susceptible to 
measurement, thus filling a gap that history leaves opea This is an especially important role 
for a country that has often believed that the separation from history was its true beginning 
(Lewis 5). To which one might add a remark attributed to Carlos Fuentes: “Literature is what 
history conceals, forgets, or mutilates.”
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NOTES
1 That is social, not material productions, since artistic or intellectual production is not the 
same thing as factory work or manual labor, a false homology developed by some Marxist 
theories (Jameson, Pol. Uncons. 45-46).
2 Stephen Connor, “Writing in History,” lecture given at Universidade de Sao Paulo, S. Jose 
do Rio Preto, January, 1993.
3 Much of the following account is based on a lecture given by Professor White at the Facul­
dade de Ciências Humanas, UFMG, in 1995, and my conversation with him at its end
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PART ONE - POWER AND SOCIETY
CHAPTER 1
THEORY OF POWER 
Section I  Definitions and Concepts
a.
I f  the word “power” has a great number of meanings, for the present purpose many of the 
technical definitions may be disregarded at die outset, although it is noteworthy, with respect to 
contemporary American literature, that the fantasy digression of “Byron the Bulb,” in Thomas 
Pynchon's important novel, Gravity's Rainbow (1973), actually manages to conflate electrical 
and political meanings of power (647-55). I shall generally ignore aspects of power that do not 
concern human beings as, for example, transcendental power in religion, referring to alleged ca­
pacities of the Deity or other spiritual beings to influence or affect man and nature.
A useful beginning might be made by looking at the five main clusters of meanings for 
“power” given in the Oxford English Dictionary. The first is “The ability to do or effect 
something or anything, or to act upon a person or thing”; the second offers as synonyms 
“strength, force, might,” which political theory carefully distinguishes from power, properly 
speaking; the third is die active property of inanimate things (like an herb or a ray); the fourth is 
control or command over others, with die s y n o n y m s  “dominion, rule, domination, sway, govern­
ment, influence, authority”; the fiflh is legal ability, capacity, or authority to act These 
definitions might all be summed up in the usual meaning of the Greek word for power, dynamis, 
the capability in one thing to produce change of some sort in another, which is broad enough to
include both human and non-human agencies. Except for the third, all the OED definitions imply 
human agency, so I shall concentrate on those.
The first OED definition correlates fairly closely to those given by some contempo­
rary theorists, such as Mario Stoppano, who says power is “the capability or possibility 
of acting, of producing effects” (973). Anthony Giddens says power is “the transforma­
tional capacity possessed by human beings, that is, fee capacity to intervene in a given set 
of events so as in some way to alter them” ( Nation-State, qtd. by Erlicle 378), which 
makes more explicit the bringing about of some alteration, only implied in the production 
of effects in die first definition. Raymond Aron says power is “the potential possessed by 
man or a group for establishing relationships with other men or other groups that accord 
with his own desires” (Aron 257), in which the alteration or effects to be brought about as 
a result of the desires of die newly fogged relationship is left implicit, but in which it is 
added that the desired changes are in die interest of one party to the possible detriment of 
another, the “zero-sum” problem.
What these various definitions have in common is, on the one hand, a causal relation, and, 
on the other, a capability, the capacity to act, something which can be applied or exercised if 
desired or thought necessary. The notion of capability can be seen in the noun for “power” in 
some languages, e.g. pouvoir in French,poder in Spanish and Portuguese, which as verbs mean 
“to be able.” A second meaning of the Greek word dynarms is die one Aristotle follows in the 
concept of that name which he develops in his Metaphysics: the potentiality in a  thing to pass 
from one state to another (Ross 173). Dynamis is thus potential that can be actualized, and it will 
be related to discussions of the difference between the possession and actual exercise of power. 
Both causality and potentiality are points I shall take up below.
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If one understands power specifically in social terms, that is, with respect to human beings 
and their diverse social interactions, which can be called “politics” in the broadest sense, power 
is further reduced to a set of meanings ranging from a general capability of acting, contained in 
the first OED definition, to such a capability coupled with the determination of some people to 
control or otherwise determine the behavior of others, implied in the first definition and made 
explicit in the fourth, that is, the power some human beings have or wield over others, with peo­
ple as both subject and object This notion would normally exclude the power of man over in­
animate tilings or over nature, since this kind of power is physical and technical in itself It is not 
difficult to see, however, that it could involve socio-political questions as well, for example, in 
the exploitation of natural resources, since the relevant technologies belong to the world of sci­
ence, business, and government, which constitute the public, political sphere (Stoppano 934).
With this stipulated emphasis on die socio-political, a number of theorists have pointed out 
diat the essential character of power is relational. One party (whether individual, group, 
institution, nation, etc.) exercises power over another. This may include even the kind of power 
one may say a person has over him- or herself^ for example, die determined ability to improve his 
or her mind or character, or some other (more trivial) pursuit, an aspect of power in terms of an 
ethics of self that has in fact been discussed at length by the contemporary theorist of power, 
Michel Foucault, in his later work.1 Foucault, however, emphasizes in his work on the “care of 
self’ (though not, as we shall see, elsewhere) the independent character of power over self, of an 
ethics that is a structure of existence “without any relation to die juridical per se, with an 
authoritarian system, with a disciplinajy structure” (“Genealogy of Ethics” 348). He points out 
that this is properly a Roman idea (i.e. Stoic, and, one might add, a modem one), for the Greeks 
felt that power over self was a necessary preliminary for the care of their companions and their
city. Indeed, the “preparation” of the self for, ultimately, socially beneficial purposes is, I think, 
the main thrust of Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethico-political theory.2
As for the last two definitions, the difference between them are both historically and theo­
retically important For the moment, I shall explore further the concept of power and some re­
lated terms, mainly as developed in the work of Robert Dahl, Mario Stoppano, and John Kenneth 
tfalbraitb.
b.
In his essay on power, Dahl refers what he calls “power terms” (power, authority, 
coercion, persuasion, force, etc.) to “subsets of relations among social units such that the 
behavior of one or more units (the responsive units, R) depend in some circumstances on the be­
havior of other units (the controlling units, C). Dahl is therefore concerned with behavioral con­
trol at all social levels. His essay has the merit of delineating some common elements in a num­
ber of modern analyses. He distinguishes, on one hand, the description of power features in a 
political system (dependent variables), and, on the other, the explanation for these features 
(independent variables). The descriptive features are: the magnitude, or amounts of power, of 
the C’s with respect to the R’s; the distribution of power among numbers, regions, social 
classes, and so forth; the scope or range of power, in that C’s may be powerful in one activity 
but relatively weak in another—a result of the tendency of power to specialization; and the do­
main or extension of power, the R’s over whom the C’s have control (“Power,” Lukes 37-58).
In his essay, Stoppano elaborates a scheme that he calls the “measurement” of power, since 
his emphasis is on quantity rather than descriptive features. Power may be measured (to continue 
with Dahl’s useful Controlling and Responsive units) by the probability that C will be obeyed, by 
the number of R’s subjected to C, by the sphere in which power is applicable, by the degree of
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modification R’s behavior undergoes, by the degree of restriction by C of R’s alternatives, and 
by costs for both C and R (Stoppano 939-40).3 It can be seen that there is some cotTelation be­
tween the two schemes; e.g.. the number and sphere correspond somewhat to Dahl’s distribution 
and domain, and the cost to one of Dahl’s explanatory features (seen below). What is readily 
apparent from either of these schemes is that detailed analyses of power in real social situations 
would be extraordinarily complex.
As for explanatory features of power, differences in resources, and how they are 
distributed, have been the most important for theories as historically and theoretically varied as 
those of Aristotle, the US Founding Fathers, and Marx and Engels. The most obvious resource is 
wealth and property, but resources may be of the most varied kinds, such as power (used to get 
more power), respect, moral standing, affection, well-being, skill, spiritual enlightenment, and 
different kinds of access and control, such as access to legality, control over employment, and 
both access to, and control over, sources of information and technology (Laswell and Kaplan 
87). 4 This last resource is especially important in the contemporary world wife the growing 
monopolization of information by multinational enterprises in “late capitalism” (Jameson, Fore- 
ward xiii).
Anthony Giddens has proposed two main categories of power resources, authoritative and 
allocative (qtd. in Erlicle 378-79). Allocative resources are economic, broadly speaking, and 
authoritative include many of the resources listed above. The major concentrations of power in 
modern societies may be said to be found in national states and in capitalism, which in turn can 
be seen as dependent on Giddens’ two kinds of resources: thus, the state depends on authority, 
since it must present itself and be accepted as legitimate, although as can be seen often in the 
historical survey, even legitimate authority seems to depend in the last instance on force.
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Furthermore, this authority is recognized only within the borders of the state. Relations between 
states, owing to the lack of both an international court of appeal and enforcing police power, are 
quite a different matter (Aron 271), as the war in former Yugoslavia has tragically shown. Capi­
talism depends on allocative or economic resources; it is in feet a theory and practice of making 
use of them, but in modern societies it also has an important role in maintaining political 
legitimacy as well, inso&r as it is eSfective, or widely regarded as being so. Here again, on ibe 
international level the situation is rather different, as capitalism tends to subvert national 
boundaries through the dynamics of capital “flow” and the ever-increasing power of multina­
tional corporations. Another, sociological meaning of power is therefore related to capitalist 
market forces, which are an example—perhaps the best example—of the “transformational ca­
pacity possessed by social structures” that may be independent of the will of individuals 
(Giddens, qtd. in Erlicle 378-79).
Other explanatory features that Dahl cites are: political or bureaucratic skill, emphasized 
by Machiavelli, which may explain why two C’s with the same resources exercise different de­
grees of power, motivation, in that one C may, for a determinate reason, use his resources and 
another choose not to (conversely, one R may respect C’s authority, while another challenges it); 
and costs, which is how much of Cs disposable resources he is willing to risk Costs will there­
fore include C’s motivation, while R’s interpretation of cost may motivate his resistance—which 
could in turn make C interpret his own costs as too high.
The causal nature of power relations has already been noted. Dahl argues that power is 
analogous to cause, even that power relations are a subset of causal relations (i.e. C has power 
over R = C’s behavior causes R’s behavior), which introduces related philosophical problems, 
such as necessary and sufficient conditions in causal and, by analogy, power relations. The
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problem of distinguishing cause from correlation carries over to the problem of distinguishing 
true from spurious power relations. Attempts to develop empirical theories of power therefore 
confront the problem of a causal chain, since additional variables can usually be inserted 
between supposedly directly related factors.5 Stoppano also argues for cause as an intermediate 
factor between C and R, but he thinks that since one is dealing with a social situation the relation 
between C’s and R’s behavior is not necessary but only probable. Therefore, C is not a 
necessary but a sufficient cause; that is to say, C’s action is sufficient to cause R’s behavior but 
not necessary to cause it, since R might behave that way for some other reason.. For similar rea­
sons, Stoppano calls attention to the particularity of this type of causal relation. C may cause R 
to behave in a certain way at a certain time but not necessarily in the same way at another time 
(Stoppano 935-36).
As for potential and actual aspects of power, Laswell and Kaplan make the important 
distinction between haying power and exercising it, which the OED definitions imply but do not 
make specific, and Aron also distinguishes between having the power (puissance) to do 
something and exercising the power (pouvoir) to do so. Thus, a man with a gun has the power to 
kill another without necessarily doing it (Aron 257). Whether or not he does so will depend on 
considerations of motivation and cost, but motivation (or the lack of it, as in this example) may 
not always be evident. Dahl posits the presence of a “manifest intention,” and Stoppano, 
similarly, an “intentionality,” to differentiate the actual exercise of power from its mere 
possessioa Stoppano says, however, that in die absence of manifest intention there may be 
“interest” on the part of C; that is, the consequent behavior of R may be of interest to C even 
when C does not always make his wishes explicit in an order or command. Dahl gives the ex­
ample of a ruler whose possession of power induces his subordinates to react in a certain way
without the ruler’s having actually ordered them to perform a specific action. By anticipating the 
ruler’s wishes, the subordinates seem paradoxically to have controlled him, if by their actions 
they have, say, elicited his favor. And yet it is clear that the ruler, merely by having the power, 
really controls the behavior of his subordinates, since in their attempt, successful or not, to an­
ticipate his decisions in their own favor, they have, in a sense, obeyed him. (Dahl, in Lukes 51- 
2). To give another example, a social environment may be so constituted that the repressed ele­
ments may continue to behave in ways the dominant group intends even when the latter is not di­
rectly commanding them on a day to day basis. Such continued behavior may indeed be the meas­
ure of their repression. Hie accurate prediction of another’s intentions is obviously crucial to 
many kinds of power relations, such as diplomacy and war, hence die importance ofbluff Being 
thought to have power that one de facto does not have may be as good as actually having it, since 
the other party will react as //one had it
If it is true enough that R’s behavior can be modified without C’s wishes being made ex­
plicit, as in Dahl’s example,6 it does not follow that R’s behavior cannot be modified without R 
himself being aware of it Manipulation, as in certain kinds of propaganda, is clearly part of the 
concept of power. Another distinction related to the actual exercise of power made by Stephen 
Lukes is that between active exercise in political decisions and the “passive acceptance of es­
tablished institutional powei^’ or the “mobilization of bias,” in which important issues may never 
reach the public realm, that is, the power of both overt decisions and of non-decisions (A  Radi­
cal View, qtd. in Erlicle 378-79).
Much thought has also been given to the means by which power is exercised. Broadly 
speaking, these can be reduced to coercion andpersuasion (Stoppano 938). On the international 
level, diplomacy as an alternative to war as a means of solving problems between nation-states
is a recognition that persuasion is often preferable to coercion (e.g. fewer costs), though 
powerful nations evidently use some combination of both. Many theorists, who have a 
predominately negative perception of power, prefer to speak of power only when coercion is 
employed, but (at least by the definitions examined) the will of C can be fulfilled, and the 
behavior of R can be altered, as much by persuasion and often to better effect, since persuasion 
normally implies consent Coercion implies the disposition to use brute force, at least as a last 
recourse since die mere threat of force may be sufficient to achieve the desired effect. Coercive 
measures may also include those which can be summarized as “applied pressure.” For example, 
C may exert pressure on R by threatening to deprive him of needed or desired resources, or to 
withdraw needed support (economic, political, military, etc.). Such a negative threat is certainly 
coercive and may be more effective than the threat of brute force. As Gerhard Lenski observed, 
force is tiie most effective means to seize power in a society but not very effective for retaining 
and exploiting it, as revolutionists soon discover. The reason is that it is both inefficient and 
costly (i.e. economically, as well as in Dahl’s sense of cost), so that large amounts of time, en­
ergy, and wealth are consumed in maintaining social control by force, and important values like 
loyalty and honor are lost to the rulers who employ it. Thus, it is in the interest of die rulers or 
ruling elite, Lenski says, to legitimize their power once all organized opposition to it has been 
neutralized. Force, that is, must be transformed so that might becomes right (244-47). The usual 
means for this transformation is ideological control, a form of persuasion that can be interpreted 
as coercive. In the most general terms, ideology simply means sets of ideas and the ways they 
are expressed and transmitted An (early) Marxist definition suggesting the coercive nature of 
ideology is “die system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or social 
group” (Althusser 239).
As is evident from this discussion, a major difficulty is that the line between persuasion 
and coercion is not always distinct Persuasion merely means that C changes R’s mind in order 
to alter his behavior, such as using a rational argument to convince him that taking the suggested 
step would actually be in his best interest R, if he takes the step, comes to the conclusion that it 
is actually better to have obeyed C lhan not Clearly, power has been exercised, since R’s behav­
ior has been modified by C, but can one say therefore that power is not, as Max Weber thought it 
was, always a question of conflict! Stoppano suggests a solution by differentiating the will of C 
and R at the beginning of the exercise of the power and at its end: at die beginning, there is a 
conflict, since R would act otherwise without C’s intervention, but not necessarily at the end, if R 
agrees with the outcome to die extent that he gives it greater value than if he had acted otherwise. 
On the other hand, R might remain dissatisfied or even humiliated by C’s imposition, so that a 
conflict of will remains even at die end. In this case, it is likely that coercion of some sort has 
been used. Whether conflict exists or not, therefore, is often a question of which means are em­
ployed in the exercise of power (Stoppano 939), and, since the parties are usually unequal, what 
resources are available to each.
R’s mind can also be changed by a positive inducement, such as the promise of some re­
ward. Again, is this persuasive or coercive? R’s acceptance of the reward may depend on his 
freely given consent, for example, in accepting payment for services rendered that C has solicited 
and R has agreed to perform despite initial unwillingness. In this case one can say that C has ex­
ercised power on R, since his will has been changed, but R has not been coerced, since he could 
in principle refuse. It is often the case, however, that R badly needs what is offered and, there 
existing such agreat difference of resources at R’s disposal in comparison with C’s, that R feels 
forced to accept C’s offer when he might not have done so if he had been in a better bargaining
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position. This kind of positive pressure, of “offering” something that is not likely to be refused, 
is clearly coercive, analogous to the negative pressure of the threat of withholding something.
The line between coercion and persuasion is even less well-defined in situations where 
persuasion is not open but insidious, as in certain kinds of propaganda, the manipulation of con­
sensus. Propaganda is often resorted to because of the higher costs of more open kinds of 
coercion, or as a complement to them. As Lenski observes, coercion is typically followed by 
attempts at persuasion, for “coercive power can often be used to create anew consensus.”
Again, as in the example of revolutions, force gives way to propaganda and die systematic instill­
ing of anew ideology (Lenski 248). The various means, subtle and not so subtle, by which power 
is employed are taken up by 20th century theorists, such as John Kenneth Galbraith.
Galbraith declares, in The Anatomy o f Power (1984), that he is concerned with what is 
often kept hidden in the exercise of corporate power. Galbraith’s emphasis is on what he calls 
“organizational power” in the contemporary world, following Weber’s perception of 
bureaucratic organization as both the means and the epitome of modern power. He says that while 
Weber’s general perception of power as the imposition of one’s will on another is generally ac­
cepted, very few theorists have discussed how that imposition is achieved This is not strictly ac­
curate, since Machiavelli, for one, wrote a handbook on the subject, and, recently Foucault has 
labored to delineate what he calls the “how” of power. Galbraith approaches the how-question 
through an analysis of what makes people submit to power (1-13). He proposes three 
“instruments”(means) for achieving submission, which he denominates condign, compensatory, 
and conditioned power. Condign power either inflicts or threatens painful or unpleasant 
consequences. Compensatory power, by contrast, induces compliance by promise of reward. 
These two types would seem to correspond to die negative and positive reinforcements of behav-
ioral psychology, or, to what I have referred to above as negative and positive forms of coercioa 
Most important for modern societies, Galbraith says, is conditioned power, which is exercised 
by changing belief and induced by persuasion, education, or some other insidious method. 
Conditioning thus corresponds somewhat to Gramscian ideological control and Foucaultian dis­
ciplinary power, since the crucial point about conditioning is that it is not recognized. Education 
is not an “innocent” form of conditioning in this view.7
Roughly corresponding to the three instruments are the three “sources” of power (i.e.
Dahl’s resources): personality, property or wealth, and, most important, organizatioa Personality 
is a quality of leadership that may include any personal quality, even brute strength (which Gal­
braith says still prevails in some situations, as in certain families) that confers power on an in­
dividual. Nowadays, personality is primarily related to conditioned power, as it constitutes a 
leader’s ability to persuade. Property or wealth is obviously connected with compensatory 
power, since submission may often simply be bought. Organization (which refers to both the 
Weberian process and its concrete result in an organization) employs conditioned power as its 
primary instrument, although an organization, such as a state, may clearly use condign and com­
pensatory power as well. The three instruments in fact occur in varied combinations, depending 
on die type of organizatioa For example, the power of a corporation to set prices, influence 
politicians, and manipulate consumers depends, Galbraith says, on its immense wealth but also to 
a great extent on how well these dubious practices are concealed, that is, on die conditioning 
implied in die capitalist ideology of free enterprise, the sovereignty of the consumer, and the im­
personality of the market The market, which is classically supposed to regulate corporations 
with its “impersonal” mechanisms, is to some extent an instrument of the corporations for 
achieving their aims (5-13).
The evil of conditioned power Galbraith explains as follows: “It is accepted as the reality 
by those who employ it, but then, as underlying circumstances change, the conditioning does not 
Since it is considered the reality, it conceals the new reality” (131, his emphasis). For example, 
in the shift from entrepreneur ownership to stockholder, the real state of affairs has been 
concealed in die myth of the individual as participant in the corporate process. Actually, 
corporate policies are decided entirely by management; stockholders remain passive recipients 
of both dividends and decisions. There is thus areal parallel between die (lack of) power of the 
corporate stockholder and of the citizen-voter in a modem democracy.
One more important difference in power in the US that Galbraith notes between past and 
present is the relation between corporations and die state. Formerly, these two great organiza­
tional powers were allies, which is now periiaps only the case with the military (Eisenhower’s 
“military-industrial complex”). The military is the supreme example of organization, which, as 
condign instrument of government policy and in compensatory alignment with corporate 
manufacture and development of technology, is a source of concern with its greatly increased ca­
pacity for devastation in war. Nowadays, however, with this important exception, government 
and corporations in the US are recognized as enemies, since other organizations, often hostile to 
corporate interests, now have access to government, and corporations perceive government 
regulation as restraining their profit-making activities (what is really behind Ronald Reagan’s 
pseudo-populist rhetoric of “get the government off the backs of die people”). Finally, the state 
has become a corporate power in its own right, with a vast increase in bureaucratic organization.
Section H. Two Views of Power
a. Weber
As stated in the Introduction, in the theories of power prior to our own century—and even in 
many of this centuiy—the primary focus has been on the state. More recent theories, while con­
tinuing to address issues related to the state, praxis at its loftiest level, have explored institutional 
and local levels of power in empirical studies (especially in the US), which seek to identify who 
actually wields power in a specified institution, locale, or situatioa This task, however, is often 
made difficult in die more complex organizations by the existence of occult powers, i.e. those 
who really make the decisions, which function parallel to those who officially hold power or 
who are thought to hold i t  The problem is, as Raymond Aron says, “up to what point die official 
distribution of authority and the effective division of power coincide or diverge” (263,272). 
Other theories, mainly following die work of Max Weber, have attempted to develop more ab­
stract schemes and general conceptions of power and domination that will work at both micro- 
and macro-levels.
For Weber, a power relation is one kind of “social relationship,” or situation where two 
or more parties (whether individuals or groups) take account of one another’s behavior in a 
meaningful way, but one in which there exists a “struggle,” wherein one party is concerned to 
make its will prevail against the resistance of the other (Weber, Basic Concepts 63,85). In this 
generalized conflictual relation, at least, the consent of the controlled party is not a consideration. 
As seen in the discussion in Section lb, however, persuasion may result in rational agreement and 
not necessarily be a hidden form of coercion. Stephen Lukes points out that the power relation 
need not imply conflict or resistance, since, first, power can be employed to avert or pre-empt 
resistance (though this merely means that an incipient struggle was crushed before it could be
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realized in action) and, second, that power can be the result of consensus or be exercised 
cooperatively (Introduction, Power 2). Hie problem is that a theory such as Weber’s is a mere 
formalization or abstraction; if one attempts to employ a concept applicable to all relationships 
of command and obedience in collective life, without considering the means of who commands 
and the feelings of who obeys, Aron says, one ends up merely with an ahistorical “interpersonal 
and dissymetrical relationship” (234-55). Weber’s definition of power, accordingly, a general 
basis for many that follow (as, for example, those given in Section la) is “the probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Basic Concepts 117). The 
phrase “being in a position to carry out his will” introduces into modern concepts of power what 
we have seen as capability or potential: A has power if it is probable he will be obeyed, as a 
commander with his troops; die commander exercises power when he gives the command and 
they obey it (Stoppano 936). As is appropriate for a thinker concerned with a social science he 
believes ought to deal with general notions (as in Ms theory of “ideal types”), Weber strives for 
abstract comprehensiveness in a definition whose core is die imposition of will and die 
overcoming (if necessary) of resistance to that imposition, which implies an ultimate resort to 
force, die focus of critical reactions to Weber’s theory.
Admitting that die notion of power is too “amorphous” to be useful scientifically, Weber 
rejects it in favor of the somewhat narrower concept of Herrschaft, which Aron translated as 
domination (Fr. and Engl.), “die opportunity to have a command of given specified content 
obeyed by a given group of persons.” Here, the possibility of imposing one’s will in die notion of 
power (.Macht) gives way to the fact of command; there is also a clearer perception of the rela­
tion between superior and subordinate (Aron 258). A second feature of domination, according to
Boudon and Bourricaud, is that the overall capacity of C is increased in some way, although they 
say that Weber does not make it clear whether C’s gain is in detriment of R (the so-called “zero 
sum” theory) or it can be attributed to their interaction (433-34).8 It is probable that both 
situations occur, at least in theory, as in die political relation between the citizens of a 
democratic country and their government. In any case, that the controlled element may sometimes 
benefit is evidently a feature of Weber’s thought
In opposition to the reductive role of economics in Marxism, Weber seeks to distinguish 
the irreducibly specific nature of political power. Politics for Weber is a social relationship 
characterized by the domination (Herrschaft) exercised by one or more men over others. He 
thinks that domination cannot be reduced to economic power, since the resources available do 
not completely determine the power available. One can, for example, buy the compliance of 
some people but not of all (Aron 255,261). For Weber, domination implies obedience, even if 
voluntarily contracted Modern democracies, since they are relations of this type, therefore imply 
obedience and politicians calling themselves “public servants” does not affect the character of 
their dominant positions, nor does the voluntary character of the social relationship affect 
dominant-subordinate positions: a worker, like a soldier, is subject to authority even though the 
woricer’s subjection is voluntary. As Aron comments, die term Herrshaft invokes the relation of 
master/servant rather than that of governor/governed. How obedience becomes duty, or force be­
comes law, leads to the question of authority and its legitimacy.
Like earlier political thinkers, Weber seeks an answer to the question of what constitutes 
legitimacy. He distinguishes domination from force and violence in the insistence that “all domi­
nation seeks to maintain a belief in its legitimacy” (qtd. in Boudon and Bourricaud 173). 
Authority may be roughly defined as the power plus the right to enforce obedience. Weber pro­
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poses three basic or “pure” types of legitimate (or, more accurately, legitimated) authority, add­
ing that an actual social situation may reflect some mixture of the three. Traditional authority 
achieves legitimacy through time-honored custom An example is the family or the church. Ra­
tional/legal authority is legitimized through its recognized efficiency at achieving goals. The su­
preme example is the modern bureaucratic state. Charismatic authority may be religious or 
secular; it is self-guaranteeing, resting on the devotion to an exceptional leader. An example is a 
hero or popular dictator, whose appeal may even override the other two types (Basic Concepts 
81). It follows that all forms of power do not have legitimate authority, tyranny, for example, 
depends on an unauthorized use of force. Economic power based on monopolistic position, 
where one party is in a position to dictate terms, is also a  form of coercion. Other kinds o f influ­
ence may be derived from some sort of personal superiority (e.g. “erotic attractiveness” or a gift 
for conversation are examples Weber gives) but are not thereby legitimate. Hie distinction be­
tween authority and influence seems to be a basic one. With authority, the power of position al­
lows one fee right to command; wife influence, personal or group resources enable one to exert 
pressure (Weber, Selections 61; Lenski 250).
Still, Weber’s typology does not always allow a clear understanding of the relation be­
tween force and legitimacy in maintaining systems of power (Boudon and Bourricaud 435). In 
connection wife domination, for example, Weber calls attention to fee importance of discipline, 
fee prompt and automatic obedience from people who have a “practiced orientation” towards a 
command. Discipline, whose major contemporary theorist is Foucault, points to subtler forms of 
domination feat work by fee active complicity on the part of fee obedient For Weber, however, 
the concept of discipline “hinges on fee belief by both sides in fee legitimacy of fee authority that 
exercises domination” (Secher, Introd. to Basic Concepts 20). In another text, Weber makes a
stronger case for the complicity of the subordinated, “a certain minimum of voluntary 
submission...an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience”
(Selections 59). Here, he emphasizes the subordinate’s advantage in obedience, which brings 
material or other rewards (“ulterior motives”) or which may rest on custom or affection, but 
strictly speaking, obedience for Weber implies a formal obligation without regard to the attitude 
of the obedient For purposes of classifying types of authority, therefore, Weber thinks that a dis­
tinction between “submission” and “sympathetic agreement” is not significant, but whether R 
obeys C out of resigned acquiescence or enthusiastic support surely always makes a difference to 
R, and often to C as well.
Power wielded by the state is distinguished by its claim to “the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.” Besides authorized force, the state for We­
ber was constituted by jurisdiction over a territory, authority, and bureaucracy (Basic Concepts 
122). Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy would also become the focus of many modern studies of 
power. Basically, administration, which is an apparatus of coordination, is required in modem 
corporate organizations, including the state, where there is domination over a great number of 
individuals. The more a state becomes a great power, the more bureaucratic it necessarily be­
comes (Boudon and Bourricaud 173; Weber, Selin Translation 347). Bureaucracy is the admin­
istrative apparatus of any kind of rational/legal domination. It developed historically, WTeber 
says, as die result of a perceived need for a large standing army and its financing, in the interests 
of national power-politics. In die modem state, the same process has come about economically, 
through the growing complexity of life and the increase of wealth available for use; an organized 
public provision arose for needs that were once unknown or provided for by private means. A 
modem political stimulus to bureaucratic development has been the perceived increasing need
for order and protection. From motives of power politics or ideology, the state usurps or is pres­
sured into taking over “social policies.” Finally, bureaucracy has developed for a number of 
technical reasons, mainly the increasing importance of transportation and communications (348- 
49).
Traditional power tends to be patriarchal, its administration depending on loyal servants 
rather than impersonal bureaucrats. Of course, it still exists in certain parts of the world, or even 
in certain regions of modern societies (like northeastern Brazil) but tends to give way to the legal 
and bureaucratic type as the society modernizes. Charismatic power is inherently unstable since 
it depends on the continued belief in the charismatic leader or the continued efficacy of a popular 
revelation. A good example of these features of charismatic power can be found in contemporary 
literature; Robert Coover’s The Origin o f  the Brunists (1966) is a novel that explores American 
evangelicalism and apocalyptic religious tendencies, as well as the more generalized mass ap­
peal and precarious hold on power of (he charismatic leader.
In contrast to charisma, bureaucracy is extremely stable due to fee development of a pro­
fessional class, a rigid hierarchy of superiors and subordinates whose functions are explicitly 
specified and who possess special competence for their tasks. The decisive reason for die ad­
vance of the bureaucratic organization over other types is because of the resulting technical effi­
ciency, a  consequence of calculable rules and the impersonal character of bureaucratic offices 
(Weber, Selections in Translation 348-49). What is often lamented about bureaucracies, their 
dehumanized character is, Weber says, precisely what makes them so effective. The impersonal 
character of bureaucracies excludes all that is irrational, all that resists calculation, which makes 
them ideal for capitalist enterprises, in which profit is the supreme motive (351). Weber 
emphasizes the machine-like character of bureaucracies, wherein both functionaries of the bu­
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reaucracy and those subject to it become like cogs in a machine, as the 1 after’s material fate be­
comes dependent on its steady functioning and the former becomes disciplined to its habitual and 
impersonal nature. The impersonal character mechanism means that it can work for anyone who 
controls it, which makes any revolution, or the creation of new types of authority, increasingly 
utopian, Weber says, especially because of a bureaucracy’s control of communications and its 
“internal rationalized structure.” Once established, therefore, it is one of the most difficult social 
structures to destroy, an instrument of power of the first order for those who control its orderly 
and methodical apparatus (Selections 68,73-5).
It has been observed by some theorists that control over subordinates is never total, since 
some kind of active compliance, a “dialectic of control,” is usually necessary if the relationship 
is not to be overly burdensome to both sides (“Power” 378-79). Weber’s contemporary, the neo- 
Kantian philosopher Georg Simmel, called attention to this character of power relations, which 
he says are too often thought of in overly “mechanical” terms, i.e. that the superordinate so domi­
nates the subordinate that the latter is deprived of all freedom, becoming a mere object or means 
to the former (Simmel 203-4). Even in the most oppressive situations of domination, the 
subordinate maintains a measure of personal freedom—except in die case of physical force, 
where domination over die subordinate may in fact be total. For Weber and Simmel, there is al­
ways “interaction,” or action mutually determined, although in situations of domination it is, of 
course, unequally determined. This interaction results, Simmel says, in a certain “spontaneity” 
allowed the subjected, even when die room for action has been severely limited. Conversely, the 
superordinate’s freedom is never complete, for “leaders are also led” (207). Hie subordinate is 
only an apparently wholly passive element insofar as he/she to some extent controls the dominant 
party, as can be seen with a teacher or public speaker, who, while nominally in control responds
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to the class or audience and is subtly modified by i t9 Even the law, which implies submission in 
a single direction, originally meant “contract ” (Roman lex) and so recognized that those subject 
to it are “contractors,” a recognized party in a binding relationship (209), a perception that 
would be expanded in Weber’s American disciple Talcott Parsons.
This give-and-take perception of the nature of power relations is opposed to the 
Hobbesian conception of power as having the means to achieve fiiture advantage, i.e. as 
something one party possesses. The essentially social character of power relations implied in 
Weber’s general definition requires another party that is induced to behave in the way the first or 
controlling party desires. If force is not the means chosen to induce the desired behavior, other 
means both coercive and persuasive may be employed, as we have seen, such as the use of a va­
riety of resources, but the various resources (wealth, prestige, etc.) are not all in the possession 
of the same people. Furthermore, as Aron points out, the “plurality of the domains” where power 
is exercised allows for reciprocity. Men are not “pure” subjects or objects of power, some may 
dominate in certain domains and be dominated in others (Aron 262).
If I may return at this point to the last two of the OED definitions of power given in section 
la, the difference between them is noteworthy. Hie fourth definition emphasizes control, 
influence, or some kind of domination over others, while the fifth explicitly mentions legal 
authority. As has been seen, power need not coincide with legally constituted authority (as in the 
various kinds of “influence”), although theorists like Parsons think that, properly speaking, it 
should. Parsons defines power positively, as a system resource, “the generalized capacity to se­
cure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization” 
where the obligations are legitimized and refer to collective goals (103). Parsons’s “consensus” 
concept of power is partly at odds with the conflictual model of his master. While power and
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authority are not quite equivalent in his theory, force is, he thinks, not power at all, and in any 
case should only be applied as a “negative sanction” in extreme cases, when the object is unduly 
recalcitrant, as with criminals. He does not accept the notion that force underlies all power rela­
tions, which he perceives rather as a system of “binding obligations,” a contractual relationship 
that depends like a currency on collective confidence. Parsons, therefore, rejects the Hobbesian 
tendency to treat power as the capacity to achieve ends without regard to the means employed or 
the authority invoked.
Parsons believes he has solved the problem of whether power is essentially coercion or 
persuasion: ‘I t  is both, precisely because it is a phenomenon which integrates a variety of fac­
tors and outputs of political effectiveness and is not to be identified wife any of them” (139) 
Power depends on authority, which depends on consensus, and is geared toward the attaining of 
collective goals. Lukes allies feat this exclusive dependence on authority and on a  value 
consensus feat can only be assumed creates a situation where only legitimated power is 
recognized as real and fee central problems of coercion and compulsion are thereby excluded 
(Lukes, Introd. 3). Also, Lebrun says, since an infraction will be punished, coercion is always 
present even for those who have never thought of contesting legitimacy (25-30). It is to fee point 
that Parsons translated Weber’s Herrsha.fi as “imperative control” which, as Aron says, 
obscures fee confrontation between who obeys and who commands in a system of imposed order 
or discipline, but which is more appropriate to Parson’s own theory (Aron 259).10
Like Parsons, fee German-bom American philosopher Hannah Arendt sees power in ena­
bling, positive terms, exercised for collective goals. IfHobbes’s notion of power made it seem 
to be something an individual could possess, Arendt argues extensively (e.g. in The Human 
Condition) to fee contrary, feat power does not belong to an individual—feat is the property of
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strength--but only to a plurality of men and women engaged in collective action.11 Power comes 
into being when men agree to join together for purposes of action and disappears when they dis­
perse. The “binding and promising” necessary for power to continue to exist requires people 
who through their mutual promises are already in the process of constituting a stable “"worldly5’ 
structure, which she thinks “may be the highest human faculty” (On Revolution 175). Although 
Arendt rejects Parson’s idea of power as a means, she too insists on the need for legitimacy:
“far from being the means to an end, [power] is actually the very condition enabling a group of 
people to think and act in terms of the means-end category...power needs no justification, being 
inherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy” (“Com. 
Power” 68).
By definition, therefore, Arendt rejects illegitimate power as power at all; what the tyrant 
exercises is violence, which she says is often confused with power. Hobbes thought that since no 
man is strong enough to dominate permanently, violence, a war of all against all, is die natural 
human condition. This is similar to Marx, in that the social order is the arbiter of public peace, 
but for Marx violence in not a natural state but characteristic of a society perverted by die mo­
nopoly of the means of production; its origin is not natural but social, and the struggle is not all 
against all but between classes. Nor is force necessarily violence, if the Hobbesian sovereign 
uses force as protection against violence, and if for Lenin the Party uses force, not violence, for 
die establishment of a legitimate system. Force, as Weber would say, can be the legitimate use of 
violence. Boudon and Bourricaud (following Machiavelli) think (hat violence can therefore be a 
resource of power. Every society is violent to die extent that force is not always regular and le­
gitimate, although a society reduced to violence is a contradiction in terms (610). Its use, 
however, depends on strategy, since it can be played (as in a bluff) to actually economize force,
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although they admit that it may have to be actually used on occasion to maintain credibility (605- 
7), a principle the American military well understands. For her part, Arendt argues that violence, 
being speechless, is essentially unpolitical. It depends on “instruments” and is ever likely to be 
resisted. It is therefore eventually self-defeating, when the resistance that will inevitably be 
called up causes a breakdown in authority: “Where commands are no longer obeyed, the means 
of violence are of no use... everything depends on the power behind the violence” (“Com. Power” 
66-67). Power can be destroyed by violence, as in tyranny; it can only be checked by power, 
“Montesquieu’s discovery” that “power arrests power” (On Rev. 151). This institutional solution 
therefore explicitly opposes the school of thought of Realpolitik, forged in the period following 
the French Revolution, which holds that the most successful means of political action are 
intrigues, lies, and violence (105).
Arendt’s theory is Weberian insofar as it attempts to establish a distinct political realm.
She argues that the social inequality (which, to be sure, is politically generated) that results in 
poverty and misery binds people to the realm of necessity. Revolutions have attempted to redress 
the social problem, to bring about anew socio-economic order, rather than change political 
structures, which she thinks should be revolution’s true aim. The Marxian “social question” was 
based on the ancient exploitation model of slavery, where a ruling class possessed of the means 
of violence could force a subject class to bear the burden of their labor. Reversing this 
relationship, Arendt thinks, will not abolish misery, which can only happen with the rise of tech­
nology. 12 Hatred of the masters or longing for liberation is ultimately “politically sterile,” just as 
mass violence as a form of rebellion is pre-political, since it is incapable of speech. People 
bound to As necessity of want are by definition not “free,” and free people are the only ones who 
can act in an actual public realm, which in a republic is constituted by the exchange of ideas and
opinions among equals (cf Foucault: ‘Tower is exercised only over free subjects and only so far 
as they are free,” qtd. in Dreyfus and Rabinow 201). As Montesquieu maintained, power and 
freedom belong together, for “conceptually speaking, political freedom did not reside in the I- 
will but the I-can” (On Rev. 150).
Arendt thinks that, of all revolutions, only the American Revolution was ultimately 
successful since it did not submit to the unleashed force of popular violence and subsequent reign 
of official terror precisely because the revolutionists understood that the central idea of 
revolution cannot be the liberation of the oppressed but die foundation of a body politic which 
can guarantee the “space where freedom can appear.” Freedom, or “public happiness” as it was 
known to the Founding Fathers, consists precisely in the citizens’ right of access to public power, 
a positive idea of freedom in contrast to die negative (classical liberal) notion that freedom is es­
sentially protection by the government for the pursuit of private ends (On Rev. 125-7). Arendt’s 
theory of collective public action would seem to be supported by the recent popular revolutions 
in Eastern Europe, where power was shown to be less a question of arms, i.e. violence, than of 
people acting collectively.13
b. Foucault
‘Tower is a positive thing..control a negative thing” -Woodrow Wilson 
Hie Marxist concept of hegemony has been undoubtedly useful for analyses of ruling class 
ideology, which is something so total that it goes beyond philosophy (“the ruling ideas of each 
age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class,” Marx and Engels 428), and becomes equivalent 
to common sense, corresponding to die reality of social experience. Ideology is a set of ideas and 
representations that serve to justify and explain the social order, the conditions of people’s lives 
and the relations they have with one another. As it develops out of the phenemonal (apparent or
66
surface level) forms of reality, which conceals and inverts the essence of social order, it is “false 
consciousness,” which implies that some ideologies are not false insofar as they do not invert es­
sence (Fiorin 28).
Social control in societies that do not resort to force depends on this assimilation of domi­
nant values, an assimilation that does not result from a common moral consensus shared by all 
classes of people, as some liberals would have us believe; rather, the class values legitimized in 
society are a function of institutional power, such as education, religion, and the press (Parkin 
81). Since the system of values and meanings in any society are not static and abstract but organ­
ized and lived as a social process, one must therefore understand how the system of values is 
assimilated, as, for example, in school curricula or in the current debates over the literary canon. 
Hie totality of the system, as Raymond Williams argues, can be seen in how opposition is incor­
porated. Whatever the internal variation of modes of opposition, they do not in practice go be­
yond the limits of die central effective definitions. For example, at the level of university 
philosophy, history, or literature courses, there is a selective tradition which is passed off as the 
tradition, or the significant past Some meanings are diluted or reinterpreted so as to support, or 
at least not contradict, the dominant culture; others are simply not perceived, or are perceived as 
harmless alternatives (Problems 37-44). The hegemony of the ruling class, which it must 
achieve to survive, therefore depends both on control of the state and, crucially to its continued 
success, through control of cultural institutions that guarantee an ideological homogeneity, such as 
the control of communications and information, which creates the possibility of a domination that 
begins in the inner consciousness. Dominant classes fortify themselves by not being able to be 
contested or questioned. Their hegemony consists of their power to define a situation or die al­
ternative as the only valid or even possible one (Guareschi 43).
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A somewhat different emphasis has been put on social control by Michel Foucault He has 
tried to think of power in new ways, for example, that power is not something to be possessed 
and used by someone and therefore external to the individual, as in so many classical theories, 
but is constitutive of the individual to begin with: “...the lesson of Foucault,” Umberto Eco ob­
served, “is that power is not something unitary that exists outside us” (4). Foucault says that 
history has studied those individuals and institutions that have held power but has neglected its 
“mechanisms” and “strategies” (Power/Knowledge 51) In his attempts to discover the 
connections between “mechanisms of coercion and elements of understanding,” he wants to erase 
the perception of powerful practices and institutions as an unquestioned given or historical ne­
cessity to show rather their contingency, the arbitrary quality of “games of truth” invented or 
constructed at given historical periods in specific situations (Miller 303-4).
hi his early works (the 1960s), Foucault rejected the essentialist, Platonic search for his­
torical origins, offering instead what he called “archeologies,” in which he examines the sets of 
discourses that condition what counts as knowledge, for example, of madness or clinical 
medicine, in a given epoch. He thinks that discourses and discursive practices can be articulated 
as the ‘‘unconsciousness of an age” (Cutting, “History of Madness” 63), indications and 
expressions of how people thought and acted. Such discourses and practices establish norms and 
rules but also controls and exclusions, determining what counts as true, or scientific, in a given 
period (Flynn 30). They are therefore social constructions with no privileged access to die truth 
(Cutting, “Introduction” 10-12).14 Subsequently, in works called “genealogies” (the 1970s), he 
shows the discontinuities and importance of randomness in historical events. The dispersed char­
acter of events and their multiplicity of explanations, levels of different types of events that differ 
in their capacity to produce effects, suggest that Foucault does not share the traditional historian’s
concern with reconstructing what happened but wants to write, as he claimed, “a history of the 
present.” The particularity of the genealogies tends to subvert, in what is thought of as the post­
modernist fashion, Lyotard’s “grand narratives” of inevitable progress, to diagnose problems 
(rather than causally explain), “to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use 
of this knowledge tactically today” (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 81; Flynn 44; Cutting, 
“Introduction” 14).
Foucault’s originality as a theorist of power is his break with the notion, which can be seen 
in all historical theories that power “consists in some substantive instance or agency of 
sovereignty” (Gordon, “Afterward” 235). To the consternation of some critics, he never defines 
power, being concerned not so much with what it is, its essence, or even the Marxist question of 
over whom it is held, as he is with how it is exercised (P/K 92). Like Nietzche, he understands 
power not as a  fixed quantity but a flux flowing through individuals and societies, bound up with 
habits, systems, and organizations (Miller 15). Its mechanisms are distributed along different 
centers and not unified at a single point, such as the state (Mohanty 33-34; Caputo 246), which is 
perhaps a reply to critics who have charged that his analysis, as such, does not make a normative 
distinction between oppressive and non-oppressive forms of power, although (it is conceded) his 
rhetoric implies one (Lukes, qtd. by Ingram 253, n.16). To be sure, in papers and interviews, 
Foucault explicitly discusses a kind of local opposition against the “totalizing nature” of power. 
He says where there is power, it is exercised, although no one is properly speaking its “title- 
holder”—^which is not to say it is not known who exploits, where the profit goes, etc. To force 
the information network, to designate the target, is a first inversion of power; the local, regional, 
and discontinuous theories being elaborated are the beginning of discovering how power is ex­
ercised. Since power relations are not localized at the level of the state, or between classes, but
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penetrate the depths of society, resistance does not consist in destroying the institutions or acquir 
ing control of the state apparatus but is fought out at points of confrontation and instability (DP 
27).
The role of the intellectual, for example, is in the order of knowledge and ‘"truth,” a local 
practice that struggles to make power “appear” and wound it where it is invisible and insidious 
(Microfisica 71,75-77), i.e. “not the uniform edifice of sovereignty,” but domination within 
“lateral” relations of power, “the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function 
within the social organism” (Caputo and Yount, “Institutions” 9; Foucault, P/K 96). In the 
“vaguer dominion” that Foucault says he investigates in the genealogies, as well, the point is to 
assemble and “make visible” in their strategic connections the discourses and discursive 
practices of institutions, which are not just fee sum of discourses formulated about an institution 
but the workings of the institution itself, including the unformulaied practices that ensure its func­
tioning and permanence (Microfisica 130; P/K 38). One thing that Foucault proposes, therefore, 
is what he has called “an insurrection of dominated knowledges” or what is below the level re­
quired by knowledge or science, the activation of local, non-legitimated knowledges against the 
unitary theoretical system that orders them hierarchically in fee name of a “true” knowledge, the 
centralizing effects of power connected to institutionalized scientific discourse (Microfisica 
169-71).
Foucault’s nominalism, noted in fee particularity of fee historical researches, doubtless ac­
counts for his surprising statement that “power does not exist,” by which it is presumably meant 
feat there is no essence as such but only particular relations of domination and control in specific 
social situations and under specific historical conditions (Flynn 34,39).15 In feet, Foucault 
wants to understand relations of power as something other than domination, as occurring in all
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relationships where one wishes to direct the behavior of another (cf section la). Since there can 
be no society without relations of power, Foucault, although his perception of it is far less benign 
than theirs, sees power, like Parsons, Arendt, and Galbraith, as positive and enabling as well as 
(potentially) repressive. The exercise of power in fact implies freedom; slavery is not the conse­
quence of power but force, constraint, and violence, since the slave’s range of possibilities are 
severely reduced. As John Caputo says, power and freedom contend, as it were, agonistically, 
with different strategies “winning” or “losing,” with victorious consolidation (one might say 
“hegemony”) on one side, or successful resistance on the other (54-55). Yet, Foucault does not 
search for causal or determining factors in the Marxist fashion, identifying domination with a 
certain class or mode of production; instead, he analyzes social, political, technical “conditions 
of possibility” to reconstruct a system of interlocking relations and effects that are contingently 
interconnected. Power relations are found at different levels, under different forms, and are not 
given once for all but are amenable to change, since total control over the other implies the ab­
sence of power (Gordon, “Afterward” 243; Bemauer and Rasmussen 12). Domination, by con­
trast, would occur when an individual or group was able to render relations of power invariable 
and irreversible by political, military, or economic means (Bemauer and Rasmussen 1-3,18;
P/K 119). In this case, liberation from a restricted state of freedom is the historical or political 
condition for the practice of liberty, a notion similar to Arendt’s, although such practices are ar­
ticulated not at a universal but local level. If power only functioned as a negation, if it were, as 
thinkers like Marcuse suppose, primarily repressive, people could not be brought to obey it so 
willingly. What makes it acceptable is that “it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no” 
(P/K 119). As opposed to the congealed situation of domination, therefore, Foucault rather per­
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ceives power as a complex “capillary” network of relations that are variable and reversible at 
different moments by varied strategies of resistance.
Although Foucault later insisted that his works were not, after all, analyses of the 
phenomena of power but were undertaken “to create a history of the different modes by which, in 
our own culture, human beings are made subjects” (qtd. in Rabinow, “Modem and Countermod­
em” 199), the centrality of power, especially in the genealogies of the middle works, is 
undeniable. In feet, one may take the “different modes” in the preceding statement to mean the 
means of domination (in the sense discussed in section la), and the way that “human beings are 
made subjects” to mean both how people are subjectified and how they are subjected These two 
meanings are perhaps not that far apart in the genealogies and they come together in the notion of 
“govemmentality,” which according to Arnold Davidson, has a double objective: first, to 
criticize current conceptions of power as a unitary system, and, second, to analyze it as “strategic 
relations between individuals and groups, relations whose strategies were to govern the conduct 
ofthose individuals” (118-19). Hie first objective offers an alternative model to the hierarchical 
one of a vertical descent from ruler or other higher-order truth (like Rousseau’s “will of the 
people”), ft is claimed that unitary power has given way with the development of a more 
fragmented and differentiated society to another horizontal type of power, “more ubiquitous, dif­
fuse, and corporealcirculating throughout all areas of social life (Ingram 220). Hie second 
objective is both ethical and political (ethics being “that component of morality that concerns the 
self s relation to sel£” including the construction of subjectivity) (Davidson 118). The 
individual recognition that his/her personal identity cannot be separated from the fate of 
humanity, both of which are historically constructed (Poster 71), would argue against a tendency 
to “psychologize” individual identity. The abstract conception of who we are, determined ideo­
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logically—and economically—by the state, must be resisted, Foucault thinks, in one way by new 
forms of subjectivity; hence, the ethical becomes political. The power that institutions have over 
people comes in a large part from their ability to deny them their individuality. This is clearly 
seen in the practices and procedures of bureaucratic or military organizations, prisons, hospitals, 
and even schools. Foucault wants to keep the question of identity open and prevent the 
administrators and managers of various kinds from constituting an identity for individuals that 
becomes an historically contingent constraint (Dreyfus and Rabinow 212-16; Caputo 250).
As a result of this conception of political struggle as a “politics of ourselves,” ethics (as 
defined above) becomes central in the late works (the 1980s). Disciplinary techniques, which 
Foucault describes and documents so thoroughly in the genealogies of power, are applied to the 
self to create anew sel£ an aesthetization of ethics found, for example, in the ancient Stoics, a 
process he evidently admires. The crucial difference is that in this sense discipline is self- 
willed, and not imposed from without by authorities for the purpose of subjugation. With self- 
discipline, the freedom and creativity of the individual are not curtailed and controlled but en­
sured and enhanced: “...the exercise of self-mastery is closely related to die state of freedom” 
(Boyne 144). Foucault himself recognized this difference as a continuity in his thought, to be un­
derstood under two aspects: the role of coercive practices and institutions in the normalization of 
individuals, on one hand, and the role of ascetic practices in the constitution of the ethical sub­
ject, on die other (Bemauer and Rasmussen 9-19). Some critics, notably Jurgen Habermas, how­
ever, find not a continuity but a vacillation between, respectively, objectivist or constructivist 
and subjectivist or voluntarist conceptions of agency, that is, either die agent is a determined 
object or a “strategic subject” (Ingram 215-69). Without presuming to decide whether Foucault 
was consistent or not in this matter, I shall concentrate, in accordance with the theory of power as
it has been discussed up to this point, on the agent as a determined object, Foucault’s concern 
with control, domination, subjugation, subjection.
Foucault sees a certain connection of “economism” between the liberal and Marxist con­
ceptions of power. In liberal theory, power is a right, can be possessed like a commodity, 
transferred, etc. through a legal act The basic notion is a contractual type of exchange, as can be 
seen in the analogies of power and wealth (e.g. Talcott Parsons), hi Marxism, power plays a role 
in maintaining relations of production and the class domination these relations make possible; 
die historical raison d ’etre of political power is therefore located in die economy. Social insti­
tutions, however, as Weber emphasized, do not precisely coincide with relations of production; 
one cannot therefore criticize the dominant system only by attacking these relations (Lebrun 63- 
69). Foucault is concerned with breaking away from this economistic model toward an analysis 
in which power is not exchanged or possessed but exercised, existing only in action, not the 
privilege of the dominant class but the “overall effect of its strategic positions” (DP 26; P/K 88- 
89; Microfisica 174-75). Once liberated from economism, the two hypotheses that suggest them­
selves are, first, that power mechanisms work for repression (die “Reichian” hypothesis), and, 
second, that the basis of the power relationship is a hostile conflict of forces (die “Nietzchean” 
hypothesis), war prolonged by other means (inverting Von Clausewitz), or the reinscribing of 
relations of force in institutions, economic inequality, etc. Hie two are connected in die sense that 
repression can be considered the political consequence of the conflict offerees, just as 
oppression was once the consequence of the abuse of sovereignty injudicial models, when 
power exceeded the contract There emerge, therefore, two basic schemes: “contract- 
oppression,” the judicial model of the 18th century philosophers, and die “domination- 
repression” analysis, in which repression is not an abuse of power but, on the contrary, the effect
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and continuation of a relation of domination, the practice of a perpetual relation of force.
Foucault says he adopted this scheme of power as an occluded war to about the mid-1970’s but 
that it needed to be adapted (P/K 91-92; Microfisica 175-77).
The response was perihaps his most important work of political theory, Discipline and 
Punish (Fr. ed. 1975, first Engl, trans. 1977), written during Foucault’s politically active period 
with French Maoists (1972-4), a work he describes as “a genealogy of the present scientifico- 
legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications, and rules,” and, 
most important, “from which it extends its effects” (DP 135). It was treated as a seminal work of 
social criticism that avoided both crude Marxism and conservative empiricism (Miller 234). Its 
historical aim is to describe in detail how methods of punishment changed between the horrible 
torture ofDamiens (1757) and the beginnings of modern prisons (c.1840). Nietzche’s notion of 
“mnemotechnics”16 Foucault revives and extends to an account of the change from the old prac­
tices of torture and violent public executions, which were meant to avenge the criminal’s offense 
against the sovereign by reproducing the crime on the visible body of the prisoner, a display of 
sovereign power’s asymmetrical relation (DP 50,55), but which exposed the cruelty injustice it­
self From exemplary punishment, the means of social control came to be an increased control 
over desires and actions through discipline, with the modern human sciences taking over 
Christianity’s disciplinary role. The point of application is once again on the body—and on the 
soul insofar as it is the seat of habits. The aim of imposing new rules was “not to punish less but 
to punish better..to punish with more universality and necessity, to insert the power to punish 
more deeply into the social body” (84). Penal reform came in at the point it became necessary to 
define a punishment in which continuity would replace excess and expenditure, since spectacular 
punishment was haphazard in application. According to the “economy of power,” it became
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more effective and profitable to guard and discipline rather than physically punish. Foucault 
admits that every system of power has the problem of “the ordering of human multiplicities” 
(218) but that disciplines try to do so at the lowest cost (in both the economic and Dahl’s sense), 
at the maximum intensity and reach (i.e. extension of domain), and for maximum output of the or­
ganizations (penal, military, etc.) within which it is exercised (218).
The social cost of this transformation was that an army of technicians, including warders, 
but also doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, and educationalists, took over. Hie technology of 
power became die liberal principle of humanizing penal institutions but also of the knowledge of 
man, a diffuse “power/knowledge” (they imply each other) that is multiform in method though co­
herent in its result (23). Discipline introduced die power of the norm, from which power 
demands the production of truth made possible by its new techniques (6). Normalization, which 
came into being from contingent circumstances (i.e. other “solutions” might have been adopted) 
narrows human possibilities by binding people to a normalizing apparatus. It imposes 
homogeneity but at the same time makes it possible to measure differences as deviations from the 
norm. It therefore tolerates diversity up to a point but punishes it when it threatens the discipline 
of the norm (Caputo and Yount, “Institutions” 6; Bemauer and Mahon 143). Those categorized 
as deviants are excluded. Science thus develops the knowledge it requires to create the desired, 
well-ordered individual. It is therefore not a neutral and objective search for transcendental truth 
but implicated in the practices of domination (DP, 7; Poster 64).
Hie range of the authorities was extended to the general population. There was a general 
and continuous submission to supervision, milder than that exercised by a sovereign, but more 
insidious and microscopic, a “capillary” regime that exercised power in the social body and not 
over it, which became possible from the moment when the myth of the sovereign was no longer
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possible (in England sovereign power was displaced to functions of representation) (Microfisica 
130-31). The idea was to create “docile bodies ,” to “shape an obedient subject” (DP 129), to 
increase the forces of the body in economic terms but reduce them in political terms, a 
“mechanics of power” that links an “increased aptitude and an increased domination” (138). 
Anyone who has been a soldier finds instantly familiar the spatial and temporal techniques of 
discipline that Foucault elaborates: enclosure, partitioning, functional sites, ranking, and time­
tables, temporal elaboration of the act, body-object articulation, exhaustive use. (Indeed,
Foucault refers to a an 18th century “military dream of society” (169) as an alternative to the so­
cial contract ideal.)
Disciplinary power is exercised through invisibility. It is the subject not the leader who 
must be seen. Surveillance (the book’s French title is surveiller etpunir) or observation rather 
than physical coercion renders fee actual daily exercise of power unnecessary. “Panopticism,” 
which Foucault discovered in a description of in fee writings of fee utilitarian philosopher Jer­
emy Benfeam, is a “technology of power,” an architectural arrangement that makes soldiers, pris­
oners, patients, students, visible to a central control.. Power is feus continuously exercised 
through an inspecting gaze that each one will end up internalizing, so that there is not need of 
weapons or physical violence (P/K155). One who is subjected to such a field of visibility and 
knows it. Foucauit explains, assumes responsibility for power’s constraints, “becomes the prin­
ciple of his own subjection” (DP 203). “Is it surprising,” he asks, “feat prisons resemble 
factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (228)
In fee following work, fee first volume of The History o f  Sexuality (1976; Eng. tr. 1978), 
Foucault seeks to show that repression is not what power is ail about The historical inquiry is 
directed toward a society feat “speaks verbosely of its own silence” and promises to “liberate it-
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self from the laws that make it function” (.History I: 8). The aim is to define the 
power/knowledge regime that sustains the discourse on sexuality in society. Rather than 
repression—the “Victorian hypothesis,” by which we falsely believe that when we say yes to sex 
we say no to power (157)—discourses of sexuality were multiplied by an “institutional 
incitement” (18) to speak and hear about it It was spoken not to be condemned but (and here one 
may connect this work with Discipline and Punish) to be managed and administered, “inserted 
into systems of utility” (34). Hie shift is not from power as constraint to power as productive, 
but a production that is also a constraint, which works through linking sex with identity, or pro­
ducing sex as a category of identity so that deviations from the established norm can be regulated, 
controlled, and punished (Butler 87). In the 19th century, sex was incorporated into order's of 
knowledge: die biology of reproduction and the medicine of sex, the first giving scientific cover 
to obstacles and fears aroused by the second (History 54-55). La contrast to an oriental art of 
sex, western civilization produced a science of sex geared to a traditional form of knowl­
edge/power, the confession, that is so deeply ingrained it seems like a liberation rattier than a 
constraining power. A “political history of truth” would show that truth is not free but its 
production is involved in power relations. A confession, for example, unfolds within such a re­
lation: one confesses to an authority who requires the confession in order to judge, forgive or 
punish (38-62).
This “analytic of sex” includes general reflections on power that take up some earlier 
themes. Foucault says that his is an “analysis”(82) rather than a theory of power, but, again, the 
analysis needs to be freed from the judicial model. In this view, all modes of power are reduced 
to an effect of obedience, so that the productiveness, resourcefulness, “positivity” of power are 
neglected (82-86). This negative view of power has been widely accepted since power can only
he ff i* eflweesl» part iteelfc “its ssicee»» is directly proportional to its lability to hide
its own mechanisms” (86). Historically, iaw was the weapon of the sovereign but aiso the sys­
tem’s “mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability” (87). Hie exercise of power in 
the west is formulated in terms of law, and facts and procedures are covered up by judicial dis­
course. This judico-political discourse is not adequate, Foucault thinks, to describe how power 
was, and is, exercised, but “the code according to which power presents itself’ (88) and which 
prescribes how we conceive it Hie forms of sovereignly to some extent still exist but they have 
been penetrated by new mechanisms, of the type he has described in this and previous works, 
mechanisms which operate not by right, law, and punishment, but by technique, normalization, 
and control, and that go beyond the apparatus of die state (89).17 One must conceive, finally, not 
the sovereign model, merely temporary forms of power, but the multiplicity of power relations: 
they are not exterior to other types of relations (economics, knowledge) but immanent in diem; 
they are both intentional and non-subjective, i.e. exercised through aims and objectives but not 
the result of an individual subject they always and everywhere imply resistance but a resistance 
that is not exterior to power itself, which by Foucault’s theory would be impossible, but presents 
“points” distributed irregularly everywhere in the “network” (92-96).
NOTES
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1 For Foucault’s most extensive work devoted to this question, see The Care ofthe Self The 
History o f  Sexuality, Vol. 3, trans. Robert Hurley (1984; New York: Vintage, 1988). By 1980, 
Foucault thought that his earlier work had insisted too much on techniques of domination and saw
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as important the techniques that individuals perform on their own bodies and souls to modify 
their conduct and transform themselves.
Howison Lectures, Berkeley, 1980 (qtd. in Miller 322-3). I shall briefly take up this point again 
in my discussion of Foucault in Section n, below.
2 Foucault said in an interview that ethos implies a relation to others to the extent that care for 
self renders one competent to occupy a place in city, community or intra-individual relationships. 
It is power over self that regulates power over others. Cf “Hie Ethic of Care for the Self as a 
Practice of Freedom” (Bemauer and Rasmussen 7-8).
3 The descriptive phrases have not in this case been italicized, as they are my own paraphrases 
ofStoppano’s more discursive treatment
4 “Increasingly, die central question is becoming who will have access to the information [the] 
machines
will have in storage to guarantee that the right decisions are made” (Lyotard 14).
5 The theoretical basis for this aspect of Dahl’s argument is Blalock (18).
6 For manipulative situations, Stoppano makes the same point: “A can bring about a certain be­
havior in B without making [his intention] manifesf ’ ( 935,938).
7 Galbraith discusses (131f), for example, how the teaching of economics in universities ignores 
the real world of great interacting organizations, a reality that is not acceptable to the ideology of 
universities or one that lends itself to mathematical models compatible with assumed market 
competition.
8 As for the “zero-sum” problem Talcott Parsons's thinks that in some cases R in fact loses if C 
gains power, the case where the quantity of power is fixed, as in a particular hierarchic
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collectivity, but fee zero-sum is overcome in the electoral mandate to do what is best for fee 
public interest within legal limits, as a bank may invest deposits as it sees fit given certain re­
strictions. Boudon and Bourricaud point out (434) feat there are situations where zero-sum does 
not apply, as when a third party is involved, whether mediator or cynical exploiter, who may tip 
fee distribution of power, or fee presence of some exceedent factor (like a windfall profit) that 
owes nothing to either side. Gerard Lebrun (15-20) thinks feat fee zero sum is not obvious, as is 
shown by Parsons and Foucault, who rejects it on fee grounds that power cannot be reduced to 
fee negative or destructive.
9 This is Simmers example, but one also thinks of politicians, who do not (or at least are not 
authorized to) wield power wife complete autonomy and must give some satisfaction to voters. 
This view can be taken too far (cf Dahl’s example of the merely apparent control of the ruler by 
fee ruled, Section lb, above).
50 In fee text of Weber (Selections from His 7/ork 59) taken from The Theory ofSoaal and 
Economic Organization and edited by Parsons, fee term given is “imperative co-ordination,” 
which not only obscures fee confrontation but positively erases it
11 By this theory, fee phrase “divine power” is an oxymoron; what God allegedly possesses is 
superhuman strength, “made irresistible by fee means of violence” (On Revolution 193), as is 
seen in fee Old Testament
12 Arendt says (On Revolution 217) feat fee abundance of natural resources in colonial America 
presupposed feat a revolution to abolish want would be unnecessary. She thinks feat private en­
terprise has therefore been an “unmixed blessing only in America” (which is debatable) and in
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the absence of natural wealth “has led everywhere to unhappiness and mass poverty,” a view 
that would justify some sort of socialism, if only for the underdeveloped world.
13 This is also the view of what is considered the best general work on Arendt, Margaret 
Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation o f  Her Political Thought (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1992).
14 That ideas are in a sense constructed by history in Foucault’s work is put by George 
Canguilhem as “...events affect concepts and not men” (Canguilhem 79).
15 Foucault said in an interview that when he used the word “power” it was as a short-cut for 
“relations of power” (Bemauer and Rasmussen 11). Caputo mid Yount explain that sets of power 
relations pervade life “without power ever amounting to a tiling or substance.” (“Institutions” 5).
16 Nietzche elaborates, in the Genealogy o f  Morals, a fable of man as a slave of desires and 
whims, with the strong inflicting pain on the weak, which brought on fear and the resulting need 
to control the warlike impulses in this state of nature. Rather than aHobbesian sovereign, laws 
and customs arose to suppress arbitrary and violent impulses. The result was a “mnemotechnics,” 
or “memory of the will,” since only memory can make people behave in predictable rather than 
arbitrary ways (Genealogy 58-62; Miller 215-18).
17 Lebrun thinks Foucault’s analyses of an invading and insidious power return to the state of 
things comprehensible to Hobbes and Hegel: “What Foucault describes is the triumph of the le­
viathan, the perfection of the Hegelian state” (69-73, my translation). If this were true, there 
would be no more politics. What Foucault is perhaps describing is the tendency rather than the 
accomplished fact
PART TWO - POWER AND POLITICS IN POST-WAR FICTION
INTRODUCTION
Politics and social themes went for the most part into abeyance in American fiction after 
the war, a situation that persisted even into the 1960s. This apparent apathy on the part of 
American writers is often compared by the Old Left to the politicized Thirties, when a large 
body of fiction inspired by left-wing ideas was produced. The Great Depression of those 
years doubtless helped people understand that there was a direct connection between politics 
and the quality of their lives. It has, however, often been lamented (or in conservative circles 
celebrated) that the socialism that enjoyed a heady revival in that period never really pros­
pered in the US. There were socialist movements in the 19th century, following European 
models, but the Socialist Party, which peaked around 1912, died with President Wilson’s re­
forms. The usual explanation for the failure of socialism in the US is the relative affluence of 
the American worker, but affluence may in fact accompany an upsurge of socialism (e.g. 
France, 1968). The explanation is historically more complex (Karabel 27). In contrast to 
Europe, in any case, contemporary socialist theory in the US tends to be divorced for these 
(and other, more current historical reasons) from politics (Eagleton, Against the Grain, 75).
The contemporary rejection o£ or apathy to, the public world of politics, especially 
left-wing politics, may perhaps be better explained by the context of the post-war years, with 
the emergence of fee United States as a super-power. While this century has been called, with 
the usual hyperbole, “the American century,” in 1939, before fee war, fee US was a great 
power only in name, wife just minor influence abroad. As historian Gordon Craig points out, 
however, only two years later Franklin D. Roosevelt was already thinking of fee US as a 
“world policeman,” and by 1945, both the fact of victory and fee development and deployment
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of history’s most fearsome weapon served to have “a very inflationary effect upon the Ameri­
can self-image (Craig 47). This historical situation, a post-war “pax americana,” with the 
concomitant rise of an affluent domestic economy emerging from war production, may be said 
to have turned the national psyche to (perceived) new or neglected priorities of private life, 
on one hand, and to fee facile certitudes of an assumed national superiority, on fee other. To 
fee consternation of nationalists, however, other parts of fee world, as Theodore Draper says, 
have often, especially more recently, refused to play feeir roles “in the American scheme of 
things” (qtd. by Craig 47).
The retreat into fee private and particular feat characterizes postwar fiction is in this 
interpretation a result of assumptions arising from American cultural hegemony, which has 
solidified and expanded since the war and only in recent decades seems to be questioned is 
literature. From fee late Forties through (in most cases) fee mid-Sixties, serious American 
novelists tended to delve into fee murky depths of feeir characters’ self-identity, which, in­
deed, has always been something of a national obsession and may historically be related to a 
society in which social roles have been more fluid than in Europe. Both fee mass and fee intel­
lectual public tended to see bad social relations as fee result of private illness or alienation 
rather than public action or political choice. This tendency may in part be owing to intellec­
tual movements imported from abroad feat lost some of feeir original bite in the New World 
Psychoanalysis, for example, has reinforced fee preoccupation wife fee interior self and fee 
separation of social from personality problems. Similarly, fee existentialism feat was popu­
larized in fee post-war US encouraged a self-absorption feat actually supported fee alienation 
feat European existentialism had come into being to combat (Van Leer 478).
Even serious post-war novelists, Richard Ohmann has argued, have shown this 
“psychologizing tendency” in their work, a tendency which he believes has persisted even into 
the Sixties, when a more politicized fiction might have been expected in response to new atti­
tudes and practices emerging from the counter-cultural attack on established values. He men­
tions Saul Bellow’s Moses Herzog, John Updike’s Harry Angstrom, Philip Roth’s Alex Port­
noy, or Sylvia Plalh’s Esther Greenwood as characters interested primarily in personal salva­
tion (Ohmann 80-90), as well as Thomas Pynchon’s OedipaMaas (in The Crying o f Lot 49, 
1966, which I shall discuss at length in Chapt7), as another example of this tendency.
Oedipa’s dilemma, however, lies in her inability to decide whether she is (privately) going 
mad or there is something really out there making her feel as if  she were; in her case, an am­
biguity is sustained in a paranoid socio-political climate.1
One might also mention E.L. Doctorow’s The Book o f  Daniel (1971), in which the nar­
rator, from the standpoint of 1967, looks back at his childhood as a son of radical parents who 
were executed as spies during the height of the “Red Scare,” as an example of Ohmann’s case. 
Hie novel is an imaginative rendering of the controversial Rosenberg Case, in which the radi­
cal couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted and executed (1953) for passing atomic 
secrets to the Soviets. As apolitical novel, it offers a valuable historical portrait of the post­
war world of the Old Left, but it mitigates, even sentimentalizes that tendency’s resolute Sta­
linism and in the manner of earlier political novels concentrates on psychology rather than 
politics, in this case, the narrator’s and his sister’s psychological traumas resulting from their 
parents’ awful fate. Susan’s radicalism, for example, owes more to the trauma of losing her 
parents at an early age than political convictions born of events. Finally, it curiously ignores 
the anti-Semitic issue that was an important historical factor in public outrage against the Ro­
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senberg’s alleged espionage. While Ohmaim is surely right about most mainstream post-war 
fiction, he has overlooked, among a few lesser figures, Norman Mailer, who published two or 
three novels in the Sixties dealing with the major political events of the time.
At the same time as the emergence of a large, affluent middle-class, indifferent to social 
inequalities that seemed to have been resolved or at least not perceived as a major priority, 
the international situation steadily deteriorated as cooperation between the two ideological 
poles of the Allied powers began to crumble even before the war was over. The dreams of 
1945 had become by the early Fifties a nightmare of fear and paranoia: the USSR’s success- 
fiil test of a nuclear device (Sept 1949) that ended US atomic monopoly and the US’s an­
nouncement of fee development of a fusion hydrogen bomb (Jan. 1950); the formation of the 
Euro-American defense alliance, NATO (1949), aimed at the Soviets and inspiring their for­
mation of the Warsaw Pact counter-alliance (1955); the fall of nationalist China to Mao Ze­
dong’s Communist Revolution (1949). The Truman Doctrine (1947), aimed at protecting 
Greece and Turkey from Communist domination and ideologically justified as helping “free 
peoples,” was used in fact to support any regime perceived as anti-Soviet: Tito in Yugosla­
via, Rhee in the Philippines, Chiang kai-shek in China, Franco in Spain, Salazar in Portugal. 
The Truman Doctrine was thus placed in a global setting as a practice of the philosophy of 
what George Kennan in the same year called the “containment” of Communist aggression, 
which had its most violent consequence in the stalemated war in Korea (1950-51), a war that 
the right-wing military commander, General MacArthur, wanted to settle by bombing (Red)
• »China, adding to fears of a massive land war in Asia
There was considerable national frustration at what was perceived as the world’s most 
powerful country being unable to achieve the kind of decisive victory in Korea obtained in the
Second World War. Conspiracy arose to explain what could not easily be explained. Com­
munists were thought to be infiltrating even high levels of government, a threat from within to 
match the threat from without (Dubovksy 274-78). Soviet peace feelers were interpreted as 
disguising increased espionage activities by US officials and, in the search for Communists 
under every bed the cherished civil rights of American citizens were repeatedly violated in 
the interests of “national security,” which, it was said, “in times of peril must be absolute” 
(Dubovksy et al. 279).3 The fears of Europe being overrun by the large Soviet forces, even as 
the USSR was being encircled by the west, and of the (real) possibility of global annihilation 
from a nuclear war between the two super-powers, no doubt contributed to a paranoid do­
mestic climate.
The early Fifties’ phenomenon of McCarthyism, with its attendant issues of power, 
loyalty, subversion, and the ideologies of extreme left and right, might also have been ex­
pected to call for serious fictional treatment, but perceptions of domestic communism and its 
implacable enemies was usually left io popular works, such as Herbert Philbrick’s personal 
account of FBI counter-espionage, I  Led Three Lives, which inspired an early television se­
ries. Ruth Prigozy, for example, has considered five political novels of the period dealing 
with McCarthyism (including two popular works) and found them all wanting. 4 Two of the 
works she cites by serious writers-Lionel Trilling’s The Middle o f  the Journey (1947) and 
Norman Mailer’s Barbary Shore (1951)—attempt to engage political ideas, while the third, 
Mary McCarthy’s The Groves o f Academe (1952) is confined to politicking and intrigue in 
die face, of administration pressure at a university campus. The climate of recrimination and 
betrayal that characterized that inquisitional institution of the period, the (Senator) McCarthy- 
inspired House Un-American Activities Committee, and legislation in a number of states that
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brought on a national academic crisis by requiring teachers and other professionals to sign 
“loyalty oaths” are replicated in this satire of earnest liberal professors.
Trilling’s novel, too, shows the dilemma of a conscientious liberal in an intellectual 
climate where polemics take the place of rational debate and political positions tend to polar­
ize, with the hapless well-meaning liberal trapped in the middle, a position Trilling himself 
and his (writer) wife Diana often found themselves in with their principled (but staunchly 
anti-Communist) stands on political issues of the time. The Middle o f  the Journey is a novel 
of ideas, as Mailer’s Barbary Shore tries but fails to become, and yet its characters succumb 
to the danger of that kind of fiction by becoming too abstract, mere mouthpieces of defined 
positions (Karl 267). Trilling’s protagonist Laskell is just the calm, judicious middle-of-the- 
roader picking his way between ideological extremes that one would expect to find in an ar­
gument of that exemplary liberal, Lionel Trilling. It is to the point that the novel is set in rural 
New England (i.e. removed from the messy urban environments of national political strug­
gles), that Maxim (based on the historical figure, Whittaker Chambers, of whom more in the 
following chapter) goes from Marxism to reaction, i.e. the extreme right and left come to­
gether, and that Laskell’s political development is depicted principally as die spiritual one 
suggested by the title, a rebirth (from a near-fatal disease) in mezzo cammtn.
The post-war polarizations of ideologies made concrete in the Cold War seem to have 
brought on a domestic situation of confrontation and fear in American society that created a 
cultural paralysis. McCarthy’s unsupported accusations of treason in high places, aided by the 
sensationalist press, provoked a collective hysteria in which intellectuals and artists got 
caught up. Many of them had in fact been members of the Communist Party or fellow-travelers 
in the Thirties but ended up renouncing the Party with die general disillusionment of die Left
after the revelations of Stalin’s purges and the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact. Many igno­
minious ly indulged in public self-castigation, however, submitting to McCarthyist pressure 
and informing on Jheir colleagues to avoid prosecution or “blacklisting.” Mailer’s novel 
(which I shall discuss in the next chapter) deals with this climate of fear and intimidation, in­
terrogations and wrung confessions, that characterizes the period.
The politics of fear and paranoia continued through the late Fifties and into die Sixties 
and even Seventies. Hie US, agonizing over falling behind in the “space-race” when the So­
viet Union launched Sputnik (1957), provided federal aid to education to promote technologi­
cal development in an apparent effort to catch up. The Eisenhower years (1953-60) continued 
Truman’s policy of containment but with an emphasis on military aid and defense alliances. 
CIA covert operations were executed under Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, the supreme cold warrior, who sought to prevent the rise of left-wing leaders through­
out die world by subsidizing right-wing military coups. For example, the US backed Diem 
against the nationalist Ho Chi Minh, a mistake for which it would pay dearly in the next dec­
ade. Nor was the administration of the celebrated liberal John Kennedy much improvement, as 
it increased defense expenditure and military aid to anti-Communist (often repressive) re­
gimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America In July, 1961, the administration recommended that 
Americans build bomb shelters as protection against nuclear attack, and in October of that 
year, Kennedy faced down Kruschev in the Cuban missile crisis, the tensest moment of the 
postwar years (Kennedy had campaigned on the existence of a “missile gap,” which Defense 
Secretary McNamara finally admitted did not exist. Ball 16-20).
The climate at home often suggested the McCarthy years. Kennedy’s successor Johnson 
claimed that “Russians” supplied anti-Vietnam US Senators with material for their speeches
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and directed the FBI to investigate contacts of congressmen with foreign embassies. In 1967, 
the CIA andNSA began to (illegally) investigate domestic organizations and individuals. 
Nixon in the early Seventies had the CIA investigate anti-war protest groups and individuals 
to see if there was funding or influence of foreign powers (none was found). Investigation 
often proceeded by unconstitutional means. In the early Sixties, the Attorney-General Bobby 
Kennedy lobbied for wiretapping in national security as well as criminal cases; although it 
was defeated, he did not restrain the FBI use of wire-taps for all purposes (the FBI even 
bugged Martin Luther King). By 1972, wiretapping and break-ins were seen as normal means 
to noble goals. In 1976, the House of Representatives voted not to release the report of a 
committee investigating the intelligence agencies, even after the Church Report (Senate) had 
uncovered multiple abuses of the CIA and FBI and ineffective executive oversight. Hie con­
clusion is that there was a greater concern for secrecy than exposing abuses of power 
(Dubovsky et al. 329-437; 502). In the fiction of Norman Mailer, John Barth, Thomas Pyn- 
ch.on, and Don DeLillo, the national obsession for spies and secrecy would eventually find 
full fictional expression.
NOTES
1 David Van Leer (505) has suggested, furthermore, that Plath’s story of Esther Greenwood’s 
mental breakdown in The Bell Jar (1963) is “the decade’s most detailed indictment of the 
psychological inadequacy of the age’s assessment of women,” and that Esther’s illness was 
not merely a private problem but brought on by her attempt “to conform to traditional models” 
of women’s magazines, i.e. asocial indictment
Truman dismissed MacArthur, but fee public reaction in the demogoguic General’s favor 
(69%) perhaps showed both his charismatic appeal and die American public’s manipulated 
fear of a renewed “yellow peril” (cf. my discussion of Gore Vidal’s Empire in Chapter 3b).
3 Quoted from the AEC board created to review J. Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance- 
- it was denied (1947), though Oppenheimer, chief scientist of die A-bomb “Manhattan Pro­
ject,” had been trusted with top-secret material since the war. Other abuses would follow. In 
his State of the Union Address, Pres. Eisenhower claimed that over “two thousand security 
risks” had been dismissed from die government. In 1954, FBI electronic surveillance 
(“bugging”) was approved by die Attorney General; in 1955, the CIA opened private mail in 
the interest of alleged national security (Dubovsky 380).
4 The two popular works she discusses but that I am unfamiliar with are Merle Miller’s The 
Sure Thing and Irwin Shaw’s The Troubled Air^ which, Prigozy s^ s , comes to the conclusion 
that the Communists were to blame for McCarthyism. Her comments on the novels are unfor­
tunately confined to a paragraph or two for each novel. The main objection seems to be that 
the liberal protagonists at die center are too weak to sustain the novels.
CHAPTER 2
POWER AND THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS IN THE POST-WAR POLITICAL NOVEL
a
Power is formally exercised and legitimated in the practices and institutions of national 
and international politics. One would therefore expect to find issues of power featured in the 
“political novel,” if I may confine that fictional category (less easily called a genre) to an ex­
tended fiction “in which political ideas play a dominant role or in which fee political milieu is 
fee dominant setting” (Howe 17).1 This definition Irving Howe goes on to amend to: “anovel 
in which we take to be dominant” political ideas or fee political milieu (17’ italics given), 
since he has argued feat whether a critic calls a novel psychological or political is less impor­
tant than why he or she proposes to use one or fee other categories. He does not comment on fee 
circularity of fee definition (in which “political” occurs in both subject and predicate), but per­
haps a certain circularity is inevitable given the indispensability of the term “political,” which 
has a wide range of meanings but which context should make clear. This definition is a stipu­
lated one, in feat I am restricting fee category to Howe’s two aspects, and yet these aspects can 
be said to comprehend broadly what would fulfill fee usual expectation of what a “political 
novel” consists of, or negatively, what it might be expected to omit and thus repel a certain kind 
of reader. A political novel is either to a great extent thematically concerned wife ideas, con­
cepts, or theories related to fee state, its institutions, and fee powers residing in such, or, (much 
more common in American fiction) feat in which fee dominant setting or milieu is institutional, 
at all levels of government2
Nowadays, one needn’t even be a radical critic to be quick to point out that “everything is 
political,” to which I would readily agree, and indeed this has been assumed in my discussion
of power in Chapter 1, but in this case such an objection would ignore the notion of '‘political 
novel” that is being given and/or that it could be said to contain when one describes a certain 
fiction as such. Affirming the essentially political nature of all social experience and all cul­
tural productions is, of course, legitimate and proper in the broadest context, which is that there 
is no area of human activity or thought independent of social, historical, and economic factors. 
The cultural sphere is certainly not to be thought of as produced or existent independent of these 
factors. In this sense, all novels are political, but if  one says that every novel is a political 
novel, die term becomes of little use, and it seems that there is, as outlined above, a recognized 
use. One might therefore distinguish between the broad and narrow context by saying that every 
novel is political but not every novel is apolitical novel. Howe concedes the stipulative and 
reportive aspects of his definition when he says that a political novel is “any novel I wished to 
treat as if it were a political novel, though clearly one would not wish to treat most novels in 
that way” (4).3
Frederick R. Karl, in his comprehensive history of the contemporary American novel, 
says that a large-scale political novel in the 20th century, such as is associated with the great 
European moderns Mann, Kafka, Malreaux, Koestler, Orwell, has eluded the grasp of the 
American novelist (254).4 In Howe’s epilogue (written in 1986), for example, in which he 
briefly discusses important post-war political novelists—Gordimer, Naipaul, Marquez, Kun- 
dera, Solzhenitsyn—he significantly mentions no Americans (252-73). More recently, however, 
Russell Reising has argued that critics have ignored the political aspects of American literature, 
and Richard Goddens, while not concentrating specifically on the political novel, has sought to 
restore the socio-economic and political dimensions of American writers as stylistically and 
thematically diverse as James, Fifegeraid, and Mailer. And novelist E.L Doctorow has blamed
critics (like Karl) for valuing political fiction from abroad but neglecting the home product: 
“I t’s like President Reagan’s feeling about trade unions: He likes them as long as they’re in 
Poland” (qtd. by Whalen-Bridge 187).
Can one conclude that post-war American fiction ignores politics? Most of it seems to 
until fairly recently, when the post-war illusions of affluence indubitably came to an end. In the 
Introduction to Part Two, I have discussed some of the socio-historical reasons for the tendency 
to treat private experience independently of the social and political context, where I suggested 
that the neglect of so many of our novelists to engage political issues is directly related to the 
collective state of mind, as it were, since the war. Some ahistorical explanations for this ne­
glect have also been proposed, notably Daniel Boorstin’s, that the character of the American 
mind is essentially pragmatic or untheoretical, which at least has the merit of explaining why 
Americans pay so little attention to their philosophers, hi the application of this theory to fic­
tion, American novelists are supposedly wary of using fee deadening hand of abstract theories 
in the drafting of imaginative works, although this would explain only the unwillingness to write 
novels dealing with political ideas.5
As for institutions, one might expect a people so ostensibly proud of their own to have 
shown more interest in fictional treatments, but it can be argued that more than pride and indif­
ference are relevant to the popular American aversion to politics. For one thing, the US was 
founded on the principles of classical liberalism, whose very logic implies a separation of 
public and private spheres. For another, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of popular 
ideology (e.g. Lincoln’s celebrated, but surely false, notion that ours is “a government offhe 
people, by die people, for die people”) in maintaining the stability of the American political 
system (Lenski 247). There is great confidence in the average citizen about the self-reliant
stability of national institutions. This is partly justified, the system having proven resilient in 
withstanding stresses from above--in occasional scandals among the upper echelons of govern­
ment, where blatant wrong-doing has tended to be redressed, or at least the overtly corrupt 
punished-and below, for example, in bona-fide attempts to deal with the urgent and conflicting 
demands of minorities, although here the system has been less successful, as recurrent race riots 
make evident. In any case, no one seriously thinks that the US government will fall to either a 
coup or a revolution; such vicissitudes are, for better or worse, the property of other nations.
This self-confidence, however, can degenerate into a generalized complacency, even 
apathy, with regard to politics, especially when that activity is associated exclusively with in­
ept or dishonest politicians. One of fee few places where fee average citizen participates in 
democratic politics, national elections, have resulted in a low turn-out of fee electorate, fee 
striking of moralistic poses by fee candidates, and media concentration on what is often merely 
personal trivia And yet, the low turn-out may simply reflect a comprehension that voting for 
political representatives is a poor substitute for real participation in political decision-making, 
which is true enough but not specific to fee US, since it is fee basic democratic problem of any 
large modem state.
It can be conceded feat to most people in fee US, fee government seems remote and unre­
sponsive to their needs and desires, interfering in their lives only when it raises taxes. This, to 
be sure, has been fee thrust and appeal of conservative rhetoric in recent decades, but whether it 
explains fee apolitieism of fee American novel, as Frederick Karl thinks, is at bast debatable. 
For one thing, fee literary canon has hardly neglected politics. Karl is surely right, however, 
when he argues feat questions of space and fee pastoral have tended to preempt political solu­
tions to social conflict in literature. Doubtless, many novelists have been inspired by Huckle­
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berry Finn’s “spatial solution” to the complexities and moral dubiousness of what Huck knew 
only too well of “sivilization” by having their heroes simply light out for the territory. To be 
sure, this has often not proven much of a solution. Hawthorne’s Dimmesdale rejects it as unreal­
istic, for example, and Melville’s Ishmael conies to realize that one can hardly leave the world 
of power behind
With a few notable exceptions, political novels were written by popular writers, that is, 
those writing mainly for the mass market These works do not fully engage political theories so 
much as “deal with ideas already in circulation” (Prigozy 254) and concentrate therefore on the 
political milieus like Washington or state and local governments. As appropriate to worics di­
rected to consumers, they seek to “reassure rather than disturb the reader’s belief in the normal 
Democratic American system” (Nye xiii). It is one of my contentions that perhaps the best 
known of these works has unintentionally the opposite effect In the readings of political novels 
in this chapter, I shall confine myself to the early post-war years (1945-60) and their reaction­
ary political climate, examining four representative political novels—two best-sellers and two 
works by serious writers—to show how these fictions perceive the workings of power in the 
American political life of their time. It will be seen that despite the official liberal belief that 
power in our political system is diffused through the mechanisms of checks and balances—the 
heritage of die constitutional debates of die Founding Fadiers—these fictions consciously or 
unconsciously deny this belief They perceive power as concentrated in fewer hands and more 
deviously exercised than liberal belief would warrant And yet, the solutions to die dilemmas of 
power offered in these worics shirk the radical conclusions that might be drawn, as each of them 
succumbs in its own way to the more facile resolutions of what has been called the “liberal 
consensus.”
b.
Norman Mailer’s Barbery Shore (1951) explores more radical positions than other 
works of the period (e.g. Trilling) and yet, arising out of the cultural vacuum ofMcCarthyism, 
manages to remain a curiously inert novel. Hie first sentence, “Probably I was in the war,” 
places the narrator Mike Lovett outside history, removed by amnesia from a known past: “The 
legends from a decade of newsprint were as intimate and distant as the places in which I must 
have lived. No history belonged to me and so all history was mine (4). As a writer of fiction, 
which Lovett means to be (without ever writing much), he would seem to be singularly unprom­
ising, but he suspects the opposite is true: “Now, at the time I write, when other men besides 
myself must contrive a name, a story, and the papers they carry, I wonder if  I don’t possess an 
advantage. For I have been doing it longer and have been tantalized less by the memory of bet­
ter years” (5). He may supply with imagination what other men must be content to sift through in 
experience. The contriving of a name and a story, especially the reference to carrying “papers,” 
also suggest a society in which it might be dangerous to have too much identity.
In keeping with his shadowy existence, Lovett remains a spectator in the major confron­
tation taking place in his Brooklyn boarding house between McLeod, an articulate, anguished 
Marxist theoretician, and Hollingsworth, small-time don juan, bully, and smug blonde represen­
tative of middle America Hollingsworth supposedly has a job on Wall Street, but since he 
never goes to work, it xnay be assumed that this is merely to associate him with capitalism, in 
its ideological conflict with McLeod’s communism. The names indicate character traits and, as 
Frederick Karl says, also suggest allegory: McLeod is nebulous, adrift; Hollingsworth, like 
Hawthorne’s Hollingsworth in The Blithedole Romance, is a man whose need for domination 
he disguises as a service to society, Lovett, although sexually randy, seems incapable of love.
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McLeod’s wife, Guinivere, whose name suggests Arthurian romance, seems extraneous to such 
a scheme, although she is at least an adulteress. In the political allegory, McLeod and 
Hollingsworth are clearly extreme left and right, the mindless vitality of capitalism and the 
promise and ultimate betrayal of communism, with Lovett in the middle, perhaps the modem 
artist wooed by both sides but straining for an impossible non-ideological place (as McLeod 
reminds him, 124) from which to practice his ahistorical art Lovett can be opposed to the alco­
holic schizoid, Lannie, a former Leftist gone over to Hollingsworth, since he moves in the op­
posite direction—from uncommitted bourgeois intellectual to committed revolutionary (Karl 
268-69). One critic has suggested that Lannie and Lovett are Trostkyites to McLeod’s Bolshe­
vism, but Lovett is apolitical until he finally joins McLeod. Again, Guinivere is the odd 
(wo)man out; the suggestion that she is “the masses,” pursued by all the men, works within the 
scheme but on the face of it remains unconvincing; she is not proletarian as she doesn’t work 
and can perhaps be connected with the masses only in her vulgarity. The novel’s title alludes to 
the Barbarv Coast, the home base for North African pirates, which does not resonate with a 
suggested political allegory unless the boarding-house residents are seen as outlaw recluses 
from official society.
The possibility of allegory would perhaps mitigate the obvious defects of the novel as a 
realist fiction: the clumsy device of a narrator who must be improbably present at all die impor­
tant conversations; the implausibility of Hollingsworth’s interrogations of McLeod in a 
boarding house (since die former evidently works for a repressive but unnamed governmental 
agency resembling die FBI of the McCarthy era); Hollingsworth’s cuckolding of McLeod and 
the latter’s unexplained passivity, etc. The unrealistic, even parodic character of the quasi-legal 
proceedings can be seen in Hollingsworth’s notes on McLeod, which recall the wild ravings of
Joe McCarthy: “Admits to being afeeist.,to blowing up churches...to being against free enter­
prise... Admits murder ofPresident and Congress, Advocates destruction of the soutii...rise of 
the colored people, Admits allegiance to a foreign power, is against Wall Street” (81).
The heart of the conflict (and the novel) is a long interrogation in which Hollingsworth 
insists on the bureaucratic language that repression favors but, inexperienced in procedural 
matters, takes no notes. McLeod, accustomed to the plodding and paranoid Party methods (he
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claims also to have been a government “statistician”), says; “If I were your superior, and knew 
you had made no record, I’d set a man to watch you, and a man for him as well” (182). The 
unreality of fee arrangement again becomes manifest: why would an agent as inexperienced as 
Hollingsworth be assigned to an important suspect like McLeod? (and why would this be done 
at home, unless merely to allow Lovett to witness it all?) Even fee spontaneous meeting of 
Lovett and McLeod on the bridge, where the one tries to win fee other over to revolutionary 
commitment, is hardly less stagey. One can imagine these kinds of scenes being done more ef­
fectively twenty years later wife devices of post-modernism, such as mi unapolegetie schematic 
and a lack of solemnity, say, by John Barth or Robert Coover, but Mailer remains hampered by 
his artifice of realism.
McLeod is clearly Hollingsworth's intellectual superior, as right-wing certitudes are no 
match for Marxist dialectic, but Hollingsworth correctly assesses their positions wife respect to 
fee locus of power: “I’m a simple fellow who concerns himself wife facts, and feat’s not so bad 
in its own way, because I’m sitting where I am and you’re sitting where you are” (191). His 
chief concern is recovering fee certain “little object” feat disappeared from fee government 
agency where McLeod worked; although never identified, fee object signifies, for one thing, 
feat McLeod’s renunciation of his mysterious Leftist past is not sincere. McLeod disclaims
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responsibility in a complicated story (185-6) of his involvement in the state bureaucracy, an 
early example in contemporary American fiction of the Kafkan system as an impersonal but 
living organism that would later be exploited to effect by Burroughs, Barth, and Pynchon. 
McLeod tries out the argument that he cannot possess the mysterious object if he does not know 
what it is: “Like everything else, the little object creates about itself a circle of acquaintance 
and can be understood only collectively, for such is the nature of knowledge today”(193). This 
line of thought is quite suggestive in explaining future relations of power, but the possibility is 
not followed up. The identity of the object becomes merely irritating and McLeod turns out to 
have it after all, willing it to Lovett as his final attempt at honorable resistance.6
McLeod was, as it happens, not a government statistician but a paid informer who 
“cooperated” (as the HUAC used to say) when he was about to be liquidated by the Stalinist 
party apparatus overseas, but then disappeared with the object in a fit of remorse for his be­
trayal, devoting himself to revolutionary theory. Under interrogation, he admits to having been 
an important member in the Party, with crimes such as the murder of a close associate and par­
ticipation in the assassination of Trotsky (“him out of Mexico”) on his hands. Self-disgust does 
not cause him to lose his lucidity; of Hollingsworth, he says: “..he’s got a policeman’s brain, 
it’s only the murders he understands, but what of the capitulations which he would undoubtedly 
approve?” What is puzzling is why McLeod is capitulating to Hollingsworth, confessing of his 
own free will to a man and a cause he despises, since even if he confesses it is understood that 
he is going to be executed anyway. The only possible answer is that it is necessary for McLeod 
to be found guilty simply for him to launch his long farewell harangue on the inevitability of 
war between the two “colossi” (i.e. the super-powers)--a forecast similar to Lenin’s -a s  a 
consequence of the logic of overproduction, competition for markets, low living-standards, and
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arms-stockpiling during the Cold War. This didactic exercise is evidently a summary of 
Mailer’s own views on the world at the time. It is both irrelevant to the immediate situation in 
the novel (Lovett already understands it and Hollingsworth couldn’t care less) and historically 
inaccurate, since the balance of power brought about by the Soviet A-bomb turned out to be 
lasting.
Out of this apocalyptic scenario, McLeod improbably believes that there will be a place
for revolutionaiy socialism apart from the Party (given Mailer’s independent but left-leaning
politics, doubtless his own belief), spontaneously arising like the Phoenix from the ashes of war
to usher in a true equality of working-people—if  we are fortunate enough, one has to add, for the
State to disappear before the people do. Lovett’s grandiloquent conclusion bears quoting:
Meanwhile, vast armies mount themselves, the world revolves, the traveler 
clutches his breast From out of die unyielding contradictions of labor stolen 
from men, the march to the endless war forces its pace. Perhaps, as the millions 
will be lost, others will be created, and I shall discover brothers where I thought 
none existed(311-12).
As this piece, with its echoes of Matthew Arnold, is spoken not by the now deranged McLeod 
but by Lovett, who has remained heretofore passively indifferent to Hollingsworth’s destruction 
of McLeod and does nothing to prevent his murder, it is hard not to conclude that McLeod, 
Lovett, Mailer himself have become the soft-headed Utopians Marx himself is said to have re­
pudiated.
Mailer has evidently attempted in this novel to create the climate of fear and betrayal in 
die midst of the McCarthy years, and, perhaps beyond that, a dialectic of the Cold War, but 
even with his oversimplifications the message comes out muddled. The main problem is how 
are we to read McLeod: as an idealist corrupted by the devious machinations of Stalinism, as a 
criminal self-destroyed by guilt, as a Graham-Greene-like humanist caught in die dirty game of
politics and unable to deal with a neurotic wife or revolutionary choice, or as an heroic social­
ist clinging to resistance even as he is being brought low by the forces of reaction?
Karl’s quite ingenious suggestion is that McLeod (with his mixed political past and sense 
of a grand mission) is a “Whittaker Chambers mutant” (268). If “politics begin and end with 
the self,” Chambers is a character right out of a Mailer novel (572). Chambers was an editor 
who confessed in 1948 that he had been a courier for the Communist Party. In a famous trial of 
fee period, he accused a high-ranking official in the State Department entrusted wife foreign 
affairs planning, Alger Hiss, of turning over secret documents to fee Soviets.7 As Karl ob­
serves, Chambers’s resemblance to McLeod is most evident in his delirious autobiography, 
Mtness (1952), contemporaneous wife Mailer’s novel. While his political views are quite 
absurd (he sees, for example, Roosevelt’s New Deal as amove in fee coming hegemony of in­
ternational socialism), Chambers portrays himself as an heroic personage in an existential and 
political drama of fee highest import, in which fee US-USSR power struggle and fee fate of fee 
free world hang on fee decisive vigilance of patriots like himself and red-baiting Congressman 
Richard Nixon. And yet, he also reveals himself in fee book as a loser redeemed by his act of 
betraying a friend, which he prefers to perceive as determined by historical destiny. To Nixon, 
for example, he says of himself and Hiss: “We are caught in a tragedy of history...I could not do 
ofeerwise”(Chambers 572).
If Chambers’s fiction becomes more compelling than Mailer’s, it is not too difficult to 
see why. The concrete details, what makes fiction fictional and not a mere rhetorical tract 
Mailer has not filled in; what remains is not so much a political novel as a sketch for one. For 
example, despite its initial promise, Lovett’s mysterious past turns out to have no function in the 
present. Nor does his conversion to McLeod’s utopian vision have any motivation in fee action;
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inaction is indeed his salient feature. As for McLeod, both actions and motives remain unde­
fined, as does his murder by Hollingsworth, who would not be both interrogator and execu­
tioner. Nor does McLeod’s martyrdom elicit any sympathy. He does nothing to save himself or 
redeem his past crimes other than withholding the object whose existence never becomes 
wholly credible. The stated ruthlessness of his past is not a convincing basis for the heart- 
wrenching of the present, and, as Hollingsworth remarks, no bureaucrat turned to theory later in 
life. Unlike post-modernist novels where the unexplained or inexplicable will have functional 
roles in threatening systems. Mailer’s novel simply remains an outline. The one-on-one ideo­
logical struggle has no immediate context in which power can be measured.
There is, in short, no connection in Barbary Shore between past and present credible in 
terms the novel establishes among the characters, just as the historical thread has been severed 
from the first by Lovett’s amnesia Nor does the plot, loosely connected discussions, create a 
substantial context that would support a novel of ideas, even if the discussions did not so often 
degenerate into unintentional parody. The novel seems amenable only to a reading where the 
contemporary world would be shown as a place of confused meanings and intentions, failed 
prospects and disappointed hopes, not the solidly material world of Marxism but one of psy­
chological moods and conflicts, and so not comprehensible in the framework of a linear tempo­
rality working itself out by inexorable laws. Yet, such a reading, the psychologizing of the po­
litical that we shall see as a common fictional strategy to the mid-Sixties, can hardly be rec­
onciled with McLeod’s martyrdom and Lovett’s inheriting of his revolutionary mission. Can the 
confusion be explained by the author’s own political confusion, like that of so many artists, 
writers, and intellectuals of die time, of being unable to uphold American capitalism and yet 
disillusioned by Soviet Communism? If this is die case, Mailer was not so different from the
period’s liberal novelists and their protagonists, such as Trilling’s Laskell, he seemed so anx­
ious to distance himself from.
c.
Gordon Milne’s historical study. The American Political Novel (1966), which discusses 
novels from the revolutionary period to the present, unfortunately ends right at the point when 
American novelists began to rediscover politics as a subject of serious fiction. It is sympto­
matic therefore that his chapter on the post-war political novel discusses only three works, by 
Robert Penn Warren, Edwin O’Connor, and Allen Drury, that only the first is an important liter­
ary work, and lhat he ignores entirely Mailer’s radical effort His title for this chapter, ‘The 
Professionals,” is also misleading, since it is aptly applied only to O’Connor and Drury, Penn 
Warren being known rather for his reputation as distinguished poet, critic and novelist (what 
used to be called “a man of letters”), author of a novel that has become a canonical work of 
literary modernism. In this section I shall discuss the two popular worics, as they share a milieu 
of government politics—the mayor’s office of a large city and the US Senate—while neither 
novel can be said, except unconsciously, to deal with political ideas.
O’Connor’s The Last Hurrah (1956), ignores the national scene for an interesting if ro­
manticized portrait of the old-fashioned paternalistic politics of urban bosses, specifically, the 
Democratic political machine of Boston in the early Fifties. The story follows the last election 
campaign for mayor of Frank Skefiington, who has already served as governor of the state. 
Skeffington, whose career (Milne informs us) is based on that of the historical James M. Cur­
ley, is a septuagenarian widower and the father of a frivolous playboy immune to his ironies.
He is presented as the best type of old-time politician, frankly paternalistic and famous for his 
political bans mots: “There’s a considerable difference between what they say they want and
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what they’ll settle for. You can promise them the first, but only have to deliver the second”
230). His crackpot political opponent, Charles Hennessey, is, he says both “honest and crazy,” 
a combination that killed him, although the former type can succeed in politics and there is much 
evidence the second type has succeeded (186).
Skeffington may serve as afictional example of Robert Dahl’s description of the features 
that explain power (Chapt.lb): as the incumbent mayor, he lias the allocative resources at his 
disposal to both dispense largesse and make deals; as campaigner, he is both highly motivated 
and supremely skilled, making use of local folk rituals, like the Irish wake, to garner votes. It 
becomes clear that in office he has been both efficient and corrupt, adept at persuasion (he is a 
brilliant extempore orator), compromise, and, when deemed necessary, applying pressure. The 
consummate politician, Skeffington is personally charming, witty, urbane, cynical, and possess­
ing an intimate knowledge of the by-ways of his fiefdom. He tolerates and makes use of a loyal 
band of retainers but will cashier a subordinate if he becomes a political liability, as in the 
episode with the skirt-chasing Johnny Byrne whose escapades would scandalize puritanical 
Irish-American voters. His strength and eventual downfall is precisely in a uniquely personal 
style of doing politics: he asks after family members by name, lends money, does personal fa­
vors, and solves problems, receiving a line of petitioners at home every morning before being 
driven to the office. In other words, he might make an effective and popular leader for a small, 
semi-rural community, but as big-city mayor can only become the victim of historical change.
Skeffington is tolerant ofhangers-on and ineffectual opponents like Hennessey but ruth­
less wife enemies, like fee greedy undertaker or fee treacherous union boss. On fee campaign 
trail, he invites his nephew Adam to accompany him as an observer, a device designed to pres­
ent a more private, sympathetic view of fee man to balance the public view of the politician
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(Milne 165), but which is rather unconvincing since the old man is characterized as someone 
who necessarily keeps his own counsel. His only serious opponent in the election race is the 
mild-mannered non-entity McCluskey, chosen to run for his malleability by the local powers of 
progressive capital: the slippery banker Cass, self-righteous newspaper editor Force, and oth­
ers less visible, who have leagued together to finally get Skeffington voted out of office. All 
are moralistic and rather unsavory characters, except the colorless McCluskey, forming a 
somewhat simplistic contrast to the flawed but fully humanized mayor. Even the characters who 
occupy a middle ground between respect and distrust secretly admire him as a lone example of 
a lost breed. The author’s dice are so loaded in Skeffington’s favor that it is difficult not to 
agree. His wit, candor, and refreshing lack ofhvpocrisy are so unlike the professional politi­
cians one encounters that one is evidently meant to overlook the fact that by any objective cri­
teria he should have been ousted from office long ago. As the title indicates, however, the story 
is to be one of human pathos. Despite numerous references to dishonesty, fraud, and misman­
agement of public funds, these unpleasant things remain firmly in the background. Every time 
we see Skeffington in action, he is either crushing some fool or ruining some scoundrel.
Why then is it the mayor’s “last hurrah”? The answer that die novel gives is what histori­
cally took place. The favor-granting bosses became obsolete once the federal government itself 
became the instrument of political paternalism. They were effectively finished off by Roose­
velt’s New Deal policies of the late Thirties and early Forties. Roosevelt took “the handouts 
out of the local hands” (330), in effect depriving them of die power that derives from rewards 
and inducements. Hie decade-long delay in Skeffington’s fall is explained by his considerable 
personal resilience, tenacity, and political savvy. The electorate finally opts for change once 
he is perceived as belonging to the past The loss of the election is therefore explained in the
novel as not owing to his well-known abuses of power but to external historical forces beyond 
his control.
At the end of the novel, fee politically independent Gardiner is made to enumerate 
Skeffington’s many excesses and crimes, as he watches ahorse-drawn hearse (apt symbol of the 
m oor’s old-fashioned elegance) take the old man’s body to the cemetery. The list is depress- 
ingly familiar: public works that were executed unnecessarily and for three times the cost; con­
tracts diverted to political supporters; tax rebates given to campaign contributors; the redrawing 
of boundaries for political advantage (gerrymandering); people on the payroll who do no work 
(featherbedding); and the awarding of public jobs to old friends. In spite of all this, Gardiner 
reflects, “Skeffington had always amused and attracted him, and in a sense, he felt a great sym­
pathy for him” (360). Such is the dazzle of the mayor’s personality that his abuses of public 
office are erased; nor will they detract from his historically heroic stature, as the final two 
chapters, devoted to his poignant death and grandiose funeral, emphasize.
In fee end, then, Skeffington is sentimentalized, his abuses of power attenuated to fee 
novel’s vision of him as a veritable symbol of a by-gone age, a more colorful and even heroic 
time than fee television-dominated present is likely to be (there is a fine Fifties set-piece of 
McCluskey filming a TV slot at home, wife wife, kids, and dog). Skeffington, who always 
makes personal appearances, is seen as fee human alternative to bland modernization To be 
sure, O’Connor strikes a chord in fee reader here wife his portrait of fee evils of contemporary 
capitalism and television politics: something valuable has been lost Hie problem is the substi­
tution of myth and selective memory feat reduces the past to nostalgia rather than as lesson for 
fee present, a falsifying practice taken up by fee current conservative congressional leader 
Newt Gingrich with his “history” lessons.
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For a less accommodating view of the often crooked and brutal paternalism of die Irish- 
American pols, one must turn to a much later novel, William Kennedy’s Billy Phelan’s Great­
est Game (1978), a work that does justice to a political past without either Mailer’s speechify­
ing or O’Connor’s sentimentality. In the novel, the McCall brothers rule Albany, New York, 
with an iron hand They control the legal administration (through rigged elections), including 
tíie police, as well as illegal gambling and minor rackets, through methods (bribery, blacklist­
ing, strong-arm coercion) that make Skeffington’s abuses look like peccadilloes. The contrast 
between their kind of politics and legitimate authority that can be recognized even by a gambler 
can be seen in the following dialogue between the reporter, Daugherty, and Morrie, (he 
(Jewish) gambler:
[Morrie]“My old man wanted me to study politics, but I always knew politics 
was for chumps.”
[Daugherty] ‘The McCalls do all right with i t”
‘‘What they do ain’t politics.”
“What would you call it?”
“They got a goddamn Roman Empire. They own all the people. They own the 
churches. They even own most of the Jews in town” (267).
And here is Danghtery reflecting with true Irish eloquence on his own inability to influence
events in his locked-up town:
The condition of being a powerless Albany Irishman ate holes in his forbear­
ance. Piss-ant martyr to the rapine culture, to the hypocritical hand-shakers, the 
priest suckups, the nigger-hating cops, the lace-curtain Grundys, and the cut- 
glass banker-thieves who marked his city lousy (272-3).
c.
Allen Drury’s Advise and Consent (1959) deals forthrightly with the McCarthy-era is­
sues of loyalty, subversion, and the abuse of public power, although its rewards on the market­
place (best-seller adapted to Broadway play and Hollywood film) might alert one to the accu­
racy of its perceptions. Elizabeth Long has argued that popular novels are a mode of access to
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the subjective dimensions of collective life; operating within the conventions of literary real­
ism, popular novels imply a community of shared meaning (3-5). This is almost but not quite to 
say, as Gramsci and other Marxists have, that most writing in any period contributes to the 
dominant culture’s power to particularize general truths, which is what makes popular works 
effective in embodying ruling-class meanings and values (Williams, Problems 37-45). Advise 
and Consent is a good illustration of this idea. The novel is replete with Cold War clichés 
about the Soviets’ evil intentions (‘They don’t want things to be worked out peacefully,” 
whines a Senator, 134) and the sincere but innocent efforts of Americans (“We’ve tried,” says 
the same Senator, “In our blundering, well-meaning way, God knows we’ve tried... some where 
along the way it’s seemed to go wrong” (125).
This curious notion of the US as helpless victim of circumstance and an evil adversary 
finds an echo as recent as Ronald Reagan’s pronouncements and is partly grounded in the uncer­
tainty of national purpose arising from the launching of the Soviet satellite Sputnik (two years 
before Drury’s work was published), an event that shocked the public into a realization that US 
technical superiority could no longer be taken for granted. The novel shows how doubts sud­
denly arose about die American way of life depicted on television as inherently desirable, 
doubts about manufactured goods and sloppy services, an indifference to the world at large and 
fearful loss of national purpose: in the novel’s rather clumsy phrases, “The Age of the 
Shoddy,” ‘The Age of the Shrug,” and “dry rot” (592-93). Narrator and characters fret con­
stantly in the familiar conservative conviction that these things could be set right if only right- 
thinking people would be resolute enough to do so. The underlying meaning of this lack of do­
mestic will (“...we have forgotten how to do anything but question ourselves in one vast pa­
ralysis of self-doubt,” 245) is a failure to make a firm stand against Communism. In this way the 
novel becomes an indirect apology for the Cold War.
Advise and Consent is set in Washington, which is glamorized, in contrast to its provin­
ciality in Gore Vidal’s novels. The story is told by way of long, mostly inconclusive dialogues, 
evidently meant to represent the hearty “old boy” conversations among the powerful that have 
been done much better by Vidal, or, for that matter, by the Victorian novelist Anthony Trollope 
in his Palliser novels. Although ostensibly a story of the US Senate, the central feature of 
American politics, the two party system, is generally ignored: there are no Democrats and Re­
publicans. The bargaining and compromises of partisan politics are scrapped for the more dra­
matic conflicts of ambitious individuals locked in personal struggle. Despite fee realist presen­
tation, wife four long sections giving biographical background for fee four principal Senators, 
these gentlemen remain as schematized as Mailer’s characters and politically less interesting. 
Intended to reveal fee human character behind the decisions, fee biographies turn out to be 
padding, since the decisions are not made in consequence of established character but of melo­
dramatic plot
The basic conflict centers on fee Senate’s confirmation of Robert LefBngwell, a smooth 
but shady liberal, appointed by the President to be Secretary of State, whose international im­
portance, it is stressed, is even greater in a time of super-power stand-off A former college 
professor, Leffingwell has been an able bureaucrat, especially skilled at influencing public 
opinion. He is therefore doubly suspect In fee Fifties, intellectuals were seen as “egg-heads,” 
bright and eloquent perhaps, but soft on Communism and so not politically reliable for fee busi­
ness of defending fee free world. Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower’s urbane and articulate oppo­
nent, was the period’s quintessential “egg-head,” no match for fee General, who, while politi-
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cally shrewd, had a grandfaiherly maimer and verbal ineptitude that guaranteed his trustworthy 
image. It is highly unlikely that such a figure would be, as Leffingweli is, the darling of the 
press, but Drury’s perception of the media also belongs to an ideology that was outdated even 
at the time. The members of the Washington press corps are depersonalized in the novel, shar­
ing identical opinions and identified only by the papers they represent. In contrast to the pon­
derous and scrupulous Senators, they play favorites, prejudge issues, and are revealed as dupes 
of an unidentified liberal establishment
In a situation recalling McCarthyism, Leffingweli is accused by a disaffected subordinate 
of having belonged to a Communist cell in his university days. Although he destroys this fellow 
in skillful cross-examination, lingering doubts remain about his confirmation. Two opponents 
emerge, Seab Cooley for the wrong reason (revenge), Brig Anderson for the right (patriotic 
concern). Cooley, a powerful Southern conservative, schemes for the missing witness to make 
himself known. Anderson, all-American boy from the West, is as Chairman of the confirmation 
committee anxious to prevent confirming a liar to such an important post The novel thus fol­
lows the general conflictual pattern ofFifties1 best-sellers. Long (104-7) identifies the novels 
in the decade following the end of the war as registering little social conflict, while those of the 
late Fifties portray heroes trying to avoid being manipulated by complex forces and survive 
with dignity. Brig Anderson’s situation clearly belongs to this category.
Anderson’s opposition brings him into conflict wife the President, press, and fellow 
Senators who are mostly in favor of confirmation. His strong will and well-known integrity are 
no match for these combined forces, which illustrates both Arendt’s dictum that strength is 
never a match for power and the truism that in politics ethical principles are often sacrificed to 
ambition. TTie President calls upon all die means of power at his disposal to bring Anderson to
M l
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heel: respectively, positive inducement, tactical surprise, exercise of authority, verbal persua­
sion, and, when all else fails, negative coercion. He offers to buy him off with a promise of 
federal assistance to his home state; he outflanks the Senator with a public announcement of 
support for the nominee; he decides simply to ship the inconvenient witness abroad. When An­
derson argues that none of these maneuvers will turn the nominee from a proven liar into a man 
of trust, the President offers the wonderfully sophistic argument that the nominee’s very devi­
ousness is precisely what makes him the ideal man to deal with the Soviets. Since the Presi­
dent’s re-election prospects evidently depend on the confirmation, he finally resorts to black­
mailing Anderson, claiming to subordinates that “there is always something in a man’s back­
ground” that can eventually be used against him.8 Hie novel thus (unwittingly) illustrates Gram- 
sci’s idea that parliamentary government is a balance between coercion and consensus.
In a plot turn worthy of a  soap-opera, the President’s opportunity miraculously turns up in 
the hands of a Supreme Court Justice, aLefBngweil supporter, who, we are asked to believe, 
conspires not only with the President and Senate Msyority Leader but with an ambitious dema­
gogue (Sea Van Ackerman) to destroy Senator Anderson’s reputation, thus clearing the way for 
confirmation. Ackerman has been identified as McCarthy, although the two could not be more 
different ideologically. He is the strongest supporter of Leffingwell, whom one could easily 
imagine McCarthy fulminating against as a Red menace to national security, and it is inconceiv­
able to imagine McCarthy making speeches, as Ackerman does, appeasing the Soviets (Kristol 
38). 9
The novel exemplifies the unequal distribution of Dahl’s explanatory features (cf 
Chapt 1, sec.Ib). Thus, in the President vs. Anderson conflict, the former has many more re­
sources at his disposal, although he is weak in diplomatic skill. Cooley and Leffingwell have
greater motivation than the others but are defeated for lack of resources, notably credibility. 
With respect to costs, Anderson pays a heavy price for his political victory. As an example of 
how power works in a constitutional system, as Drury evidently intended, however, the novel 
could hardly be worse. It shows how power may corrupt legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of government. It shows clear preference for the Senate’s aristocratic forum of men of 
presumed sound judgment and institutional experience over the expressed gullibility of the pub­
lic and a sensation-hungry press, often depicted as wolves out for blood. The title, taken from a 
senatorial formula, suggests that power is disseminated through the system and has an orderly 
course of operation. While this notion is ritually invoked by the narrator (‘The whole story of 
the creation of the American government is the deliberate diffusion of power...,” 320), the story 
itself shows that only a few Senators actually count in the real decision-making, and that influ­
ence consists in the greater capability of eliciting favors and applying pressure. Drury often 
describes the Senate as a kind of exclusive club where members engage in civilized debate 
(“...amiable gentlemen who like each other and had much rather get along together than tear 
each other apart..,” 103), but his story shows how these amiable gentlemen revile each other on 
the Senate floor, maneuver to exclude each other from important committees, and make secret 
deals.
The novel therefore contains a serious contradiction. It tells the story of how power cor­
rupts at die highest levels and in a11 branches of government and yet it seeks to uphold with 
platitudes the basic decency and integrity of its institutions. Nor does Milne’s platitudinous 
observation that some men are good, some bad, do much good here. The majority leader and the 
vice-president, both presented as good men, go along with die President’s blackmail, or at least 
do nothing to try to stop it Hie redressing of the moral balance at the end (Van Ackerman is
censured, LeffingwelPs confirmation is voted down, and the President conveniently dies) is 
wholly contrived It is also highly doubtful in the context of this novel, not to mention the politi­
cal history of the post-war years, that, as Milne thinks, it is a good that the American system of 
government permits the freedom to both right and wrong. It is such “freedom” that has allowed 
the growth of an imperial presidency since the war which the separation of powers, so lauded 
by Drury, was designed to prevent
In another of William Kennedy’s Albany novels, Legs (1975), which relates the career of 
the gangster Jack “Legs” Diamond, one finds a passage that might describe Druiy’s unwitting 
view of the congressional institution. The narrator is a lawyer who has given up a respectable 
practice and a future career in Congress to work for Diamond:
When I think back now to whether the Congress or the time with Jack would 
have given me more insight into American life, I always lean to Jack. In the 
Congress I would have learned how rudimentary hypocrisy is turned into patriot­
ism, into national policy, and into the law, and how hypocrites become heroes of 
our people (117).
d
Although often cited as a distinguished example of literary modernism, with an obvious 
debt to Faulkner, Robert Penn Warren’ sAll the King’s Men (1947) shares the melodramatic 
plot, surprise revelations, and violent resolution common to both serious and popular American 
fiction. At the same time, it manages to be a study of regional politics, a roman a c le f (it is 
claimed) based on the career of former Louisiana state governor Huey Long and was read, or 
misread, as a sympathetic account of a dictatorial demagogue by outraged liberal critics 
(Baumbach 17). Willy Stark’s career in a number of respects resembles Long’s, e.g. both be­
come state governors in the Bible Belt in the Thirties, but, as I shall argue, Stark is more in­
spired by Long than a fictionalized portrait of him. The novel’s controlling consciousness is the
narrator Jack Burden’s and it is his conflict that is worked out. Stark’s aide, Burden is a cyni­
cally uninvolved young man who comes to seek redemption and self-knowledge by “coming to 
terms with his past and its burden.” The novel is therefore usually read as a resonant moral 
fable set in apolitical context, but I shall read it as Stark’s, not Burden’s story, i.e. mainly as a 
political fiction. Although Stark is seen only through Burden’s eyes, like Jay Gatsby in Nick 
Carroway’s, he takes on a vitality like Gatsbv’s that survives the limited point-of-view.
Stark’s political career begins as humble county treasurer in red-hill country, where he 
opposes the favoritism and racism of a local boss in the construction contract for anew school, 
is ousted from office, and tries exposing the boss’s corruption by distributing handbills but is 
prevented by the sheriff a cohort of the boss. Burden is a big-city reporter who tells the story in 
a series of articles in which he cynically presents Stark as one who “keeps his faith with the 
people.” When the school collapses from the use of faulty material and children are killed.
Stark becomes a legend and Burden decides to help him, apolitical naif and “moral rookie.” 
Stark’s political style of reciting facts and figures is scrupulous but boring; it is transformed 
into a folksy populist rhetoric that appeals to the common people’s sense of being ignored or 
exploited by their leaders. His new style adds to his charisma and he eventually becomes gov­
ernor and finds himself in the position of being able to do concrete deeds. As his manipulative 
skills increase, however, ends and means become confused, which becomes Warren’s ethical 
focus on the uses of political power. Stark is effective but skirts legality-he has, for example, 
packed the state Supreme Court with his own people. Conservatives make the familiar com­
plaint that he is “giving the state away” with his social programs, which he pays for by taxing 
the rich. As his eventual enemy, Judge Irwin grudgingly admits, “He’s played it hard and close. 
But there’s one principle he’s grasped; you don’t make omelets without breaking eggs” (124).
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The first sentence, referring to a way of plying poker, and the second, a slogan of Mao Zedong, 
suggest Stark’s effective but undemocratic politics. His moral complexity makes him a conun­
drum for liberal theory. He pushes successfully for welfare for the aged and infirm, health care 
for the poor, and increased public education, and pays for them by taxing rich individuals and 
corporations, revolutionary ideas for his time and place. The monument he wishes to build for 
his own posterity, for example, is a huge modern hospital for the poor. He demands monk-like 
poverty and obedience from subordinates (chastity, however, is not his strong suit); no one in 
his administration is to get rich on graft, kickbacks, or illegal deals.
His other, darker side is revealed in the course of chastising a corrupt state auditor, who 
has been j uggling the books for private gain. He fires the man but blocks his impeachment 
merely to show the opposition who is really in control and snuffs further protest by threats. His 
ethically proper Attorney-General Hugh Miller (“clean hands and a pure heart”) resigns, ob­
jecting to the auditor’s escaping the legal punishment that he himself has been so efficient at 
dealing out Stark lectures him on the inadequacy of the law: “You made fur flv and put tin-horn 
grafters in the pen. But you never touched what was behind 'em. The law isn’t made for them.
All you can do about that is take the damned government away from the behind guys and keep it 
away from ‘em any way you can” (137), a folksy version of the Marxist-Leninist idea of law as 
the vehicle of the ruling class and the necessity of seizing and holding on to power in a legal 
situation of structural injustice. Is this revolutionary necessity or dictatorial rationalization?
Warren’s answer, unsurprisingly, is a complex liberal one. When the opposition next try 
to impeach Stark himself for his legal omission with the auditor, he makes a direct appeal to the 
masses, who rally to his support, an illustration ofWeber’s idea that charismatic power may 
override the legal type but also may for the same reason be more easily abused, as is shown by
Stalk’s use of intimidation. “Do you know what I can do to you?” he asks a hapless victim, and 
Burden adds, “And he could do it, too. For he had the goods” (147), where the “goods” are the 
means of bribery and blackmail that he uses to get the opposition leader to vote against im­
peachment Stark understands the differences between the means of power, which for him are 
usually methods of neutral izatioa Preferring to destroy rather than simply bribe to achieve 
compliance, he explains: “Bust 'em and they stay busted, but buy £em and you can’t tell how 
long they stay bought” (232). To destroy Judge Irwin for supporting his opponent, Stark in­
structs Burden to dig up some “dirt” to smear the Judge’s reputation, explaining that there is 
always something in a man’s background that can be used against him, a method that has been 
used to great effect against presidential candidates in recent years, but it cannot easily be justi­
fied as revolutionary pragmatism Nor, and this is periiaps the important point in Warren’s 
moral indictment of Stark, is the means employed always for good ends, as is seen when Stark’s 
wild son Tom is involved in an accident where a girl is killed and Tom’s responsibility is cov­
ered up by state police under Stark’s orders.
Stark is not so much a Machiavellian or a homespun Lenin, however, as a more obviously 
American type, amoral pragmatist who believes that what is right is what produces results 
(Blair 461). It is ironic that what brings about Stark’s downfall is an idealistic impulse, the 
great hospital for the poor for which he wants Adam, a famous surgeon, as director. Both men 
are imperfect idealists who are doomed to destroy one another: Adam “the idealist doomed by 
his ideals,” because basically powerless; Stark, ruthless with the individuals around him, is 
fervid only in the defense of the faceless masses (Blair 460,468). Adam wants no part of 
Stark, but Burden has obligingly dug up fee “goods” for his boss on Adam’s father, who once 
took a bribe (covered up by Judge Irwin), and is therefore able to coerce Adam, pious toward
his father’s memory, into accepting the job. Burden can also blur means and ends, giving Adam 
the justification that at the hospital Adam can do real good. Adam wants to take the job on 
condition there be no interference from Stark, but Stark gives him a lesson in the realities of 
power (256-9), whose essence is that Adam could only keep his hands clean in an operating- 
room When he practices medicine in a state institution, he is, of course, part of a system of 
power. The question in the novel persists, however, if high-handed or illegal methods are the 
only way, or the only effective way of doing the world’s business (to which Foucault’s answer 
might be that the established institutional methods are far more effective). To Burden’s home­
made “theory of historical costs,” that “maybe a man has to sell his soul to get die power to do 
good” (394), one might add that if men needn’t sell their souls they can hardly escape having 
them transformed in the act of modern power formations.
Burden’s theory of historical costs, which he also calls the “theory of the moral neutrality 
of history,” would resound with echoes ofhigh-falutin’ historical theories but is shown by War­
ren to be basically flawed. Adam’s desire for objective distance is not possible in any real 
world, but the responsibility of an agent for his actions and its consequences is not thereby re­
moved, although Burden acts as if it were. As Hugh Miller says, “Histoiy is blind, but man is 
not” (436). This becomes die burden of Jack Burden, to accept (in the novel’s final words) his 
place in “histoiy and the awful responsibility of time.” He comes to acknowledge the inextri­
cable nature of private and public life when he says that his own and Stark’s stories are one 
story. He has tried to remain aloof, even inert (“The Big Sleep”) or think of action as simple 
reflex (“Hie Big Twitch”), but his story questions the liberal search for private certainties re­
moved from public responsibility. Consider his concern with discovering and revealing the 
truth, thought of in that tradition as the supremely individual and self-liberating act Burden’s
revelations in fact destroy several lives. On the other hand, withholding the truth from his 
mother, like her withholding from him the truth of Irwin’s paternity, are noble acts. His work 
for Stark has been to discover the truth about people, but truth as “dirt” or “goods,” material for 
blackmail. Truth is not innocent and not always liberating.
Stark’s life and career, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, resembles Huey 
Long’s (1893-1935). Governor of Louisiana who rose to national prominence before being 
shot dead by Dr. Carl Weiss for reasons that never became clear (Wilke and Helterman 516), 
Long instituted a socio-economic refonn program opposed by the state legislature but finally 
pushed through after he gained control of the state through a system of extensive patronage. He 
built roads, schools, and hospitals, taxed large businesses, especially oil companies, and used 
pressure and bribery to get his laws passed. He was impeached (1929) but not convicted. In all 
this he resembles Stark, but unlike him., Long went on to be elected to the US Senate and contin­
ued to control Louisiana from Washington through a puppet successor. As virtual absentee gov­
ernor, Long reorganized the state by virtually abolishing local government and retaining the 
power to appoint all state employees. He hoped to succeed Franklin Roosevelt as President, 
and his “share fee wealth” plan, which included a guaranteed family income, was in fact far 
more radical than Roosevelt’s New Deal (“Long, Huey” 1607).
It seems feat Stark is not a very precise portrait of Long, as Warren has always insisted. 
He was much more powerful, both in unscrupulous means and effective results, and yet more 
visionary than the literary character. Stark’s vision is reduced to an obsession wife an un­
tainted hospital feat is revealed to be futile. ‘Tin building feat place, fee best in fee country, and 
a bugger like Tiny is not going to mess wife if’ (233), but it is Tiny, fee corrupt underling, who 
will cut a deal for its construction, who indirectly causes Stark’s and Adam’s deaths, and who
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will succeed Stark as governor after all. Stark and Adam, “the man of fact” and “the man of 
idea,” cancel each other out, leaving the field free for the Tiny Dufiys. Warren has retained 
some of the more “colorful” aspects of Long’s legend but suppressed his greater historical suc­
cess and his socialistic tendencies. This suggests that Stark is not to be seen, as liberal critics 
feared, as a glorification of a dictator, since Long achieved far greater glory, but perhaps noth­
ing more than fee now banal observation feat power corrupts (Baumbach offers fee suggestion 
feat Stark is closer to Conrad’s Kurtz than to fee historical Long). The corruption is, in fee end, 
not political (which can, Stark shows, sometimes be effective) but moral, and the story ends 
firmly in fee hands of Burden, since neither extreme, Staric or Adam, is finally acceptable. Al­
though this novel as a study of political power is much more penetrating and interesting than fee 
others I have discussed in this chapter, it too can ultimately be seen as an example of fee liberal 
tendency to evade political realities by transforming them into individual moral or psychologi­
cal issues.
d.
When I began this chapter by observing that politics is the site where power is legiti­
mately exercised, fee reference was, of course, to modern bourgeois democratic politics. In 
retrospect, however, such a reference, if it were exclusive, would risk canceling out fee novels 
I have analyzed as political. What strikes one in fee most general terms is how far fee political 
vision they project is from that of American political theorists like Hannah Arendt and Talcott 
Parsons, for whom power is essentially ‘‘binding obligations,” consensual (Arendt) or contrac­
tual (Parsons) relations feat are enabling, inherently noble. What is common to all fee novels 
examined here is precisely a distrust or disbelief in democratic, consensus-seeking politics, 
which points to a lack of faith in fee kind of constitutional government feat is fee pride of fee
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American political system. All these novels share the cynical (or realistic) belief that power 
works in more devious, extra-official, and illegal ways than the best American political theory 
seems to acknowledge. This might suggest that novelists are more perceptive than philosophers 
about political and social reality or that their vision is the more radical one, but the novels in 
one way or another also share the Machiavellian idea, which both the philosophers named 
roundly reject, that shrewd, ambitious, and manipulative individuals are more effective, for 
good and evil, than the clumsy mechanisms of democratic systems.
it may be said that the very laboriousness of such mechanisms do not readily lend them­
selves to imaginative treatment Drury is exemplary here: despite his cumbersome efforts to 
reproduce the essence of senatorial debate, he has to resort to melodrama to get his story told. 
Since a true political novel of ideas is lacking, the authors must fall back on the psychologizing 
that is the stock-in-trade of other, non-political novels of the time. These novelists, at this par­
ticular historical moment, perceived power as residing in the individual will, which is true of 
Mailer’s radicals, Warren’s dictatorial governor, O’Connor’s paternalistic mayor, and Drury’s 
maneuvering senators. Their view conflicts with Arendt’s truly democratic vision of power as 
collective, inherent in the formation of political communities, which bases its legitimacy on die 
past As Arendt argues, when power seeks to justify itself it appeals to the future, to unfulfilled 
promises, to an end outside itself This is die type of power found in these novels; it is justi­
fied, not legitimated.
To be sure, this view may well imply a just criticism of the American political system as 
a system that does not live up to its declared principles and ideals, and the novels therefore may 
be said to have their historical as well as aesthetic utility. And yet, to summarize once more the 
salient points, Mailer’s novel is politically confused, O’Connor identifies with his suspect
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protagonist, and Drury fatuously supports what he himself shows to be an inadequate system. 
Even Warren, who presents the most credible historical context and gives a skillful portrait of a 
charismatic leader, ultimately only suggests ethical questions (means vs. ends, the proper do­
main of legitimate action) that are probably moot, at least within the terms he has defined them.
TTie question of context brings up a second negative trait, one that is likely to be fatal for 
apolitical novel, the absence of grounding in historical experience. O’Connor evokes a period 
through the falsifying lens of nostalgia The roman a c le fpretensions of Drury’s novel with 
respect to the McCarthy era are not sufficient to conceal the ideological confusion of the author 
or save the novel from affirming itself as an over-extended soap-opera Mailer’s more serious 
attempt at a dialectical work dealing with radically opposed ideologies fails through his in­
ability to achieve credible links between past and present, or between events and experience 
inside and out of his novel, a defect that does not, of course, negate the reality of fictional 
worlds but calls into question the relevance of political theorizing in a novel devoid of histori­
cal contingency. Mailer might have opted, like Orwell, for allegory, but as I have tried to 
show, an allegorical reading breaks down in a conflict with pseudo-realism and messianic 
pseudo-Marxism.
Even Warren’s novel, much superior to the others as fiction, has fallen prey to simplified 
solutions in the resolution of its political issues. Whereas in Mailer, the victory of the right- 
wing is clear, though it leaves room for a vapid and unearned optimism at die end, the mutual 
canceling out of Adam and Stark conveniently leaves Burden free of political responsibility to 
reclaim his soiled soul: “Redemption as a happy ending,” as Baumbach unkindly but accurately 
puts it (34), an ending that is, after all, rather pat, since neither extreme turns out to be accept­
able in itself (Milne 155). This suggests Sacvan Berkovitch’s view of the American liberal
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ideology of process as “telos,” the capacity to negate conflict by absorbing it as part of a 
hopeful process leading to a better future.10 Burden, the disillusioned idealist turned cynic 
survives the mutual destruction of conflicting opposites to emerge into a hard-won knowledge 
of himself (though he makes a bow to history in his final words), what will become in later 
decades the familiar liberal middle way—here between the two personalized extremes of World 
and Idea.
Warren’s emphasis on Burden’s complex inner conflicts and the defining of the reader’s 
interpretation of Stark’s actions through the filter of Burden’s narrative perception has, as I 
pointed out at the beginning of section (c), become the orthodox reading of the novel by liberal 
critics. The novel is in fact a good fictional example of the cultural consensus of revisionist 
liberalism with its view of a given human nature, subject to error and sin, wife fee intercon­
nected components of good and evil in fee individual and fee individual’s perpetual suscepti­
bility to corruption, in this case by power. These factors make fee novel for critics of fee new 
post-war persuasion a “vehicle for fee ironies and paradoxes of fee moral life and the social 
history it produces” (Schaub 22).
The presentation of Burden as fee novel’s center and fee view of man as inherently cor­
ruptible accords wife what Thomas Schaub {Cold War vii) calls fee new or “revisionist” lib­
eralism of fee late Forties and early Fifties, a fearful and yet determined postwar response of 
writers and critics to fee charged political climate and disheartening events which I have de­
scribed above (cf Introduction to Pail II). Revisionist liberals thought of themselves as “tough- 
minded” in reaction to fee supposedly tender-minded, sentimental, and naive faith in utopian 
solutions of fee older progressive liberals and socialists of fee Thirties. In their opposition to 
Communism and its betrayal of liberal hopes, fee new liberals proposed a tough “reality” as
opposed to the “ideology” of older leftists and the exaggerations of the McCarthy right. Both 
Schaub and Russell Reising posit Lionel Trilling’s influential The Liberal Imagination (1950) 
as the basic text for the newer and tougher liberalism, a book that they think became the domi­
nant interpretation of American literature and culture at the time Warren’s novel was published 
and discussed (Reising 93; Schaub 20). Rather than analyzing the political climate more 
acutely, Trilling adopts in the essays in this work the ahistorical Freudian tactic of positing 
reality as basically psychological, “an experience of complexity that has its generative roots in 
the ineradicable conflicts of the private self’ (Schaub 21).
Warren, who wrote his first book was on the radical abolitionist martyr, John Brown, 
was associated with the Southern Agrarians and a contributor to their conservative manifesto
1 ’11 Take My Stand (1930), and yet he was not considered conservative enough to the conster­
nation of Donald Davidson or Allen Tate. For Warren, the “truth” was to be determined in the 
plurality of contrary voices, an eminently liberal position (Clark 301), one which we are hear­
ing again in fee Nineties, wife fee calls for and celebrations of a new pluralism.11 Schaub 
points out that although fee New York-based intellectuals like Trilling were ostensibly in con­
flict wife fee Agrarians and New Critics (John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, Cleanth Brooks), 
wife whom Warren is also associated (Agrarians and New Critics tend to overlap), both New 
York critics and fee southern New Critics unintentionally produced fee discourse of fee liberal 
consensus, as both groups essentially argued for a formalist aesthetic, with irony, contradiction, 
and paradox as fee greatest virtues of literature. For fee New Critics, who were greatly influ­
enced by fee criticism of T.S. Eliot, fee dynamic “tension” of certain kinds of poetry (e.g. the 
metaphysicals had it; fee romantics did not) was what they favored for other kinds of literature 
as well when they finally turned to discussions of fee novel. Social relevance became largely
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irrelevant in these discussions, except when social materials themselves are aesthetically or­
dered, as in Warren’s novel. For the New York critics, who held up the European modernists 
as the only proper models for American prose fiction, form is what kept literature from becom­
ing mere “statement,” or worse, propaganda (Schaub 31-35). The worry over producing 
propaganda instead of real literature is partly the cause of post-war fiction’s retreat from an 
engagement wife political issues (and its perceived unrealistic ideologies) and its escape into 
fee more adequately managed complexities of the self As Schaub summarizes fee situation:
“The discourse of resistance and reform was no longer dominated by fee language of social and 
economic forces, giving way, instead, to explanatory models based in psychology—to a re­
newed focus upon fee mind” (69).
NOTES
1 Howe has chapters on Stendhal, Dostoevsky, Conrad, Turgenev, and Janes, and, in a chapter 
devoted to American novelists, Hawthorne, James, and Henry Adams.
2 These two kinds of definitions, stipulative and reportive, are employed in analytic philosophy 
(Hospers 32-4).
3 Wife this in mind, I do not treat fictions of race, class, and gender here as “political novels,” 
although by a broader definition they would clearly be considered so. Since these kinds of 
worics are concerned, even primarily so, wife relationships of power, they are political fictions 
in fee broader sense than I am using in this chapter.
4 Despite these unimpeachable examples from European literature, when it comes to American 
novels, Karl’s idea of fee political novel is less predictable. He discusses Mailer and Trilling, 
as I do below, as well as Doctorow’s and Coover’s more recent novels about fee Rosenbergs, 
but also adds, curiously, Saul Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King (1959) while admitting.
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however, that “we must extend the idea of politics to fit the book, rather than contract the novel 
to fit apolitical scheme,” i.e. what is usually regarded as apolitical novel. The “existential 
grit” of Henderson, surely, is not “political” in the way, for example, the conflicts of Ralph 
Ellison's Invisible Man (1952) are.
5 Howe, for example (20), agrees with fee wariness theory but thinks it is a “mistake” on fee 
part of our writers.
6 Tanner (352) calls fee object “feat elusive mystery of power” that no party or country can 
“appropriate or exploit” Sergio Bellei recalls Poe’s purloined letter and Lacan’s well-known 
reading of it: “The power of the symbolic order of fee unconscious constitutes and empowers 
subjectivities as they confront each other to possess fee missing object, which, while not con­
cealed, controls fee exchange of power between them” (private communication). Hie subject is 
therefore lost in fee collective game of knowledge This is so ingenious feat it is a pity Mailer 
cannot have taken up fee suggestion, but fee object is after all concealed by and known to 
McLeod, and eventually to Lovett if not to the reader.
7 Hiss, in a verdict feat is still controversial, was found guilty (1950) and served four years in 
prison (“Alger Hiss” 381),
8 This tactical use of blackmail to break apolitical opponent seems to have been borrowed 
without acknowledgement from Robert Penn Warren’s earlier (1947) novel where fee Gover­
nor uses almost identical words to describe his intention, hi a further similarity, the accused 
man also commits suicide. Cf my discussion of the novel below, section (c).
9 For other roman a c le f associations, cf. Milne (175-77). Despite his suggestions of historical 
personages as models for Drury’s characters, Milne rightly calls attention to “humors” or typed 
quality of even fee main characters, fee typing by explanatory epithets of the secondary ones.
127
and the resort to gross stereotypes for the foreign diplomats. One has to agree with Cord Meyer 
(328» whose review Milne cites) that no “folly imagined and complexly motivated human 
beings confronting wife believable anguish fee hard choices feat practical politics frequently 
present” appear in fee novel. Milne would make an exception for Brig Anderson. While it is 
debatable as to how “ believable” Anderson’s anguish is, he is able to defeat the nomination 
and fee President even if  he cannot save his own career. His suicide therefore seems unnecessa­
ry.
10 I owe (his suggestion to Prof Sergio Bellei.
11 Clark, whose essay title is revelatory, wishes to argue feat the New Criticism was not fee 
“Tory Formalism” it is accused of being, but that liberal ideal of “something akin to democratic 
pluralism” (302). He is feus in fundamental agreement wife Schaub, although unlike him he evi­
dently approves politically of his new formulation.
CHAPTER 3
“MOVERS AND SHAKERS”: PERSONALISM AND POWER IN THE HISTORICAL
NOVELS OF GORE VIDAL
‘True history is the final fiction” (Vidal)
a.
Among his steady production of novels and essays, Gore Vidal has been writing histori­
cal fiction about power in the upper levels of the US government for nearly three decades. 
Washington D. C. (1961) was the first such novel to appear, though it covers the historical pe­
riod latest in time, the decade following the Second World War. The novel tells of an aging 
senator, James Burden Day, who finds his power and influence waning, while his former aide, 
Congressman Clay Overbury, is on a meteoric rise. The contrasting curves of their respective 
careers are reflected in their personalities, which Vidal means us to see as old vs. new type of 
post-war politician. Day is the wily old politician who still holds to principles, while the 
youthful Overbury is ambitious and unprincipled, ready to use any advantage to gain power and 
able to appreciate die newly increased power of the media and exploit it for his own ends. 
Despite a distinguished career in the Senate, Day is ruined by one ethical mistake: he takes 
money to finance his last campaign from die oil lobbyist Ed Nillson, who wants to buy his be­
nign neglect toward the purchase ofNative American lands for petroleum exploitation. Collu­
sion as a fictional part of national politics is the axis of die plot Overbury, who wants Day ’ s 
Senate seat and knows about die bribe, eventually forces him out of the race, the two men’s 
competition for power complicated by their being personally fond of one another.
Overbury, like John Kennedy, has the political advantages of good looks and a 
(fabricated) heroic war record, essential parts of the contemporary emphasis on a politician’s
charisma in an age when his support of this or that issue is almost secondary to his media pres­
ence. After initial hostility to his marriage (from homosexual jealousy), his faiher-in-law Blaise 
Delacroix supports his career, Blaise is a powerful publisher and a fearful bully. Both men 
contrive to have Clay’s alcoholic and unfaithful wife, Enid, committed to an institution, using 
Blaise’s wealth, the pressure of their respective positions, and the means of bribes and intimi­
dation for the purpose of forestalling a messy divorce that would threaten Clay’s career. Enid is 
killed in an accident, it is suggested, through combined responsibility of husband and father. In 
revenge, her brother Peter, who holds leftist views and runs a maverick political magazine, 
exposes the fraud of Clay’s war record, which had been invented by one Harold Griffiths, a 
closet homosexual (duly rescued once by Clay from arrest and humiliation). Griffiths was a 
friend of Peter’s but sells out to Blaise, becoming an obediently “patriotic” war correspondent. 
Blaise’s newspaper then promotes Griffith’s faked account which serves as a spring-board for 
Clay’s first campaign. Collusion between powerful men (and at the cost of a pathetic woman) 
thus drives fee action.
And yet, at fee conclusion, Peter’s exposé fells flat: no one believes it, or, if  they do, 
really cares: Vidal explains that what Americans really love despite moralizing rhetoric is a 
winner. This outcome is somewhat surprising, given Vidal’s own declared intentions of expos­
ing and denouncing wrong-doing and hypocrisy in our national politics. These denunciations 
presumably have fee purpose of making people see what really goes in fee upper echelons of 
power, among fee so-called “movers and shakers” of our national politics. In an interview, he 
said of his work: “I am attacking fee ruling class of fee country, and fee economic interests feat 
dominate fee United States, and fee feet feat we have no politics...” (Ruas 63). It is, indeed, fee 
ruling class feat Vidal satirizes, although he has nothing much to say about dominant economic
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policies, i.e. capitalism early or late. The last phrase in the statement quoted seems to imply 
that the politics that the US does have is not a true politics, in Jefferson’s sense, or even Hannah 
Arendt’s: a collective effort of people bound by mutual promises to constitute a stable worldly 
structure, which (she thinks) “may be fee highest human faculty” (Arendt 175). Nowhere in his 
fictional works, however, does he give any hint of what a true politics might consist of
Vidal has himself lived among fee ruling classes all his life and is neither intimidated nor 
particularly impressed by them. Although he sets himself up, as in fee quoted remark, as some­
one in opposition to fee ruling-class, I think feat a key to his political stance is feat he also 
shares many of its values, especially fee notion feat political and social change can be effec­
tively brought about from above, which may stem from fee experience of a cosmopolitan life 
and long association wife various establishments. Born at fee US Military Academy at West 
Point, Vidal is fee grandson of a US Senator, Thomas Gore of Oklahoma, from whom he says he 
derived his fascination with politics, and perhaps (it has been suggested by novelist Diane 
Johnson) his feeling of upper-class noblesse oblige (Johnson 24-25). Vidal is also fee cousin 
of Al Gore, fee current Vice-President, and once himself ran unsuccessfully for the House of 
Representatives, so his attitude toward mainstream politicians may be said to be somewhat 
ambiguous. Biography apart, his historical novels tend to be icon-busting, as he seems deter­
mined to expose, often in wonderfully comic ways, fee pious and hypocritical humbugs behind 
fee national myths. Unlike his perceptive political essays, however, there are no alternatives 
in these works to traditional politics, perhaps because he is primarily concerned wife showing 
fee ways things were done in fee past, and yet his satirizaiion of those things implies a vision of 
another, better way of doing them. The only solution feat he seems to be proposing is a change, 
if  I may borrow a term from fee movies, in fee cast of characters.
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The failure of Peter in the novel might help explain the failure of the author: exposing the 
movers-and-shakers is titillating and perhaps even necessary but its effectiveness as a challenge 
to the status quo is partial at best A personalist view of political power, to which I shall re­
turn in my analyses of Vidal’s historical novels, must essentially be limited to revealing net­
works of “old boy” favors, deceit, hypocrisy, the double-dealing and official lies of main­
stream politics. His novels, in one sense, amount to a kind of fictionalized retrospective report­
ing, but although Washington D. C., for example, was published in the late Sixties, with a fic­
tional setting in the post-war period, it surprisingly does not engage McCarthyism except con­
descendingly and in passing, so that Vidal’s reporting in this case at least is partial and omis- 
sive. Nor can it go much beyond exposing unscrupulous practices to gain and hold power 
prevalent among incumbent and aspiring politicians, which few informed people seriously 
doubt This method will become something of apattern in subsequent novels.
This novel was to be the first in a trilogy, later expanded to a second triad of novels, an 
overall project that would offer a  social (upper-class) and political (politicians, generals, dip­
lomats, etc.) history of the United States from colonial times to the present, a more or less 
complete chronicle, in other words, of the nation’s “movers-and-shakers.” Historically,
Vidal’s novels are rather more substantial in detail than O’Connor’s, or, for that matter, most 
other popular American historical fiction, as he attempts to recreate an epoch with a solid basis 
in the historical record~not only through secondary sources but biographies, letters, documents, 
and apocryphal tales of historical figures, and the social customs and political events of the 
time as recorded in books, newspapers and monographs. Respect for Vidal’s scholarship can 
be seen in die heated debate entered into by academic historians (who might ordinarily be ex­
pected to ignore him) on the publication of Lincoln (1984).
As was seen in lhe discussion in the Introduction (sec.II), theorists like Hayden White 
have stressed die notion of the fictionality of all narrative and the dependence of the historian 
on narrative to make events comprehensible. For his part, Vidal claims to have blurred the dis­
tinction between history and fiction by writing a blend in which historical and imagined events 
have more or less equal plausibility: “Tn these books I’m doing the work of a historian or biog­
rapher, reflecting on the past and making narratives of it, in much the same way as the historians 
who interest me the most do...Thucydides, say, who was a proto-novelist” (Ruas 62). Vidal 
attempts a double angle, to examine what might have happened under differing circumstances, in 
the light of what acually did happen, so he can, as he says, “attribute motive” to historical fig­
ures, which, Michael Wood says, a conscientious historian shouldn’t do (‘Tassions” 30).
Since Vidal doesn’t, of course, always know what historical figures really said on a given oc­
casion, his method is to invent plausible dialogue for what they might have said, given the con­
text and circumstances, a method that was in fact first employed by Thucydides, although it 
should be added that probably owing to Vidal’s status as best-selling author, he makes his char­
acters sound rather cleverer than they might have in real life. As ""historian,” however, Vidal 
does not resemble Thucydides, die forerunner of scientific history (i.e. cause and effect in 
events, as opposed to the older, anecdotal narratives ofHerodotus) so much as the late Roman 
historian Tacitus, whose gossipy histories of those early movers-and-shakers, the Roman em­
perors, have a morally corrective purpose. This resemblance points to the essentially didactic 
mode of Vidal’s work. He has expressed a need for the novelist to address a large audience, 
without which “[the novelist] cannot delight, instruct, reform, destroy a world he wants...to be 
different for having lived in it” (qtd. by Wrood 30). This didactic purpose I shall return to after 
an examination of the last two novels of the series.
b.
Empire (1988) is set at the turn of the century, the period when American leaders, during 
the McKinley administration, made a series of decisions that would compromise the nation’s 
traditional foreign policy of isolationism and turn it to the business of becoming an imperial 
power. The novel begins with the end of the Spanish-American War (1898), amilitary adven­
ture that officially supported Filipino and Cuban rebels against Spanish colonialism but was 
economically motivated by the loss of American investments (not mentioned in the novel) and 
publicly encouraged by the inflammatory reporting of Hearst’s newspaper chain. In the novel, 
Hearst claims credit for creating single-handedly what Secretary of State John Hay dubbed a 
“splendid little war,” for its low “costs,” i.e. potentially large political gains and small number 
of military casualties. The conflict was resolved militarily by Admiral Dewey’s victory over 
the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and land fighting in Cuba Théodore Roosevelt, then Assistant 
Secretary of the navy, had secretly ordered Dewey to assemble the fleet at Hong Kong in ad­
vance for the attack on Manila, a story only obliquely mentioned by Vidal but which corrobo­
rates his portrait of a devious Roosevelt Roosevelt later took part in a minor battle in Cuba as 
a member of a cavalry regiment, a story that Hearst popularized as the exploits of the “Rough 
Riders,” which would give Roosevelt the hero’s status he needed for political popularity. As a 
result of the victory, Cuba was freed, Guam and Puerto Rico became US territories, and die 
way was opened for the “annexation” of the Philippines, to the understandable dismay of the 
Filipino rebels, who had counted on American assistance in their struggle for liberatioa As it 
turned out, they merely exchanged one colonial oppressor for another and the ensuing war of 
resistance was this time waged against their “liberators.”
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Hie novel addresses the problem of how to make this flagrantly imperialistic move ac­
ceptable. Vidal’s Hay thinks that the Filipino insurrection is actually a boon since the US 
needn’t bring its troops home so long as the insurrection continued: “the word ‘insurrection’ 
assumed that the United States government was the legitimate government of the Philippines” 
(108). The US, Hay concedes, was not the legitimate government but the alleged liberators, and 
“the so-called insurrection was actually a war of independence from foreign liberators turned 
conquerors.” To disguise this unacceptable truth, Hay illustrates how the rhetoric of the new 
imperial power operates, employing terms like “temporary” and “trustee.” Eventually, Hay’s 
astute plan to pay Spain for the islands is adopted (the islands were eventually ceded to the US 
for 20 million dollars), since, in the prevailing liberal model of contractual power, payment 
becomes proof of the legitimacy of ownership. “Otherwise,” Hays says, “we can be accused of 
theft, or brutal imperialism, which is not our way, or ought not to seem our way” (71). The 
blithe Machiavellism of the last phrase is vintage Vidal.
It turns out that Dewey’s exploit would make him, like other successful American military 
leaders, from Washington to Grant to Eisenhower, an excellent presidential prospect, but he is 
eliminated as a candidate by making foolish statements to die press. One who does know how to 
exploit this powerful tool is Theodore Roosevelt, who, as we have seen, achieves heroic status 
with Hearst’s support The novel then relates, and debunks, Roosevelt’s meteoric career, first, 
as reforming (but actually conservative) Governor of New York, an office given him by corrupt 
Republican bosses of die state political machine; then, as vice-president, an office achieved 
both by his own show-boating and intriguing at die convention in Philadelphia and the bosses’ 
desire to finally get him out of die state; and, finally, as president, an office he simply succeeds 
to when McKinley is assassinated.
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McKinley is seen sympathetically as a canny operator, rather Papal-like in the serenity
with which he exercises power, in contrast to the blustering, aggressively macho Roosevelt
Historian Henry Adams (another character) succinctly describes how McKinley (the “player”
of the passage) has engineered the imperial scenario:
In those affairs where the balance of power in the world suddenly shifts, there 
must be a consummate player, who calculates his moves. This player puts 
Theodore at the Navy Department so feat he will put fee Admiral at Manila; he 
then responds to fee sinking of fee Maine with a series of moves feat lead to a 
near bloodless war, and fee end of Spain as a world-player, and fee beginning 
of fee United States as an Asiatic power... (13)
McKinley is not less shrewd at home. He gets financing from corrupt bosses like Mark Hanna, 
while giving fee misleading impression feat they are manipulating him.
Another important character is John Hay, who historically was Lincoln’s secretary and 
biographer, then McKinley’s and later Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, hi his famous “Open 
Door” policy regarding China, Hay outflanked other imperialist nations like Germany and Rus­
sia that had designs on Chinese markets. By proclaiming an “open door,” a “meaningless” for­
mula, but “no less powerful for its lack of content' (230), Hay managed to avoid fee actual 
partitioning of China (which in fee 19th century had been divided into European “spheres of 
influence”) and so secure equal access to fee so-called “treaty ports” for fee US, in those days 
very much a minor international power. Rather than an admonition to respect China’s territorial 
integrity (fee official reason), fee policy served as a way for fee US to buy time until it was able 
to exert its will in Asia Vidal offers an additional justification. Hay tells McKinley, wife fee 
cynicism of fee colonialist, since he does not evidently believe it, feat it is fee task of the An- 
glo-Saxon races to “civilize and to ...Christianize fee less developed races of fee world” (69, 
his emphasis). This would doubtless sound convincing enough to fee American public at fee
time but quite astonish both the Chinese, the world’s oldest continuous civilization, and the 
Filipinos, whose country was already 80 per-cent Christian.
Yet, the novel tells of men in high places convinced of this necessity, like Roosevelt him­
self, the consummate imperialist, who wants to invade China to prevent Russia from grabbing 
Manchuria and gaining control of central Asia Roosevelt is candid in his ambition and con­
vinced of his mission to lead the US to inheriting Great Britain’s world imperial role. When he 
abandons the Chinese fantasy for the Latin American reality, Roosevelt treats the hemisphere as 
the US’s back-yard (one of the characters asks, ironically, of the Monroe Doctrine: ‘Is  all the 
western hemisphere, even Tierra del Fuego, apart of our house?,” 23). In 1903, in the interests 
of securing the Panama Canal (Vidal claims that the Canal could have been built in Nicaragua), 
Roosevelt encouraged the Panamanians to declare independence from Columbia and sent US 
warships to back them up. Hay must once again “provide the legal underpinnings for our latest 
acquisition” (362).
Hay’s close friend Henry Adams, the quintessential 19th century mind, is concerned not 
so much with what happened as why it happened, the “laws” that govern history in the positivist 
historiography of the time. Vidal questions this obsession with historical laws, and the pre­
sumptions of imperialism, through the mouthpiece of Henry James: “You speak of laws of his­
tory, and I am no lawyer. But I confess to misgivings. How can we, who cannot honestly govern 
ourselves, take 15) the task of governing others? Are we to govern the Philippines from Tam­
many Hall [the New York political machine headquarters]? Will we insist that our Oriental 
colonies be run by [political] bosses?” (35)
Besides imperialism, or the exercise of hegemonic power abroad, Vidal’s other theme in 
Empire is the power of the press to invent reality and manipulate public opinion. The key char-
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acter in this regard is the cheerfully cynical Hearst, who uses his chain o f newspapers both to 
further his own aspirations to political office and to make and break politicians. He himself is 
defeated by both strong-arm means and, ironically, the media He loses the Mayoralty ofNew 
York City when Tammany Hall simply burns the ballots. He loses the office of state Governor 
by adverse publicity (on orders from Roosevelt) that suggests he is a dangerous radical.
Hearst, a wealthy man, is a populist, though hardly a radical. If one was in favor of an eight- 
hour work day as Hearst was, Vidal tells us, one was considered a “socialist,” which eveiy 
American is taught from birth to fear and abhor.
The main female fictional character, Caroline Sanford, merely imitates Hearst, in contrast
to her half-brother and rival Blaise (from Washington D. C., though younger), who goes to
work for him, and in her success as well as her personal life becomes a model of the modern,
independent woman. Early in her story she is asked if  she knows about power and gives a
schoolgirl’s answer about Julius Caesar winning a campaign and then writing a book about it.
She is told that the book that one now writes is the newspapers. Hie point is not what happens
but “the way that things are made to look that matters now” (11). One might add that, as we
have seen in the discussions of Machiavelli and Gramsci, it has probably always been that way.
Caroline’s ambition begins to take definite shape when she visits Hearst’s office and watches
him arbitrarily arrange headlines and invent news, not according to truth, information, or even
importance, but to provoke a sensationalism that will sell:
Although money was the source of power in this rude place [i.e. the US, Caro­
line having been brought up in France], now even less of a civilization than it 
had been in Burr’s day, what she had heard and seen of Hearst that night had 
convinced her that the ultimate power is not to preside in a White House or open 
a parliament while seated on a throne but to reinvent the world for everyone by 
giving them the dreams that you wanted them to dream (96).
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The media, as C. Wright Mills theorized in the 1950s, formed personalities by stereotyped 
models that organized individual perceptions and created aspirations.
Vidal evidently wants to show-what, again, few informed people seriously doubt-how 
newspapers, which have the power to expose corruption, do not act so much in the public inter­
est as in the interests of the publishers. Hearst and Blaise both purchase some stolen letters of 
the Standard Oil Company, written by and to politicians and judges concerning political favors 
or decisions, with payments by the company for services rendered (the now sadly familiar pat­
tern of parallel government with private enterprise and public office working for mutual profit). 
Both publishers plan to use or withhold publication for best advantage. Hearst wants revenge 
on Roosevelt by publishing some vague references in the letters that might involve the President 
in Standard Oil money; no matter that Roosevelt has a reputation as a “trust-buster” for his 
sponsoring of anti-monopoly legislation or that there is anything substantial in the letters: Hearst 
will, as usual, invent the context, just as (he reminds the President) he has invented him. Roo­
sevelt huffily protests that “history,” not Hearst, has invented him, to which Hearst replies with 
a statement that might be not only the novel’s epigraph but that of his whole historical project: 
“True history is the final fiction” (472).
c.
Jh his memoir, significantly titled Screening History (1983), Vidal elaborates on this 
point with respect to movies: “How, through ear and eye, we are both defined and manipulated 
by fictions of such potency that they are able to replace our own experience, often become our 
sole experience of a reality become... unreal” (qtd. by Johnson 24, emphasis given). This state­
ment, which calls attention both to the representative power of the visual media and the absent 
sense of history in the contemporary world, a gap which is increasingly filled by Hollywood
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films and television, would place Vidal squarely in the midst of certain strands of contemporary 
cultural theory. One problem with the statement is that if film becomes the only reality, how can 
it be manipulative in the same way that other representative accounts (which imply a reality 
external to themselves) can? If film has become our only reality, there is no possibility of ei­
ther manipulation or resistance, and yet it seems that Vidal has not gone over entirely to Bau- 
drillard’s theory ofthe hyperreal, in which simulation models replace things (Baudrillard 
166f£), as the statement implies that he still believes in a reality independent of its representa­
tions. What I think he means is that these representations are so powerful they seem more real 
than our own (real) experience, thus “replacingi” it in our imaginations.
Accordingly, the final volume of Vidal’s American fictional history, Hollywood: A 
Novel o f America in the 1920’s  (1990), turns out to be a conventional novel about the early 
days of film-making, which has some interesting things to say about the power ofthe image but 
is not lhe exploration of representations of reality that the statement quoted might promise. The 
novel’s title is misleading, probably maliciously so, since the novel deals as much with Wash­
ington as with Hollywood, but fee satirical point is well-taken: fee political capital = fee 
movie capital, both places dealing wife fee production of images and both essentially populated 
by actors, a point which has been clinched historically by the election of Ronald Reagan.
The sub-title is also not quite accurate, as fee story begins in 1917, on the eve ofthe en­
trance ofthe US into fee First World War, and ends well before the end ofthe decade, wife fee 
death of President Harding (1923), taking in fee main historical events: fee War, fee great Flu 
epidemic; fee Treaty of Paris; fee Wilson administration; fee League ofNations and the failure 
ofthe US Senate to ratify, Harding’s campaign; and fee Teapot Dome scandal, wife fee indict­
ment of top government officials, from which Harding himself is spared by an early death. As
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usual, Vidal, concerned with giving a histoiy lesson and writing entertaining fiction, often relies 
on the higher gossip: an uxorious Woodrow Wilson; FDR’s blonde mistress; Theodore’s coke- 
snorting daughter, Alice; Harding with his two mistresses, illegitimate child, and a tryst in a 
White House closet, etc. If this sensationalist “insider” view of the corridors of power cannot 
be justified solely by Vidal’s background and family connections, he does in fact offer histori­
cal information not often known to non-specialist readers-like that the US and Germany were 
ready to end the War at an earlier date but the European Allies held out for unconditional sur­
render. Despite the entertainment potential of the gossip, the novel is, like his other historical 
fictions, a sugar-coated pill of didactic entertainment rather than an historical soap-opera
Simultaneously with the era’s political events and scandals, another story is told, the be­
ginnings of the movie industry in Hollywood. Once again, Vidal can offer an insider’s view of a 
world, drawing oil his experience as a screenwriter and connections with the industry’s per­
sonalities. He bridges the two worlds ofWashington and Hollywood through the character of 
Caroline Sanford, carried over from Empire. After her career as East Coast publisher, she 
rather improbably becomes an early silent-film heroine and (he two worlds can be satirically 
juxtaposed through her participation in both. WTiile she is making a melodrama about the victo­
rious Allied armies, for example, in the “real life” news the German army is overrunning 
Europe. One of Vidal’s concerns is that the movie version of events tends to prevail as what is 
perceived to be reality. As he says succinctly in his memoir, “In the end, he who screens the 
history makes the history” (qtd. by Johnson 24).
In Hollywood, Vidal shows how propaganda tends toward a hegemonic power, as the 
fabrication of truth in film is paralleled by the fabrication of truth in politics and the press. The 
two worlds of movies and politics are separated geographically, West and East coast, but we
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are to understand that in purpose, if not in style, they have similar aims (nowadays, in any case, 
“politics” is often little else but film). In the early years of Hollywood, movies (which the 
author informs us were called “photo-plays”) were perceived as having great potential for po­
litical propaganda, and frequently invited the application of political pressure and censorship. 
The head of war propaganda in Wilson’s administration, George Creech, was an advertising 
man who, anticipating Richard Nixon, justified telling lies as necessary for national security. In 
one episode of the novel, Tim, a leftist film director makes a movie called “The Strike Break­
ers” that is banned as subversive. Since the movie is a silent one, Tim simply changes the title- 
cards in order to favor the bosses rather than the workers, and the film is hailed as a victory for 
capitalism. Vidal seems to be also making a point about the ambiguity of visual images; for 
him^  words are what mean, a point also made by Caroline’s never being recognized as “Emma” 
(her persona as film star) by her friends and only occasionally by strangers. This suggests, too, 
that Vidal’s belief in the power of images is not so strong as he states. „
Vidal’s historical view is that the American people of the period were not concerned 
about Germany or Europe but thought of their own country as a haven for disaffected Europeans 
(including most early film producers and directors and many stars). The country was xenepho- 
bic and isolationist but public opinion was induced by effective propaganda to support inter­
vention in the First World War. Wilson makes a private speech to Senator Day (the younger 
version of the character in Washington D.C.) in which he shows how to transform production 
from domestic to military needs but fears that the corporate interest in war will cause the coun­
try to revert to the days of Grant Wilson, who was elected on the platform of one who would 
“keep us out of the War,” in fact led us into it hi the speech to Congress where Wilson re­
quests a declaration of war, Vidal, in another effective juxtaposition, contrasts the sordid po-
liticai motives and the exaJted rhetoric of justification by intercalating Wilson’s public speech 
with Blaise Sanford’s private thoughts picking apart the phrases to reveal their emptiness of 
real content (43-6).
The myths of electoral politics are attacked in the story of Harding's election, which is 
not the result of the liberal ideology of popular appeal to a sovereign people but of backroom 
deals between bosses and the buying of delegates. The bosses select the nominee and the media 
take over. Harding is shown to have won the election as the man with the fewest enemies. 
Mediocre in qualifications but tactically astute, he waits for the parly favorites to cancel each 
other out and then steps in to fill the vacuum, a political strategy Vidal employed in his film 
about electoral politics based on his own play with the ironic title The Best Man (1960).
d.
Although purportedly an “on-the-spot” account, Vi dal ’ s narrative has a contemporary 
tone; there is an anachronistic effect in the gap between story and discourse, similar to that o f a 
“period’5 movie. Hie historical explanations that the narrator gives show that he could not have 
been present at the time of the action, so that the apparent temporal realism of the narrative 
breaks down. Although this is a common enough postmodernist ploy, Vidal seems indifferent to 
the discrepancy. There is also a somewhat homogenized point-of-view. The various characters- 
-Caroline, Blaise, Senator Day-become at varying moments the narrative focus, and yet the 
author, or implied author, always seems to be hovering near, ready with a characteristically 
acerbic quip or pithy observation: e.g. American democracy was “a fiction that the American 
people in any way controlled their fate. The Constitution had largely excluded diem.” This re­
mark mocks two national pieties-individual autonomy and the sacred political text-but it could 
have been spoken by any of the characters, or at least the clever ones; it is in fact the same
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voice found in Vidal’s brilliantly caustic essays. This consistency of tone and sentiment, it 
should be noted, deviates from the realist mode of the novel (i.e. fiiliv developed characters, 
linear plot, etc.)» sines all of die sympathetic characters tend to sound alike, but it has also been 
said of a writer as different as Don DeLillo that his dever characters all speak in an aphoristic 
style that make them “emanations” of die author (Aaron 74). Note that this is rather different, 
since DeLillo uses characters as vehicles not for his own opinions but for a variety of the spe­
cialized languages and professional jargons that enter into dialogue and conflict with one an­
other, while Vidal’s characters are univocal. The consistency of tone is in fact typical of satiri­
cal discourse. Northrop Frye has discussed Menippean satire as a stylized rather than natural­
ized narrative, which, to be sure, would pertain more to postmodern fictions such as Pynchon’s 
or DeLillo’s than Vidal’s novels, which tend toward afiilly naturalized discourse. Vidal’s 
novels do resemble Frye’s characterization of Menippean satire, however, in that they tend to 
present “people as mouthpieces of the idea they represent,” a “vision of die world in terms of a 
single intellectual pattern” (Frye 308-10).
Much ofVidal’s work illustrates die strengths and limitations of satire, which attempts to 
correct folly and abuse in individuals, institutions, and society as a whole through die classical 
techniques of wit, ridicule, violent juxtaposition or contrast, parody, burlesque, and caricature. 
In non-technical terms, it employs shame to expose abuses with die aim of correcting them. And 
yet, the claim to correct abuses implies an ideal standard from which the satirized persons and 
institutions are deviant Satire can therefore be seen not only as critical but as deeply conser­
vative. For one thing, it implies the satirist’s access to the truth. For another, die satiric mode, 
as Richard Poirier says, allows the imagination only to reproduce the environment, or (in the 
more common American mode), create an alternative ideal environment, a utopia, which shares
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with satire the privileging of an idealized society over an actually existing one. Satire is there­
fore critical but “essentially submissive, in being merely corrective, to the necessary reality of 
an established society” (Elsewhere 16,42). This view does not perhaps exhaust the complex 
essence of Swift’s work, but it does suggest the limitations of Vidal’s.
For a more innovative type of political satire in contemporary literature, one might com­
pare Joseph Heller’s Good As Gold (1979). Gold, a Jewish professor who lands ajob in 
Washington, models himself on Henry Kissinger, the Jewish intellectual that becomes powerful 
among the Gentile elite, but the more Gold acts like, or thinks he acts like, Kissinger, the more 
he grows to hate him, coming to see his model as a secret Nazi, greedy and pompous, “the ar­
chetypal schmuck.” Heller’s method is thus to criticize a powerful politician by the indirect 
approach of examining someone who imitates him rather than offering an unproblematized fic­
tional representation of the man himself (Walter J. Miller 245).
It can be argued that modern America needs and deserves its satirists quite as much as 
ancient Rome. Vidal clearly feels that Americans prefer national myths to historical realities 
and he intends to set as straight about our own past: “What little the average thoughtful Ameri­
can—that is, the 5 per-cent of the country who read books-what little they know about Ameri­
can history, I taught them” (Ruas 60). Apart from the characteristically breezy arrogance and 
gross generalization of the statement, it is highly authoritarian in its assumption not that history 
is often mediated by fiction, which is true enough, but that Vidal himself somehow has access to 
the truth, a “truer history” than the ones available, as it were, superior to others for being some­
how in closer correspondence to what really happened. This is not an example, it should be 
noted, of Hayden White’s historicist theory of alternative versions of the past that may in fact be 
offered in good faith but are inevitably different since they are written from different historical
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times and places and with necessarily different ideologies. Vidal seems to believe that there is 
an unproblematic reality out there that can be misrepresented for political reasons, and that he, 
Vidal, has discovered and chosen over other willful misrepresentations. It is in fact character­
istic of the satirist, from Juvenal to Swift and beyond, that he (and it always seems to be a “he”) 
is unique among his fellow citizens in understanding the corruption of their society.
In contrast to Vidal’s statement that the cinematic representation comes to “replace” his­
torical reality, Frederick Jameson has argued that historical novels from Walter Scott onward 
depend to some extent on previous historical knowledge, the received knowledge one acquires, 
mainly in school, through the culture’s legitimizing, orthodox histories (a knowledge that, as 
both Jameson and Vidal recognize, historical films and television programs now provide even 
more than historical novels). Hiis kind of novel, Jameson says, establishes a dialectic between 
what the reader already knows in this way and the revelations provided by the novelist His­
torical fiction thus mediates between one fiction (doxa) and another. Jameson refers specifi­
cally to EL. Doctorow’s period Hollywood novel, Ragtime (1975), which one is tempted to 
compare to Hollywood since they both have a central political dimension and a parallel story of 
the early years of Hollywood film, covering roughly the same historical period. Doctorow’s 
political story is a (fictional) radical one, however, about a black revolutionary and his white 
cohorts. Jameson’s point is that Ragtime is an example of the new type of historical novel 
which does not set out (as Hollywood and its predecessors do) to represent the historical past 
. but only our received ideas about that past It “short-circuits genuine historiography” through a 
procedure that employs a singular, pared-down language and a designation ofboth historical 
personages and generic family manes (“Son” etc.) that reify the characters so that “it is impos- 
* Bible for us to receive their representation without the prior interception of already acquired
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knowledge or doxa” (Jameson, Postmodernism 70). Implicitly, Vidal recognizes this in his 
interview statements about teaching Americans the history they haven’t learned in school but he 
evidently thinks there is a “correct” version of events.
All this suggests that any attempt to represent even ami»« critical version of the past is 
not unproblematic. Vidal claims to be attacking the class structure of power in the US, but he 
does so in ways that at least partly reinforce it His exclusive emphasis on powerful and influ* 
ential individuals, the movers-and-shakers of history, is a view shared by the class he would be 
criticizing and helps reinforce that view insofar as it is convincing. Hie novels are content- 
oriented, rich in character and incident, but in fact reproduce theworld-view projected by the 
dominant classes and so are (as the Marxists would say) historically incomplete, although they 
pretend to be comprehensive. As ^ have suggested above, it seems that, for Vidal, in most cases 
a mere change of “cast” would suffice: substitute good guys for bad guys, or, in his unpuritani- 
cal vision, more interesting and less hypocritical bad guys than the pious banalities usually in 
power. This personalist view obstructs a situation in which a structural problem of uaequai 
power and institutionalized injustice needs addressing Both the problems and the solutions are 
reduced to personalities, basically because Vidal’s perception of political power is what has 
been described earlier (Chapt, Sec. II) as the old liberal “juridical” model of power, as 
something held by an individual, transferable in die political contract, and subject to abuse 
when the contractual rights and obligations are exceeded Vidal’s imperial presidents, for ex­
ample, are Foucault’s 18th century sovereigns, exorcising power over the social body rather 
than in it and marking their presence by representation—hence, their concern for public image, 
the press, and later film aid the electronic media, and their use of the old judicial discourse
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through which their power is legitimated by being represented to the people in highly visible 
fashion. People form their subjectivity in relation to this dominait spectacularized class.
Another problematic aspect of Vidal’s critique of American political power is his lan­
guage. I have already pointed out the discrepancy between his characters’ language and their 
supposed historical context Hie urbane, self-assured prose» furthermore, in which the various 
characters all take on a single narrative voice, cannot adequately account for the whole of a 
“geopolitical reality” such as is found in Empire. As Richard Poirier puts it in his review of 
that novel:
On the subject of“empire,” Vidal is writing outside the dominant traditions in 
which imperial power is usually represented in English. Melville, Conrad, and, 
later Faulkner, Mailer, and Pynchon write about the imperial quest as if  its 
source, movements, and results are necessarily concealed; it is a mystery that 
calls for a style correspondingly elaborate and suggestive, full of hints o f mys­
teries that cannot be revealed...By contrast Vidal’s prose is intended to strip 
American imperialism of its mystery and to deny in the American political land­
scape the “hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning” that a character in Pynchon 
finds in a configuration of California lights (“American Emperors” 32).
Vidal’s prose, though it aspires to a realist model o f linguistic “transparency” suggests, as i  
have argued above, the monological voice of satire, Poirier’s suggestion of the language’s flat­
tening out of mysterious byways, where it needs to be more subtly responsive to the concealed 
aspects of American imperialism. Vidal is unquestionably an improvement over novelists like 
. Allen Drury, who unreflectingly, even fatuously, reproduce the dominant ideology of American 
power in uncritical clichés, but his conceptual limitation furnishes a less critical perception of 
American power than those contemporary novelists Poirier mentions who manage to call into 
question traditional representations of it Vidal’s novels can be fairly said to be representative 
of that rather overworked critical notion o f the “imperialist” tendencies o f narrative—closure, 
locus of authority, conformity to a single vision—and as such may be contrasted to a work like
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Pynchon’s The Crying ofLot 49 (1966)—to which Poirier alludes above—with its constant 
challenging of alternative visions and versions of reality, of which more in Chapt 7b (Cooley 
316; Schaub, Pynchon 3).
Richard Ohmarm suggests how even serious fiction can fall short of challenging political 
realities:
Although tiie ruling ideas aid myths may indeed be, in every age, the ideas and 
myths of the ruling class, the ruling class in advanced capitalist societies does 
not advance its ideas directly through its control of the means of mental produc­
tion. Rather, a subordinate but influential class [what Ohmann calls “the pro­
fessional-managerial class” to which most writers, critics, editors, publishers, 
teachers and readers of contemporary literature belong] shapes culture in ways 
that express its own interests and experience aid that sometimes turn on ruling- 
class values rather critically—yet in a nonrevolutionary period end up con­
firming root elements of the dominant ideology, such as the premise of indi- 
vidualism (Ohmann 91).1
Although Ohmann is here talking about canonical works, the point is relevant to Vidal’s novels, 
in which history is a story eminently of individuals exercising their will on the world, acts 
which, while practically limited in the novels to die conversations of the powerful, are taken to 
be comprehensive. As in die dominant ideology of formula fiction, US policy is not the product 
of socio-economic forces so much as that of the adventures of heroes “confronting a series of 
tests.” Teddy Roosevelt’s discourse of the Philippines as a “test” of national character (as 
Vietnam and other misconceived adventures would be called by their defenders in later years) 
reflects this rhetoric of national character on trial, as do both liberal and conservative rhetoric 
in this century (Brown 358). Vidal, of coons», makes Roosevelt a blustering imperialist in his 
novel, but die underlying ideology is not therefore canceled. This ambiguity of subversion and 
affirmation, critical adversity and ideological complicity, is characteristic of Vidal’s historico- 
fictional project
In conclusion, 1 might summarize the features of Vidal’s historical novels I have dis­
cussed that reduce its critical power, as follows: die fiction of an unmediated, represented re­
ality, and the concurrent, unproblematized language that expresses that reality, the dramatiza­
tion of an essentially banal factuality, principally through the personalization of the historical 
process already discussed; a linear, coherent plot that best serves this dramatization but that 
risks falsifying historical complexity, a moral message that die linear plot, realist metaphysic, 
and transparent language all facilitate. These interconnected procedures are also, it will be 
noted, structural features of Hollywood cinema, the “classic realist” movies derived from die 
techniques and assumptions of 19th century novels and plays (Connor 174; Stam et al.). It is 
therefore somewhat ironic that Vidal’s novels, which satirize die Ho 1 lywoodizati on of Ameri­
can reality, so resemble Hollywood movies in their formal features and unexamined assump­
tions.
NOTES
1 Cf also Fiorin 74 (my transl.): “When the enunciator reproduces elements of the dominant 
discourse in his own discourse, he contributes in a certain way to a reinforcement of die struc­
tures of domination.”
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CHAPTER4
a
Frederick Jameson has written that one of die determinants of a capitalist culture is die 
split between the public and private, die political and the poetic (“Third World Literature” 
69).1 This split in consciousness, briefly examined in the previous chapter, apparently holds 
true in American fiction since die 1930s. Novelists who in the Thirties were engaged with 
social issues came to be loosely classified after the war as “political,” while others emerged 
as “psychological realists,” or novelists of manners or of the erotic, etc., insofar as their work 
emphasized die pi&lic or the private sides of experience. For John Updike, for example, a 
major novelist who has written penetratmgly on die domestic life of die American middle- 
class, political issues and national power struggles remain as a “background” in his four 
novel “Rabbit” series, which evidently intends to be a social chronicle extending over four 
decades. Similarly, Saul Bellow, Bernard Malamud, Philip Roth (with the exception of a 
political satire), John Cheever, J.D. Salinger, Vladimir Nabokov, William Styron (even in his 
novel o f the Holocaust), Walker Percy, Truman Capote, John Hawkes, James Purdy, just to 
mention die more prominent older male authors (Nabokov died in 1977, Cheever in 1982, 
Capote in 1989), have all tended to concentrate on their characters’ inner lives as if  these 
were somehow autonomous from public events and prevailing national ideologies. The ex­
ceptions to this tendency, among die older generation of contemporary novelists, would seem 
to be Joseph Hello*, Norman Mailer, and Mary McCarthy, die latter all die more surprising, 
since women, mosdy excluded from male structures of power, have often been expected to 
concentrate on the psychological dramas of a more reduced domestic world.
POWER AND RESISTANCE IN NORMAN MAILER
It is certain that the public/private distinction can only be artificially maintained. 
Raymond Williams says that it is wrong and damaging to assume political institutions and 
conventions are of a separate order from artistic ones. At the very least, our “descriptions of 
our experience,” such as literary creations, we try to communicate, maldng private experience 
public (Long Revol. 54-6). While individualism, it is well-known, is die American ideology 
par excellence, even writers who concentrate on the individual’s inner life, in order to effec­
tively engage the reality o f their time must connect to some extent inner or imaginative life 
with die national collective experiences out o f which it has been formed. Updike, for example, 
is doubtless aware that this relationship of psychic and political distance holds true especially 
in die class he writes about, as apart of its distinctive ideology. Jameson claims that maintain­
ing the public/private distinction is worse than a mistake, it is “a symptom and a reinforce­
ment of die reification and privatization of contemporary life.” It would seem that the tendency 
to concentrate on private experience at die expense of public in much contemporary fiction is 
one more example of this malaise (Pol. Unconscious 20).
I do not wish to swing automatically to the opposite side of the rift by my concentra­
tion on die political aspects ofNorman Mailer’s fiction, but merely to use him for die present 
purpose as the outstanding example of the older generation of novelists now woridng (he was 
born in 1923), who have engaged with die public issues o f their time. Mailer is in feet espe­
cially importará for the relation of politics and the self One of die major characteristics of his 
work is precisely die tension between inner and outer, die conflicting allegiances of the politi­
cal and spiritual, collective and individual, social and sexual, poetic and prosaic. It has been 
said, for example, that the essential conflict unifying die diversity of his novels is “the conflict 
between [individual] will and external power” (Bufithis 289). Mailer’s fiction, and even his
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life—to the extent that he has made an outrageous public spectacle of his private life, or at 
least the “private life” he has chosen to make public—tend to contain both sides of the division 
(assuming that there is a division). What perhaps makes Mailer unique in this respect is that 
there is no attempt at reconciliation; he seems to thrive on the tension that is generated. I 
shall examine in this chapter three novels, from the beginning, middle, and most recent phase 
of his career. If die emphasis is on political preoccupations, the corresponding private ones 
are not to be understood as negligible in these and other worics. They are always at least im­
plied, present in their absence, tugging, as it were, in the opposite direction. In his most ex­
plicitly political novel, Armies ofthe Night (1968), he dramatizes this very conflict, and even 
in a fictional-biographical work like The Executioner's Song (1978), in which he examines in 
detail the life and career of areal-life murderer, the story of Gary Gilmore becomes a spring­
board from which to laimch sharp criticisms of the culture that produced him. This formula­
tion may appear to make Mailer the embattled figure he has so often posed as, tom by the 
conflict that determines, in Janeson’s argument, modem capitalist culture. While this would 
not be too misleading, one could also argue, as I do, that this tension is actually a way of con­
taining the conflict, a “solution” to Mailer’s obsession with power struggles.
For power is Mailer’s central concern, and I shall analyze the fiction with this as­
sumption. Hie earliest novels, for example, have been described as variations on power rela­
tions: The Naked and the Dead (1948) about men and war, Barbary Shore (1951) about men 
and politics, and Deer Park (1957) about men and sex (Tanner 349). One uses die word 
<cmen” advisedly in this formulation, for Mailer’s fictional world, although it contains plenty 
of (hetero)sexual activity, is exclusively male, or at least male-oriented. It is not my purpose 
to examine Mailer’s adversarial position as exemplary male-chauvinist (although that would
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be a worthy enterprise, for which one might refer to his polemical exchanges with feminists
like Kate Millet and the non-fictional work, The Prisoner o f Sex, 1971), but in fact women do
take secondary roles in the fiction. Sex itself is perceived typically in terms of conflict and
dominance rather than any kind of emotional fulfillment
Mailer’s demon is obsessed, as all his novels in some way or other testify, 
with fee meaning ofpower: the condition of vitality itself in fee personal, so­
cial, and historical realms. Ideologies are merely the political foil o f this radi­
cal awareness o f life, as sex is its personal expression (Hassan 141, his em­
phasis).
That power is the “condition of vitality itself’ suggests feat power in its personal mani­
festations need not be negative, although in Mailer’s fiction fee power of nature may well be, 
and the power of institutions always is. Mailer, who launched his long career as I 'enfant 
terrible of his generation, has always taken an oppositional stance, both within his novels, as 
“fee perpetual adversary whose character seems an argument against every other character'’ 
(Hendin 118) aid in society, as public defender of modern writers, who (in his own formula­
tion) “are almost always in opposition to iheir society” (“Our Country” 299).
b.
War is fee locus classicus for power conflicts, and yet, paradoxically, fee American 
combat novel has removed fee writer from fee ideological aspect of power, extracting him 
from what one would expect to be a highly politicized environment and relocating him in an 
“elemental area” that hearkens back to fee frontier (Karl 95). In fee tradition of fee adventure 
tales of fee classical American canon, fee combat novel provides an all-male alternative to 
bourgeois society and its women, children, and responsibilities. While necessarily (and, as 
shall be seen, intentionally) removed by its setting--a Japanese-held island in fee Pacific dur­
ing fee Second World War-from ordinary social and political life, The Naked and the Dead
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(1948) is, nevertheless, a novel about different kinds of masculine, and institutional, power 
(Poirier, Mailer 29). The military conflict between the American and Japanese armies, how* 
ever, forms die backdrop for other power conflicts the novel is primarily concerned with. The 
war itself is neutral; it has no ideological value, as die eventual American victory in the is­
land campaign will owe nothing to American militaiy superiority.
At die core of the novel, however, is an ideological struggle, between the Commanding 
General, Cummings, and his young aide, Lieutenant Hearn, with overtones of generational, 
class and perhaps homosexual conflict (Poirier 29). Ln a wider context, the enlisted men are 
constantly concerned about the presence of some superinunan power, whether person or thing, 
that seems to be controlling events and circumstances (Tanner 3S0). This perhaps reflects 
both Mailer's perception of nature as an often sinister force, and die pervasive paranoia of 
port-war Americm fiction in relation to the institutional powers that control individual fetes. 
The paranoia (if that is what it is) has nothing to do with the quite rational fear and anxiety felt 
by men under the stress of combat My analysis will concern itself with die human agencies, 
although in this and subsequent novels human beings will actively engage dark and unknown 
powers.
The island campaign is presented in a double focus that serves to expose the distant, 
abstract, strategic or chess-like perception of war of the CG, aid those like him, by juxtapos­
ing its perception to another view, literally from the ground, of war as experienced by an in­
fantry reconnaissance platoon (“Recon”). Hearn, pat of the CG’s staff till he is transferred to 
Recon, thus serves as a connection between an army’s two hierarchically unbridgeable gaps 
(Hassan 142-43). Despite Cummings’ personal charm and professional brilliance, he is a self- 
confessed reactionary, “a tyrant in a velvet voice” (Naked 63). His working motto is the
Machiavellian “make yourself an instrument of your own policy” (66), which, at the locus 
where power and knowledge intersect -a s CO of die island campaign, master of military his­
tory and strategy, and in fill! possession of the details of both geography and military intelli- 
gence—he is in excellent position to do.
in die Heam-Cummings discussions, the issue is one of class. Hearn is fascinated by the 
totality of die General’s power, “which gave a base to whatever he said” (69). Cummings, 
who sees intellectual potential in his young aide, wants to shape him, break him, if  necessary, 
of his liberal sentiments and ideas, specifically Hearn’s distaste for the privileged officer 
caste to which he rightfully belongs. “Understand your class,” he advises Hearn, “and work 
within its limits. Marxism with a reverse twist”(134). Hearn has attended college, is even 
something of a literary intellectual, with experience as a labor organizer and a term with a 
college Marxist organization (he was expelled from it for being too much the “intellectual 
bourgeois”). Hearn is upper-class but rejects his industrialist father, and yet he cannot wholly 
embrace left-wing causes either, as Cummings shrewdly perceives. Hearn himself fears that 
his radical sentiments are not genuine but merely assumed. His main objection to officers is 
their special privileges, which they enjoy while die enlisted men do all die dirty work and 
take most of the risks. He thinks (rightly) that the men hate officers for this and (wrongly) that 
it will impair their fighting ability. Cummings assures him the opposite is true: how well an 
army fights depends on the material factor of men and equipment available, but also on how 
low a standard of living the soldiers have had in civilian life. He reasons that peasants make 
superior soldiers, accustomed as they are to hard labor and physical suffering without com­
plaint; Americans (Southerners are the exception) tend to be unsatisfactory, since they are 
comparatively rich and have an exaggerated sense of their individual rights. They therefore
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have to be broken to become proper soldiers, and part o f (fais process is their becoming con­
vinced of their own inferiority: ‘The army functions best when you are frightened of the man 
above you and contemptuous of your subordinates” (139). In this cynical reasoning, class re­
sentment should be stimulated, not avoided, since hate and fear confer, and confirm, power.
As the quote above shows, Cummings is no patriotic fool, but a full-fledged right-wing 
ideologue, who holds the Hobbesian view that man is naturally given to dominance rather than 
cooperation and sharing. When he says that man’s deepest urge is omnipotence, he is at least 
speaking for himself^  for whom power flows from the top down and any resistance to this 
flow only calls down repression to staunch it Punishment is employed as an instrument to 
instill fear and ensure discipline, and so it must be disproportionate to the offense, or “power 
becomes watered” (256). Cummings would extend this theoiy to civilian life to be trans­
formed into appropriate use, for the present machine-age requires that power be consolidated 
(Hassan 143). For him, the war’s main purpose is not die defeat of Fascism in Europe or 
Japanese militarist expansion in the Pacific, but the translation of the US’s “potential” energy 
into “kinetic” energy, the putting of theory into practice, ever much as important to Fascist as 
to Marxist theory. Cummings actually believes that die concept of Fascism is sound but unfor­
tunately started in the wrong country. When power, materials, armies are created, he reasons 
correctly, “they don’t wither of their own accord. Our vacuum as anation is filled with re­
leased power...” (254). He concludes that America is the nation destined to cany on the en­
ergy that has been released by the war, and the historical process tends toward consolidation: 
physical (i.e. technical) power for material progress, and political power to enable it to hap­
pen. He predicts—and here, perhaps, one hears Mailer’s own voice—that post-war policy 
will be less hypocritical and more straight-forwardly imperialistic, hi this, he was wrong; it
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was imperialistic right enough, but became even more hypocritical. American liberal ideology 
could hardly condone, much less promote, a Fascist program.
Their very first talk is an object lesson in power. When Hearn is impertinent and Cum­
mings reminds him of his rank by making him salute him, die pattern of their relationship is 
established. Hie two men play chess, which Cummings loves as an analogue of war, the god­
like manipulation o f pieces is his normal point-of-view. In his project of bending Hearn to his 
will, he gives his aide humiliating tasks, until Hearn “balks at becoming a chess piece for die 
General to direct” (248) and stubs out his cigarette on fee floor of Cummings’ spotless tent 
Cummings, who has been balked in die campaign after an initial advance, sees this gratuitous 
act o f defiance as a ’’symbol o f the independence of his troops, their resistance to him...The 
fear, the respect his soldiers held for him now was a rational one, an admission ofhis power 
to punish them, aid that was not good enough. The other kind of fear was lacking, die unrea­
soning one in which his powers were immense and it was effectively a sacrilege to thwart 
him” (251). The reference to sacrilege reminds one of how rational theories of power would 
make disobedience not only illegal but immoral. Hearn understandably resents such hybris, 
but his symbolic rebellion merely results in his trading Cmnmings for Croft, Recon’s formi­
dable platoon sergeant
Croft is the irrational aspect of power in secret alliance with die rational Cummings, a 
sort of“earthly double” to Cummings’ divine aspirations (Hassan 146).2 Croft exemplifies, 
at a lower echelon, the General’s theory offear and hate to gain and maintain domination. A 
natural killer (even in civilian life, where as a strikebreaker he once shot a man), Croft is 
tough, fearless, ruthless, self-confident, and thoroughly professional; in short, he is perfectly 
adapted to war. Contrary to the fearful soldiers in his command, he relishes both the terrain
and the dangerous mission. He is an earlier, scarier, but more credible version of Sylvester 
Stallone’s film character, John Rambo. When an inexperienced young soldier panics and is 
killed by a shell while the platoon is still on the beach, Croft has visions of omnipotence,
“odd dreams and portents of power.” Like Rambo, he is not so much courageous as pathologi­
cal, as he shows in the ecstatic machine-gunning episode.
Croft is resentful o f Hearn’s taking command of what he considers his own platoon. As 
a leader, he is in feet more effective than Hearn, who tries to “buddy 19” to the men, forgetting 
first, that as an officer they would dislike him, however personable he is as a man, and sec­
ond, the Machiavellian advice that fear is more effective in the long run than love. They hate 
r Croft, both as person and platoon sergeant, but, as Hearn cranes to realize, they recognize 
Croft's competence. Hie sergeant is serenely indifferent to their opinion; his only requirement 
;is obediencei-Hie Croft-Heani conflict is an example o f who effectively holds power in an 
organization versus who officially holds it; i.e. Hearn has the rank but Croft the control. At 
the climaxofthe mission,the ambush si the mountain pass, the whole purpose of the patrol (to 
see if  Cummings’ planned attack is feasible) is lost Hearn thinks that to save the platoon he 
should therefore turn back but he realizes that if  1» does he will have to face Cummings 
empty-handed and despises himself for risking die men’s lives for an improper motive. Power 
corrupts, but he realizes he enjoys leadership.
Hearn’s fantasy of resistance to Cummings is in the mode of romantic revolutionary, a 
role that Mailer will pose in later in life and which here he already exposes as insufficient 
Hearn reflects that his fantasy of waging guerrilla war against the Cummingses of the world is 
foolish fancy (one might add, at least for an American), but thinks more soberly that “for 
whatever reason, you had to keep resisting”(456). One way to do this would be for him to
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resign his commission and become a common soldier, giving up his privileges, but that would 
also mean leaving the men in the hands of the odious Croft, and yet “if he stayed he would 
become another Croft” (456). He thus recognizes himself in both Cummings and Croft and 
their Faustian will to power, but not being ruthless enough to act on this recognition he be­
comes easy prey to Croft, who gets him killed in the second ambush. Bourgeois intellectual to 
the end, Hearn has merely a “rhetoric of engagement” and so can remain only disenchanted 
with the world, another “rebel-victim” of the post-war American novel (Poirier 26; Hassan 
147-48).
Croft lacks any scruples and so regains control of Recon, lacing only the final challenge 
of Red Valsen, unconscious anarchist, who resists military rule with indifference, cynicism, 
and obscenity, carrying on a long, wily duel wife Croft, till finally, rejecting the patrol that has 
become merely Croft’s obsession, he raises the specter of mutiny, at which point Croft effec­
tively applies <<naked power” by threatening to shoot him. When Red backs down, his will 
broken, Croft reigns supreme, but his aspiration to total control turns out to be futile, for he is 
defeated by nature itself in the form of die mountain, which he perceives, Ahab-like, as a per­
sonal affront to his dominance. When die exhausted men are attacked by the hornets and lose 
their forward momentum, Croft feels he has lost die meaning for himself, since his power over 
die men had extended to a Faustian desire for power over nature itself Here, as elsewhere in 
Mailer’s fiction, nature responds with supreme indifference.
Cummings, too, is defeated in his will to power, since, militarily,, the mission has been 
to no puipose, the campaign having already been won by a fluke, the blundering blind luck of 
die mediocre Major Dalleson, acting in Cummings’ fortuitous absence. The novel ends 
therefore in a reaffirmation ofNaturalism, with Croft frustrated by nature and accumulated
circumstance, and Cummings by chance, for the break-through of the Japanese lines is the re­
sult of their hunger, lack of supplies, and bad luck (their CG is killed by an artillery shell). 
Cummings gets official credit for the victory but realizes bitterly that anyone could have won 
it; he has been cheated by the decisive but unpredictable variables of war, one of Tolstoy’s 
main themes. As for the men of Recon, they stagger through the action with only their sensa­
tions—fear and pain—intact like their Civil War counterparts in Crane’s The Red Badge o f 
Courage (1895), they have no comprehension of where they are, what they are doing, or why 
they are doing it
With the outcome determined by non-human agencies, nature and chance, the only politi­
cal issues in the novel are the ideological debates o f Cummings and Hearn. Mailer thought 
that he should set his novel in the Pacific rather than in the European theater of die war pre­
cisely to avoid the complexities o f die European political issues (which included the alliance 
with Communist Russia, die participation of nationalist partisan militias, and die great ques­
tion of Hitler’s “Final Solution.”). He said thas “to try a major novel about the last war in 
Europe without a sense of the past is to tail in die worst way...” and cited Irwin Shaw’s The 
Young Lions (1948) as an example of such a failure (Advertisements 28). Shaw’s novel, 
which attempts to see the European war from both German and American sides is, to be sure, 
much inferior to Mailer’s effort, but it is hard to say whether the phrase “without a sense of 
the past” refers to the novelist or to Americans in general. In either case, there is, once more, 
die shying away from political realities.
During the war, die conflict in the Pacific was seen by the American public as a 
straightforward case of aggression by an expansionist and militarist Japanese imperial gov­
ernment The public preference for the Pacific theater was also the result of racism, since the
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enemy there was Asiatic (and both verbal and visual propaganda emphasized the “sneaky 
Japs”). There is, however, the wdeniabie fact that the US fleet had been nearly destroyed at 
Pearl Harbor in a tactically brilliant surprise attack, which was perceived by Americans (has 
been so until today, as fee 1991 commemoration showed) as an unconscionable act of treach­
ery, while Germany only declared war on fee US shortly afterward, for reasons feat are still 
unclear. By setting his novel in the Pacific, taking a more neutral stance toward the larger 
meanings of fee war, and concentrating on conflicts within the US Army itself^  Mailer in effect 
removed his novel from history. lit could have been written, mutatiz mutandis, about almost 
any other war.
Karl has argued that precisely because fee novel is apolitical the long dialogues be­
tween Hearn and Cummings are “misplaced,” while they would not have been in a war novel 
set in Europe (Karl 97), but this is to fail to recognize Mailer’s true interest in fee novel, as in 
nearly all of his novels (cf Hassan’s quote, above): fee confrontations of power. In any case, 
fee importance of fee dialogues in fee narrative structure cannot be denied. The first half of the 
novel is given over to them, and fee second hal£ fee narrative of fee patrol, can be read as fee 
illustration of both fee temporary effectiveness but ultimate futility of Cummings’ theory of 
fear and power, fee theory applied in practice, as it were, wife Sergeant Croft fee arm to 
Cummings’ brain. In this perspective, too, Hearn is fee link between Cummings and Croft, 
since he cannot be tolerated at either end of fee organization.
It might also be objected feat fee men in Recon are (fictionalized) products of history, 
even its victims, i.e. sons o f fee Great Depression, as emphasized in fee ‘Time Machine” 
flashbacks of their civilian lives, a modernist device Mailer borrowed from John Dos Passos 
feat is inserted into fee novel’s realist narrative. Hiese individual histories, moreover, are not
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connected to a collective perception of American history but neutralized by the brutalizing 
experience of combat, as the novel constantly shows. Even individually, the lives point up the 
central concern with power. Martinez, the Tex-Mex scout, represents conflicts of racism and 
the poor self-image of minorities. Proud to be a sergeant, he was poor and exploited as a ci­
vilian. Having assimilated conventional ideology about America and its opportunities, he has 
only succeeded with his specialized combat skills (he is the only one who kills an enemy 
soldier close 19  and is amaster-scout) and realizes he is, after ail, afraid to call himself a 
‘Texan,” since he is not an Anglo like Croft. Gallagher, die “revolutionary reversed,” was a 
cog in the Boston Irish-Catholic political machine, a proto-fascist who had once belonged to 
an armed anti-Semitic, anti-Communist organization. Poor, ignorant, full of envy and resent­
ment, he represents the lumpen always ready for co-optation by the forces of reaction. The 
representational nature of Recon is especially clear in its cross-cultural ethnic make-up: Chi­
cano, Irish-American, Pole, Jew, Kalian, WASP, “hillbilly,” etc. ( All that seems to be miss­
ing is a Negro, but Negroes in fact were in segregated units ratal after the war). Character as 
biography, as individual history, has little bearing on the issue of present survival, which de­
pends on the factors of chance and fete, although Croft, as rugged Texas individualist, may be 
an exception, a theme to which Mailer will return in Why Are We In Vietnam?
Mailer, then, does not deal with die Second World War as historical experience, but as 
an arena in which to spin out dramas of power struggles. These struggles take place in three 
basic categories: between individuals, between individuals and groups, and between small 
groups and larger ones. In the first category, Cummings vs. Hearn is, as we have seen, is die 
familiar ideological one of liberal vs. reactionary. With Croft vs. Hearn and Croft vs. Red, 
Croft’s victory in both cases, since he resorts to violence with Hearn and the threat of it with
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Red, is owing to brute force, naked power over their bodies (Red as the undisciplined soldier 
is recalcitrant to the usual method). In Cummings vs. his (non-advancing) Troops, Cummings 
as Commanding General possesses both institutional aid traditional power (in Russell’s 
scheme), and also takes specific coercive measures to punish what he sees as the men’s re­
calcitrance. This could not, however, be described as “naked power,” such as Croft employs. 
Although this is usually military in Russell’s discussion, he says it takes the form of internal 
tyranny, such as using military force against one’s own citizens in civil disruptions, or in for­
eign conquest, so that, if  relevant, it might better describe Cummings’ campaign against the 
Japanese (Russell, “Forms of Power'’ 20-21).
Yet, Russell might plausibly argue that naked power is what is used on die American 
soldiers themselves, since enlisted men are often inducted into the army and therefore do not 
freely give consent to exercise power over their bodies. Yet, citizens of a democratically 
elected government at least theoretically recognize the army as a legitimate authority entrusted 
with national defease (although Russell himself, a militant pacifist, would object to this).
Prior assent would therefore be given to those authorities to do as they saw fit, within die 
constraints of die law, even against die will of reluctant or dissenting individuals in the face of 
unattractive situations like being sent to war, though this argument would be and has been 
contested by conscientious objectors.
Such an argument would, however, in this case be more than academic, since die men 
are already present in that exemplary system of power known as an army, whether they have 
consented (enlisted) or not (were inducted). Their obedience can best be understood by Fou­
cault’s notion of “discipline,” which is a word much appreciated in military organizations.
An army is subject to and subjected by discipline. It produces what Foucault calls “docile
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bodies,” bodies that are subjected and therefore obedient but, in the same proportion, through 
die repeated bodily movements of training, the soldiers become apt and efficient as fighters. 
Discipline has this twofold effect: it increases both aptitude and domination. Civilian recruits 
are transformed into disciplined soldiers through military “exercises,” individual skills are 
developed along with unit maneuvers, aptitude in die service of utility, which in turn requires 
precise obedience for mmritmim efficiency as a unit Cummings is an effective commander 
because of his mastery o f detail, his concern with die smallest problems as well the overall 
picture. As Foucault says, “Discipline is apolitical anatomy of detail”, in which everything is 
turned to account In his example, Napoleon claimed to discover die minute world of detail in 
order to master it (Foucault, DP 138-39).
Hearn vs. the Army also belongs to the second category (individuals vs. groups), 
which, as an ideological and class conflict, has more in common—though from die other side 
of die class barrier—with Officers vs. Enlisted men, die only conflict in the third category 
(group vs. group). This important final opposition would seem amenable to a Marxist analy­
sis, since Mailer has made a clear division between a privileged officer class and an ex­
ploited class of enlisted men. Thomas Schaub, for example, thinks “class analysis had been 
the basis of novelistic structure” in this novel, but that Mailer was to forego naturalistic nar­
ration for a psychologizing, first-person narrator in later novels when Marxist analysis was 
called into question or fell into disrepute among American artists and intellectuals during die 
Fifties (Schaub 151). Schaub seems to be thinking ofHeam and Cummings* debate, which 
structures the novel only in the sense that it provides the basis for Hearn’s transference from 
one order of power to another. Hie class conflict is, to be sure, latent in Recon’s instinctive 
distrust of Hearn, when he first comes to command the platoon, for while the men distrust
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Croft’s character and obey his orders, they can verbally abuse him on a nearly equal basis of 
his non-commissioned rank of sergeant, while lack of respect for an officer could mean a 
court martial for insubordination. And the conflict becomes overt at several points in the 
novel: Cummings’ advice to Hearn about cultivating class consciousness (“Marxism with a 
reverse twist”), the barely disguised insolence to Hearn of the enlisted man in change of taking 
care of the General’s tent, and Cummings’ granting of special favors (such as the large por­
tion of fresh meat allotted to a porportionately smaller number of officers) to purposely make 
die men aware of “their own inferiority,” another example ofFoucaultian disciplinary power, 
the denial of the body for the aim of spiritual development
Yet, a Marxist analysis is problematic, since Marxist theory does not allow power re­
lations between individuals outside of the Marxist concept of their place in the production 
process, which would seem to exclude the imposed hierarchies o f a non-productive military 
organization (Poulautzas 125-26). lit would also be equivocal by similar reasoning to equate 
die enlisted men with a true proletari&t, for the siiapie reason feet soldiers, especially in a 
wartime situation of universal draft, do not constitute an economic class. Hie men are dis­
tributed not according to class, i.e. their civilian origins, but rank, “the place one occupies in 
a classification” (DP 142). Furthermore, it is dubious to insist on a class struggle as the basis 
for power relations within the Army (independent of the power relations that cause certain 
men to be commissioned, others not), because of the preconceived outcome of such a hypo­
thetical struggle. Military uprisings within the ranks or against civilian authorities are histori­
cally unprecedented in the US military (although civilians have at more than one point in US 
history staged anti-draft riots at the prospect ofbeing inducted into the Army), and, given die 
historical and institutional subordination of military to civilian authority, highly unlikely. The
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outcome is, quite literally, written in die Table of Operations and Equipment, the structural 
basis of Army organization always already determining a relationship of perpetual domination 
over the non-commissioned troops.
c.
Since at least the early Sixties, Mailer has adopted a romantic revolutionary stance of 
resistance to die counter-culture’s bug-bears of encroaching corporate technology (with the 
consequent perceived loss of elemental sensuous experience), and the political authoritarian­
ism of an “inhuman” bureaucracy aid an imperial presidency. The isolated and ineffectual 
heroes of the first three novels, published in the late 1940s and the 1950s, could find no way 
to resist what Mailer calls “totalitarianism,” which includes not only the hegemony of an all- 
powerful state, btrt an increasing insistence in American culture on uniformity and “mass” 
values implicit in the pop-sociology expression o f the period, “the lonely crowd.” Nor will 
the heroes of die first two Sixties novels fere much better, though they are both more resource- 
&1 and more determined Hie individualism of Mailer’s outlook would not, after ail, jive feat 
well with the neo-tribalism of a “hippy” counter-culture, or, for that matter, with an effective 
politics of possible resistance, but in the three Sixties novels, in line with that culture, he takes 
up the cudgel of a (Thoreauvian?) anti-capitalist, anti-technological, pastoralist (Poirier 
26,86,100).
Hiese oppositions become evident in one of Mailer’s most important works, the 
“fictual novel” The Armies o f the Mght (1968), which may be considered a companion piece 
to Why Are We in Vietnam (1967), the metaphorical treatment of the latter giving way to a 
reportorial one, but the oblique qjproach is at least thematically maintained, since the subject 
is not the war itsel£ which remains present yet distant, but die domestic resistance to it The
novel brings the totalitarianism that American politicians identified in Communism home to 
die repressive structures of American government It specifically focuses on events that oc­
curred in October, 1967, when amass march of protesters against the Vietnam war converged 
on the Pentagon, locus and symbol of U.S. military power. In die first part, ‘History as a 
Novel,” which makes up the bulk of the whole, Mailer takes die reader along, via a chrono­
logical diary—yet novelistically replete with backward and forward digressions on his own 
life and work and on the mind and behavior of “corporate America”—to observe his own ac­
tions at, and observations o£ die March. The account is historical in that it proposes to tell us 
What happened, but history as fiction, since Mailer knows that objective facts or events are 
never simply given but occur as effects on die observer or recorder. S is also both eye­
witness and autobiographical, since the author is both “present” at the scene of the events but, 
as he freely admits, constantly shaping the story so as to place himself at their center.
Any interpretation of what happens organizes the information that is presented, but 
Mailer proposes to go even farther in his wish to “write an intimate story of an event which 
places its focus on a central figure who is not central to Ihe event” (64). This figure, 
“Mailer,” is an eyewitness who does not have to make himself always look good, since he is 
not one of the leaders or organizers of the event, “but ambiguous in his own proportions, a 
comic hero” (64) aware of his pretensions and limitations, for “[o]nce history inhabit« a crazy 
house, egotism may be the last tool left to History” (65). Mailer die author (i.e. outside the 
text) thus writes a book with Mailer die narrator observing “Mailer” the protagonist, who, as 
character, even has a number of different names: Norman, the Novelist, the Ruminant, die 
Historian, the Participate—names that affirm die variety of his roles but also attest to his in­
vention of multiple identities, multiplying “Mailers” to adapt to, or perhaps better define, the
multifariousness and insanity of American society (Karl 580). It has been suggested that if  the 
narrative identity is diversified, as it is in Why Are We in Vietnam? and even the non- 
fictional Advertisements for Myself it will be more difficult for the internal super-ego, and 
die external powers of die state, to contain the individual (Bufithis 288). Hie plurality of 
identities also points to the crisis of the self that emerged, as we have seen, from the fiction of 
the post-war years. Hie multiple selves are in this view Mailer’s pluralist equivalent of 
Ralph Ellison’s “invisible” mask hiding a precarious identity.3 The split personality that the 
narrator admittedly shares, personified in these multiple narrative selves is, however, a sur­
vival tactic, not apolitical unconscious,” though he does perceive a schizoid madness at the 
heart of the US : “Any man or woman who was devoutly Christian and worked for an Ameri­
can Corporation had been caught in an unseen vise whose pressure could split their mind from 
their soul. For the center o f Christianity was a mystery, a son o f God, and the center of die 
Corporation was a detestation of mystery, a worship of technology”(200). The businessmen, 
generals, CIA and FBI agents, and the myriad hucksters of the American Dream are all wrong: 
America is profoundly un-Christian, which helps explain why die war must go on.
The WASP power-elite is convinced that Communism is die enemy of Christian civili­
zation and so must be relentlessly opposed wherever it seems to be making inroads, a theme 
that will underlie the incredible antics in Mailer’s CIA novel, Harlot’s Ghost (1991). That 
Communism is threatening a remote country in southeast Asia is therefore cause for alarm, 
especially in conjunction with the dubious central diesis o f die “domino theory.” Mail»' sum­
marizes (193-6) the political and strategic arguments of the Vietnam war’s supporters 
(Hawks) and opponents (Doves), only to conclude that, while on die face of it the Doves’ ar­
guments are stronger, power is not destroyed by superior argument Ideology, it is implied, is
more powerful than reason, but the overly patriotic American public can in fact still be 
swayed, for public opinion has been changing constantly as to whether or not die war should 
be continued. Yet, die Hawks, who firmly hold every power but the consensus of 
(reasonable) public opinion they have not been able to mold, are not too concerned about this, 
and they use the mendaciously effective tactic of appealing to the patriotic public by branding 
Doves as disloyal or cowardly.
Coercion is, as we have seen, never enough to maintain repression for long without also 
winning ‘‘die hearts and minds” of the subordinated. This is what the U.S. policy in Vietnam 
conspicuously failed to do and is die main reason the U.S. lost the war; it is also an underly­
ing theme in the novel, as police repression is foredoomed to have an adverse effect on the 
public’s attitudes. It was therefore arguable whether media coverage of die police repression 
of‘‘unruly” demonstrators honed a conservative public, anxious about “law-and-order” in a 
society already torn by racial strife, for or against the war. I should say that initially at least 
the Hawks’ hegemonic control of public Gpinion aid their playing on fears of continued civil 
disruption worked for a while, but failed in the long run, when it became increasingly appar­
ent that a military victory would not be forthcoming and that civil opposition was not re­
stricted to an undisciplined youth. Public opinion was therefore central in the eventual but 
belated decision to end the war. As Hannah Arendt argues, “[w]hen commands are no longer 
obeyed, die means of violence are of no use; and the question of this obedience is not decided 
by the command-obedience relation but by opinion, and, o f course, by the number of those 
who share if’ (On Violence 66-67). Historically, this is what happened. Hie war continued 
long after it was popular, with an empowered minority exploiting the lack of open opposition, 
but it eventually became so unpopular at home as to be untenable abroad.
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Since political arguments in this climate of opinion have made little difference, M ailer 
offers semi-serious personal ones, such as that any war is bad which has better-armed rich 
boys fighting poor boys, and yet his analysis of Vietnam (198-9) is not without subtlety, even 
foresight His conclusion that Asia was best left to the Asians is, of course, unimpeachable, 
even though there still existed a mentality about Asia that perceived it as an adjunct of the 
Wert, so that people used to ask how it was that we had “lost” China, as if  it had been ours in 
the first place. But the notion that “to leave Asia would be precisely to gain the balance of 
power” is an inspired paradox, the explanation being that what will eventually ensue with the 
absence of colonial powers is far too complex to control or even predict He has correctly 
perceived die current situation of the end of Communism in the late Eighties (which, however, 
took place in Europe, not Asia) as another paradox: ‘Id the expansion of Communism was its 
demise” (199).
Again, Mailer perceives his subject, here a particular historical event, in terms of the 
adversarial power struggles among indivi&ials and groups in varied combinations. Hie two 
major opposing forces of the mass demonstration are the US government, in the monolithic 
symbolic aspect o f the Pentagon and the personal presence of the coercive state apparatus 
(police and army), vs. a diverse mass of civilian demonstrators, united only by their marching 
in opposition to government policies. Behind this physical confrontation of demonstrators and 
police/soldiers, however, is die ideological conflict o f Hawks and Doves. Mailer ranges the 
power of a corrupt U.S. on die side of die Hawks, “corporation-land villains”(104), whose 
adversaries, a rather pathetic mass of neurotic wimps, are, however, empowered by the forces 
ofhirtory:
All die healthy Marines, state troopers, professional athletes, movie stars, red 
necks, sensuous life-loving Mafia, cops, mill-workers, city officials, nice 
healthy-looldng easy-grafting politicians fiill of the light (from marijuana?) in
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their eye of life they enjoy-yes, they would be for the war in Vietnam. Ar­
rayed against them as hard-core troops: an elite! the Freudridden embers of 
Marxism, good old American anxiety strata-ihe urban middle-class with their 
proliferated monumental adenoidal resentments, their secret slavish love for 
die oncoming hegemony of the computer and the suburb, yes, they and their 
children, by die sheer ironies, the sheer ineptitude, die kinks of history, were 
now being compressed into more and more militant stands...(44)
Such are the unlikely soldiers upon whom the revolution depends. During the March, helicop­
ters of die government and die police hover over these “troops” to remind them o f“the secret 
of who owned the air—corporation-land” (127). Hie demonstrators’ target is the main build­
ing of corporation-land itself:
...the symbol, the embodiment, no, call it the true and high church of die mili­
tary-industrial complex, die Pentagon, blind five-sided eye of a subtle oppres­
sion which had come to America out o f the very air o f the century (this evil 
twentieth century with its curse on the species, its oppressive Faustian lusts, its 
technological excrement all over the conduits o f nature, its entrapment of the 
innocence of the best--for which young American soldiers hot out ofhigh 
school and in love with a hct-rod and his Marine buddies in a platoon in Viet­
nam could begin to know the devil of oppression which would steal his soul 
before he knew he had one) yes, Mailer felt a confirmation of the contests of 
his own life on this March to die eye of oppressor, greedy stingy dumb half of 
the worst o f the Wasp heart, chalice and anus of corporation land, smug, in­
closed, morally blind Pentagon, destroying the future of its own nation with 
each day it augmented its strength...(125-6)
In this passage, Mailer the reporter yields to an unleashed narrator who fires on all the famil­
iar targets: the military, nature-destroying technology, brain-washed American youth, the 
Wasp power-elite, corporate America, all the powers that made Vietnam possible, that keep it 
going, and that must be resisted.
Hie conflict over the war itself which has defined die situation and constituted its back­
ground, will be examined in the second part of the novel; in the first part, Mailer concentrates 
on die conflicts of power within the opposition itself One initial problem within the opposi­
tion, despite the over-all coordination of the Mobilization Committee, was its lack of defined
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leadership. Unlike the Civil Rights march on Washington (1963), there was no central organi­
zation determining the strategy or even the purpose of the march on the Pentagon, and yet 
Mailer perceives that, paradoxically, this lade of centralization is part of the demonstration’s 
strength, for “...the authority could not comprehend nor contain nor finally manage to control 
any political action whose end was unknown” (99). Hie government could attack the march­
ers and put them in jail, but in the «id it could not comprehend a mass movement that oper­
ated, unlike die older Communist movements, without a coordinated plan. In fact, die “solid- 
as-brickwork logic” of the Old Left had been adopted by the bureaucrats of “the American 
center.” They too are appalled at political activity that is not run by die book.
Another contradictory soiree of power within die opposition, or at least that part of it 
called the New Left, often including its “hippy” cohorts, is its new style of politics, with an 
emphasis on aesthetics. Mailer sees these people as a motley army, one not in uniform but in 
costume, “...close to being assembled from all the intersections between history and comic 
books, between legend and television, the Biblical archetypes and the movies.” la this war- 
as-masked-costume ball, “the aesthetics was at last in the politics” (103). Hie apparent clash 
between style and action is reflected in the contradictory nature of the new generation’s be­
liefs. Hie present generation is more in tune with technology than any before it, despite some 
anti-technological rhetoric, but it also believes in psychedelic drugs, die occult, tribal ritual, 
and unstructured sexuality. Hie anti-authoritarian radicalism therefore cannot be repressed in 
the usual ways, owing to its unpredictable and extremely anti-logical character: “belief was 
reserved for the revelatory mystery of the happening where you did not know what was going 
to happen next” (97-8).
Some sort ofrepression was sure to come, however, as a powerful government could 
not tolerate civil disobedience. And yet power does not automatically belong to die govern­
ment since it has to reckon with negative propaganda, for how can the self-styled “leader of 
the free world” be shown stomping its own citizens without serious loss o f face? When 
marchers begin to go over barbed-wire fences, for example, Mailer has a paranoid vision of 
concentration camp pens but immediately corrects himself: “he should have divined that the 
government was not going to pen people in full view of others who were free, nor give fields 
of such photographs to European papers with any faint reminders implicit of when last civil­
ians had been seen behind barbed wire”(128). Memories of the Second World War coincide 
with die current technology of total media coverage. Past and present converge to advantage.
Hiis paranoid vision of government repression is not without its reality in the ranks of 
the demonstrators. The black militants at die March have their own priorities of resisting ra­
cism—of which they see Vietnam as merely an exported example—and generally distrust the 
white Left. If the blacks march to die Pentagon 2nd do not “preempt die front rank, they would 
lose face as fighters; if  they were too numerous on the line they would be beaten half to 
death” (114). Hieir relinquishing of the March is not entirely explained by this dilemma 
Mailer sees die black militants as a kind of Leninist revolutionary vanguard, sure of their se­
cret power, with their own system of communication and silent movement, who had moved 
“into that Black twenty-first century when Black Power had succeeded in rendering the white 
man invisible at will” (1 1 2 ).
For die white demonstrators who do take part, the comedy of their jostling for a place in 
the front rank in competition for die TV cameras, is not lost on Mailer, who is in turn deter­
mined to keep his place in die line; if  he is going to get his head busted, let it be for that even­
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ing’s television commentators (119), and he is candid about Ihe many petty “power plays” 
among leaders and celebrities. On the eve of die March, for example, he argues with a 
movement lawyer over who is to preside at a public meeting with celebrity speakers. For the 
lawyer, DiGrazia, meetings are simply meetings, to be endured for die cause, but Mailer’s 
instinct for the spectacle, even if  only to play the fool, prompts him to call for an audience 
vote. When this turns out fairly even, he proposes to give die audience a lesson: “In die ab­
sence of a definite vote, the man who holds the power, keeps if’ (50), a variation on the cli­
ché, “possession is the better part of die law/’
Of these minor, mainly personal struggles, two are illustrative, as one involves the 
authority of prestige, the other brute force. Novelist Mailer, critic Dwight McDonald, and 
poet Robert Lowell are die literaty stars, “notables” who lend their names to the March 
propaganda. Mailer admits being jealous of Lowell, who besides possessing a Wasp aristo­
cratic serenity in contrast to what he calls his own brassy Jewish vulgarity, has the reputation 
of being die most distinguished living American poet, a claim Mailer says he would like to 
make for himself as novelist Yet, when Lowell remarks to him that he and his wife (critic 
Elizabeth Hardwick, who blasted Mailer’s latest novel) thought Mail«* “the finest journalist 
in America?’ (as opposed to the finest novelist), he takes this as condescending insult and sup­
poses Lowell is hying to “neutralize” any future risks of confronting him. When Lowell keeps 
congratulating him for a more moderate speech Mailer made during a draft-card burning 
ceremony, Mailer doggedly keeps congratulating Lowell on his speech, determined not to lose 
in this private competitive game of mutual admiration.
In die physical confrontation, Mailer suffers an anti-Semitic slur by an anti-demonstrator 
in a Nazi uniform. When Mailer returns the insult, a big US Marshall steps in to break up the
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imminent fight, but the Nazi persists and is bounced off a track and rapped with a club. Mailer 
cannot help wondering whether die Marshal secretly thinks die Nazi is just a contemptible 
distraction from the real danger, i.e. Communist-inspired demonstrators like himself Curi­
ously, he does not consider the irony of his being protected by a government lawman nor 
dwell on the irony of a powerful government so sure of itself that it can wage a grossly unjust 
war while giving guarantees of free speech and assembly to its own citizens, though the para­
dox of this situation will indeed become clear in the second part
Hie comic ironies o f marching against a liberal authoritarian state is further shown by 
Mailer’s pondering the moment he should get himself arrested, trying to time it so as to make a 
party in New York that evening and warning die Marshall who arrests him to keep his hands 
off him since he isn’t resisting arrest Getting arrested is a ritual with little danger of violence 
and only a few hours actual incarceration. Hie price of confronting authority is therefore 
comically low, and yet Mailer soon learns that his celebrity status offers the government an 
opportunity to be vindictive. Expecting to be released immediately, he is given five days in 
jail for the Socradc offense o f negatively influencing the yoimg. There ensues a legal straggle 
between the judge who is determined to keep Mailer in jail as an example and the dexterous 
movement lawyer, Hirshkop, who keeps pulling new aiguments and legal technicalities out of 
his sleeve until die judge finally relents. What makes die judge back down, besides Hirshkop’s 
legal virtuosity, is the realization that to resist on this particular case might entrap the govern­
ment in future rulings, enfeebling that level o f courts in dealing with civil disobedience. Hie 
government indulges in give-and-take: it reluctantly releases an important law-breaker to en­
sure flexibility later when more might be at stake.
Mailer’s fame also prevents any realization of die romantic dream of being a real, “gun- 
in-tbe-hills” revolutionary: ‘lie would pay for the pleasures of his notoriety in die impossibil­
ity of disguise” (89). On the other hand, he resists participating in radical organizations be­
cause they are too much like bureaucratic sects, “rusty tin cans” that attract the wrong kind of 
people, mediocrities who join movements to indulge ‘‘their self-pity and self-righteousness” 
(107). This shows the profoundly individualist basis o f his politics, since, as Weber empha­
sized, what counts in an organization is the power it can mobilize irregardless of die person­
alities of its individual elements. Mailer’s more serious objection, that die opposition itself is 
part of die problem (“...technology-land was the capitalist bastion, and the mediocre middle- 
class masses of the Left..were the first real champions of technology land,” 107), exposes the 
romantic-pastoralist basis of his positioa Consider die following diatribe against liberal aca­
demics, the very class of people who were almost unanimously opposed to the war:
They were of course politically opposed to die present programs and move­
ments of the republic in Asian foreign policy, but this political difference 
seemed no more than a quarrel among engineers. Liberal academics had no 
root of areal war with technology-land itself no, in all likelihood, they were 
the natural managers of that future air-conditioned vault where die last of hu­
man life would still exist (25).
Despite the sociological truth behind this passage, it is one example of what Mailer 
does throughout the novel. He resists identifying with his true political allies, finding fault 
with their convictions, personalities, or style, seeking out their contradictions and anomalies 
and finding points o f sympathy with their adversaries. This is partly a need to maintain a mi­
nority status for himself partly a strategy to give his work a dialectical movement, to avoid its 
becoming just another radical harangue against right-wing America—thus, the sympathetic 
treatment of the Marshall who arrests him, of the Commissioner who tries him, of the young
soldiers guarding the Pentagon. In opposition to his allies, ‘‘Mailer” insists on the need for 
action, railing against wishy-washy liberals and pacifists whose cautious mood saps revolu­
tionary spirit: “...Mailer had recognized long ago that he was sufficiently devil-ridden to 
need a little action from time to time, and the promise of these pacifistic moods seemed to be 
that they would go on forever”(79). This may be no more than Mailer (the protagonist) posing 
as An American Dream’s Stephen Rojack, tapping his demonic side as a source of authentic 
energy and pretending it is not a fantasy. On the other hand, Mailer (author and public per­
sonality) often engaged in provocative or outrageous behavior, it has been argued, not so much 
as a means of self-promotion, though that is also quite plausible, but as a testing-ground for 
purposes of his work: ‘T ill people see where their ideas lead, they know nothing,” he said. 
The process is cyclical: ideas lead to action which leads to writing and to new ideas 
(Bufithis 279). Mailer’s quarrel with liberal academics is that they do not see where their 
ideas lead, preferring die safe harbor of concepts.
In contrast to such people, who can only think of revolution in terms of lawyers, hospi­
tals, and passing out pamphlets, Mailer “liked good character when it issued in action which 
was visually tumultuous rather than inspiring awe in the legal mind” (66). Hie key word 
“visually” tips one off that Mailer is not necessarily extolling violent action as superior to 
words. He knows, after all, he is writing abook about die March that will ultimately be more 
effective in its power of persuasion than his own minor physical participation in the event If 
he follows his own advice (seeing where ideas lead), it is as if he has to go through the mo­
tions in order to produce the book. To be sure, “action” cannot be armed conflict, since any 
serious attack on the Pentagon would be suicidal. Mailer himself after all, does not fight die 
Nazi or a man behind him in the line provoking him or get in a fight in jail, as he expects. Ac­
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tion in the context of this historical event is not armed but symbolic conflict, action as theater, 
a march “on die bastion which symbolized the military might of the Republic, marching not to 
capture it but to wound it symbolical!f’ (65, his emphasis).
In Part II, “The Novel as History,” Mailer sacrifices immediacy for objectivity, relating 
events that he did not actually witness, i.e. history as created by others rather than history as 
Mailer creating it As usual, the power struggles are presented in binary terms. Thus, within 
the opposition, the important conflict is radicals vs. liberals. In power terms, the radicals 
have greater motivation, as they are more militant and less law-abiding, but die liberals have 
more resources, with greater numbers and much more money. In terms of influence, the ear­
nest, respectable, and well-behaved liberals have greater influence on the general American 
public, while the radicals function, as it were, as the political conscience of the liberals. Each 
of these tendencies contains an “alphabet soup” of organizations, ft»* the bureaucratic com­
plexities of which Mailer has little patience. As novelist, he tends to shade ideological nu­
ances in the positions of representative individuals.
Within the militant ranks themselves is a conflict that arose together with the counter­
culture of die Sixties: Old vs. New Left. Older radicals are not militants gone soft with age; 
they are “old” because they still employ the “solid-as-brickwork logic” and rhetoric o f Com­
munism Although many have dropped out of the Party, they still retain a Marxist outlook, aid 
their natural enemies are liberals and enlightened professionals. Hie New Left is younger and 
politically eclectic; they admire Mao and Che, Fidel and Malcolm X, they emphasize style 
and aesthetic, they are more inflammatory than logical in their rhetoric, and they prefer im­
provised rather than meticulously planned tactics. Itieir natural allies are hippies and blacks.
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These two positions Mailer personifies in the two main organizers of die March, David 
Dellinger and Jerry Rubin. Dellinger is an older, militant but non-violent pacifist from the 
East Coast who has the difficult job of an intermediary between liberal and radical factions. 
He realizes the March needs the money and numbers of die former if  it were to continually 
grow. At the same time, the anti-war movement thrives on publicity. Media power could only 
be supplied by flamboyant radicals like Rubin, the Berkeley “Yippie” whose declared goal 
was“wholesale disruption and dislocation of American society.” Merely another mass pro­
test, without civil disobedience, would cause the peace movement to “become a predictable 
figure in the tapestry, to be discounted by die power-elite rather than respected”(245), taking, 
that is to say, its non-effective place as pseudo-opposition to an oppressive state.
This unstable alliance was further strained by the timely occurrence of the Arab-Israeli 
war in June, 1967 (the New Left, in opposition to the Old, leaned toward the Arabs), and die 
difficult relationship of white radicals with black militants, who, after die joint militancy of 
die Civil Rights actions in the south, expelled whites from their organizations. This conflict is 
“settled” by the blacks, who simply abandon die demonstration as irrelevant to their needs. 
The Old vs. New Left disagreement on tactics is settled by Dellinger. A mass, peaceful dem­
onstration would be followed by acts of civil disobedience by those who chose diem. Behind 
this compromise solution, however, is the greater struggle between the government and the 
Mobilization Committee, the ironies of which Mailer summarizes: “...the compromise said in 
effect: we die government wage the war in Vietnam for our security, but will permit your 
protest provided it is only a little disorderly. The demonstrators: we still consider the war 
outrageous and will therefore break the law, but not by very much” (252). These professed 
attitudes are, as Mailer says, absurd. The situation is unsatisfactory for any long-range goals
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and results in the division of tactics in the actual March. Hie radical organizations that reject 
compromise stage their own poorly planned attack that results in brutal beatings and arrests. 
Hie government does not maintain its own legal fiction during the March, but is true to itself 
as the legal, but coercive liberal state. It “remained to the end what it had been from the be­
ginning: a part legalistic, a part co-operative, and a part threatening!” (293-4).
Hie external confrontation, summed 19  in the formula of People vs. Pentagon, Mailer 
concretizes in the feeing lines of demonstrators and soldiers. While “each side is coming face 
to face with its conception of the devi]”(269), the long hours bring about less apocalyptic re­
actions, as demonstrators by tun tempt and taunt the soldiers. Mailer sees class conflict here, 
as the demonstrators are urban, middle-class, or hippy exiles from the middle-class, spiritu­
ally alienated, secretly in envy (Mailer thinks) of the tough, gritty lives of die virile working- 
class soldiers. This sociological simplification, however, makes his point o f relative power, 
i.e. moral authority vs. brute force. Although he typically identifies with the abused soldiers, 
die demonstrators while feeling physically weaker will gain strength from die soldiers, “steal 
their balls,” because they have the moral right on their side. His sympathy therefore shifts de­
cisively in die “Battle of die Wedge,” when die troops brutally crush last-ditch resistance by 
courageous demonstrators.
Another ambiguous element of Mailer’s perception of power is die media coverage of 
die March. Hie novel begins by quoting an article in Time magazine that grossly misrepresents 
Mailer’s antics at the meeting (i.e. according to Mailer, for Dwight McDonald, in his own 
favorable review of the novel, said the article was “reasonably accurate”) (196).4 Mailer 
pretends to use this opening to write a book in which he will tell what really happened, though 
of course his version, while more complete and interesting than the conventional press’s, is
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just another version. However his antics are presented, as a writer he is particularly indig­
nant over the misrepresentation of his words: “the more one might have to say in a sentence, 
the worse one would probably sound Henry James would have come off in a modern inter­
view like a hippy who had taken a correspondence course in forensics”(76). The report on 
Mailer’s arrest makes him afigure of ridicule in jail, the speech he gives when released 
makes him out to be a hypocritical fool, and Time magazine condescendingly calls the experi­
ences related in the novel a “weekend revolution.” His indignant attitude, however, may well 
be disingenuous, since he is obviously aware of the ideological distortion of the “objective” 
press.
By contrast, he is enthusiastic about the coverage of television and film, either because 
these media cannot misquote his words, or because he thinks that TV and movies count more 
than books in shaping public opinion, or because he can more effectively play the buffoon on 
screen, probably all three. Besides the comic jostling for a good spot in front of the TV cam­
eras mentioned earlier, it turns out that “Mailer” is being filmed throughout his entire experi­
ence by a British film crew, so the misrepresentations of his words by the written news media 
will be corrected, he hopes, by the visual media, as well as his own account in his novel.
Even Time characterizes “Mailer” in cinematic terms, as “an extra, a bit player who will in­
evitably be cut out of the film” (120). This points up a dileumia in Mailer’s adversarial 
stance, which needs the media to “record” the revolutionary event but not (mis-) interpret it, 
as do die newspapers and magazines. However much credence one gives to the presumed ob­
jectivity of visual media, Mailer is at least being true to the new (i.e. Sixties) form of aes­
thetic politics he has discussed, where style is more important than substance, and the 
“happening" replaces the Old Left logic. The disciplined mode of the “Leninist” Walter
McTeague, a professional revolutionary, accordingly, has been passed by in the electronic 
age: “Leninism was built to analyze a world in which all the structures were made of steel— 
now the sinews of society were founded on transistors so small Dragon Lady could hide them 
beneath her nail” (201). Hie New Left showed by die political antics Mailer delineates in the 
novel that the struggle for power in the media, which was a struggle for die means of represen­
tation, that took place among the media, die government, and other political interests, was not 
trivia] (Rowe 197). Mailer realizes this during the episode of die US Marshals arresting dem­
onstrators, when for a moment he thought they would be herded concentration-camp style into 
barbed-wire pens. That could not happen since the television images would call up in peo­
ple’s minds the terrible pictures and films of die holocaust and thus cause the government to 
be equated at least indirectly with Nazism. In this sense, the media can work as much against 
official versions of events as in their favor: “Having moved full-scale into die video age, 
official discourse must now operate within an altered representational economy that it cannot 
wholly control” (Shapiro 120).
Mailer’s involvement with media may be interpreted as a more ‘‘postmodern” response 
to the refusal of such involvement by humanist writers like Bellow or Updike, as is the era­
sure of boundaries he has effected between his private and public life, much as his personal 
style of disruptive actor or buffoon is distinct from the serious, restrained personal mode of 
these writers. Hie involvement is conqriex, as public and private become intertwined in such 
away that his legend—what in the novel he calls die “sarcophagus of his image” (15 ) which 
he might escape from only while asleep—/£ Mailer in a sense, or at least not independent of 
him. Hie sarcophagus metaphor shows that he knows how trapped he is in his image, even 
dead inside it, and yet still distinct from it (Lennon 179-187). Mailer once more takes an ad­
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versarial position, doing battle with the powers of public opinion, but it is moot whether he 
has underestimated their power in trying to pit himself against their manipulation by creating a 
public personality. His “space” is distinct from both the old-fashioned, high-minded refusal to 
participate in ‘‘publicityof writers like Bellow and Updike, artists of the private space, and 
die total personal absence or spatial effacement of the postmodernist Thomas Pynchon, who 
exists only through his texts. Despite Mailer’s provocative behavior, it has been argued that 
Mailer has in a sense been co-opted by his own presence, so that his rebellious stance simply 
becomes apart of the system (Lennon 184), his public rebelliousness an affirmation of die 
system’s declared tolerance for difference. Hie more he attacks television, for example, the 
more he is invited to appear on talk shows. Rather like Gore Vidal, he finally becomes an 
acceptable provocation.
d.
Harlot’s Ghost (1991) is generically a mixed bag: a spy novel that violates the genre 
by refusing closure, a historical fiction about the most dubious contribution of die U.S. to die 
Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency (est in 1947 by the National Security Act), a 
bjldungsroman about a young man’s life and education in the “Company,” as die Agency is 
appropriately known to its members, and a coursebook on the theory and practice o f espio- 
nageand counter-espionage, the covert handmaidens of imperial power. 5 Hie CIA is per­
ceived in this long(l,168 page) novel as a corporation that invests in secrets, with few limi­
tations.onitsouidays. and no accountability to its stockholders, ft was corporate America at its 
most delinous,with capitalist qreed replaced by the reigning attitudes of paranoia, in relation 
to die Soviet Union, and arrogance, in relation to the “Third World.” In this novel, as in so
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many other of Mailer’s novels, conflicts of power between organizations, and within them, 
are important, and it is mainly with these that I wish to deal with in this section.
Garry Wills has shown how the CIA emerged from its wartime predecessor OSS by 
way of British MI-5, which bequeathed it a triple legacy that remains characteristic in the 
post-war years: 1 ) social ties, or the “old boy” network among members; 2) colonialism, the 
manipulation of die “low«* orders,” often outside the law, for the perceived good of the Em­
pire; 3) peer relationship with die (European) enemy (“CIA” 23). Wills does not make die 
connection between the three explicit but it is, o f course, social class. 6 “Gentleman Spy” 
Allen Dulles, of the OSS and later director of the CIA under President Eisenhower, was the 
brother of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s influential Secretary of State, who instituted the 
security policy of foreign aid to prevent the spread of Communism and the development of 
nuclear weapons to keep the Soviets “contained” (that is, respectively, in earlier diplomatic 
power slogans, “dollar diplomacy” and the “big stick”). In this political climate, Allen 
Dulles insisted on ideological orthodoxy for his CIA personnel, which Wills says is puzzling, 
since in the McCarthy years Cold War liberals actually admired the CIA for its ability to keep 
free of McCarthy’s control—the wonderfully absurd notion of die secret police as guardians of 
liberty. Wills explains this paradox by way of the triadic bequest he has proposed that the CIA 
inherited from the British; thus, 1) OSS and later CIA personnel were recruited from top U.S. 
universities and corporations. Secrecy and the consequent lack of official recognition of their 
deeds caused the formation of close ties of loyalty. 2) Hie CIA in its formative years, and 
even before, encouraged its personnel to take the “long view,” above merely local politics 
and with an appeal to a higher morality. Colonialism thus “returned as an ideological empire.” 
Foreign operations, as well as scores of devious schemes within the U.S. itself^  made manifest
the CIA’s conviction that the democratic process is insufficient and therefore requires secret 
assistance. The colonizing power needs to impose colonial discipline, even on its own citi­
zens, for their own good. 3) Hie CIA can only be thought important if  the enemy is perceived 
as such, which tends to magnify the enemy and thus the Agency itself (Wills 23-33). All three 
of these legacies are relevant to Mailer’s novel.
Harlot’s Ghost is narrated by one Harry Hubbard, a certified member of what sociolo­
gist C. Wright Mills once called “the power elite”: the white male, Anglo-Saxon Protestants, 
wealthy, well-educated at Ivy League {»rep schools and universities, interlinked by school, 
corporate, and marriage ties, and shared cultural values, once exclusively East Coast, that 
hold die top positions of power and influence in American business, the military, and govern­
ment Mills argued that this group did not constitute a ruling class in the Marxist sense since 
their power is not exclusively economic. Harry’s father Cat, a CIA officer, is a former mem­
ber of OSS and a friend of Allen Dulles. Harry is therefore predisposed to his profession by 
his family background, added to a combination of introverted personality and the rabid anti­
communist ideology imbibed in schools in the post-war years, in which the USSR was often 
represented as die anti-Christ At Yale, for example, Harry attends foreign policy forums but 
eschews political arguments about Republicans and Democrats: “They hardly mattered. Allen 
Dulles was my president, and I would be a combat trooper in the war against the Devil”
(361).7
Harry meets the great man himself at die wedding party ofHugh Tremont Montague, die 
“harlot” of the title, based on the historical James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s own “super-spy”. 
Montague has his own undefined domain of power in the Company, “an empire within an em­
pire,” as his friend Cal recognizes, He is the “spook’s spook,” created by Dulles to keep an
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eye on everything and report directly to him: “Tliat way [Dulles] would have a hedge against 
his own bureaucracy running things without him ” (750) This independent figure, paradoxi­
cally created to override an unchecked bureaucracy, can threaten die organization by his very 
independence. The central, unresolved mystery o f die novel is die body that all evidence 
points to as Montague’s, or is the whole thing an elaborate hoax he himself has masterminded? 
Either way, die outcome is disastrous, as it implies that die master-spook, aware of everything 
going on, was unaware of a plot that made him its victim, or worse, that he has <<turned” and 
become a Frankenstein’s monster, a double-agent for the KGB.
Montague, Harry’s godfather, protects him when he is afraid a reprimand will go on his 
permanent file (for failing to find some information for die West Berlin branch when still a 
cleric) by concocting a complicated procedure of altering cryptonyms so that Harry’s real 
name cannot be traced. When Harry is himself sent to West Berlin, however, he discovers die 
(historical) station chiefj William Harvey, has become obsessed with discovering the clerk, 
and Harry, who becomes Harvey’s personal assistant, is set the paranoid task of discovering 
who he himself is while concealing it from his obsessive boss. A small deceit to stay out of 
trouble blossoms into a “structure” of untruth in which Harvey suspects him of being involved 
in a plot regarding the CIA’s secret tunnel into the Soviet communications network. Once 
more, he has to call on his personal collection with Montague, outside of the official chain of 
command, to avoid getting in trouble..
Deceit is, of course, die source of power and principal modus operandi in the CIA’s 
foreign operations, but the novel shows how pervasive it is even within the Company. Nobody 
tells the truth to his chief of station, who officially should have access to all officers’ infor­
mation, but he in turn holds out on his district chie£ who holds out on his superiors in Wash­
186
ington. Hie method of sending/withholding information is called “double entry reporting.” 
Even friends lie to one another. In the “panopticon” situation of central surveillance, officers 
must communicate to one another only through die central office, but spaces or locales are 
opened up when the officers use die system for personal use. At one point, Harry is simulta­
neously lying to his station chiefj (the historical) Howard Hunt, Montague, aid even his father, 
which gives him a feeling of power he has never experienced, an “extra-dimensionality.” Hie 
main skill is being able to keep one’s stories straight, without seeming too straight. As Mon­
tague says: “One of the few rules you can count on in our work is that a story will conform in 
every detail to its earlier version only if  the initial account has been artfully fabricated and 
carefully repeated “ (358).
Hie novel’s only truthful link is the letters Harry exchanges with die female officer, 
Kittredge, Montague's wife, with whom he is in love, in which he gives unauthorized details 
of his espionage work, but they are not completely truthful after all, as he withholds informa­
tion compromising to his character. She, in turn, will deceive her husband with Harry, and 
later, Harry with Dix Butler, despite vows of fidelity to both. Deceit therefore pervades the 
characters’ love relationships as well as their work. Montague makes a metaphorical connec­
tion between the two areas in a training lecture:
“When a man seduces a woman, he may gain her not only by strength, but 
through weakness as well. That may even be seen as the commencement of 
love—honest interest in the other’s strength and need. When seduction is in­
spired, however, by demands of power, each person will lie to the other. 
Sometimes they lie to themselves. These lies develop structures as aestheti­
cally rich as the finest filigree of truth” (403).
Deceit becomes more serious at the national level. Montague says that die expected 
massive military attack across Europe by the Red Army—the reason, it should be added, for 
the U.S. militaiy presence in Germany, the creation of the NATO defense alliance, and die
augmentation of die nuclear arsenal-was no longer credible as early as the mid-Fiffies, but 
the CIA and die Pentagon could not let die public be aware of Soviet military weakness for 
fear that it might “go soft” (as the expression goes) on Communism. “Left to themselves, 
Harlot says, “they’d just as soon be friends with the Russians” (355). To forestall such an 
outcome-which would, conceivably, end die Cold War, remove the threat of nuclear holo­
caust, and save billions of dollars in defense expenditures—the CIA took it upon itself to lead 
a misguided people to a higher truth. Harlot teaches Harry that the true mission of the CIA is 
“to become the mind of America?’(250), but ‘‘not a mind that verifies what is true and not true. 
Hie aim is to develop teleological mind. Mind that dwells above the facts; mind that leads to 
larger purposes” (355). Hiese purposes larger than die truth are, o f course, to be determined 
by the CIA.
The historical abuses of die CIA—interference in the internal affairs o f foreign govern­
ments, including assassination attempts of leftists and covert support for rightist dictators, 
chemical experiments in brain-washing techniques, illegal tampering with die mails and 
wiretapping of American political figures, among many others, are justified by characters in 
die novel as “that transcendental wickedness that partakes of goodness because its aim is to 
gain the rightful day” (863).8 “Communism is the entropy of Christ,” Harlot explains. ‘To 
oppose it, we must, therefore, create a fiction...” (355). The ideologies of the U.S. as the 
military and spiritual savior of die world, the CIA as its instrument of secret opposition to the 
demonic deviousness of Communism, and an alleged higher necessity that cannot condescend 
to the truth, all come together here.
Mailer shows how it is common policy for ranking members of the Agency to get infor­
mation on one another as ammunition for possible future power struggles. Hiese are profes­
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sionals trained to trust no one, who routinely use and change cover names and cryptonyms, 
give out misinformation, employ evasive action while traveling, and never discuss their job, 
so it is not surprising that a certain amount of paranoia is engendered. That is even part of a 
spy’s necessary skills. As Montague explains, “The man with a talent for counter-espionage, 
the true artist, draws on his paranoia to perceive the beauties of his opponent’s scenario” 
(372). Paranoia is the complement of cynicism, which is the distrust of too neat a story.
Harry moves through the post-war world as a small but integrated part of the Com­
pany’s crusade: West Berlin; Tatin America (Uruguay), where he helps bug the car of a leftist 
politician and film the love afiair of a KGB agent with his boss's wife; Miami, to train Cuban 
exiles for die Agency’s biggest public fiasco, the Bay of Pigs invasion (April, 1961). Of the 
Miami operations, Harry says: ‘Terhaps the best way to give you a conception of our power 
and emplacement here is to note die state and national laws that we are ready to bend, break, 
violate, and/or ignore. False information is given out routinely on Florida papers of incorpo­
ration; tax returns fudge the real sources of investment in our properties; false flight plans are 
filed daily with the FAA; and we truck weapons and explosives over Florida highways, 
thereby violating the Munitions Act and the Firearms Act, not to speak of what we do to our 
old friend Customs, Immigration, Treasury, and the Neutrality Act” (953). He doesn’t mention, 
but Mailer depicts, the private war of clandestine raids on Cuba, sabotage, and assassination 
plots using Mafia gangsters, even after the Bay of Pigs that would finally end the Cold War.
Wilfred Sheed has complained of the “cartooney” aspect of the characters, the sheer 
silliness of their anti-Communism, but surely that is part of the point: this was the ideology of 
American political culture from McCarthyism to Vietnam, and up to the revolutions of Eastern 
Europe. Mailer’s geo-political theories, in any case, have always been those of a maverick
provocateur. As Sheed recognizes, what made Mailer worth reading was ‘‘neither his knowl­
edge of tihe human heart, which is variable, nor his global theories, but his overpowering in­
tuition of men at war-with each other, with civilization, but best of all with and within the 
organizations created by and for themselves” (42). These “wars” are, precisely, the power 
struggles between individuals and institutions in their varied combinations.
Hie raison d ’être for all the other conflicts in die novel, die Cold War itself is rela­
tively neglected, just as is the American-Japanese conflict in Mailer’s World War II novel. 
Once again, Mailer wisely refrains from trying to adopt the point-of-view of the “other side,” 
(the closest he comes, significantly, is die double-agent Chevy Fuertes, who is both sexually 
and politically ambiguous). Hie whole weight of Mailer’s criticism is against how much 
power these overgrown schoolboys wield, and its often absurd applications in the name of the 
United States. One measure of die dtmger is die sheer size and international scale of its pene­
tration. Harlot tells Harry about how die Company taps into everything: finance, media, labor 
relations, economic productioa “Dwelling in an age of systems, we are obliged to draw ex­
perts from all fields: bankers, psychiatrists, poison specialists, art experts, public relations 
people, trade unionists, hooligans, journalists...we have liaison into every game that’s going 
on in this country. Potentially, we can give direction to the land” (210-11). Hiis touted he­
gemony is perhaps the message of a Mailer who once proposed a “people’s CIA” to 
“guarantee everyone apiece of the paranoia” (qtd. by Sheed 41).
As for internal conflicts, some struggles take place as die result of the Company’s being 
just another entrenched bureaucracy that seems to exist for its own sake. Since its business is 
gathering, containing, and deciphering secrets, the Agency’s officers are even more turned 
bade in on themselves than in other bureaus, in that their accountability to authority is com-
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promised by the nature of their work, and power struggles are made more difficult insofar as 
they cannot be publicly acknowledged. Although die internal structure of the organization em­
phasizes central control-foreign stations, for example, cannot communicate with each other 
but must reroute communications through Washington—this control is difficult to maintain in 
the general atmosphere of secrecy and practices of both routine and elaborate deceit
Hie many individual power struggles reflect both personal and institutional conflicts. 
Examples of the personal type are Harry vs. Dix (social class, homoerotic), Harry vs. Rosen 
(colleague competition), Hairy vs. Cal (Oedipal); of the institutional type, Montague vs. Har­
vey, Harry vs. Harvey (i.e. subordinate/superordinate), Harvey vs. Bobby Kennedy (rival 
government bureaus), and yet each aspect is never in isolatioa Thus, Montague and Harvey’s 
mutual antipathy and opposite personal styles are played out against a background of inde­
pendent power domains in the CIA, their having taken opposite sides in the British spy scan­
dal, and Harvey’s former position in the FBI As for institutional conflicts, that between the 
CIA and FBI is in part territorial. By law, the CIA cannot do domestic spying, though it often 
oversteps legal boundaries, and CIA officers hold the FBI in contempt as crude blunderers 
(and as socially inferior). There is some concern that, since die two Agencies who ought to 
be working in concert often spy on one another, Harvey is in fact a plant by his former boss, J. 
Edgar Hoover, who, for his part, held power for decades by threats of revealing die contents 
of his voluminous secret dossiers on leading public figures. At the same time, Harvey is sus­
pected (correctly) by die FBI of furnishing privileged information to the CIA
Another “territorial” struggle is the CIA vs. the military. In one episode, Harvey gives a 
tour to a visiting general from die Pentagon of his top-secret “Catheter” tunnel into East Ber­
lin. Despite his obsession with security, Harvey wants to show the military that the CIA’s
operation is picking up more information than any operation in histoiy: “Got to remind them 
of that Got to keep diem in their place” (279) Hie tunnel turns out, ironically, to be a great 
source of misinformation, when it is “discovered” and false information emitted by die Sovi­
ets. 9 Power for an intelligence operation is possession of information (i.e. knowledge), not 
the capacity for projecting force, which is properly military. Since the former makes the latter 
possible, it should have priority, but not overstep its bounds by executing military operations. 
This is in fact one of the more serious historical abuses of the CIA, an agency that was 
founded, it needs constant reminder, to gather information for governmental purposes. The 
conflict can be seen in the Miami episode, where Harvey’s wild military operations directly 
oppose the policies of (die historical) Cold Warrior General Edward Landsdale, director of 
operation “Mongoose,” the covert operations after the Bay of Pigs designed to destabilize 
Cuba Landsdale is bent (as Montague had advised) on undermining Cuba rather than martyr­
ing it, a policy which, although almost equally despicable, is surely the more pragmatic, and 
likely to have come directly from Kennedy.
Perhaps die major institutional conflict, CIA vs. the State Department, is the most diffi­
cult to comprehend historically, die Agency being presumably subordinate to State and die 
information it gathers utilized by State in formulating foreign policy. Yet die novel makes 
clear that the Company constantly makes policy for its own ends, and its secrecy and public 
unaccountability tend toward bureaucratic autonomy. The US ambassador in Montevideo 
warns Hunt against stirring up trouble in a democratic country, which Hunt breezily ignores, 
and the whole business of Cuba in the second half of the novel revolves round the Company’s 
totally independent —and disastrous—operations. Hie CIA even spies on its superiors in die 
State Department Montague gets Rosen, a homosexual, to “turn” his sexual preference in
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order to seduce and eventually marry the plain secretary of the State Department’s Dean Rusk 
so that he can have access to Rusk’s files.
Finally, die Company comes into conflict with die press, which can be summarized as 
public information vs. public misinformation. Reporters discover holes in the Agency’s cover 
stories on secret Cuban exile bombing missions with CIA-furnished aircraft, and also blow 
the cover off die Bay of Pigs invasion. As a result of these (historical) failures being made 
public, a Congressional committee was set up to whom these independent warriors would be 
held accountable, and people began to ask why we needed an Agency engaged in covert op­
erations in the first place, that it is folly to allow an organization with unregulated power, 
allegedly acting hi the public interest, to operate without necessary aid sufficient public con­
trols that would prevent activity actually harmful to that interest10 Moral considerations 
aside, this is apragmatic question. As an historian put it, in another context, ‘I f  we subvert 
world order and destroy world peace we must inevitably subvert and destroy our own politi­
cal institutions” (Commanger).
In a recent article on the CIA’s legacy, Thomas Powers has advanced the paradoxical 
argument that the CIA-KGB opposition actually prevented die Cold War from escalating into 
armed conflict, “so long as both sides [we]re good at discovering, but not too good at hiding, 
the secrets that really count” This is likely true with respect to nuclear weapons, since the 
balance of power achieved through mutual knowledge of their total destructive capacity ac­
tually prevented armed conflict between the two major powers. Powers also shows, however, 
how little the Agency really accomplished in its all-out effort to win the Cold War: much 
death and havoc but little actual good in Southeast Asia, Cuba, and Central America; its fail­
ure to predict major events such as the Soviet atom bomb, the North Korean and Chinese in­
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vasions in Korea, die Hungarian Revolt, Castro’s victory in Cuba and Krushchev’s placement 
of missiles there, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the collapse of Soviet Communism and 
end of the Cold War itself 11 In other words, the CIA failed in its alleged primary purpose of 
intelligence-gathering in nearly every historical event of significance since the Second World 
War. If fiction is said to “confront experience in its immediacy and closeness, while ideol­
ogy is by its nature general and inclusive” (Howe 20), Harlot’s Ghost has the merit of show­
ing how such monumental failures were possible through the representation of one by the 
other.
e.
I have suggested that even though Mailer is one of die contemporary novelists in the US 
most committed to a critical examination of national politics, his notion of power does not 
solely signify political power, since he is interested also in personal and “natural” forms of 
power as sources of vitality and renewal. Here, there tends to be a struggle between the re­
alization of the powers of self, its revelation or salvation, emerging triumphant from the socio­
political strictures placed upon diem, most clearly in An American Dream (1965). I have, in 
any case, discussed novels dealing with power in its broadly political senses-conflicts 
caused by repressive external forces, and power relations between individuals within organi­
zations and between organizations at various levels of influence and complexity.
Mailer’s general notion of power, formed as it was in the post-war period of late For­
ties and Fifties and the counter-cultural revolutions of the Sixties, is, as should be clear by 
now, one of repression by hegemonic powers, on the Weberian model, which in turn demands 
some sort of adversarial or oppositional response. At age twenty-five, Mailer campaigned for 
Hemy Wallace, presidential candidate for the inexpressive Progressive Party, though even­
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tually he became disillusioned with the parly’s alliance with (be Communists. At the Waldorf 
Peace Conference in New York, Mailer said that both Soviet and American governments 
were imperialist, both concerned with dominating underdeveloped countries to secure new 
markets. His description o f himself as a “radical conservative” may therefore have some sub­
stance, as his positions have tended to follow an individualist line in distrusting parties and 
ideologies of both left and right (in 1969, he ran for mayor ofNew Yoric City on a secession­
ist platform, coming in next-to-last). The British novelist Anthony Burgess has observed that 
what makes Mailer’s works interesting to foreign readers (his books have been translated into 
some twenty languages) is the “sense of protest or counter-protest”’ (qtd. by Bufithtis 278-79). 
Mailer’s novels and essays confront, almost gleeftlly, “corporation-land,” his perception of 
die US as a technocratoc, bureaucratic, politically repressive and militarily dangerous state, 
buttressed by its attendant pieties and fraudulent ideologies. To this (often vague) entity, he 
seems to be proposing in his fiction and non-fiction an unrelenting resistance.
Hie politics of resistance in popular American culture has been described as varied 
strategies of inversion, evasion, opposition, or disruption (Fiske 82). If these possibilities are 
adapted to Mailer’s novels—which, to be sure, the author claims as examples not o f popular 
art (though his novels have frequently been best-sellers) but works of serious literature— 
“evasion” or “opposition” are the strategies adopted by the protagonists in die novels, except­
ion the last, Harlot's Ghost, where the protagonist is actually part of the system. A potentially 
radical strategy, “disruption,” is found only in Armies o f the Night, whose protagonist 
“Mailer,” however, slyly oscillates between evasion and disruption. The protagonists in the 
novels, always die resourceful, independent male of the traditional American canon, typically 
struggles against some repressive power or is caught in the contradictions attendant upon such
a struggle—an opposition, therefore, more in Durkheim’s rather than Marx’s sense. If I have 
sometimes schematized these conflicts in my readings in the form of“x vs. y,” it is to simplify 
their complexity to more easily show their number and variety, and especially to point up the 
oppositional nature of Mailer’s perception of power, its Weberian conception as an essen­
tially conflictual relation.
In The Naked and the Dead, the power of military command, i.e. power legitimated by 
institutional structure and tradition, is both at its highest and lowest levels subverted by indi­
viduals (Cummings and Crofi) who would go beyond their legitimate institutional functions 
toward a transcendent omnipotence, an epic hybris that is brought low not by their own flaws 
of character, still intact at the end, but by the impersonal forces of naturalism and chance. Re­
sistance to power in this novel is shown as futile (Hearn is in turn put in danger by Cummings, 
killed by Crofi), given the rigidly hierarchical structure of the military organization in which 
individual resistance is both structurally and traditionally impossible, as well as by the pro­
tagonist’s personal shortcomings—his inability to appreciate die formidable resources and 
motivation of his controllers’.
Amies o f the Night would seem to posit a collective resistance of opposition and dis­
ruption to a hegemonic regime ofgovernment-Pentagon-courts and its ideologically duped 
allies (brutal cops, Nazi anti-demonstrators, hostile conservative public). And yet the novel 
is largely a (distinctly American) study o£ first, the possibility of collective action and the 
individual resistance to that possibility (‘‘Mailer’s” conflicts with his political allies, or at 
least his concentration not on political alliance but on their personal characteristics, i.e. his 
repugnance at their personalities and his sympathy with his natural enemies), and, second, his 
rewriting of die selfj the multiple Mailers, as an act of will rather than the self as socially
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constituted, la this most political of his novels, it is therefore fair to say that “he interprets the 
march on die Pentagon as an existential event filtered through the schizophrenic consciousness 
of a fictionalized Self* (Schaub 74). But does this mean, as one favorable critic has said, that 
in this novel Mailer, “finally acknowledged die limitations of radical individualism” by the 
satirizing of his own persona as existential hero?” (Van Leer 493). Or does it rather mean that 
Mailer seems to be unaware that he has, as an unfavorable critic would have it, “forfeited any 
political territory” in his emphasis on the psychology of character and society? (Schaub 73).
In this respect, die rise of die New Left, celebrated by Mailer in the novel as the beginning of 
anew politics, reflects his rejection of a class-based analysis of social problems in favor of a 
psychological approach that cuts across class distinctions (Fiske 10). Such a rejection, on the 
other hand, need not imply a rejection of politics. A non-class based form of resistance has 
been called “poststructural opposition,” with unfixed and unstable social categories that are 
formed strategically and tactically according to issues more in accord with fluid American 
conditions (Fiske 9).
Finally, in Harlot’s Ghost, no position of resistance is attempted, as the novel takes 
place inside the enemy camp, as it were. The false ideology of the Cold War is rather exposed 
in a third-person narrative of Harry’s education in the CIA, and the power of governmental 
bureaus in examinations of their internecine conflicts. To summarize the conflictual fates of 
the protagonist of each of die novels I have analyzed, then, it can be said that, in the first novel 
he is destroyed, in die next two he flees in one and submits in the other, and in the last, he is 
already part of the system. Only does Armies o f the Night suggest a revolutionary stance, but 
even in that novel it is more of an ironic posture than a political positioa The struggle is 
comically in tune with the perceived realities of American power and Mailer’s personal rela­
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tion to diem, though it may also be suggested, as sympathetic critics have done, that Mailer is 
really showing that political activism cannot truly result from individual rebellion, or that, 
given the realities of American power, literature rather than political activism is a more vi­
able means of resistance.
In this overview, it would seen that from the evidence of his novels Mailer is aware of 
the limitations of the individual as a source of resistance. As I have suggested, this may be not 
only a question of individual weakness but a condition of society. Hie social fragmentation of 
contemporary American reality has prevented die unity o f “anti-systemic” forces in effective 
organizations, as Jameson argues, so that ethnic groups, student, labor, neighborhood and re­
gional organizations, feminists, and counter-cultural movements of various types have not 
been able to coordinate their several oppositions politically, even if  what John Fiske calls 
“localizing” or “bottom up” power has often been effective in specific locales and on spe­
cific issues (Jameson, Pol Unconscious 54, nt; Fiske I lf) .
In The Authoritarian State (1942), Max Horkfceimer examined fee question of resis­
tance of thought, subjectivity, and the individual to the oppression of larger systems. For 
Horkheimer, this desire for revolution is not found in any place in society, for it is of the rea­
son, which belongs to the individual. Critical conscience can no longer be conceived as theo­
retical knowledge of the laws of history (as in Marxism) but as the practical experience of 
suffering. In amass society, this suffering is of “the isolated individual, who is not ordered or 
covered by any power” (qtd. by Ferry 505-6). In a totalitarian system, the dominated classes 
are the victims only in die beginning; later, blood flows from all the people irrespective of 
classes. For this reason, the place of resistance has become the isolated individual, whose 
only weapon is the word. Although this is a philosophical position developed in the midst of
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the war, it seems to fit Mailer’s situation fairly well. He knows, or least shows in his work, 
that despite the impotence of the individual as actor in the face of American socio-political 
reality, as a writer he in feet possesses real power. In this regard, “he resembled many of his 
postmodern contemporaries, who viewed direct political action with skepticism while pre­
serving literature as a means of patiently investigating the nearly hopeless social and political 
conditions of our lives” (Rowe 183).
Yet, it is at least questionable whether Mailer, even as a writer, is as radical as he 
seems to have wished. Thomas Shaub (who calls his chapter on Mailer ‘Hebei without a 
Cause”) argues that Mailer’s radical intentions were in feet undermined by the post-war dis­
course of die liberal culture he claims to have repudiated (138). Mailer, who once declared 
himself a socialist, is, as argued above, really closer to a “radical-conservative” individual­
ist Along with other former radical artists and intellectuals in the US who came to adulthood 
in the Forties, Mailer had a vision of socialism but no revolutionary party to execute it Roo­
sevelt’s New Deal was, as we have seen, not nearly as radical as its opponents had charged. 
By1948, die year of the publication of Mailer’s first novel, for example, the presidential vic­
tory of the Democrat, Harry Truman, “signified the willingness of labor to work within the 
compromises offered diem by government and business” (Schaub 144). By the Sixties, 
Mailer’s attitude toward die New Left, the only potentially revolutionary class since the Thir­
ties, is ambiguous, and in his work he looks to individualist types— tough, creative loners—for 
a response to repression, an outlook that Schaub says has its purest form in the essay “Hie 
White Negro” (1959), in which Mailer attempts to radicalize the “hipster" as nihilistic indi­
vidual, a romantic stand-in for a revolutionary class. This effort to substitute psychology for 
politics “was also one of the fundamental strategies of liberal retrenchment in the face of Hit-
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ler and Stalin in the thirties,” a “psychologization of cultural analysis” and social history that 
was to prove so influential in die next few decades (Schaub 133-45,147, my emphasis), be­
ginning with Wilhelm Reich’s analysis of Fascism (1933), and finding die most popular ex­
pressions in Erich Fromm’s Escape to Freedom (1941) and David Reisman’s The Lonely 
Crowd (1950). In Shaub’s view, Mailer too gives in to the “liberal consensus,” i.e. he shares 
in the conformist values he so often rails against While this judgment may be too extreme, 
there is no doubt that Mailer psychologizes politics, as in, for example, all three of his Sixties 
novels. At the end of section (a) of this chapter, I quoted Mailer’s rebellious statement to die 
symposium on American culture in which he maintained that the modern artist is “almost al­
ways in opposition to their society.” Hie quote continues: “and that integration, acceptance, 
non-alienation, etc., have been more conducive to propaganda than art” (“Our Country” 299). 
The statement taken entire both reaffirms the modernist notion of the artist as someone set 
apart from his society and the notion of an art that is inherently anti-ideological and, as such, 
lie reaffirms the post-wsr liberal discourse of an art distinct from apolitical art (Schaub 61).
As I also suggested in section (a) of this chapter, Mailer has always tried to reconcile 
or neutralize the polarities of self and world, public and private, by maintaining the tension 
between them. As Bufithis puts it: ‘In Mailer’s world to test oneself against any implacable 
power is to be caught visibly in contradictions” (289). Sac van Berkovitch has argued (with 
respect to Hawthorne), that the only plausible modes of dissent in die US center on the self, 
radicalism as interpreted through “polar unities at die heart of American liberalism: fusion 
and fragmentation...process through closure” (31), which would, to be sure, suggest that the 
system has in advance co-opted any possible resistance and Mailer has been naught in a 
struggle to overcome such determinations. In any case, although Mailer’s earliest critics,
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writing in fee McCarthy era, found him dangerously subversive, it can be argued from hind­
sight that his maintaining the tension between irreconcilable forces is better able to contain 
conflict than release it Poirier may be saying more than he means when he says that “[t]he 
form by which Mailer tries to accommodate diverse and often contradictory feelings finally 
takes better care of frightening impulses both in the self and in society than do the essentially 
repressive forms subscribed to less critically aid often unconsciously by those who charge 
him wife irresponsibility” (Mailer 11, my emphasis). Mailer himself says somewhere feat 
metaphor “exists to contain contradictions,” which may be a key to both his aesthetic and po­
litical styles.
NOTES
1 In a later article in the same journal, Aijaz Ahmad (3-35) thoroughly dismantles this argu­
ment with respect to so-called Third World Literatures.
2 Frederick R. Karl, in contrast to most critics, sees fee novel as essentially “about” Croft, 
whom he calls a “principle of pure being’’ (Karl 97). As my analysis shows, however, 
Cummings and Croft are paralleled in character and narrative structure.
3 1 owe fee latter suggestion to Professor Sergio Bellei.
4 Other* highly favorable reviews are: Richard Gilman, “What Mailer Has Done,” The New 
Republic (June 8,1968) 28, and “Hand on the Pulse of America,” Saturday Review (May 4, 
1968) 25-6.
5 Louis Menand (“From Here to Eternity” 113) sees fee novel as a synthesis of Mailer’s fa­
miliar obsessions (Marilyn Monroe, Kennedy), a psychological study wife anew theory of 
personality (“Alpha-Omega”), an essay on good and evil, an investigative report on fee US’s 
secret government, a novel of manners about fee American WASP, and a love story. Although
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an argument could be made for all of these, I have naturally concentrated on the political angle 
of the “secret government” Mailer, in this novel, as in the latter two Sixties novels, employs 
postmodernist techniques: die textual play of embedded manuscripts, mixed genres, mingling 
of historical and fictional characters, and the refusal of closure (Ryan 54).
6 Menand thinks that this is what the novel is really about Mailer does make much of the 
importance of family connections for the main characters and of the snobbishness of Montague 
and Kittredge in their scorn of the social pretentiousness of social interlopers like Howard 
Hunt In my view, the social connections help establish the CIA as an institution of the power- 
elite.
The most recent biography of Allen Dulles is Peter Grosse, Gentleman Spy: The Life o f 
Allen Dulles (Houghton Mifflin, 1995).
o
Thomas R. Edwards (44 et passim) has given a fanciful reading of die novel as a Miltonic 
work, in which “intelligence” is spirit as well as information, with the Agency God the father 
and its networks archangels. For this point, see also Menand (116).
9 Historically, the tunnel was not discovered as the novel relates but betrayed to the Soviets 
by die famous spy George Blake, who woiked for Soviet intelligence. Cf Blake’s recent 
autobiography, written from exile in Moscow, No Other Choice: The Cold War Memories o f 
the Ultimate Spy (Simon & Shuster, 1993).
10 It is noteworthy that Mailer himself founded (in 1974) an organization called die Fifth 
Estate, a citizen’s group established to investigate die CIA and the FBI
11 Angleton, for example, thought that the recent demise o f Communism in Eastern Europe was 
a massive Soviet hoax, which must be the most incredible example of paranoia in recent 
American history.
PART THREE - POWER IN THE POSTMODERNIST NOVEL
INTRODUCTION
a
In the introduction to City o f Words (1971), reflecting on contemporary (i.e. 1950-70)
fictional themes, Tony Tanner wrote:
there is an abiding dream in American literature that an unpatterned, unconditioned life 
is possible, in which your movements and stillnesses, choices and repudiations are all 
your own; and there is also an abiding American dread that someone else is patterning 
your life, that there are all sorts of invisible plots afoot to rob you of your autonomy of 
thought and action, that conditioning is ubiquitous (15).
The dream of unfettered freedom and the nightmare of control, which one might call, respec­
tively the romantic and the conspiratorial modes, are, as Tanner says, “abiding” features of the 
American novel, and yet in the context of the post-war years, the fear of control, 
“conditioning,” have become especially important These two opposing perceptions of power, 
in fee form of social restraint and individual liberation have been integral to William S. Bur­
roughs’s Naked lunch and to Mailer’s three novels of the Sixties (An American Dream is an 
example of both dream and dread in the same novel). Hie suspicion of some grand conspiracy 
and its attendant paranoia are socio-psychological phenemona that again become important in 
the innovative Sixties fiction of Barth, Pynchon, and DeLillo, whose works will be examined 
in subsequent chapters.
Hie two perceptions of freedom and control are opposed but not unrelated. Tanner 
thinks that die illusion of freedom is related to die long-held belief of Americans that their 
country is uniquely free of the cultural molding of older societies in Europe, and the dread of 
control to the more current feeling that undefined patterns interfere with their direct contact
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with experience. One could plausibly argue that these polar experiences of freedom and dread 
are responses to the social and political situation of the US after the Second World War, that 
is, from the late Forties through die Fifties and early Sixties, when anew historical configura­
tion began to emerge.
Hie familiar idea of die US as a special place has, of course, been part of American 
mythology since colonial times. The lure of the boundless frontier, die sense of a unique his­
torical mission, the feeling of escape from the social and political restrictions of the Old 
World, the widespread sense of limitless possibility, in short, the composite elements of the 
American Dream were there from the beginning and yet were constantly added to and reinter­
preted in die course of American history. With the decisive participation of die US in the two 
Euro-Asian world wars, however, American political and economic power attained a dimen­
sion hitherto unknown in the national experience. Hie immense wartime productive capabili­
ties remained intact for the economic expansion of die post-war peace that would bestow on 
the America® people an unparalleled material prosperity, while American politicians took 
leading roles in all major international decisions, making and breaking the fetes of less pow­
erful nations. In short, the wars that had devastated Europe and Asia, by die fortunes of geog­
raphy and historical event, made die United States even stronger, with a heady consciousness 
of itself as a super-power, policeman to the world, an example to be either feared or emu­
lated.
At the same time, other realities underlying this new status and its benefits were moving 
in their inexorable way toward agrowing sense of fear and impotence, fueled by the series of 
ominous political and military events in the late Forties and Fifties that I have outlined above 
(c£ Introduction to Part Two). The feeling on die international front that things were out of
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control was not alleviated by die domestic phenomenon ofMcCarthyism and its obsessions 
with national security, which in the circumstances became “national insecurity”: die concern 
for atomic secrets and communist conspiracies in high places that led to the trials of Judith 
Copiin, Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, and the Rosenbergs. As we have seen, McCarthy’s witch­
hunt for subversives in Eisenhower’s government, the constant disclosure of alleged security 
risks, and the illegal wire-tapping of suspects by the F.B.L all ran unchecked in a nation that 
had always prided itself on its concern for individual freedom. Abroad, American fear of 
Communist-inspired revolution was and for decades thereafter has been what Hannah Arendt 
calls “the hidden lietmotif of postwar American policy with its desperate attempts at stabili­
zation of the status quo, with the result that American power and prestige were used and mis­
used to support obsolete and corrupt political regimes that since had long become objects of 
haired and contempt among their own citizens” (On Rev. 217).
Economically, too, the Fifties saw die beginning of the end of older industries (coal, 
railroads, textiles) and the corresponding rise o f giant corporations (IBM, Xerox) and growth 
industries (synthetics and plastics, electronics), with larger firms swallowing up smaller and 
corporate wealth and power becoming increasingly concentrated. General Motors, for ex­
ample, had assets greater than any US state and many foreign countries. By the Sixties, die 
power of die banks and multinational corporations became consolidated and half of die fed­
eral government’s revenues went to the military. Capitalist expansion led large firms outside 
their customary markets into unfamiliar areas of enterprise in die search of new profits (e.g. 
Knopf publishers became part of the RCA empire; Gulf Oil came to control film distribution). 
The old entrepeneurial dream of individual effort and gradually increasing success gave way
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to a perception of the dehumanizing social and political realities of die “warfare/welfare 
state” (Dubovksy et al. 415-37).
Two traditional institutions, agriculture and the universities, are illustrative of how 
American consciousness had radically changed Hie pastoral myth of the independent small 
farmer suffered a series o f fetal blows, as small fanners were forced into bankruptcy by fel­
ling prices and high costs. Government subsidies to corporate farms also contributed to die 
rise of huge agri-businesses. And by the Sixties, the academic myth of the intellectual “ivory 
tower3’ yielded to an increasing perception by radical students and social critics that the uni­
versity was an integral part of a militarist; imperialist government, as evidenced by compul­
sory military (R.O.T.C.) training on campus, the development ofhigh-tech weapons systems 
by physicists and engineers, the elaboration of social scientists in developing counter­
revolutionary techniques, and perhaps most significant, the professional rotation ofhigh-level 
corporate, governmental, and university personnel. Charles Kadushin, who conducted inter­
views in 1970 on the political attitudes of university professors during the preceding decade, 
found that “less than half of [the] respondents wanted to get out of the Vietnam war immedi­
ately, most were opposed to Black Power, and an overwhelming majority were hostile to die 
New Left” (qtd by Draper 33). The conclusion was that most of the nation’s intellectual elite 
t supported die prevailing socio-political order.
1964, the year of the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley, which initiated widespread 
US campus unrest, and of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which initiated US military action in 
Vietnam, was die real beginning of a turbulent decade that would see the rise of recreational 
drug-use and rock-and-roll counterculture at home and the escalation of die Vietnam conflict 
to unforeseen proportions abroad. When Lyndon Johnson, who became President after Ken-
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nedy’s assassination (1963), ordered the bombing ofNorth Vietnam (1965), the opposition to 
his foreign policy soon nullilfied his socially progressive domestic program. Worse was to 
come: more assassinations (Bobby Kennedy, Martin Luther King), more civil strife, more 
committment to a deteriorating war, for which explanations were offered that proved as futile 
as those found during the Korean conflict Conspiracy theories, which proliferated after Ken­
nedy’s assassination, abounded in the prevailing political climate, nor did they substantially 
diminish in the Seventies. Paranoid social critics like Bertrand Gross believe that fascism 
will not come to the US in die heavy-bonded military coups of Eastern Europe or Latin Amer­
ica but in a “friendly” or insidious disguise: die continued practice of co-opting disruptive 
elements into the system, an increased governmental tolerance for and use of drugs as social 
control, the infiltration of suspected subversives and their organizatons. Although it is to be 
questioned, however, whether such practices ought to be labelled fascist,” since that term 
has a more or less specific historical reference, there is doubtless something to be feared in 
new forms of power and the benevolent “feces” of goverameci, corporations, and the media 
Hiese are the preoccupations of writers like Barth, Pynchon, and DeLillo.
b.
| Marshall Berman divides “aesthetic modernism” of die 1960s into three broad tenden-
/'
I cies, which are distinguished by die overall “attitude” of die artist with respect to modern life.
Hie first tendency is that which attempts to free itself o£ or withdraw from, modern life in the 
direction of the purely aesthetic or formal, which Berman criticizes as “die freedom of a 
beautifully formed, perfectly sealed tomb” (30). While one can imagine a painter or even a 
poet taking such an attitude, it is difficult to think of any examples of novelists who might em­
body it Even those novelists who concentrate on inner or private experience can ignore but
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not evade the social context Henry James, usually regarded as the paragon for a formal aes­
thetics for die modem novel, was by no means anxious to ignore society, on die contrary, for­
mal mastery is intended, he tells us, to render “life” more fully.
Hie second tendency Berman finds is a permanent revolution against “die totality of 
modern existence,” Lionel Trilling’s “adversary culture” ( Berman 30), which can be taken as 
die modernist project Hie artist seeks to counteract the fragmentation, alienation, and deca­
dence of modem industrial societies by clinging to “the special integrity of personal con­
sciousness or style” (Rowe 165), in which the individual, whose existence is perceived to be 
threatened by the forces of dehumanization, is die moral, psychological and spiritual center. 
William S. Burroughs, Kurt Vonnegut, and Norman Mailer could be cited as contemporary 
examples of this attitude, writers who came on the literary scene in the 1950s, when the Euro­
pean models of existentialism, die absurd, and individual alienation had a strong intellectual 
and emotional appeal in the US. Da the 1960s, die anti-authoritarian implications of these ob­
sessively personal themes would become clear in a more politicized social climate, and these 
three novelists especially would oppose a concept of “totalitarianism” implicit in Berman’s 
notion of totality (c£ Chapts. 5 & 6). Berman also rejects this attitude as destructive without 
being correspondingly constructive, which, however, reiterates simplistic conservative criti­
cisms in the Sixties of proposed revolutionary attitudes or programs. For these writers, it 
might be countered, destruction means not the tearing down of civilized institutions it has 
taken so long to build, die classic conservative fear, but “the destruction of some false or de­
ceptive form of experience as die productive condition of the construction of anew relation to 
the object” (Benjamin & Osborne xi). These two artistic attitudes might be designated, in the 
terms of Berman’s own discussion, withdrawal and negativity, respectively, since he sees
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them both as rejections of die contemporary world, to which he opposes a third, affirmative, 
attitude in the tendency which espouses an erasure of die boundaries between art and other 
cultural activity, such as technology, politics, and entertainment This tendency he calls (or 
rather, he says that artists “called themselves”) postmodernist, which critics have character­
ized as either rupture or continuity with modernism
Leslie Fiedler first proposed (1969) postmodernist literature as a radical break of 
novelists like Barth and Voimegut who merged different genres and embraced popular forms 
(Connor 108-9). Other theorists, like lhab Hassan, see postmodernism as just another phase 
of the rejection of formalism that can be perceived in certain strains of modernism itself 
(Connor 109), and Berman evidently considers it a growth out of, or synthesis o£ the other 
two Sixties’ modernisms rather than a completely separate tendency. Umberto Eco has de­
scribed die process as a moment when die avant-garde can go no further, at which point a re­
action sets in, which may be a conservative retrenchment, the normal production of popular art 
that goes on without heeding experimental modes, or it may be other than a simple reversal: it 
may be a dialectical response to the avant-garde, recognizing that the past cannot be destroyed 
without a logical progression into silence but must be revisited ironically (Hoestery 243). In 
any case, this tendency is chronologically identified with the Sixties, while die other two 
modernist tendencies may go back to the Twenties, if  not earlier.
The virtue of the postmodernist attitude, however, Berman thinks may be its defect, for 
it goes too far in its “openness to die modern world.” He apparently means that too much 
openness is capitulation, with a critical refusal “to see and say that some of die powers of this 
world have got to go” (32). Most other critics, however, see postmodernism as socially criti­
cal and politically engaged. Jose Saldivar thinks that postmodern theory is not homogeneous
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but a theoiy in which political contestation is central (521). Linda Hutcheon agrees that it is 
at least potentially subversive since its “initial concern” is “to de-naturalize some of the 
dominant features of our way of life” (2).
Like modernism, the distinctive characteristics of postmodernism must be seen in rela­
tion to both literary history and the immediate cultural context (Chabot 31). Martin Jay sees 
postmodernism as “a fluid network of proliferating and incommensureable dijferances 
[Derrida’s term] which escape reduction to a finite number of common denominators” (Jay 
99). Anti-differentiation implies the abolishing of the modernist institutional self-sufficiency 
and by extension the reintegration of art into society, which in turn implies a demystifying of 
the artist as high-priest of the modern world. As Hutcheon says, postmodernism was made 
possible by modernism’s irony, ambiguity, self-referentiality, parody, attention to language, 
and attack on realist representation, but it contests modernism’s ideology of artistic autonomy, 
individual expression, and separation of art from mass culture and everyday life (15). This 
anti-differentiating inpulse is perhaps the most characteristic feature (or at least mcst-sgreed 
upon characteristic feature) of postmodernism, which its champions see as democratic and 
even revolutionary, in contrast to die radical formal inventiveness but ideological traditional­
ism or even Fascism of modernist writers (Conrad, Pound, Eliot, Yeats, Ford, Woolf)
(Connor 104). In modernism, the ideological representation of capitalism that has completely 
emerged is there with no prior history (Donongo 185).
The revolutionary character of postmodernism is, however, not without its difficulties, 
hi relation to history, for example, postmodernism is said to have an abstract conception of the 
historical process (Rowe 185), a “vulgar deconstructionist paritexbialism” or “indiscriminate 
dijferance” said to arise from the undecideability of all language (Jay 105, 107). Connor’s
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description of the “dissolution of the universal perspective” of modernism (80), which ac­
cords with an “incredulity toward metanarratives” of science and social science that Lyotard 
(xxiv) finds most characteristic of postmodernism becomes, for Roily, a neo-conservative in­
credulity toward all metanarratives that threatens die basis of any legitimacy (Rorty, 
“Habermas” 84). Hie promise of reintegration of literature with life must also be qualified 
somewhat by die ambivalence of die postmodernist writer about the potential of literature for 
achieving social transformation, die utopian hopes of modernism’s transvaluation of the age. 
Rowe says that postmodernism makes die more modest claim (perhaps in view of modern­
ism’s failure in this respect) o f a more critical understanding of contemporary society, espe­
cially the determination of thought and value by language (182). Linda Hutcheon, with respect 
to previous dreams of critical autonomy, points to postmodernism’s recognition that “there is 
no value-neutral, much less value-free, place from which to represent in any art form. And 
there never was” (46). She claims that postmodernism is a “complicitous critique,” in that it 
paradoxically legitimizes culture while it subverts it (15). Postmodernism denaturalizes both 
realist assumptions of transparency and modernism’s self-sufficiency, while retaining in its 
complicitous way the historical power of both—hence, its ambivalent politics (34).
With respect to literature, what Berman sees as a question of attitude toward die modern 
world might be supplemented by the postmodern attitude toward aesthetic formalism. Hie lit­
erary works of “high modernism,” which reach their acme in die 1920s, were self-conscious 
rejections of 19th century Realism with its outdated répertoriai methods of “capturing life” by 
attempting to record it Highly elaborate structure is die hallmark of modernist architecture 
(planes and surfaces), music (tones and sounds), painting (form and texture), and literature 
(linguistic organization). In literary criticism, the American New Critics, whose key critical
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terms were ambiguity, tension, and paradox, stressed fee integrity of fee lyric poem and fee 
felicities of its tight, concise form, as literary model, banishing context as irrelevant In fee 
novel, fee stress was on “subjectivist relativism” and individual consciousness (Connor 107). 
It is not too difficult to connect this individualist and formalist view of art wife fee oft-noted 
political conservatism or mild liberalism of fee New Critics and to fee curious absence of 
their interest in fee contemporary novel, wife its sprawling formlessness, notorious delight in 
“content,” and, most recently, problematizing of the conscious self It is also noteworthy that ~ 
fee supreme work of literary high modernism in English, Joyce’s Ulysses (1922).is not only 
elaborately, even forbiddingly structured, but is also a novel feat outdoes Realism itBelfin fee 
detailed effort to reproduce a time and a place in language, ft is to fee point thatthishistori- 
cizing impulse in Ulysses is held in tension wife fee anti-historicizing tendency ofthe mythical 
parallels.
Postmodernism in literature, then, cannot be seen just as an open or positive attitude to­
ward fee world, as Berman says (surely, Ulysses is amuch better example of that), but as an 
anti-differentiation, which in one aspect is a reaction to fee formalist view of art whose.em- 
phasis on aesthetic abstraction tends to favor a clear-cut distinction between high-brow and 
popular art, and a rejection or revision of fee modernist idea feat “fee various arts have'their 
own essential qualities” (Menand, “Finding” 16). in postmodernist works, textuality becomes 
more important than subjectivity, i.e. fee conjured worlds o f fiction are not so much distorted' 
through fee lenses o f consciousness but dependent on their own textual mechanisms (Connor, 
125). Louis Menand distinguishes between this aesthetic of form and literary devices. Wil­
liam H. Gass, for example, is a literary formalist, “an aesthete” in fee tradition of Joyce even 
as he is fee contemporary of Barfe, Pynchon, and Barthelme, for whom “fee aesthetic” is “just
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one more ideology of modernism, one more discourse to be parodied, pilloried and de­
bunked.” And yet, in Gass’s most recent novel, he does not hesitate to employ postmodernist 
devices (Menand, “Journey” 10). Stylistic characteristics often attributed to postmodernism 
include a prevailing mode of pastiche, self-conscious playfulness in language, a mixture of 
high and low discourses that imply the removal of a barrier between popular and high art, a 
mixture or indeterminacy of genre, and the pervasivness of irony, the rhetorical analogue of 
intellectual skepticism regarding social and political praxis (Rowe 184). Unlike Rowe, Alan 
Wilde sees irony not as a distinctive but as a differentiating feature: in modernism, irony is an 
<<unresolvable paradox” which die ironist attempts to resolve by “aesthetic closure” (10 , 2 1 ). 
In postmodernism, by contrast, the world is ironically perceived not as merely fragmented but 
as random and contingent, a condition for which no closure is attempted but is merely ac­
cepted (27). Ingrid Hoesterey posits a lack o f center owing to an insecurity amid a plurality 
of discourses as die motive force behind literary postmodernism (‘Introduction” xiv). With 
this refusal to contain incoherence, there is less emphasis on aesthetic ordering and formal 
organization and an increased tolerance for randomness, multiplicity, and uncertainty (Wilde 
45; Connor 115), “die plurality of conflicting formations” (Koslowski 146).
Postmodernist literature is also characterized by a self-consciousness of narrators and 
characters, who often comment on themselves as literary constructs. Hie subject, which Fou­
cault posits as a construction of the power discourses of an epoch, is, for postmodernist litera­
ture, a verbal fiction, “a literary character in that ultimate novel, history” (Rowe 185). Hie 
“historiographical assumption” of postmodernism is die textual nature of history which made 
it accessible to adaptation and revision (186). This points to postmodernism’s return to and 
use of narrative. While Jameson identifies the “revolutionary” break with the “repressive”
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ideology of storytelling a postmodernist trait (“Politics ofTheoiy” 54), Hutcheon argues, to 
die contrary, that this is a misconception that shows die “danger of defining the postmodern in 
terms of (French or American) anti-representational late modernism, as so many do” (50). As 
Hayden White says, die postmodern “is informed by a problematic, if  ironic, committment to 
narrative as one of its enabling presuppositions” (qtd. by Hutcheon 50). Hutcheon insists that 
postmodernism does not repudiate narrative, as late modernism does, but problematizes it 
There is in fact a return to narrative, which, as we shall see with Barth and others, is not 
straightforward. In both historical and literary postmodern representation, the doubleness re­
mains; there is no sense of the historian or novelist reducing the past to the present and there 
is no dialectical resolution. Hie boundaries remain even though they are challenged (71-72).
Menand has recently argued that anti-formalism or anti-essentialism is not, as is often 
supposed, primarily die work of abstruse philosophical and literary theory, the high-brow 
postmodernism one is familiar with from contemporary French theorists and their epigones, 
but an earlier, “cultural work” of middle-brow American artists, that is, “accessible figures 
who played to a large nonacademic audience”: Pauline Kael (film criticism), Andy Warhol 
(painting), Tom Wolfe (journalism), and Norman Mailer (fiction). Menand thinks that die lib­
eration of art from abstract modernist principles was in feet a great achievement of American 
culture of the 1960s (17). There does seem to be a postmodernism in literature, at least, that 
preceded theoretical postmodernisms of current critical debate. Rowe distinguishes the fic­
tional and critical postmodernisms. The first, which he dates from 1965 to 1975, is 
(Menand’s) American literary experimentation, but the beginnings could be moved back to die 
beginning of die Sixties or even slightly before if  one is to accomodate Burroughs» Vormegut, 
and Barth, who are the first innovative novelists of the decade. Hie second, which Rowe
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calls “poststructural and deconstructive scholarly approaches,” is the advanced French theory 
of the academy, covering roughly fee next decade (1975-85), which feminist and African 
American scholars have more recently appropriated for their own uses but which has been 
very influential for literarary and general cultural criticism Rowe even posits a “third” post­
modernism to cover socio-economic and political phenemona, but this turns out to be what 
other critics identify as <<post-industrial society” from fee Sixties to fee present, wife fee great 
importance of a service (over production) economy, and fee rise of a society dominated by 
information and mass-media A society of smaller scattered powers, as C. Wright Mills said 
back in fee Fifties, became a mass society, in which people had few ties in fee community to 
counteract monopoly control from powerful centers, “which being partially hidden,” became 
“centers of manipulation as well as authority” (Power Blite 237). Connor identifies this as 
“postmodemity,” which is distinct from fee postmodernism which fee main postmodernist 
theorists have discussed (27). Jameson relates the two in his observation that fee Sixties was 
the culmination of fee transition from monopoly to multinational capitalism and that postmod­
ernism is fee cultural experience of this economic phase which also paralleled great social 
upheavals (“Periodizing” 78; Chabot 32). Postmodernist culture results from what he calls 
fee “cultural logic” of late (i.e. multinational) capitalism and its commodification of represen­
tation itself wife an ever increasing production and relentless consumption of cultural forms. 
Jameson sees this culture as characterized by depfelessness and a decentering of fee sel£ in 
which image, signifier, surface (as opposed to modernist depth) and simulacrum reign su­
preme
if  the Sixties is the beginning of postmodernism in American fiction, civil rights, in the 
early part of the decade, and the Vietnam War, in the later part, were the great historical 
events that shaped radical consciousness in the form of the political “New Left” It is note­
worthy, however, that the radical literary experimentalists in fiction of the time—Barth, John 
Hawkes, Ronald Sukenik, etc.—neglected or “marginalized” these questions in their work 
(Rowe 183). The need for a more politicized art and criticism became even more evident in 
die Seventies and Eighties, with the rise of a “New Right”: the “nouveau philosophes” in 
France, the conservative political ideologies and economic policies ofReaganism and 
Thatcherism in the US and Great Britain. Hie right tended to adopt a rhetoric of liberty and 
transcendent subjectivity, but die leading conservative philosopher in the US, Robert Nozick, 
for example, developed a minimal-state, maximum rights theory that is really a theory of anar­
chism in the Thoreauvian tradition that cannot justly be appropriated by right-wing ideologies 
of unimpeded individual greed. The libertarian rhetoric of die right could not disguise their 
desperate calls for hierarchy, discipline, and authority. Since 1968, criticism has been di­
rected, however, not against reactionary positions but mainly against liberalism. Where die 
conservative image of die self as inherited and trained meshes with a radical view is, accord­
ing to some commentators, in the recognition of die ubiquity of power and interdependent 
levels of enforcement Where they differ is that the conservative stance is not a critique of 
power but a call to submission.
As was seen in Chapt 4, this anti-liberal stance can be seen in Norman Mailer, the 
novelist who most squarely faced political conflict and who, in his Sixties novels, employed 
postmodernist techniques even though his social vision and political stances remained rooted
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in the Fifties. Other novelists, both more traditional (Ken Kesey) and more experimentalist 
(Vonnegut, Heller) took an apparently radical view of social transformations but. in the end, 
as shall be seen in Chapter 5, unlike Mailer they tended to evade political implications in an 
unconscious movement toward a liberal consensus. And yet, these novelists were important 
in their creation of “literary disruptions” (Jerome Klinkowitz’s 1975 term) that undermined 
modernist tradition and its representations. Raymond Federman sees die the disruptions as 
formalistic, with die new fiction attempting to explode the modernist myths and stable sym­
bols, and, perhaps beginning with Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, as seeking to drive a wedge 
between official discourse and die subjects who receive it (“Self-Reflexive Fiction?’ 1147- 
48). There would be greater distrust of establishment discourses and the manipulation of his­
tory by die mass media and the disappearance of the unequivocal realtion between the real and 
die imaginary. Reality is shown to be “a fraudulent verba! network” in which it makes no 
sense to replace one set of illusions for another. Literary targets included the Southern and die 
Jewish novel, which were perceived as discourses of moral responsibility, guilt, and a silent 
agreement with official discourse (1152). Federman sees the new self-reflexive writers (i.e. 
from about 1968 on) as important for their denouncing of language itself as perpetuating lies 
and illusions, though even older writers, such as Burroughs and Vonnegut had been doing this 
a decade or so earlier.
Burroughs’s restless formal experimentation, his apparent quest for die limits of his 
medium, are, in one sense, the essence of modernism: the autonomous subjectivity and self- 
reflexivity and the attempt to break free from die linear structures of realism through random, 
free-associated blocks of images reminiscent of modem poetry. In the later works he employs 
the “cut up” and “fold in” methods of composition that he learned from Brion Gysin, a painter:
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radical extensions of the juxtaposition of images, essentially a verbal collage technique. These 
formalist methods and experiments are analogous to those of modernist artists like Pound, 
Eliot, John Cage, Merce Cunningham (none of whom, it may be noted, are novelists).
At die same time, there are a number of postmodernist features in Burroughs’ fiction, 
which have given his work the status of a prototype in contemporary literary history. For ex­
ample, Burroughs draws on and mixes a variety o f genres, such as Gothic and detective fic­
tion, science-fiction, spy novels, Westerns, pornography, and popular arts like movies. Jennie 
Skerl even calls Naked Lunch (1962) a “pop-art novel,” which, along with the collage tech­
nique (used ironically) by the Pop artists of the early Sixties, “uses powerful pop icons” for 
its primary imagery, in die manner of Andy Warhol and Roy Lichenstine (54). It is to die point 
here that Pop Art is considered an anti-modernist movement, an early manifestation, as it 
were, of post-modernism (Hoesterey, “Introduction” x), and emerged at the same time that 
Naked Lunch, touted by Mailer and Mary McCarthy, was being read by a larger public. In 
addition, Burroughs' characters are postmodernist caricatures, flattened “loci” of impersonal 
forces, quite different from the introspective characters of classic modernist novels (Skerl 50, 
55). There is m Naked Lunch the now familiar tendency to reduce die novel o f depth to die 
cartoon of surface. Even when writing in die first-person, Burroughs precludes introspection 
by objectifying and distancing his persona (compare Kurt Vonnegut, whose narrative persona 
has taken on an increasingly personal tone). With other distinctive stylistic and thematic char­
acteristics, such as die mixing of discourses (e.g farcical American accents and techno- 
bureaucratic prose), the obsession with waste and entropy, the introduction of simulacra and 
the proliferation of conspiracies and their concomitant paranoia, and die dislocation of. and 
confusion about, die ultimate sources of power, Burroughs has not only influenced his near
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contemporaries (Gaddis, Mailer, Voimegut, etc.) but looks forward to important younger 
novelists like Barth, Pynchon, Barthelme, and DeLillo.
With the media becoming nearly hegemonic in the Sixties, novelists struggled to assess 
its power and come to terms with die implications its cultural domination had for literature. 
Mailer was ambiguous about the media, preferring, as we have seen, television over newspa­
pers and perceiving in Armies o f the Night (1968) not only die importance of performance in 
politics but also the centrality of representation in historical events. For postmodern artists 
like Barth, Pynchon and DeLillo, this tendency has reached its fullest expression. There is no 
assumption that a real world is simply “out there,” waiting to be perceived, understood, and 
patiently described by the artist Barth, from die Sixties on, opts for textual play and ludic 
narratives in an apparent belief that there is nothing at the center of die novelist’s representa­
tions. Pynchon uses Barthian textual play and the full range of postmodern techniques to con­
struct alternative worlds for a more radical political vision. For DeLillo, the novelist most 
concerned with the transformaiion of American consciousness by technology and die mass 
media, reality is already framed, mediated, and so accessible only through the multiple and 
competing representations produced by them. He works not with characters so much as 
“words, images, and representations as his primary material” (Johnston 274). The novelist’s 
task, as the author stated in a recent inverview, is to deal with these materials while maintain­
ing a critical stance toward diem, to “absorb and incorporate die culture without catering to 
it” (Begley 290). If die world is perceived as its representations, postmodernist literature at­
tempts to counteract the tendency to perceive less, making perception equal to the representa­
tions by questioning and shifting the frames (Ibid.). This is a radical enterprise, and it is per­
220
haps not surprising that the political world, which is a world of representations for the pur* 
poses of power and its concealment, will itself be represented and read in new ways.
CHAPTERS
A RADICAL RESPONSE TO‘TOTALITARIANISM”? THE INDIVIDUAL ADVERSARY
IN BURROUGHS, VONNEGUT ET AL 
a
I concluded in the Introduction to Part Three that Marshall Berman’s judgment that 
postmodernism is not critical of contemporary life need not be right, and yet his distinction of 
a “destructive” or adversarial art, one in which an oppositional stance is intimately related to 
a perceived sense of an authentic self is one that is useiu] both for die fiction ofNorman 
Mailer and for that of the novelists discussed in this chapter. I have, to be sure, said little 
enough about the formal properties of Mailer’s novels and in fact centered my analysis on his 
adversarial attitude to “life” (i.e. existing power structures) rather than to any formalism, an 
indifference to which could be easily demonstrated in his work. Thus, if  not structurally, then 
thematically (attitudinally, in Berman’s sense), Mailer, as well as Burroughs and Vonnegut™ 
although both authors may be considered early postmodernists in stylistics, tone, technique, 
etc.-- are “modernist” in their preoccupation with die preservation of an authentic inner self 
threatened by modern reality, die (modernist) realization of a “painful gap” between experi­
ence and consciousness and the need to “replenish” consciousness with the intensities of ex­
perience (Connor 4). In effect, this may be no more than to say that they are also men of their 
time and place, informed by the material and spiritual structures of American life in die Fifties 
and early Sixties, which, as was seen both in the Introduction to Part Two and Chapt 2, 
tended to produce an inner-directed individual.
Accordingly, the political and social threat perceived by these writers is what Mailer 
called ‘‘totalitarianism,” which in the post-war era the political and cultural right-wing iden-
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a
I concluded in the Introduction to Part Three that Marshall Berman’s judgment that 
postmodernism is not critical of contemporary life need not be right, and yet his distinction of 
a “destructive” or adversarial art, one in which an oppositional stance is intimately related to 
a perceived sense of an authentic self is one that is useful both for the fiction ofNorman 
Mailer and for that of die novelists discussed in this chapter. I have, to be sure, said little 
enough about the formal properties of Mailer’s novels and in feet centered my analysis on his 
adversarial attitude to “life” (i.e. existing power structures) rattier than to any formalism, an 
indifference to which could be easily demonstrated in his work. Thus, if not structurally, then 
thematically (aititudinaily, in Berman’s sense), Mailer, as well as Burroughs and Voimegut— 
although both authors may be considered early postmodernists in stylistics, tone, technique, 
etc.-- are “modernist” in their preoccupation with die preservation of an authentic inner self 
threatened by modern reality, the (modernist) realization of a “painful gap” between experi­
ence and consciousness and die need to “replenish” consciousness with die intensities of ex­
perience (Connor 4). In effect, this may be no more than to say that they are also men of their 
time and place, informed by the material and spiritual structures of American life in die Fifties 
and early Sixties, which, as was seen both in the Introduction to Part Two and Chapt 2, 
tended to produce an inner-directed individual.
Accordingly, the political and social threat perceived by these writers is what Mailer 
called “totalitarianism,” which in the post-war era die political and cultural right-wing iden­
tified unequivocally with (Stalinist) Communism, but which radical and liberal novelists 
tended to see, as in Mailer’s version, as an insidiously advancing (domestic) state repression 
that was designed by our leaders to check an even more insidious “creeping socialism” in 
national political and cultural life. Hiomas Schaub, however, identifies the often invoked 
notion of totalitarianism as die fear of revisionist liberals (among whom he lumps Mailer and 
die novelists discussed in this chapter) toward “mass society” and “mass culture”(15), a 
judgement that is not entirely unjustified. Mailer’s concept o f totalitarianism includes but 
plays down Soviet expansionism, since he is more concerned with what is happening in his 
own country and, more importantly, the threat o f an intellectual and behavioral conformity of 
die American masses (in a popular critical phrase of the period, Reisman’s “lonely crowd”). 
Schaub’s argument holds that novelists tended to share the declared anxieties of cultural crit­
ics about keeping high art aloof from a perceived and threatening contamination from popular 
forms (“if  we cannot stop the ruthless expansion of mass-culture, die least we can do is to 
keep apart and refuse its favors/’ wrote the left-wing critic Philip Rafcv, qtd. by Schaub IS). 
This, I think, is an oversimplification since die novelists’ response to popular forms is less 
anxious and more complex, as shown by their often adapting these forms in their own work. 
Yet, it is true enough that both critics and novelists saw behavioral conformity as increasing to 
a great extent in response to the astonishing growth of die mass media in die Fifties and Six­
ties—a conformity which Burroughs, whom I shall argue is die only truly radical novelist of 
those discussed here, identifies as a result of media and language “mind control.”
The concept of totalitarianism in this period was peihaps a scare word, a tactical con­
cept meant to alarm and warn of present tendencies and future possibilities. Most definitions 
of the concept see the land of centralized, uniform control of all provinces of life historically
present only in the dictatorships of the present century, the kind of regimes conditioned and 
facilitated by industrialism and technology, with organization, communications and propa­
ganda as the means for a complete mobilization and terrorist regimentation (Gleishaltung) of 
every individual. In a broader sense than this ideal-type definition, however, totalitarianism 
may be seen as a tendency in all states aiming at the management of crises and at development 
by means of a political and ideological monopoly of power. As such, it is part of the modern­
izing process of nations and societies in the age of democracy, bureaucracy, and pseudo­
religious ideologies (Bracher 406-10).
b.
William S. Burroughs, although older than any of the writers discussed in the following 
section (born 1914), is more radical in every way. Burroughs can be considered a middle 
term between die individualism of modernist fiction and die politicizing tendencies of post-_ 
modernism Partly due to his appearing on the literary scene during die Fifties and early Six­
ties, however, he is claimed as a founding father of the Beats, the post-war avant-garde 
movement that rejected reigning middle-class values and celebrated what was thought of as 
less alienated and more authentic (i.e. more instinctive) personal existence, with Zen, jazz, 
existentialism, and other arts of the spontaneous combining with recreational sex and drugs. 
The connection with Beat fiction, beyond the chronological connection and an incantatory use 
of language that was perhaps ultimately inspired by that 19th century bohemian, Walt Whitman 
(Van Leer 493), can also be explained by the Beat writers’ own declared enthusiasm for Bur­
roughs’s work and his close personal association with Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg 
(Burroughs, for example, appears as a character in Kerouac’s novel On the Road, 1957). 
Kerouac, John Clellon Holmes, and other Beat novelists whose work centered on the anti-
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rational self and who experimented with various kinds of “spontaneous writing” might justly 
claim Burroughs as a forerunner, and yet Burroughs’ influence extends beyond the Beats to 
writers like Mailer and Thomas Pynchon. He reveals in his novels a more political preoccu­
pation wife something closely resembling Mailer’s concept of totalitarianism, and his para­
noid, nightmarish fictional world foresees Pynchon’s, making fee bohemian ambiance of Beat 
novels look almost innocent by comparisoa
What I call Burroughs’s political dimension migjht seem all fee more surprising since his 
fictions deal wife an exclusively drug-oriented world, where extremes of fee personal and fee 
irrational come together. Burroughs wanted to show, even in his first and most conventional 
novel, Junkie (1953), feat “junk” (drugs, especially heroine) is more than an objective evil; it 
is a way of life, a kind of substitute for being, wife terminal addiction being in effect a state of 
living death. Even though fee emphasis is on fee hell of withdrawal, while fee joys of getting 
stoned are not explored (wife what might seem a logical perversity to non-addicts, junk is not 
sought to make one feei good but to avoid getting sick for not having it), Junkie is not at all a 
standard testimonial of fee type “what drugs have done to me.” Hie original sub-title is 
“Confessions of an Unredeemed Drug Addict,” and by fee end of fee book, Burroughs’s alter- 
ego “William Lee” has, indeed, made no repentance and no resolutions.
Places of confinement—jails and hospitals—are prominent, and critics have found these 
fee institutional bases for Burroughs’s analysis of power in later works (Skerl 51). As Fou­
cault has shown, these institutions are sites where disciplinary power is applied in an exem­
plary way, wife fee bodies of fee inmates subjected to a strict regimen of well-meaning dis­
cipline. Junkies as radically undisciplined and anti-social people would seem to be fee ideal 
object for fee kind of power Foucault describes as bofe repressive and socially beneficial.
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Yet, even in Junkie, and increasingly in the later works, Burroughs’s particular notion of 
“control” ignores the supposedly socially beneficial aspect of even hospital cures (never mind 
fee naked power of the police), which junkies merely see as a means of getting “clean” so that 
they can be more susceptible to stronger and cheaper doses when they get out Junkies are 
controlled by a craving for drugs, a biological need, but the “control addicts” who arrest, 
confine, watch, treat, and abuse them are themselves controlled by their “need” for power, 
which is evidently psychological (and pathological), corresponding to the physiological need 
of die addicts. The novel shows die give-and-take of die struggle between two groups linked 
by their respective needs.
Burroughs’ most influential work, Naked Lunch (19S9) and the trilogy that follows go 
beyond this level of a marginalized social group and its struggle with institutionalized powers 
to envision an “allegorical war of control.” 1 The concept of control is broadened to include 
crucial areas of social experience, such as bureaucracy, the media, and even language itself, 
all interrelated in their capacity for domination (Burkholder 71). Bureaucracy, to recall We­
ber’s argument, is the means of exercising power over people but a means that soon becomes 
a power in itself Language in this connection is the vehicle for both bureaucracy and die me­
dia and is itself perceived as oppressive. The media fix fluid experience into received 
“ideas” and manipulate social roles. The arch-villain for Burroughs is Henry Luce, publisher 
of Life and Time, magazines that simplify and mythicize the national experience in ideologi­
cally digestible forms and were especially influential in the Fifties, when television had not 
yet achieved its current cultural hegemony.
Unlike die rather straightforward autobiographical narration of Junkie, Naked Lunch 
consists of blocks of fantastic, even surrealistic images, more like an extended lyric than a
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narrative, for, although the images constantly blend and shift, there is, as in poetry, repetition 
of key phrases and motifs and the effect is narrative discontinuity. Hie imagery, in any case, 
is obsessively scatological, anal, and bestial in a text in which eating, defecation, and uncon­
trolled ejaculations are frequently described activities. 2 Although there are narrative epi­
sodes in the text, there is no overall narrative structure to give them continuity among them­
selves; they seem to occur in some non-existent or frozen time. As Burroughs explains in his 
“Introduction,” a junkie runs on “junk-time,” which is out of sequential history, since he may 
spend extended periods of time doing nothing but staring at the wall or (like Burroughs him­
self before his final cure) at his own shoe.3 Naked Lunch would therefore seem to be a su­
preme example of solipsistic obsession, with little relevance to public forms of power, but in 
this novel “junk” expands far beyond its meaning of an addicting substance and the pursuit of 
an alternative life-style through drugs by the down-and-outs in Junkie into a suggestive sym­
bol for social products and functions. For example, junk is most evidently money, capital­
ism’s ultimate commodity: “Junk is the mold of monopoly and possession.. Junk is quantitative 
and accurately measurable. Hie more junk you use the less you have and the more you have die 
more you use...Junk is die ideal product..the ultimate merchandise. No sales talk neces- 
sary...the merchant does not sell his product to the consumer, he sells the consumer to the 
producf ’ (Introduction to Naked Lunch xxxviii-xxxix). Junk is also a metaphor for other 
kinds of addictions which, like money and economic exploitation, have wider implications 
than private hallucinations and obsessions. Besides drugs, die ‘‘basic addictions” for Bur­
roughs are sex and power, and for him all three are dehumanizing agents. As with Mailer, sex 
is an expression of power but without Mailer’s emphasis on sex as the source of primitive
vitality. For Burroughs, it is (like drugs) rather a form of controlling and being controlled 
(Skerl 55; Lee 74-78).
Power, therefore, Burroughs conceives rather narrowly, as illegitimate and dehumaniz­
ing control over other people, a control that goes beyond the basic brutalities of naked re- 
pressioa As the narrator explains, “A functioning police state needs no police” (36, his ital­
ics).4 Burroughs’s world is the Orwellian one of totalitarian mind-control, where junk is a 
kind of conditioning, indeed, is itself a metaphor for the conditioned lives we now live. Con­
trol is no means to an end but an end in itself: “K can never be a means to anything but more 
control... like junk” (Naked Lunch 163-4).5 A leading character in this connection is Dr. 
Benway of “Annexia,” a  genial monster who has renounced simple brutality for more effec­
tive means of control, which can be summed up as his expertise in T.D. (Total Demoraliza­
tion). He enjoys explaining the methods of “prolonged mistreatment,” which combine pene­
tration into private life with the use of drugs for an “assault on fee subject’s personal identity” 
(25). These methods, which recall fee horrors of Huxley’s and Orwell’s dystopias, are more 
effective fean ordinary torture since fee subject is systematically confused, made to feel he 
deserves any treatment he gets because there is something wrong wife him which is never de­
fined. To this Kafkan condition, Burroughs adds fee importance of need in fee uses of control: 
“Junk yields a basic formula of ‘evil’ virus: Hie Algebra of Need” (73). The formula ap­
plies to all kinds of addicts, including control-addicts like Benway. Bureaucracy is fee ra­
tionalized institutional procedures feat make people like Benway more acceptable: “The na­
ked need of fee control addicts must be decently covered by an arbitrary and intricate bu­
reaucracy so feat fee subject cannot contact his enemy direct” (21).
Ill
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Control is seen by Burroughs as originating at some point external to the individual and 
as worse than title private hallucinations brought on by drugs: “Self-induced distortions are 
preferable to those imposed upon us” (Karl 208; Tanner 119). Not the Puritan (or Freudian) 
enemy within, but an evil lurking outside waits patiently and cunningly to move in mid take 
over the human host, like the virus so often invoked in the novel—something cancerous that
inhabits a person and sucks out his life, leaving, like junk, only the shell, which is functionally
t
dead. This virus, whether in the form of a  monstrous parasite or in that of its human counter­
part, must be “isolated and treated” (Naked lunch 169). His work therefore claims a thera­
peutic function, and there is a pervading discourse of hospitals, doctors and, of course, drugs 
and remedies. In an interview, Burroughs maintained the medical imagery when he explained 
that he had “diagnosed” the illness in his first two novels and suggested a “remedy” in the next 
two (qtd. by Tanner 110).
While this devouring evil is pervasive in the world, its source cannot be easily located 
or even precisely named. Burroughs shares the social dystopia of Kafka and die modernists, 
but his paranoid vision differs somewhat from that of Pynchon and the postmodernists, for 
whom paranoia results from an excess of connections. A decade and a half before Pynchon, 
Burroughs perceived die dread arising from entropy, the notion that energy is running down 
and the world being exhausted or drained, though he did not develop the idea As the refer­
ence “Hie Planet drifts to random insect doom” (224) suggests, furthermore, Burroughs sees 
entropy working not as the forces of physics bid through images of organic life. As the virus 
takes over the junkie’s body, he descends to ever lower forms of organic organization (Tanner 
118). As material being regresses (e.g. bodies to blobs, men to insects, articulated forms to 
undifferentiated jelly), on the social level government and corporate institutions, including
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organized religion, take over the social “body” for their own needs, destroying it in the proc­
ess. In die trilogy that follows Naked Lunch, a kind of space Mafia called “the Nova Mob” 
also takes the form of a  virus that controls human beings through junk, sex, power, and lan­
guage. Member-groups within the Mob specialize in certain areas of addiction: the Uranians 
drugs, the Venusians sex, and die Crab People power. Hie clusters of image associations are 
suggestive, including the historical (Nazism and the totalitarian social system of the Mayans), 
die pseudo-scientific (L. Ron Hubbard’s “scientology” and Wilhelm Reich’s “orgone box”), 
and the pop cultural (science-fiction and astrology) (Skerl 58). Class power comes in (in The 
Soft Machine, 1961)) as the Mayan priest ruling-class, and corporate power can perhaps be 
seen in die ‘Trek Sex and Dream Utilities” company, although these are hardly more than sug­
gested.
Burroughs’s work, then, while looking forward to postmodernist obsessions of paranoia 
and entropy, has classically modernist preoccupations, as my references to Orwell, Hiixley, 
and Kafka, might suggest Hie '‘foreshadowing of the explosion of self’ that would character­
ize fiction in the following decades (Karl 205-11) make Burroughs’s world resonate with 
Henry Miller’s comic-horrific view of die US as the “air-conditioned nightmare” and 
Mailer’s individualist oppositions to the dehumanizing structures of American life. For Bur­
roughs, evidently, all that can be obtained is an inner freedom, die liberal-modernist dream of 
individual autonomy and inner resistance to external repression. In what Burroughs calls his 
“mythology of war and conflict..” (i.e. die “allegorical war of control” mentioned above), he 
says: “Hell consists offal ling into enemy hands, the hands of virus power, and heaven con­
sists of freeing oneself from this power, of achieving inner freedom, freedom from condition­
in g  (qtd. by Tanner 110, emphasis added). As the eschatological metaphor suggests, this is
essentially a formula for saving one’s soul. Frederick Karl, in fact, thinks that everything in 
this novel and die author’s subsequent novels is “a definition of self” In this interpretation, 
with each successive text Burroughs moves further and further toward Nietzche's Über­
mensch, a self beyond all control, seeking some ultimate liberation though the paradoxical 
embrace of degradation in a different order of experience (208). As in the fantasy and detec­
tive genre fiction he draws on, Burroughs’s strategy of resistance depends on an individual 
agent of liberation (“Lee” or die “Agenf ’ or “Hie Exterminator” or other alter-egos in the 
various works) and, in a more promising move in the manner of some science fiction, of ex­
propriating the technology of the controllers, althoiigh this possibility is unfortunately not de­
veloped.
In Naked lunch, inner resistance may take the apparently radier simple form of securing 
for oneself a clarity of vision, an ability to see the “facts” in die face of the encroaching virus, 
as in the story Benway tells of the devouring asshole that gradually draws out die life of the 
body into itself threatening to become an anal tyrant Since die asshole itself cannot see, it 
gradually seals off the eyes, which brings on death in die brain (131-2); hence, the importance 
of clear visioa The difficulty of attaining clear vision is allegorized in “Interzone’s” four 
parties, which is perhaps the essence of Burroughs’s vision of power. One party, the 
“Senders,” exercises a biological mind control through miniature receivers installed in the 
body, which receive one-way telepathic messages from State-controlled transmitters. The 
Send«* must transmit endlessly without receiving, lest he “louse up his continuity” by die ad­
mission of another consciousness. This is Burroughs’s view of the mass media: mindless, 
one-way transmissions without meaningful content; die medium is the message, with a venge­
ance. Television as die crucial cultural product and manipulative power in American cultural
life was just beginning to make itself felt around fee time of the appearance ofNaked Lunch. 
The Senders are a striking preview of what Baudrillard and other cultural critics say about 
television, a medium “which suggests nothing, which magnetizes, which is only a screen, or is 
rather a miniaturized terminal which in fact is found immediately in your head...”
(Baudrillard, Seduction 220, qtd. by Kellner 70). It also anticipates what Kroker and Cook 
say about how television transforms and controls people: by “implanting a  simulated, elec­
tronically monitored and technocratically controlled identify in fee ilesh” (qtd. by Connor 
171). “Mass communications,” where fee masses in fact don’t communicate, are efficient 
creators of the “totalizing codes” of fee dominant culture (Czermak and Silva 50). In feet, they 
really “fabricate non-communication... if one agrees to define communication as an exchange” 
(Baudrillard, Critique 169).
A second party, fee “Liquefactionists,” as feeir name suggests, liquefy or turn people 
into an amorphous sameness. A (solid) variation of them is fee “Divisionists,” who divide 
into clones of themselves toward “an eventual monopoly of one replica,” since “every replica 
but your own is eventually undesirable” (164). Hiese three parties taken together suggest fee 
Fifties’ preoccupation wife conformity and loss of an authentic selfhood. The only sympa­
thetic parly, called fee ‘Tactualists,” is opposed to fee other three. Factualists issue bulletins 
on various evils perpetrated by fee others; for example, they clarify feat they are not against 
telepathy in itself which would constitute an intimate kind of interpersonal communication, 
but only against fee evil of fee Senders’ one-way telepathy (167), which constitutes mind- 
control.
The novel itself can be thought of as Burroughs’s own series ofFactualist bulletins, 
meant to correct or “cure” fee maladies of fee other parties. In a stricter political reading,
however, it is clear that (here are Fascist elements in the parties, which he sees as threats to 
modem life: die total State control via propaganda of die Senders; the Nazi-like genetic con­
trol and obsession with racial purity of the Divisionists; in the popular perception of Com­
munism in the Fifties, the Liquefactionist reduction of individual difference. What is notewor­
thy about the Factualist resistance against die three evil parties is its interest in preserving 
individual integrity, presumably intellectual and spiritual, though in die novel (metaphorically) 
physical. Allen Ginsberg made the telling point that die Factualists are, in one sense, “a really 
respectable conservative party,” since they take “a very anti-State or anti-creeping State posi­
tion” (Ginsberg & Mailer xxvi).
Burroughs’s preoccupation with “facts,” stable or fixed events or truths, contradicts his 
technical resolution to avoid die static tendencies of language in favor of a radical stylistic 
flexibility. His own text does not offer facts, but images and fleeting events that in die nature 
of things can be only partially apprehended. As he cautions in the “Afterward”: “You were 
not there ai the Beginning. You will not be there at die End... Your knowledge of what is going 
on can only be superficial and relative” (220). That the Senders are identified as the Party 
most particularly to be combatted is related to their being transmitters of language, die most 
powerful and dangerous force, though a debased one, from which there is no escape. In the 
trilogy, similarly, the head of the Nova Mob controls the word, and speech is called “the 
talking sickness.” Burroughs is doubtless not opposed to language itself (impossible for a 
writer), but to the debased forms of it found in contemporary culture. Like die postmodernist 
Donald Barthelme, Burroughs’s campaign against linguistic “dreck” includes exposure 
through parody. His resolution to produce a non-linear anti-narrative may be explained by his 
(Factualist) determination to not himself become a Sender who offers up a fixed and fixing (to
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“fix” in junk slang = inject the drug) form of narrative structure: ‘1 do not presume to impose 
‘story’ ‘plot’ ‘continuity’..!  am not an entertainer” (221). Burroughs has objected to what 
he identifies as the “Aristotelian construct and its attendant logic,” and the limiting structure 
of subject-verb-object (qtd. by Burkholder 73). Presumably, his real objection is to a discur­
sive narrative structure, since his own sentences, of course, must have these grammatical ele­
ments. It is therefore a central paradox of his work, or at least of his intentions, that he must 
(as a writer) use language in the attempt to go beyond it Otherwise, he could only follow the 
logic, first suggested by Beckett, of lapsing into silence, an alternative, given decade after 
decade of prolific text production, he doesn’t seem to have considered, unless “silence” as 
with Beckett be interpreted as a  kind of strategy. Thus, in the trilogy, die Nova Police are 
good guys who counter the Nova Mob’s word-control by silence.6 Schaub sees both Bur­
roughs and John Barth, in their suspicion of form and projected meaning and, at die same time, 
their need for die same, as characteristic of the “postwar conflict in liberal discourse between 
a suspicion of ideology and a desire for action” (79).
c.
Arising from the social and political circumstances of the Fifties, conformity and con­
trol were quintessentially themes of the early Sixties, as evidenced not only in Burroughs’s 
avant-garde fiction but also in what were the most popular novels on college campuses at die 
time: Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1961), Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo'sNest 
(1962), and Kurt Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle (1963), all of which were also critically well- 
received. Kesey’s novel, according to enthusiastic critics, “exposes the repressive institu­
tions of modem industrial societies that demand sterile conformity” (Maguire 447), a de­
scription that could be applied to Mailer’s novels, and, by way of my political reading, to
Burroughs’s. For the powerful structures of Mailer’s army or Pentagon, Kesey offers a mental 
hospital as a metaphor for the system, a conflation of Burroughs’s hospital and jail. Hie 
hospital, efficiently and repressively run by the formidable Nurse Ratched (suggesting not 
only “wretched” but ‘"ratchet,” a grinding mechanical device used for applied force) is often 
compared in the novel to a well-oiled machine with wired and interconnected insides, whose 
corrective mechanisms include routine humiliation, numbing drugs, electric shock therapy, 
and, ultimately, lobotomy.
In Madness and Civilization (tr. 1965), Foucault demonstrated how the treatment of the 
mad went from repression to more concerned authority. Until the end of die 18th century, an 
abstract, faceless power kept die mad confined; later, their keepers would hold both the pres­
tige of the authority that confines and the reason that judges, intervening without restraints but 
with observation and language. Kesey’s mental hospital exposes this later system of humane 
treatment by well-meaning professionals by showing how the usually soft-spoken Ratched can 
swiftly turn into an avenging angel for the system. Unlike Foucault’s impersonal medical staff, 
who are, after all, committed to curing their patients, Ratched seems determined to keep diem 
within die hospital walls by systematic humiliation disguised as professional treatment Her 
means are confinement, reduction to submission through “therapy,” and, when that is ineffec­
tive, reduced privileges and even physical restraint, a combination of older and newer forms 
of treatment
As a  microcosm of a repressive US society, the hospital is a system of total control, die 
worst possible combination of the powers of discipline and surveillance, organizational effi­
ciency (die hospital is called “the Combine”), and the naked power of bodily subjection, ft 
silences minorities (Chief Bromden) and subjugates pathetic neurotics with coercive effi-
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ciency, budding resistance (Ellis, Ruckley) is neutralized in the interest of function. The nar­
rator, Chief Bromden, is another paranoid of Sixties’ fiction, who sees die mechanical control 
of die world so total that he thinks even people have devices inside them. Watching Ratched 
work, he thinks:
Practice has steadied and strengthened her until she wields a sure power that 
extends in all directions on hair-like wires too small for anybody’s eyes but 
mine; I see her sit in the center of this web of wires like a watchful robot, tend 
her network with mechanical insect skill... What she dreams of there in the 
center of those wires is a world of precision accuracy and readiness...a place 
where the schedule is unbreakable and all die patients who aren’t Outside, 
obedient under her beam, are wheelchair Chronics with catheter tubes run di­
rect from every pantleg to die sewer under the floor” (Kesey 30).
Hie concept and imagery of this passage doubtless owe much to Burroughs, but the perception 
of control is not diffuse, as often in Burroughs, but hierarchized and highly visible in die figure 
of what is in effect an institutional tyrant aided by the devices of a dictatorial technological 
state. Power is therefore centralized and punishment is “spectacular,” i.e. for social control 
of die other inmates both out of proportion to the offense and clearly visible to diem Nurse 
Ratched’s power is “written” on the bodies of those who dare to step out of line.
Her adversary, McMurphy, is a typical hero of die counter-cultural Sixties, even a per­
sonification of them, though as gambler, womanizer, and brawler, Frye’s low-comic type, 
since he brings sex, comradeship, and irreverent laughter into the closed and up-tight world of 
die Fifties and its organizational (wo)man (Klinkowitz 23). McMurphy is the counter­
example to the imposition of sameness and loss of self (the hospital’s rules for destroying the 
patients’ individuality) and the strong individual who can subvert order and incite rebellion in 
various ways: refusal to submit or even cooperate, ridicule, selective comprehension, alter­
native behavior styles, etc. He represents the vital, authentic self that is, however, ultimately
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vulnerable to a repressive system. After the usual methods of control and even the brutality of 
shock-therapv have failed to bring him to submission, Ratched will have him lobotomized, a 
form ofbrain-castration for his intrusive and anarchic sexuality.
As personification of the Sixties, McMurphy might also represent the possibility of a 
cultural revolution, and yet his revolution is only temporary, doomed to eventual defeat, since 
his confrontational tactics underestimate the power of his adversary and his disruptive role 
seems limited to the Sixties’ deification of “consciousness-raising” (Ibid.). McMurphy’s 
demise is not unrelated to his status as cliché hero o f comic books (which, along wife televi­
sion, make up die whole of his culture), and his resistance must necessarily be restricted to 
that kind of form (Tanner 344). In a radier politically suspect way, too, he is after all de­
stroyed by a system in which the agents of totalitarian repression are a woman and her black 
assistants. Only the minorities, with their alternative vision of America and their techniques 
of a Joycean “silence and cunning” (Bromden throughout pretends to be mute) would seem 
capable of revolutionary action in this situation, since cniy Brombden in the end breaks free of 
Kesey’s nightmare vision of total control, and yet even his escape (like Mailer’s Stephen Ro- 
jack’s to Yucatan in An American Dream), is the romantically impossible return to die pre­
civilized world of his Indian ancestors.
Equal critical enthusiasm accompanied Heller’s 1961 novel, Catch-22, which has been 
characterized as “savagely radical,” aiming “to expose the entire power system of the post­
war world” (W.Milier 237). Heller’s attack centers on die “power elite,” die unholy alliance 
of the military, politics, organized religion, and big business which arose in the wake of the 
war, including multinational coiporations, which proliferated after the war, gaining trading 
advantages by developing products at home and manufacturing diem abroad. Catch-22 is
Æ
therefore a novel of the American Fifties although its characters and setting are an Air Corps 
bombing squadron in Europe during the Second World War, a technically innovative use of 
historical anachronism that will become a feature in postmodern fiction, in which Heller sug­
gests the power situation of post-war historical developments.
The military and the corporation are satirized essentially by conflating the two. The 
military group in the novel, as Karl points out (311), is much like a business corporation of 
the Fifties: the commanding officer Cathcart setting production goals (die number of combat 
missions to be flown) and constantly raising them while competing for promotion with his 
rival Korn. Hie pilots correspond to the middle-managers who (here, literally) take the “flak,” 
and the enlisted men are the workers, used but unrewarded by the system. The supreme corpo­
rate figure in the novel is the black marketeer Milo Minderbender, whose syndicate is a cor­
porate capitalist cartel, all-encompassing and so above merely national interests that Milo’s 
collusive dealings with the Germans include the bombing of his own squadron. Hie sole con­
cern with profits and performance and the corporate independence from constitutional rules 
and allegiances are made clear when Milo is cleared of this enormity by Congress when he is 
able to show a profit Hie war episode illustrates the Fifties’ fetichizing of die notion of 
capitalist “free enterprise.”
And yet, despite its anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian message, Caick-22, is, at least 
as far as its anti-hero Yossarian is concerned, another example of the alienated and apolitical 
self struggling to maintain sanity in the face of the mass pressures and absurd situations of die 
contemporary world. Yossarian finds himself in die absurdist “catch-22” situation of being 
unable to escape his C.O.’s pursuit of more and more combat missions, since only by demon­
strating madness under stress can he be freed from combat, yet the evident desire to be re-
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lieved of it by such behavior would prove a concern for his own safety and therefore that he 
was quite sane and fit for duty. Eventually, there is no way out but desertion (“What if they 
had a war and no one came,” was the sentimental slogan of the Sixties).
Catch-22, as Thomas Edwards observes, is really an “end of ideology” novel that sees 
any commitment except to one’s own survival as futile. Yossarian’s problem is not political 
but existential, since the real enemy is neither the Germans nor even his own superior officers, 
but death itself or rather, his own death (10-11). That he is neither psychologically repelled 
by violence nor philosophically opposed to it is shown by his own record as a bombardier 
over many successful combat missions. He is not at all concerned with the victims or his 
crucial role in what is after all a  particularly impersonal method of killing people, but simply 
wants to end his combat tour and let someone else take over (Muste 8). hi this reading the 
novel’s “glorifying of individual solutions” for people who remain blissfully unaware of what 
their independence signifies makes it a vehicle for the mentality of the Fifties: Yossarian’s 
escape to idyllic Sweden conceals die historical fact that Swedish corporations produced 
high-grade steel for Hitler’s military machine (Karl 313).
In Heller’s more traditional second and third novels, too, the political turns out to be 
subservient to the personal. In Something Happened (1974), a novel about power games and 
die struggle for status in a civilian corporation, executive Bob Slocum can play die corporate 
game cunningly. Although the novel shows the destructive power of corporations on indi­
viduals (one man jumps from a window, most suffer from constant anxiety), it tends to present 
Slocum’s moral deformation as an interior problem of individual alienation rather than an 
example of die reifying power of capitalist organizatioa For an example of the latter, one 
must turn to the first part of Don DeLillo’s Americana (1971). In both Heller’s second and
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third novels, Heller explores large organizations, in which “the struggle for power within the 
organization...consumes more energy than does the struggle to achieve die organization’s de­
clared goals” (Miller 237). In Good as Gold (1979), Gold’s public career in Washington 
basically serves to help him understand his own failings: “How much lower would he have to 
crawl to rise to the top?” In each case, a predictably apolitical solution is forthcoming: Yos- 
sarian deserts, die classic “light out for the territory” solution we have seen as so common in 
the American novel; Gold rejects a generously corrupting Washington to return to his family 
and Jewish roots, die almost equally popular humanist solution; Slocum shamelessly courts 
the system but is destroyed, a victim of his own failings and a properly “poetic” justice.
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., like Mailer and Burroughs, has been writing novels since the Fifties, 
and like the latter shows a preference for anti-realism in plot, for chance over causal explana­
tion. His work has been described as absurdist, black comedy, biting satire, etc. whose main 
theme is “man’s need for illusions” (Harris 54) and die consequent offering of acceptable lies 
(i.e. fictions) that will make the horror of contemporary life easier to bear. Correlated with 
this brand of existential humanism, several of die earlier novels (die later ones show signs of 
weariness) have also been read as attacks on powerful institutions and political tendencies in 
the contemporary world, such as fascism (Mother Night, 1961), science (Cat's Cradle,
1963), and institutional politics (God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, 1965). Cat's Cradle, for 
example, illustrates die Foucaultian theme that there is no disinterested science and no inno­
cent knowledge. The head of die General Forge and Foundry Co. claims that people don’t 
understand scientists, that his factory is involved in “pure research,” etc. His employee, Dr. 
Hoenniker, did much of his research at the factory and turns out to be one of the inventors of
the A-bomb. Hoeimiker, a brilliant nai£ will, through one of his playful inventions, “ice-nine,” 
eventually freeze die world into lifelessness.
Vonnegut’s novels differ from most fictional satire in their narrative tone, which is light, 
whimsical, apparently neutral, without the controlled anger or willful outrage at the world’s 
absurdities described within. Lacking a “rhetoric of certainty” in which the satirist looks at 
die world from a superior position and pronounces on it, Vonnegut’s “stoical comedy” evi­
dently wishes to improve the world without much hope for doing so (Scholes, Fabulation 
157,161). Resignation would therefore be the appropriate attitude to take toward an absurd 
world (Harris 71), accompanied by Vonnegut’s rather homely and sentimental version of 
Christian humanism, in which we fallen human beings ought to love one another, since there 
seems to be nothing much better. In its more palatable version, Bokononism, the casual relig­
ion of Cat's Cradle, eschews any kind of dogmatizing with the (dogmatic) teaching that die 
world is essentially a mystery and that man’s “granfalloons” or false categories are merely 
imposed upon it  As satirist, Vonnegui wants to expose human greed, cruelty, and especially 
the human capacity for self-deception, and he has a pessimistic vision on die cosmic scale that 
is perhaps appropriate to a fantasy-science fiction writer, but what of human history? Bok­
ononism’ s answer to one of its catechism questions (“What can a thoughtful man hope for 
mankind on earth, given the experience of die past million years?”) is simply: “Nothing” 
(164). Id a passage meaning to praise Vonnegut as “among the best writers of his generation,” 
Robert Scholes puts his finger on Vonnegut’s main limitation: “Vonnegut’s comic prose re­
duces large areas of experience to the dimensions of a laboratoiy slide” (Scholes 204-5).
Vonnegut’s first novel, Player Piano (1952), perhaps best illustrates the author’s view 
of power, the individual as adversary of repressive systems, and the futility of histoiy. The
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novel tells of conflict between people and technology in Hium (i.e. doomed like Troy), which 
is evidently a fictional version of Schenectady, New York, home of the General Electric Re­
search Laboratory where Voimegut once worked as public relations writer (Reed 495). Hium 
exerts a nearly total control, minus Orwellian thought control, over the population, but die 
system is ostensibly benevolent, since basic material needs are provided free of charge. So­
ciety is geographically and politically divided. On one side of the river are die machines— 
including the giant computer Epicac XIV, which, like John Barth’s WESCAC (for which it 
may be a forerunner), is humanized—and die engineers and managers who design and care for 
diem On die other side live the people who cannot intellectually compete and are relegated to 
government employment in maintenance or the army that merely keeps them busy, so that there 
is a modified but simple Marxist structure of ruling class in possession of wealth and the 
means of domination, and dispossessed proletarians who, however, are not exploited in die 
classic sense, since it is precisely their labor which is no longer needed. In this structure, at 
least, die novel would be a somewhat prophetic vision of a relatively benevolent capitalist 
future. One important theme, which is doubtless a criticism of contemporary socialist regimes 
as well as future capitalist ones, is that people need meaningful work rather than merely ma­
terial satisfaction as passive recipients of the state.
Hie adversarial hero, Paul Proteus (i.e. able to blend in, or flexible in action), is man­
ager of Ilium works and believer in science and progress but a man uneasy at his own integra­
tion into the system, die smug banality of his fellow managers, and the pathos of the people 
across the bridge. Hiere is therefore considerable resemblance to Orwell’s 1984 (published 
only three years before) with its lone official who rebels inwardly against the injustices of the 
totalitarian state, tries to opt out of die system and is destroyed, although Vonnegut’s dystopia
is not without its comic elements. Hie novel points to die theme of anti-machine, since die title 
reverses the notion of a person producing art via a machine (piano player) to a machine pro­
ducing programmed music (player piano) where the person is redundant (Tanner 182). It 
should be recalled, however, that aplayer-piano is an old-fashioned artifact, while new tech­
nology tends to make itself indispensable; at least, the novel will show that a modern society 
cannot do without what it has already adapted itself to so well. At the same time, it is sug­
gested that for all their convenience machines have their human price: people enjoy doing at 
least sonie routine: jobs that machines deprive them o£ depriving them in the process of part of 
their humanity.
Hie Ilium power-structure is a rationalized meritocracy (with the usual petty politicking 
among the less able) which rewards the managers. What is economically and occupationally 
relevant is all that is considered usefiil biographical information, recorded on IBM cards, 
including IQ, which is public knowledge. Hie criticism here seems to be against public sur­
veillance of private life and the rationalist disregard of impostant individual qualities that are 
not measurable. Hie paternalistic managers personally resemble present-day prosperous Re­
publicans, resentful of recipients of the welfare state: the working class has been given every­
thing so what more can they want? In contrast to the cynical members of the Inner Party in 
1984, Freud rather than Marx is invoked (Proteus resents his famous father), and these people 
are more “American,” i.e. shallow rather than cynical, in turn adolescent and machine-like. 
As post-war conservatives, their view is that die lower-classes ought to be more grateful for 
the public bounty and they tend to blame every sign of discontent on “radicals.” Proteus is in 
fact asked to infiltrate a subversive organization, known as die “Ghost Shirts” after a suicidal 
Indian resistance movement This is an anti-machine brotherhood run by intellectual drop­
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outs, Finnerty, an old friend and engineer, and the preacher Lasker, whom Proteus meets in a 
saloon that becomes the command post for die revolt of the proles (which never takes place in 
Orwell’s novel). As with the historical Luddites (1811-1816), an anti-machine organization 
of workers pledged to destroy machinery, a popular rising accompanied by nationwide sabo­
tage is plotted and executed. In the novel, the rebellion goes out of control (in case anyone 
dunks Vonnegut is advocating revolution) and the brotherhood destroys everything that any 
society needs to survive: bakeries, sewage disposal, etc. Like the Luddites, the brotherhood 
has not distinguished between good and bad technology.
Player Piano is very much of its time (early Fifties) in political implications. Proteus 
is asked to “cooperate” with die authorities, i.e. finger Finnerty and expose the subversive 
conspiracy. Although Proteus becomes die symbol of resistance as a (false) Messiah, he is 
really manipulated by the rebels. He is, therefore, used by both sides, “a typical American 
hero in wanting to find a place beyond all plots and systems, some private space...a house by 
the side of the road ofhistory and society” (Tanner 182). The common solution suggested by 
thelast phrase of this citation, the American penchant for aretum to the pastoral, is rejected.7 
Proteus buys his “house by the side of the road,” an old-fashioned farm, to live and work on 
after dropping out, but it turns out that he doesn’t know how to do manual labor and his wife 
merely wants to plunder die quaint old furniture for her new house full of die latest gadgets. 
Finnerty is a model bohemian drop-out, someone die system patemalistically tolerates if  only 
to affirm itself Lasker, a preacher (“trafficker in symbols”) wants merely to make a statement 
with a Ghost-Shirt suicide charge. Hie rebellion solves nothing, as Ilium society is seen as 
too corrupted by progress to adhere to revolution seriously. Hie leaders turn themselves in to 
the police and the people begin to rebuild the town and put the machines back together. If
Proteus’s fate seems to imply that history cannot be escaped, history as meaningful events 
does not really exist in the novel. It is merely static, or rather merely recurrent and repetitive 
events, much like the player-piano in die saloon, the mechanically programmed rhythms of 
life-in-Bium.
In his culminating Sixties’ novel, Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), which made Voimegut, 
like Heller and Kesey, something of a campus celebrity, the protagonist Billy Pilgrim travels 
in both time and space. Hiis device allows a mixture of fact and fiction, the combination of 
historical experience—die horrendous Allied fire-bombing of Dresden during the Second 
World War (which Vormegut tells us in the novel that he witnessed as aP.O.W.)—and science 
fiction (Billy is a human freak on Tralfamadore). Hie time-travel is evidently intended to 
juxtapose diverse human experiences and attitudes, World War n  and Vietnam, for example 
(which, however, cannot seriously be compared), or war-mongeriqg humans and peace-loving 
Tralfamadorians, i.e. an actual and an ideal humanity.
Juxtaposition of an accepted reality with an ideal standard is a traditional satirical de­
vice, but the effect here is that historical difference is dissolved; “a leveling of experience” 
occurs (Karl 340), with everything on a single plane of cosmic indifference. Since past and 
future are conflated to an eternal present, and Billy voyages instantaneously to different
worlds. Him» and place become essentially meaningless. What happens therefore tends to be 
seen as inevitable, and Billy ia resigned to a  totally deterministic view  of life. He can see all
but do nothing- “Among ail the things that Billy Pilgrim could not change were the past, the
present, and die future” (56). Unable to effect change, he beoomes passive, sees the world, as 
it were, aesthetically rather than historically cranner 198). The novel's refrain. "So it goes."
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sums up the prevailing attitude, an expression of resignation, and Traiiamadore becomes an 
escape to Eden.
Can Billy’s lifelong effort to concentrate on the “good moments” and the Tralfamador- 
ian plea for a guilt-free existence be so easily juxtaposed with the horror of die Dresden 
bombing, which Vonnegut makes resonate, but which must under die circumstances be trivial­
ized? Vonnegut’s time-travel has die effect of conflating different events and meanings that, in 
Karl’s nice image, “turns human behavior and history into molasses” (347). Either historical 
experience is avoided or moral paralysis sets in at the contemplation of such horrors, a di­
lemma that is not evaded by those contemporary writers, like Primo Levi, who attempt to 
come to terms with the Holocaust Vonnegut’s protagonists (in contrast to Burroughs’s cut-out 
characters) are given the illusion of human depth but find themselves unable to break free of 
their consciences or necessary illusions. Like Heller’s characters, diey are more wary or 
traumatized observers, survivors, than adversaries to the oppressive forces of contemporary 
life.
NOTES
1 Hie novel was originally published as The Naked Lunch, in Paris, 1959. Burroughs himself 
confirms die story that the three following novels were all parts of an original manuscript that 
he was producing in pieces and sending to his Paris publisher, Maurice Girodias, of the 
Olympic Press. Instead of rearranging the proofs as they were returned from printers, Bur­
roughs and two friends simply decided to leave (hem in the fortuitous order they took on, an 
order which reinforces the atemporality of the novels and looks forward to further experimen­
tation with atemporal and random organization by Burroughs and other writers (Ruas,
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“William Burroughs” 134; Burkholder 72). Given this arrangement, one might justifiably take, 
as I mostly do here, the four novels as a single text
2 Feeding metaphors are appropriate, Tony Tanner says, since the text is about the various 
ways human identity is “devoured” in modern society (Tanner 115). Defecation is organically 
die opposite of eating and mouth and anus are confused in at least one of die more memorable 
episodes. “Shif’ is also an all-encompassing metaphor for Burroughs’ vision of modern soci­
ety, as, it will be recalled, it is for Mailer. Ejaculations are frequent and uncontrolled, ma­
chine-like, in keeping with Burroughs' insistence on die individual's loss of control over self 
and desire (Buiidiolder 72.
3 First published in Evergreen Review (1960) as “Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sick­
ness,” the Introduction actually forms part of the text ofNaked Lunch, the author’s discursive, 
“scientific” analysis of additioa It functions, together with die “Afterword,” as a framing de­
vice in which a pseudo-explanation of die journalistic type is offered as counterpoint to the 
“madness” of the main text
4 It is somewhat astonishing to learn that Burroughs attempted in the mid-1930s to get into die 
OSS, forerunner of the CIA (he was rejected for having cut off a finger joint). He was, how­
ever, in his early twenties at this time (b.1914), a decade before he would begin writing, so 
this move might be put down to youthful romantic notions ofbeing a spy-later he worked for 
a time as a private detective and is said to admire the popular spy novels of Frederick For­
sythe. In any case, he was unsuited to disciplined organizations, being discharged from the 
Army (1942) for psychological reasons.
5 Curiously enough, it was die testimony of Ginsberg, poet of the apolitical Beats, and not that 
of Mailer, both of whom testified on Burroughs’ behalf duriug the novel’s long trial for ob­
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scenity, who called attention to the importance of power as control in die novel. See Gins­
berg’s testimony in ‘‘Excerpts from the Boston Trial” (i.e. the trial preceding the 1966 Massa- 
chusettes Supreme Court obscenity trial, at which die novel was eventually ruled not ob­
scene), printed as a foreword to Naked Lunch xix-xxxiv.
6 Hie allusion may be to Stephen Daedalus’s “silence and cunning.” Ihab Hassan (“Literature 
of Silence” 74-82) has interpreted silence as aform of literary expression. According to 
Connor (109), Hassan sees modernist literature as enacting a “conmplex silence” encompass­
ing a number of meanings “from refusal to subversion.”
7 Karl (246) thinks die contrary: that the novel argues lor a  return to an agrarian past, but the 
farm is abandoned as a solution and the end of the novel shows that there can be no going 
back.
CHAPTER 6
SYSTEMS, CONSPIRACIES, AND THE ROMANTIC QUEST: JOHN BARTH 
“Reality is a nice place to visit, but you wouldn’t like to live there.” (Barth)
a
John Barth, the self-declared postmodernist, after two Fifties novels in the existentialist 
mode, made a radical departure with The Sot-Weed Factor (1960) and subsequent works in 
which he often combines political themes and a full range of ludic narrative strategies. In this 
chapter, however, I shall attempt to show that this contemporary master of complex fictions 
(and, it should be noted, a  college professor), has not really gone beyond die post-war liberal 
solutions to social conflict, has, in a sense, psychologized, even romanticized, the political.
At the same time, Barth has added to our understanding of die power mechanisms of American 
life in the Fifties and Sixties. It may be said that the conflicting notions of freedom and con­
trol that Tanner discusses in die quotation I cited in the Introduction to Part Three are inter­
twined themes of Barth’s fiction. For example, both die need for and illusions of individual 
freedom, and the pervasive but illusive presence of contemporary power are what determine 
die intracacies of plot in Barth’s pseudo-colonial novel, The Sot-Weed Factor. In this 
chronicle of die adventures of one Ebenezer Cooke, self-proclaimed poet-laureate of Mary­
land, Barth’s home state, begin the multiple fictions and play with history that would become 
staple fere in die postmodernist American fictions of die next two decades.
Cooke is a character from a local historical chronicle who becomes a character in 
Barth’s (pseudo-) historical novel that is also a parody of 18th century English novels, com­
plete with descriptive chapter headings, picaresque episodes, convoluted plot, period lan­
guage, unsuspected connections, amazing coincidences and surprise revelations. Hie search
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for the father and the protagonist’s obsession with chastity recall Fielding’s Tom Jones and 
Joseph Andrews,\ other classic authors drawn upon, wife a certain license, are Rabelais, 
Chaucer, Boccaccio, Cervantes, Defoe, Voltaire, perhaps others. These multiplying intertex- 
tual fictions tend to question fee objectivity of history. For example, fee main joke (admittedly 
sophomoric)--fee pornographic farce of fee impenetrable maidenhead and fee ruse of fee 
“sacred eggplant”--is grafted onto fee mythico-historical story of John Smith and Pocahontas, 
a version of history feat is already popular legend In fee novel, fee story is based on fee pri­
vate journal of Sir Henry Burlingame, which is itself an invented imitation of colonial jour­
nals like fee diaries of (fee historical) John Smith, which in turn were themselves supposedly 
based on actual experiences but are thought by historians to be full of autobiographical inven­
tion. Hie novel’s connection wife history is, to say fee least, highly oblique.
Barth himself called his novel a “moral allegory.” It shares wife Warren’s >1// the 
King's Men fee classic American theme of an innocence feat has evil consequences (“the true 
original sin,” according to Barth) via a story of state politics, although fee Louisiana of War­
ren’s novel (cf Chapter 2d) does not share fee proliferating fictions of Barth’s Maryland, 
wife its constant disguise and deceit, role-playing and counterfeit, false identity and rumor. 
These can themselves be perceived as forms of socio-political fictions. Frederick Karl (466) 
sees allegorical parallels precisely at this point, in fee “counterfeit politics” of fee Fifties. 
Maryland in colonial times becomes post-war Washington, and Cooke’s journey from inno­
cence to experience parallels fee nation’s own historical journey from a deluded post-war 
optimism to fee new realities of McCarfeyism and fee Cold War.
Hie issue of fee counterfeit is suggested in fee novel by fee absence or disguise of fee 
most powerful figures. For example, Cooke supposedly receives his poetic “commission”
from Lord Baltimore, who turns out, like so many other characters, to be Henry Burlingame 
ID, Cooke’s ubiquitous tutor, friend, and would-be lover. At more than one point, Cooke is 
not even sure whether the man is friend or enemy, assistant or betrayer. Burlingame himself 
claims to have never seen John Coode, the main political conspirator of the province, who 
also takes on a variety of bizarre disguises, and there is finally the question ofwhether Coode 
works for or against Baltimore or just for himself, and whether Captain Mitchell (who turns 
out to be Burlingame) works for Coode or for Coode’s adversaries. This confusing and con­
voluted game of who is who, who works for whom and what he is getting out of it, does re­
call, to take up Karl’s suggestion, the elaborate spy and counter-spy networks of the Fifties 
and the delirious imaginings of some of the period’s politicians, notably McCarthy and his 
congressional ally, Richard Nixoa The conspiracy in Ate novel, for example, may not even be 
a conspiracy at all, except as it exists in the understandably bewildered mind of Cooke, pre­
viewing Pynchon’s equally befuddled Oedipa Maas.
Recognitions and revelations occur only to lead to further mystifications. The master 
role-player Burlingame, for example, has an ambiguous role with respect to helping or hinder­
ing both Cooke’s own career and the history of die Maryland colony. At one point, he seems 
to be a patriot involved in an intrigue to save the colony, at another, he turns out to be die son 
and brother of Indians who are conspiring against i t  IQs racial and political ambiguity is 
reflected culturally and physically: he is both civilized and savage, sexually insatiable and 
anatomically dysfunctional, a multiple ambiguity recalling that of Mailer’s equally bizarre 
character, Chevy Fuertes, in Harlot’s Gkost. Tlie protagonist’s paranoia about disguised 
identities and doubts about his own role in Maryland’s political development gives way to a 
gradual understanding, a “process of recognitions,” whereby he comes to realize that his val-
ues, tested in experience, are counterfeit (Karl 469). This suggests that the complicated plots 
and colonial power-plays, despite their resonance with historical events of die Fifties, mainly 
have ihe role of developing Eben’s moral consciousness. This in turn recalls the denouement 
of Warren’s novel and the facile closures of die liberal consensus, but the climate of paranoia 
in relation to national political phenomena strikes an ominous new note to be taken up and 
sounded by other important novels in the Sixties and Seventies.
b.
Rather than projecting present into the past, Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy (1966) allegorizes 
the historical present It recalls die First Voyage of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels in die elabo­
ration of contemporary political parallels and the Fourth Voyage in the proposal of animals as 
amoral counterpart to the evil and duplicity of human beings. In contrast to Gulliver, who 
ends up renouncing humanity in the name of arace of rational horses, Giles begins life as a 
goat and becomes humanized by experience, all the while retaining his animal nature as a 
moral touchstone. Hie story unfolds on die vast campus ofNew Tammany College (=  the 
US), part of die University system, but this is a campus novel only in die allegorical sense that 
University = universe, with West Campus standing for the Western world, an over-extended 
(800 pages) academic conceit but not without relevance to the period.1 It was in the Sixties, 
as I have pointed out in die Introduction to Part Q, that radical students became aware of the 
complicity of the institution of the American university in the so-called “military-industrial 
complex” College students were being trained for technical and administrative positions in 
the corporations that manufactured napalm and guided missile systems, and undergraduates in 
land-grant colleges were required to undergo Reserve Officer military training on campus. 
Hie professors, far from living die popular myth of die “ivory tower,” engaged in weapons
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research and went on the payroll of the CIA, while university presidents and directors became 
chairmen of corporate boards and high-ranking government officials, sometimes, like Robert 
McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War, all three. If the professors did not 
avoid political involvement, they did avoid political responsibilty. As Christopher Lasch 
explains: “Hie freedom of American intellectuals as a professional class blinds them to their 
un-freedom...Their freedom from overt political controL.blinds them to the way in which fee 
‘knowledge industry’ has been incorporated into fee state and fee military-industrial complex” 
(98). Knowledge, as Foucault has endeavored to show, does not develop in apolitical 
vaccuum and is not politically neutral.
In fee allegory, Giles is working on “The Revised New Syllabus” (fee novel’s alternate 
title), which suggests what Barth himself called “a souped-up Bible,” as well as illustrative 
autobiography and program for future study. Entities and events of contemporary history tend 
to have their fictional counterparts. Hence, Campus Riots One and Two are fee First and 
Second World Wars, fee perennial enemy East Campus is fee Soviet Union and satellite 
states, and so forth. The tragic and comic are often indistinguishable, however, and history is 
rearranged and conflated on occasion, so feat, for example, figures from fee Bible and Greek 
history and literature are invoked amid references to fee Holocaust and fee Cold War. The 
novel is therefore connected wife historical events in a  particularized but often non- 
chronological way, owing to its mixture of historical, mythical, and philosophical dimensions 
(Scholes 86).
New Tammany College, for example, evidently gets its name from Tammany Hall, fee 
New York City Democratic political machine, which began as a force working for fee com­
mon people, became increasingly controlled by the privileged classes, and ended up as a cor-
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nipt instrument of the city’s political bosses, finally passing out of existence in 1966, the year 
Barth’s novel was published The college follows a similar course in its own history, with 
sinister elements gradually gaining control and power-grabs distracting from the college’s 
primary purpose of “passing^’ or “graduating” students. Tammany, then, may be die promise 
and the betrayal of die US political system, or even any large, unwieldy organization where 
die lust and competition for power perverts original ideals and where an entrenched bureauc­
racy begins to exist for itself alone.
In similarly inexact correspondences, contemporary historical figures are paralleled. 
Unis, Max Spielman, Giles’ mentor and the developer of die huge WESCAC computer, was 
persuaded to push the button to release the EAT waves that brought on mass destructioa Max 
thus recalls J. Robert Oppenheimer, leader of the Manhattan Project, which developed the 
atomic bomb. Like Oppenheimer, who lost his security clearance in the late Forties for al­
leged Communist sympathies, Max loses his job when his loyalty is questioned for being a 
sympathizer of the Student-Unionists (Communists). Yet, in character, Max, an old Jewish 
humanist, resembles die amiable genius Einstein or Saul Bellow’s Mr. Sammler much more 
than the notoriously “difficult” Oppenheimer. Dwight and Milton Eisenhower, Alger Hiss, J. 
Edgar Hoover, and John Kennedy, perhaps others, make similar “appearances.” Although the 
historical elaborations are more fully worked out, die ultimate effect of this hodge-podge, I 
would argue, is die reduction of history to molasses, similar to Vonnegut’s reductions in 
Slaughterhouse-Five.
WESCAC, or West Campus Automatic Computer, is a rather more complex image or 
symbol of a number of ideas, although it does not fit neatly into die allegorical scheme. While 
it seems to be Barth’s fictional means of examining his satirical and philosophical concerns, it
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also serves as an image of contemporary power, a “power-knowledge” that both produces and 
dominates. Its immediate productive function is as the metafictional narrative “source” of the 
novel itself The computer is said to have edited and printed out die memoirs of George 
Giles, which were also edited by a writer named J.B. (who resembles John Barth) and his 
publishers, who add a Swiftean “disclaimer” of their own, a device in which Barth ingen­
iously anticipates criticism by incorporating it into his novel as a preface.
These complex framing devices illustrate the author’s judgment of his own work as that 
of someone whose ‘‘talent has to make simple things complicated” (Casciato 30). More than a 
perverse love of complexity for its own sake, these fictional convolutions are part of Barth’s 
declared project of casting doubt on common-sense reality and its deification in realist fiction. 
For Barth, realism is a “kind of true representation of a representation of life” (Casciato 26). 
The proliferation of fictions in Giles, which will become obsessive in later works, is to un­
dermine the delusion of mirror-like representations, associated in the novel with Dr. Eierkopf 
(eye-head). This novel, like Sot-Weed, is concerned with self-deception and counterfeit and 
the corresponding aspiration toward what Barth apparently conceives as real knowledge, so 
that simple explanations are constantly resisted through artifices of paradox, hyperbole, ferce, 
puns, serio-comic sub-plots, etc. hi Barth’s work, “the illusion of a single coherent model of 
reality being erected is constantly negated” (Tanner 247) and, it would seem, die aspiration 
for a definitive knowledge, knowledge of the “truth,” cannot therefore be completely realized.
S'Giles is the humanist center of these epistemological questions, WESCAC is the cen­
ter of its system of power, a “machine” that goes beyond die attributes of machinery even in an 
early description, where it existed from the early West Campus as a kind of spirit of technol­
ogy or material progress, though closer to an animal organism than a spiritual being:
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It was put at first to the simplest tasks: doing sums and verifying certain types 
of answers. Thereafter, as studentdom’s confidence in it grew, so also did its 
size, complexity, and power, it underwent as series of metamorphoses, like an 
insect or growing fetus, demanding ever more nourishment and exerting more 
influence, until in the years just prior to my own birth it cut the last cords to its 
progenitors and commenced a life of its own. It was not clear to me whether a 
number of little creatures had emerged into one, for example, or 
whether...WESCAC one day had outgrown its docility, kicked over fee traces, 
and turned on its keepers. Nothing about fee beast seemed unambiguous...The 
whole ofNew Tammany College, I took it, if not fee entire campus, had 
gradually come under WESCAC’s hegemony, voluntarily or otherwise.... (86)
While much of this passage seems to be describing a Frankenstein’s monster, fee mention of 
“hegemony” and “ambiguity” and involuntaiy submission in fee latter part suggests more con­
temporary modes of power, fee impersonal bureaucracy of institutions and fee normalizing 
functions of fee modern state in which visible leaders are no longer important The control 
implied in its calculations is feat of fee (zero-one) binary system, which for Baudrillard is 
purely structural (fee opposite signs are only functional and reversible), a concept feat will 
also be important for Pynchoa
Ten pages later (96), WESCAC begins to resemble a modern computer, wife programs, 
binary functions, and so forth. One might draw a parallel of WESCAC’s development wife fee 
history of fee earliest automatic controlled computers, fee Mark I, from fee beginning of fee 
Second World War, to fee ENIAC (completed in 1946) and UNIVAC, or Universal Automatic 
Computer, which became (1951) fee first machine to handle numerical and alphabetical data 
wife equal facility. These “first-generation” machines were replaced by fee transistorized 
computers of fee late 1950s and early 1960s, which in turn yielded to the integrated circuit 
models of fee mid-1960s and early 1970s (“Computers” 188). Barth’s novel, then, speared 
at fee beginning of fee third generation of computers and its plot spans fee period of fee first 
two generations, which produced fee gigantic hardware suggested by WESCAC. At this pe­
riod, the beginning of what can now be seen to be the computer revolution, computers were by 
no means taken for granted to die extent that they are today. Wild speculations and fears about 
the possibilities of “thinking-machines” taking over human destiny were rampant in science- 
fiction, popular legend, and even ordinary news. The exaggerations of WESCAC, therefore, 
have an historical basis in this experience.
WESCAC’s ambiguity owes to its being both source and devourer of information. It thus 
suggests positive and productive power as well as instrumental domination: teaching faculty 
and administrative policy-maker on Campus, but also anew kind of sinister military weapon 
whose EAT-waves (EAT = Electroencephalic Amplification and Transmission) suggest Bur­
roughs’s horrific political parties, and, historically, the radioactive fallout scare (rational 
enough in a time of intense atomic testing) that was much in die news in the Fifties. West 
Campus has won the Second Campus Riot, but the waves have caused “mental burn-out” of 
thousands of Americans, victims of the computer’s version of nuclear fallout WESCAC is 
therefore partly beneficial, partly destructive, but potentially all-powerful, with a power- 
knowledge that tends toward ever new sites of human control. It is suggests both Foucaulfian 
and older forms of centralized power. It is a product and a creator of new technologies, and, 
as physical object, both centrally located and so accessible to Giles’s reprogramming, and yet 
amorphous in its ever-multiplying functions that threaten to evade rather than contend with and 
resist external control.
As suggestive as the “character” WESCAC is, however, it takes up only a small part of 
the vast landscape of the novel, in which Giles’s quest takes thematic precedence. Allegori­
cal and mythical elements become mixed in Giles’s personal story, as he turns out to be 
WESCAC’s son, got upon a virgin via a program for impregnation that would produce a
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“Grand Tutor,” with the name-acronym GILES (Grand-Tutorial Ideal Laboratory Specimen). 
Past and future are conflated, with the planned eugenics suggesting the Nazis, who keep turn­
ing up, and die computer as father of amessiah, suggesting the god-like status and powers the 
computer will assume in the near future. As Grand Tutor, Giles is die only one who can 
change the AIM (Automatic Implantation Mechanism) of WESCAC, analagous to a human 
will. If  successful, he will save West Campus from self-destruction that would result from 
the computer’s proliferating power by defusing the Quiet Riot (Cold War) as the principle 
agent of East-West détente. And yet, overall, this admirable political aim is secondary to die 
novel’s preoccupation with “passing” or “commencement,” a vaguely spiritual goal the hu­
man race is aspiring to which sounds suspiciously like a secular version of Christian salva­
tion.
Hie parallels of apolitical allegory therefore in first instance turn into socio-historical 
ones. Giles’s personal development from goat to man in such a reading may be meant to stand 
for a pastoral or rural way of life and its replacement by an urban society (Karl 287). Like­
wise, die bildungsroman of an innocent youth’s coming of age through bitter experience 
would become die myth of America itself  ^along with die moral warning of die dangers of self- 
deception and false innocence (present as well in Sot-Weed). But the insistence throughout 
the novel on the problem of individual identity (Giles’s LD. card, with its blankness and con­
fusion of names, the False Grand-Tutor, etc.) underlines the meaning of Giles’s transformation 
as an essentially spirituaiyhumanist one. Hie computer, at this level, is die symbol of the con­
temporary obsession with sel£ Christopher Lasch’s “culture of narcissism” Hie ultimate in 
narcissistic experience, WESCAC creates and completes cycles without outside interference 
(Karl 285). In allegorizing his tale, Barth seems to have avoided the “pychologizmg” of so­
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cial history that radical critics like Schaub noted in Mailer and other Fifties’ novelists, since, 
in the allegory, fantasy elements “stand for” but, crucially, do not replace historical events. 
And yet, Barth does not avoid what is perhaps the major flaw in his project, since Giles’s 
progress from goat-boy to “graduate” can be read as a reconciliation of the simple virtues of 
pastoralism with the inevitability oftechnologism, a mistake that even the often sentimental 
Voimegut doesn’t make. If unlike Mailer, Barth has been attracted to but has not wholly suc­
cumbed to a neo-romantic nostalgia for a pristine (but bawdy) American experience that can 
no longer be reclaimed, he apparently thinks that these old-fashioned virtues still have a cer­
tain vitality and viability in a technologized world.
Myth, philosophy, and history coincide once again in Giles’s climactic descent into the 
belly of WESCAC to transform its AIM. Mythically corresponding to the hero’s descent into 
the underworld, which is classically undertaken for social and spiritual transformation, Giles’ 
triple descent is evidently meant to be a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of his spiritual goal, 
which also has ideological meaning and consequence. First, he comes to a position of a clear 
distinction between “pass” and “fail,” which is, ideologically, the conservative belief in the 
necessity of fundamental and clear-cut distinctions—and an example of binary structural con­
trol. This results in disastrous consequences in the (Cold War) boundary dispute between 
East and West Campuses. Second, his formulation “failure is passage” is die countercul- 
turai’s radical, but equally mistaken, belief in complete negation, or the destruction of all dis­
tinctions, which leads to intellectual arbitrariness and political anarchy, what one might call 
“Vonnegut’s solution.” Third, there is what is apparently (and disappointingly) meant as 
Giles’s attainment of wisdom, in which passage and failure are distinct but interdependent 
(Scholes 84; Tanner 250-1). This solution smacks of a dubious liberal mix of (Emersonian)
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individual self-reliance and (hippy) social interdependence, or Barth’s admirable but mis­
guided attempt to reconcile American past and present spiritual heritages. It is to die point 
that the climactic fulfillment of the spiritual and political task of Giles’s life, the transforming 
of AIM, is accomplished through his sexual union with Anastasia in the belly ofWESCAC, 
which results in fertility and spiritual renewal, or, once more, a (sexual) romanticizing of die 
political. Giles is once referred to as “Enos Enoch [Jesus Christ] with balls,” a spiritual sav­
ior who will restore sexuality to its rightful place. For one thing, the issues that the novel 
raises are too grand for such simplistic spiritual solutions as the healing powers of the Six­
ties’ sexual revolution (Karl 288-9). That sex takes place within, is contained by, a computer 
would make it part of hegemonic control as well, not a supposedly natural alternative. What 
Foucault calls the “Victorian hypothesis,” by which we falsely believe that when we say yes 
to sex we say no to power is mistaken (Foucault Hist.ofSex. 57) Sex has already been in­
corporated into the orders of our knowledge (cf Chapt Id).
In his quest, Giles must come to terms with his origins and purpose in life, which links 
this novel to Barth’s “existential” novels, The Floating Opera (1956), and The End o f the 
Road (1958). He must also manage, accept, support, defuse, or negate die competing versions 
of power of his associates which aid, oppose, or somehow compromise his own. For die 
rationalist-humanist Max Spielman, heroes are needed but not especially to be revered, hero- 
hood, like red hair or a humped back, being a genetic trait rather than a divine calling, a 
needed antidote to Nazi deification of heroes. On the other hand, Max believes, despite the 
historical events that would suggest the contrary, in the powers of WESCAC, its capacity for 
expansion into beneficial effects, and, since he was responsible for its original programming, 
the effectiveness of its defense mechanisms. He might therefore be seen to represent what
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Mailer denounced in Armies o f the Night: the liberal professional in love with technology- 
land, deluded in his rationality, and historically blind.
Max’s one-time colleague, Dr. Eierkopf is, however, even worse. A eunuch-like scien­
tist, helpless without the brutish black servant Croaker (a racist stereotype of inarticulate 
mind, sexually uncontrolled and strong body) represents mind served by body. Either is lost 
without the other, as is pure spirit, in the form of the Oriental mystic, The Living Sakhyan, 
who remains mute and motionless throughout Eierkopf defends “disengaged” intelligence, the 
false neutrality of positivist science, or knowledge without power. He therefore cares nothing 
for whom he works, having served the Siegfrieders (Germans) before West Campus and is the 
foil to Jewish humanist Max. Power resides for him in die laboratory, since for him knowl­
edge is apolitical.
Other characters embody social and literary types as well as political action, or lack of 
it, in various forms. Leonid Andreich, a defector from East Campus, is a Dostoevskian carica­
ture who fails in his political mission from sentimentalism. Peter Green is a WASP stereo­
type of entrepreneurial wealth—patriotic yet politically naive, self-deluded but optimistic— 
complete with neurotic marriage, phony liberalism, racist paternalism, anti-intellectualism, 
“I’m OK” personal philosophy, cliche-ridden speech, and connections with environmentally 
polluting industries: a  composite, it would seem, of most of die negative strains in the con­
temporary American character. For Stoker, power is power in die literal sense of electricity, 
energy, die lifeblood of technology. A sooty Vulcanic figure, dressed in black and leader of a 
rough pack, Stoker recalls (the stoker) Yank, in Eugene O’Neill’s The Hairy Ape (1922), the 
motive dynamic force of modem times and proud of it Like Yank, Stoker thumps his chest 
and points to the infernal scene of the fumace-room: “Here’s where your power is!” (220).
Finally, Chancellor Rexford embodies both charismatic and organizational power. His boy­
ish looks, persuasive rhetoric, and dangerous policies recall John Kennedy, hi his speech 
initiating the semester, he rejects Giles’s aim to change AIM, and upholds the East-West 
standoff, reproducing die Cold War arguments for nuclear deterrence. In the Boundary Dis­
pute, Rexford shows his credentials as cold warrior, for die secret diplomacy essential to 
intercollege business needs a  convenient front like the Dispute, a policy that shakes Giles with 
its cynicism
Counterfeit and disguise may once again allude to political schemes and values, but in 
this novel they are more directly related to perception, the confusion of illusion and reality. In 
Giles, there is the magician, masker, inq>ostor, return ofNorthrop Frye’s alazon figure, Har­
old Bray, the false Grand Tutor who achieves the power of notoriety through the shifting fake 
identities and false promises of die trickster, a  figure familiar in American public life as 
small-time politician or commercial huckster, but who in literature goes back to Melville and 
Twain with an immediate predecessor in Barth’s own Henry Burlingame. The difficulty of 
perception is also suggested by the motifs of blindness, eyelessness, lenses and mirrors. Sim­
ply looking, as Eierkopf does, is an inadequate substitute for action, and the transformation of 
WESCAC, it will be recalled, can only be realized in a sexual act in which Giles comes to 
“know” Anastasia (Scholes 79). Hie importance and difficulty of accurately seeing is ex­
amined in the long parody of Oedipus Rex, ‘Taliped Decanus” (312-54), midway through the 
novel. Oedipus is the Western symbol of die dangers of cognition, as he begins to “see” only 
after he becomes literally blind. ‘Taliped,” though a parodic tour deforce, trivializes 
Sophocles’ tragic figure, which Tanner explains as Barth’s sense of the contemporary loss of 
the value of fictions, that they may be significantly related to real experience 252-53). This is
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a point the author will take up both in his well-known essay, ‘The Literature ofExhaustion” 
(1967), on the impossibility of reflecting life in letters, and the essay’s “fictional comple­
ment,” the ahistorical, metafictional gimmickry o f Lost in the Funhouse{\96%) (Hite 711; 
Barth, “Lit ofExhaustion”). These works do not claim a loss of literature to relate to reality 
so much as the ability of a realist literature to do so. He would undoubtedly point out that 
Oedipus, while a cultural touchstone, is himself a fiction.
In the context of agents of power, Giles Goat-Boy is particularly relevant for its vision 
of WESCAC, Barth’s quite early perception of the powerful role computers were to play in 
contemporary society, of a centralized power that is also diffuse, the fusion of power and 
knowledge in both producing subjects and reducing them to submission, and of die increasing 
role of machines and information in a society where the humans remain politically passive.
For these purposes, his rather overblown allegory is an effective vehicle, but this historical 
perspective is the most superficial in the novel’s own terms. The historical parallels are 
elaborate but tend to be conflated, losing any contextual significance, and suggesting that his­
tory itself is nothing more than an elaborate game. Giles’s personal struggle within his soci­
ety, which seems to be the essential point, might actually have better been realized in a realis­
tic fiction (where such conflicts find their classic form), especially if Barth’s artistic aim is, 
as he says it is, “to speak eloquently and memorably to our still-human hearts and conditions” 
(qtd. by Boyers 730). It may singly be the case, of course, that Barth’s humanist ideal runs 
contrary to his literary practice. Or, as Robert Scholes says (110-12), the fiction of 
“fabulation,” of which he takes Giles to be a supreme example, arises from a conflict between 
mythical and philosophical perspectives, that is, whether man is to be resigned to his fate or, 
as Giles does, to actively create one, an essentially Romantic project If this is the case, Barth
has attempted to reconcile the existentialist resignations of Jakob Horner and Todd Andrews, 
the protagonists of his Fifties’ novels, with the possibilities of political action in Giles’s 
changing both himself and his society.
One version of Barth’s political vision is the “counterpulling of individual against what 
weighs him down,” including history and systems (Karl 465). Burlingame, in Sot-Weed, re­
sists systems and conspiracies by disguise, reshaping himself by taking on false identities. 
Giles, too, must undertake an Oedipal liberation from a father (WESCAC) that is a kind of 
supreme system He functions by shifting between human and animal identities. The Barthian 
protagonist therefore does not so much resist the power of systems and imposed roles by 
counterpull (as in Karl’s image), as by a transformation of self, by slipping in and out of a 
convenient identity. Resisting a fixed role in society is a traditional project for the lone male 
in die American novel, one which in contemporary fiction can be seen from Mailer’s Rojack 
to Pynchon’s Profane or Slothrop to DeLillo’s Oswald. It is related to a fear of restricted 
freedom and the paranoia of being caught in someone else’a plot that this chapter began with.
It is as if systems are so powerful in the US, technology so all-encompassing, and politics so 
ineffective, that the individual is trapped not only in his impotence to make die connections to 
effect change but to escape being obliterated as a self
c.
In Norman Mailer’s impressively long list of background readings on the CIA he prints 
at the end of Harlot's Ghost, Barth’s Sabbatical (1982), which preceded it by a decade, is 
not included but might well have beea In both novels, there is a central, unsolved mystery of a 
high-echelon CIA officer who has gone independent in certain covert operations and whose 
body (if it is his) ends up in die sea Mailer’s novel, more richly furnished with historical
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detail, could have been entitled “Inside the Company.” TTiis was in fact the title of one of the 
more important non-fictional exposes of CIA covert operations by ex-officers like Philip 
Agee and Victor Marchetti (both of whom are cited by Mailer and Barth), which appeared in 
the mid-1970s and which helped both to bring on official investigations of the Agency feat 
brought its public reputation to an all-time low.
Like Agee and Marchetti, Barth’s protagonist, Fenwick Turner (“Fenn”), is an ex­
officer who repents and blows fee Company’s cover wife a book: KUDOV, code name for 
Clandestine Services Division (historically, “Covert Operations”). Although KUDOV is an 
insider’s version, Sabbatical is an outsider’s. The CIA as a regrettable part of Ferm’s past is 
perceived as apolitical and moral evil. Its escapades keep intruding on but manage to be kept 
at fee margins of fee ongoing love stoiy of Fenn and Susan and their sabbatical sailing cruise.
It is kept so, at least, until it almost, but not quite, threatens to overwhelm fee present wife past 
events and their consequences in a complex network of family relations, to Harlot, by con­
trast, life and education in fee Company is an continuing affair and is shown rather than com­
mented on in fee interlocking relations of private life and public power.
Hie main Harlot-like character in Sabbatical is Ferm’s twin brother, Manfred 
(“Count”), a senior officer of KUDOV, who has been missing at sea (from Fenn’s boat), for 
some time. Count was. a  specialist in Soviet counter-intelligence, fee hot-spot in Cold War 
years, but ran counter-intelligence operations in a number of theaters, including Latin America 
(Fenn has witnessed his expert interrogation of an alleged right-wing Chilean at a local CIA 
safe-house). Li this novel of doppelgangers, Fenn is fee liberal vmtzr-manqui, who has been 
recruited by his more worldly brother. Several sinister developments take place or have 
taken place around his person that serve to thicken the plot of this “near” epy thriller. A nu-
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Fenn’s ex-wife Marilyn Marsh has herself become, in the seven-year interval of Feim’s mar­
riage to Susan, a CIA officer of some standing. This is a family romance with a difference.
The mystery deepens when Ferm and Susan hole up during a storm in a bay that turns out 
not be on their charts and in which they witness mysterious sights and sounds that may indicate 
a CIA site. The meaning of the episode and the links with Count, Paisley, and the Russian 
defector seem about to be revealed when Fenn meets with his friend and former CIA mentor, 
Dugold Taylor, and yet their talk only leads to further complexities. Speculation on Count’s 
disappearance takes the form of: a) he was the mole and was kidnapped or killed by die KGB 
(Dugold denies this), b) like Paisley, he was “deep-sixed” by unknown parties, c) he commit­
ted suicide, leaving no trace, to which Fenn later adds, d) as a careless sailor, he was acci­
dentally drowned. Conflicting details do not rule out any of the alternatives. At this point, 
Dugold pitches Fenn to be a double-agent The Company would forgive Fenn for his book, and 
he would have, as CIA’s most public critic, the perfect cover. TTiere is a suggestion of coer­
cion in the possibility, to Fenn’s horror, of Orrin being recruited. The possibility is held out, 
too, of Fenn’s learning whether or not Gus is alive, since his disappearance is also a matter of 
speculatioa He may have been: a) killed by DINA, the Chilean secret police, b) being held 
incommunicado in an off-shore prison in exchange for Carmen’s information on Fenn, c) being 
held in exchange for Orrin’s research work, to which Fenn later adds, d) rescued from prison 
by Count (not dead after all) and then both of them drowned in the icy ocean waters while 
trying to escape.
Tliese multiplying intricacies are engaging to the reader but are not to be unwound.
When Dugold suddenly dies of a heart attack, yet another mystery arises (was it of natural 
causes, or induced? since he told Fenn of CIA research into a new drug that brings on medi-
cally unsuspicious heart seizures). At the funeral, in CIA headquarters (Fenn fears he is being 
kidnapped), he is pitched again, this time by his ex-wife, and indignantly refuses. At this 
point, one is left with the following mysteries: What really happened to Count? What really 
happened to Paisley? What connection is there, if  any, between them? Was Dugold mur­
dered, and if  so, how was he connected to either of the above? What really happened to Gus? 
And, most intriguingly, since this is apparently aspy-story, who really is the deep mole?
None of these questions turn out to have answers, nor does it seem to bother the intrusive nar­
rator, concerned with Barth’s somewhat tiresome metafictional preoccupation with getting the 
story told, that they do not
This dénouement, or lack of it, in turn suggests alternate possibilities, which are not 
mutually exclusive. Has Barth simply written apseudo-spy novel wife the joke, as it were, on 
the reader? This is likely, especially if  one takes as analogies Sot-Weed as a pseudo- 
historical novel and Giles a pseudo-campus novel. On the other hand, the novel’s demonstra­
tion of the pervasiveness of CIA penetration into private life and the resulting paranoia point 
to the ominous systems ofPynchon, as well as Mailer’s more well-documented text on CIA 
penetration into both public and private. Hie lack of resolution of what may be a major con­
spiracy concerning national security also suggests a fictional parallel to modem American 
history’s great unsolved mystery, the Kennedy assassination, a story also full of loose ends 
and irresolvable contradictions, which will later engage both DeLillo and Mailer. Finally, 
more in line with Barth’s previous work, and connected with the first possibility, is that Barth 
in his refusal to turn out another example of an “exhausted” fictional genre, has produced a 
postmodernist text, with refusal of closure, embedded narratives, ambiguous narrative voice, 
the characters’ occasional comment on plot and technique, factual/fictional “footnotes,” etc.
In this case, Sabbatical is not at all the departure it seems to be from the more playful texts of 
Lost in the Funhouse (1968) and Letters (1979) which preceded it, but is—rather than the 
political statement its subject would suggest— yet another novel about making fictions (Karl 
486). In this perspective, one might say that Barth has returned to narrative, even a traditional 
one, but with the postmodernist difference: a simultaneous attempt to insert an historical nar­
rative (CIA in recent history) into the gaps of his “romance” in order to subvert the spy-genre, 
and to use the spy-genre to threaten to swallow but be (ironically) contained by the romance 
genre.
Taking the clue from the title, which suggests rest and renewal, and die sub-title (“A 
Romance”), however, what is after all essential in this novel is Fenn and Susan wending their 
way through paradisiacal waters, their voyage “a mythical search for Edenic renewal” (Karl 
486). That is, in the end, all that is offered, since the multiple questions are simply dropped, 
and Fenn and Susan literally sail off at the end to “a world elsewhere,” to adapt Poirier’s 
phrase, satisfied that there are no answers and engrossed in their own future. Hie cruise, 
which apparently served only as the narrative frame, and the life prospects of the main charac­
ters (Susan’s status as mother after an aborted pregnancy and her unresolved academic career, 
Fenn’s heart condition), which were about to be rendered prosaic by die proliferating com­
plexities of the spy tale, remain after all firmly in place, life goes on, etc.
TTie novel is not really concerned with recent history since the centrality of die romance 
is played out against what turns out to be a mere background of historical plots. With respect 
to power, for example, is die novel merely concerned with the liberal notion of showing how 
and to what extent the power of a government organization is abused in its unanswerabililty to 
its reputed authority, and how and to what extent it impinges on the private lives of individual
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people? The emphasis on the family network and their collectively sad but hopeful story 
would point to this, but it would also indicate yet another romanticized solution to fee pub­
lic/private dilemma of American life. The unexplained mystery at the end of Harlot’s Ghost 
merely confirms what the novel has been showing all along, but in Sabbatical there is no final 
resonance. The missing persons remain missing, although the family network remains intact, 
and Fenn and Susan simply get on with their romantic escape. The novel is a good example of 
the terms of the quotation with which Part HI (Introduction) began: Tanner’s notion of the 
contemporary novel’s paradoxical dream of both unfettered freedom and dread of invisible 
plots of conditioning and control. The dream will all but disappear in the novels of Thomas 
Pynchon
NOTES
1 In another sense, Robert Boyers (730) argues that both Sot-Weed and Giles are 
“quintessential university novels,” written for people for whom books are central to experi­
ence and language is definitive of what matters, a positive judgment feat ties in wife fee fre­
quent criticism of Barth as a  merely “academic” novelist
2 Prof Sergio Bellei has pointed out to me this notion of Baudrillard’s and the pervasiveness 
of binary structures throughout fee novel.
CHAPTER 7
SYSTEM, CONSPIRACY, PARANOIA: THOMAS PYNCHON
“We have to look for power sources..and distribution networks we were never taught”
(Gravity’s Rainbow)
Criticism has duly noted and discussed the importance of the concept of entropy in the 
fiction ofThomas Pynchon, and the author himself called attention to it in an early story of that 
name, hi physics, entropy is the gradual leveling of energy in any closed system, according to 
the second law of thermodynamics. Chaos varies in direct proportion with an increase of en­
tropy but also, somewhat paradoxically, differentiation decreases as energy distribution be­
comes more uniform. The movement, irreversible, is therefore from order to chaos and from 
differentiation to sameness. Everything—the universe itself—will eventually run down; “heat 
death” is the destiny of all.1 This inexorable and irreversible movement, Pynchon, following 
the model of historian Henry Adams, translates into social terms (Harris 77; Slade 33-4). In 
this theory, human societies are going the way of physical matter. Besides the natural accidents 
and disasters we may succumb to, man-made organizational conformity, fee entropic state of 
“de-differentiation,” and fee dehumanization resulting from exclusive reliance on advanded 
technologies are transforming fee social world into fee twentieth century version of heat death, 
what Pynchon calls “fee inanimate.”
This drive to inanimateness has become a nearly obsessive theme in Pynchon’s fiction. 
Entropy serves as a central metaphor in what appears to some critics as a humanist project, if 
not in fee manner of Mailer and counter-culture critics of fee Sixties who lamented fee en­
croachment of technology (for Pynchon, it is already here, invading our bodies and minds), then 
at least in alerting us to its usurpation of fee human. Pynchon has accordingly been claimed by
humanist critics, notably Joseph Dewey, who see his work as an affirmation and reformulation 
of humanism in the impersonal contemporary world. There is some justification for this inter­
pretation: a few characters, notably women and blacks, practice values like love, solidarity, 
human concern, but this practice is not presented fatuously as the alternative to activism but 
rather as a gesture of heroic resignation, “painting the side of the sinking ship” (V. 460) or at 
least refusal of pessimistic inaction (Harris 91-93). Pynchon seems to resist the retreat into 
self-absorption, as is evidenced in his first novel V. : (1963) by the decadence of the Whole 
Sick Crew (a satiric view of the Fifties’ Beat culture), and the two protagonists, Benny Profane, 
who realizes that in the end he has learned nothing from his eventful but aimless existence, and 
Herbert Stencil, who has failed in his obsessive quest for fee elusive figure of V. Furthermore, 
what it means to be “human” has usually gone undefined in humanist criticism, while science 
fiction and postmodernist literary and critical texts have often rendered fee concept problem­
atic, and in Pynchon’s work it can at least be defined negatively. One might add feat Pynchon’s 
humanism, if feat is what it is, is of a raiher different order: a major humanist belief for exam­
ple, feat human life has meaning, remains in Pynchon’s worfc only a possibility. Other critics 
perceive a Pynchon who is critical of fee reigning humanist ideas as obsolete for our time and 
hence invalid as guides to human behavior (Henkle 215). Perhaps Pynchon can be seen as hu­
manist in fee way most contemporary novelists are—as one who laments fee loss of value and 
human potential in a world where technical efficiency, fee principle of“performativity” has 
become fee norm (Lyotard xxxiv, 50). His major novel, Gravity’s Rainbow, has been described 
by Karl (308) in these terms as a story of postwar life as “a continuing process of human means 
against scientific ends.”
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The two main themes ofV. are the contemporary drive toward the oxymoronic condition 
of human inanimateness, and European imperialism of the early 20th century—a retrospective 
forewarning against American imperialism of the late 20di century. Both of these remain preoc­
cupations in die later work and both are related to entropy: die first, directly, in die expansive 
development of technology in our century, perceived negatively as die “expanding empire of the 
inanimate;” die second, metaphorically (as the latter phrase also illustrates), as die technologi­
cally advanced western world, in exhausting itself goes on to draw the life out of cultures that 
still retain some vitality. Hie two themes, power as imperialism and power as the technology in 
its service, come together as the “Culture of Death” engulfs the technologically less developed 
in “a quest to reduce everything, first other and finally sel£ to inert matter” (Cooley 308).
Examples of technology as the way to die inanimate abound in V. The double-agent 
Bongo-Shaitesbury has an electric switch sewn into his arm; Fergus-Mixolydian has done the 
same with electrodes, by which he becomes an extension of his television set The plastic sur­
geon Shale Shoenmaker (whose first name suggests inanimate rock) took up his profession after 
seeing die facial disfigurement of a friend after a plane crash, wishing to “repair the havoc” 
wrought by natural and human agencies like disease, accidents, and war. This noble motive 
degenerates with time into an indifference and eventual alignment with die inanimate, shown by 
the nose-job he gives Esther Harvitz, turning her into a WASP stereotype (Slade 104). Tlie 
operation, while it is parodically represented as a sexual penetration, loses its intimacy as it is 
performed with instruments (i.e. the inanimate inserted into the body) and, once accomplished, 
makes die doctor, later to be Esther’s lover, want to transform her entire body in an inexorable 
forward motion toward inanimateness.
274
pire to. SHROUD compares the automobile junkyards littering the American landscape to the 
stacked human corpses in Auschwitz, the death-camps being the culmination and symbol of the 
20th century’s technology of death.
The schlemihl Profane has been proposed as the secular-humanist alternative to the tech­
nological society-with his fat body, the desire of various women to mother him, his drifter’s 
existence and refusal to take part in the system, and especially his ineptness with machines and 
general clutziness in a world of material objects. Against the world of machines, it is claimed, 
Profane is die underground man of modernism, like fictional predecessors in Ellison, Beckett, 
and Kafka: marginal but vital—unlike Herbert Stencil a producer of disorder, dynamic and 
wasteful as his fellow sailors, an “anti-power” (Karl 303). Yet, Profane does not escape in die 
novel die indictment of inanimateness. Along with his wistful dream of an electronic woman 
(any problems can be referred to the maintenance manual), Profane is accused, correctly, by 
Rachel Owlglass of evading any connection with other people (although even this message is 
subverted, since Rachel herself despite an overdeveloped nurturing capacity, makes love to her 
MG). In contrast to Stencil, whose itinerary is guaranteed by his obsession, Profane goes ran­
domly from one situation to the next, a “human yo-yo,” taking what he needs without giving 
anything in return, which rather undermines him as a model of humanism Furthermore, his ran­
dom movement between places and among diverse groups without purpose connects him with 
the constant but aimless and eventually futile movement of entropy, his alternating activity end­
ing in stagnation.
The power of technology is also seen negatively, albeit indirectly, in this novel with re­
spect to its collusion in die military superiority of Europe for colonial conquests. The imperial­
ist theme emerges from a series of late 19th and early 20th century historical incidents, which
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are not presented chronologically but filtered through the not always reliable perception of 
Stencil, fee scholar-braveler who spends his life on fee quixotic and inconsequential quest for 
V, a quest for personal fulfillment feat recalls both similar quests of the Fifties and/or fee 
myfeical quest for “America,” which, like V, is difficult to identify (Karl 306-7). The first two 
incidents take place at fee turn of fee century, hey-day of European (and beginning of American) 
imperialism. In fee Fashoda crisis (1898), fee Western European powers maneuver for advan­
tage in North Africa, wife ‘‘Machiavellians” still playing antiquated Renaissance games of es­
pionage and intrigue. The reductive colonial gaze of fee dominant culture, familiar in canonical 
colonial narratives, would here seem to be reversed, since both spies and tourists (who are 
said to inhabit a  merely “two-dimensional” geography) are perceived through a number of na­
tive (i.e. Arab) points-of-view, in Alexandria and Cairo. And yet, typically, this reversal is 
only apparent, as fee native perceptions are really projections of Stencil himself, who is said to 
supplement fee information assembled on his travels and in his research by “impersonation and 
dream” (Harris 80). The difficulty of perception applies most forcefully to V. Signs of her 
proliferate in names and icons and yet Stencil can never solve her mystery, nor does he evi­
dently want to, wife his declared method of “approach and avoid.” Stencil may in fact fear 
success, for every referent to V. is related to disintegration, fee process of entropy, and it is to 
fee point feat she is present in all fee historical episodes, being fee sole link between them 
(Harris 82).4
Tourists and colonizers are again connected in fee episode at Florence (1899), where fee 
explorer Godolphin relates ajoumey feat he alone survived to fee strange land of Vheissu 
(located in an African jungle), which he perceives as fee “skin” of a woman wife shifting col­
ors, an alien surface feat cannot be penetrated or possessed: “They [fee tourists] want fee skin
of a place, the explorer wants its heart” (188). Godolphin does manage to penetrate the surface 
on his voyage to the South Pole but to his horror he finds literally “nothing”: a vision of the 
void or the completion of entropy. Where Stencil always hesitates at the brink of discovery, 
Godolphin has a glimpse and is thereafter deeply disturbed by what he has seea The imperial­
ist cannot really possess what he has conquered. Godolphin thereafter suffers acute paranoia at 
imagined plots by Vheissu.
The debasement o f the colonizer is underscored in the two most harrowing episodes, 
which take place in South West Africa Hie first (1904) relates the aftermath of a native upris­
ing, the near extermination of the Herero people by the German troops of General Von Trotha, a 
colonial proto-Holocaust The naked power exercized on die natives, who are raped and mur­
dered in creative ways, illustrates the inanimateness of their bodies to their conquerors, who 
renounce their own humanity in die absolute freedom of their violations, a form of “self- 
reification” (Slade 66). In die second episode, an uprising of die Bondels (1922) and its sup­
pression occurs only as background for die goings-on in the fortress-villa of Foppl, who had 
served under Von Trotha and is excited by die thought of a reprise. Foppl and his guests, as­
sembled as a “European Conclave or League ofNations” in a mockery of the recently formed 
League ofNations, indulge in a “siege-party,” a sado-masochistic orgy which, in its steadily 
increasing depravity, is amoral and social equivalent of physical entropy in a closed system.,■ 
Here, too, Pynchon parodies imperialist fiction, notably Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness,” with 
Foppl’s Kurzian desire to exterminate the natives—an example of Linda Hutcheon’s notion of^ 
historiographic metafictions situating themselves within historical discourse (Cooley 313-5, 
and 323 note 12).
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Hie epilogue of V. takes place on the island of Malta (1919) to which the various plots 
constantly return, and the crises of the historical episodes come to their culmination there. 
Malta’s geographical position has made it the most conquered country in Europe, the quintes­
sential victim of European imperialism Bombed by the Germans in die Second World War, the 
island has resisted in its rock-like “tenacity”, only to become the assembly point for British 
forces in the Suez crisis (1956), perceived at die time as the last gasp of the British Empire (as 
the even more recent Falklands war showed, however, there was still some life in it yet). There 
are two tiny pockets of resistance. PaolaMaijstral, one of several resourceful Pvnchon hero­
ines, is an abused Maltese, married to an American sailor (the latest of the conquerors?), but 
since, as she says, nobody knows what a Maltese is, she can’t be labelled or possessed. Her 
father Fausto, in his successive self-reincarnations, has moved, as it were, in the reverse direc­
tion ofV., going from resigned colonized native to a fully conscious Maltese convinced of his 
humanity. Both “characters” illustrate the Foucaultian notion of the instabililty of die self and 
the capacity of people to remodel themselves according to goals independent of fee dominant 
paradigms.
In accordance wife fee novel’s complexity, fee role of history is ambiguous. On fee one 
hand, there is Machiavelli’s Fortuna, frequently alluded to as a significant factor in events. On 
fee other, there is Stencil, who gives events form through narrative but whose vision and meth­
ods, as we have seen, are anything but objective. What he gives is not “history” but 
“Stencilized” history, feat is, historiographic metafictions. Stencil, one of Pynchon’s many 
paranoids, comes to believe in “The Plot That Has No Name” (wife a pun on plot, meaning both 
narrative and conspiracy). In recreating fee past, he has distorted it into his own obsessive fic­
tion, which has come to have a reality as meaningful as real events.5
Taken separately and together, the historical episodes suggest social entropy, man’s pur­
suit of nihilism. Is Pynchon’s work “an attempt to situate Americans in history?” (Wood 28) or, 
as some critics would have it, does fee entropic vision spell the end of history?: “the perspec­
tive of fee larger ahistorical view which throws into doubt fee entire notion of a history in 
which ‘life’ has any more significance than ‘decay’,” (Schaub, Pynchon 10; Harris 87). In fee 
latter reading, Pynchon’s is a cosmic view rather than an historical one, an interpretation ap­
parently strengthened by fee contemporary (1950s) plot of fee aimless “yo-yoing” and decadent 
aesthetic attitudes of fee Whole Sick Crew, which would then function as a contemporary com­
ment on fee pointlessness of modern history. Entropy reduces human history to a series of 
meaningless events (which would, to be sure, make Pynchon’s alleged humanism equally 
pointless), but this is perhaps to confuse fee idea of physical entropy wife its metaphorical so­
cial meaning. His next novel will point to possible reversals of fee slide of society into an irre­
versible conditioa
Since Pynchon evidently cares about what happens to people, or at least peoples, the in­
roads into history have to be taken more seriously than John Barth’s play wife history. One 
problem, it has been pointed out, is fee discrepancy between fee power of fee comedy of ideas- 
-and one might add, fee evocations of a spiritually dead culture-and fee rather muted depiction - 
of love, fellowship, community, etc., in V., or even in his most recent novel, Vineland, which 
seem too feeble to be offered as a solution (Henkle 215). Pynchon’s vision is dark, but he may 
be suggesting feat there is hope in fee fact feat, like Fausto, some men actually learn from expe­
rience, which would underscore fee importance of history. By giving fee several historical m? 
cidents no causal connection, Pynchon is showing how fee plots feat men see are their owncon- 
nection, an insight feat works equally well for paranoia and for history and that will again be.
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taken up by DeLillo. Histoiy then is not meaningless since one gives it meaning through the 
forging of connections and the ordering of apparently random conjunctions. This is, as we have 
seen in the Introduction, sec. n, the role of both historian and novelist Events must be inter­
preted to emerge from random happenings.
b.
Both entropy and history are again important in Pynchon’s second, and shortest novel,
The Crying ofLot 49 (1966).6 The heat loss of physical systems is again replaced by social 
decay and disintegration, but the Western civilization of V. is here narrowed down to die US, 
called throughout “America,” in order to focus on the dream, the what-might-have-been, as 
well as contemporary reality. That reality is late capitalist society with a dull, uniform, ho- 
mogenious landscape (signs of entropy), and its citizens reduced to automatons or drop-outs, 
depending on whether they participate or not in its reductive forces.: This loss of human energy 
is indicated by a central term “waste,” which paradoxically may also spell out a possibility for 
renewal, for the closed system ofV. may not after all necessarily apply to the US of die Sixties, 
where people were waking up to what had happened to their country and becoming aware of the 
possibility of resistance to the socially entropic forces afflicting it (Slade, Pynchon 132). The 
entropic tendency of die whole, Pynchon seems to be suggesting, may be subject to change at a 
local level through die resistance of the “weak, bottom-up local power” against the “strong, 
top-down,” “imperializing” power (Fiske 11). As Norbert Weiner, die theorist of entropy, put 
it: “While die universe as a whole...tends to run down, there are local enclaves whose direction 
seems opposed to the universe at large and in which there is a limited and temporary tendency 
for organization to increase” (Weiner 20-1, qtd. in Slade 132). Less pessimistic than V., this
novel offers the possibility of such an organization, and in the novel its existence can be at least 
partly confirmed by historical research and hypothesis.
The central Western myth of Oedipus, which Barth parodied in Giles, is again evoked in 
Crying. The tragedy of Oedipus was both an individual dilemma and a crisis of the state. A 
similar situation exists for OedipaMaas, although she is a modern (wo)man and so incapable 
of tragedy in a world where human relationships have been eroded by excessive systemization 
and reification. In a novel where the central metaphors have to do with communication, the re­
lating of people to people, Oedipa is constantly frustrated in her attempts to make contact or 
effect connections, not only in EM. Forster’s sense of “Only connect,” but in Pynchon’s evi­
dent desire for communily (Oedipa’s wanderings in nighttown San Francisco give her a prolif­
eration of information that will, hopefully, lead to community). If this failure is her personal 
dilemma, it is related to her failure to unravel completely die labyrinthine mysteries of the Ih- 
veriarty estate (of which she is executrix), vast in extension but with a curious lack of a center, 
so that the closure of this possibility remains incomplete. Oedipus’s discoveries lead to both 
self-enlightenment and destruction, Oedipa’s only to further mystery or confusion, as the two 
outcomes of Oedipus remain in abeyance. In her case, lack of self-knowledge reaches new 
depths, as she becomes uncertain as to whether she is overwhelmingly paranoid or simply going 
mad in her inability to sort out truth from deception.
Solving mysteries is the province of the detective novel, a popular genre in tune with 
Pynchon’s often flippant tone, cartoon-like names, convoluted plot, and nameless menace. 
William Spanos says that until postmodernism die novel was based on a “detective novel” 
premise, i.e. “on a monolithic certainty that immediate psychic or historical experience is part 
of a comforting...well-made cosmic drama or novel” (qtd. by McCaffery, “Lit Disruptions”
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140). Hie novel, Spanos argues, was based on epistemological premises-linearity, causality, 
inductive inference— that are no longer so certain. As Roland Barthes says, expectation be­
comes the basic condition for truth: “truth...is what is at the end of expectation...truth is what 
completes, what closes” (76). In Crying, closure is denied as the central truth is still being 
awaited at the end. It is therefore rather an anti-detective novel, since Poe-esque rationality 
leads to nothing (Castillo 30-3): “Each clue that comes is supposed to have its own clar­
ity...But then she wondered if the gemlike “clues” were only some kind of compensation. To 
make up for her having lost the direct, epileptic Word, the cry that might abolish the night”
(Crying 117-118). The suggestion is that there may be no central, explanatory meaning behind 
the clues. Hie capitalized “Word” (the logos?) and allusion to the title’s “cry” also suggest a 
revelation of some ultimate, even transcendental truth that is not to be forthcoming. As shall be 
seen, the mystery is not solved because it is unsolvable.
Hie clues are provided by a series of male characters, the central one being Pierce In- 
variarity, invisible, fee absent cause of her search, who emits rather than interprets signs 
(Johnston 57), but does so in bewildering multiplicity. Hie other men act as interpreters from 
whom Oedipa hopes to find fee referents for fee signs, but wife each encounter fee existence of 
a referent becomes less certain, since all of the men are in some way not ‘‘normal,” none of 
them represent an official discourse feat can counterract her paranoid vision (67,71). Oedipa’s 
surname Maas suggests fee “mass” of fee solid, middle-class personhood she is endowed wife 
at fee beginning of fee novel, which is relentlessly “stripped away” from her piece by piece, 
just as her clothes are in fee game of “Strip Boticelli” she plays wife M etier in the first chap­
ter (Karl 360), a metaphorical equivalent of fee physical dissassembly ofV. After fee various 
encounters wife these men, too, her connections with them are severed, she realizes, “one by
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one.” Thus, her psychiatrist Dr. Hilarius goes mad with visions of avenging Israelis; her hus­
band Mucho retreats into the solopsism of psychedelic drugs; her lawyer-lover Metzger runs 
off with a fifteen year old girl; the man in the bar says over the phone that “it is too late” for 
him; the theater director Driblette “takes a Brody” into the Pacific ocean. And yet, there is a 
sense that justifies her first name. She undertakes the quest despite the opposition, incompre­
hension, indifference, or loss of these various men (and so is in another sense an embodiment of 
the new, independent woman of the Sixties, finding her own way in die world), and she shows 
the Oedipal virtues of courage and determination in the pursuit of truth, wherever it may lead. 
Unlike Oedipus, she is saved not condemned by her persistence and is mas (Sp.) “more” than 
her male companions, who drop out along die way, “more” perhaps than Oedipus, since she has 
what he notably lacks, namely, human sympathy. The “escape”of the male characters appropri­
ately parodies the flight of classic male heroes in American fiction who cut themselves off from 
die possibility of real communication by opting for solitary solutions.
At die beginning of the novel, for example, Oedipa is sensitive to the trauma Mucho has 
suffered at his old job as used-car salesman, popular symbol of deceit (a familiar Sixties poster 
of Richard Nixon had die caption: Would you buy a used car from this man?). What has un­
nerved him is the advance of the inanimate in the practice of trade-ins (he dreams of a used-car 
lot with a NADA sign: National Auto Dealers Association): people leave traces of their 
shabby lives in the cars they trade in, so that cars and people come to seem to him interchange­
able. Indeed, in the post-war affluence of die 1950s, people were often identified by the kind of 
car they drove as both social life and status in the US centered on the automobile and, of course, 
automobile ads try to make the identification complete. Mucho is repelled by the “incest” of 
people trading versions of themselves in. In accordance with die shift from die old counterfeit
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Unlike Oedipus, she is saved not condemned by her persistence and is mas (Sp.) “more” than 
her male companions, who drop out along the way, “more” perhaps than Oedipus, since she has 
what he notably lacks, namely, human sympathy. The “escape”ofthe male characters appropri­
ately parodies the flight of classic male heroes in American fiction who cut themselves off from 
die possibility of real communication by opting for solitary solutions.
At the beginning of the novel, for example, Oedipa is sensitive to the trauma Mucho has 
suffered at his old job as used-car salesman, popular symbol of deceit (a familiar Sixties poster 
of Richard Nixon had the caption: Would you buy a used car from this man?). What has un­
nerved him is die advance of the inanimate in the practice of trade-ins (he dreams of a used-car 
lot with aNADA sign: National Auto Dealers Association): people leave traces of their 
shabby lives in the cars they trade in, so that cars and people come to seem to him interchange­
able. Indeed, in the post-war affluence of the 1950s, people were often identified by the kind of 
car they drove as both social life and status in the US centered on the automobile and, of course, 
automobile ads try to make the identification complete. Mucho is repelled by die “incest” of 
people trading versions of themselves in. In accordance with the shift from die old counterfeit
car-culture of the Fifties to the equally counterfeit communication culture of the Sixties, and the 
“printed circuit” design of SanNarciso, Mucho becomes adisk-jockey (for Baudrillard, com­
modities give way to cultural products and signs in the reification of people). He distrusts this 
occupation as well, however, since his voice over the air is distorted, as language and signs 
will be throughout the novel. For example, in saying Oedipa’s name over the air, he must pur­
posely mispronounce it to allow for distortion. When Dr. Hilarius calls Oedipa, he sounds like 
Inveriarity’s imitation-Nazi officer “voice,” an involuntary imitation of a comic imitation, and, 
in another twist, Hilarius turns out to have been a real Nazi.
One of Pynchon’s systems of power in this novel is that of (he communications media, 
ever-present and so persuasive its messages seem to stand for reality itself, and yet it is always 
ambiguous in the novel as to whether the media facilitate or impede real communication. For 
example, Oedipa’s lawyer Roseman is actually writing an indictment of the television lawyer 
Perry Mason. Her other lawyer, Metzger, with whom she works on Inveriarty’s will, looks 
like, and in feet once was, a movie star. While they talk, Oedipa flips on the T. V. and his image 
appears in an old movie as the child-star, Baby Igor. As a lawyer, he becomes an “actor” be­
fore the jury, Perry Mason is an actor who becomes a lawyer before the camera A pilot film 
for aT.V. series based on Metzger’s career stars his friend Manny Di presso, who was a law­
yer who quit practicing to become an actor who will impersonate a lawyer, etc. The confusion 
is over which role is real recalls the absent distinctions of sign and referent in postmodernism.7 
The city San Narciso (selfhood is holy: this is Southern California), where she goes to execute 
the will, looks to her like the printed circuit of a radio, suggesting die inanimateness of contem­
porary society and, as means of mass communication, die endless chatter of the mass media, but 
the layout also has a “hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning” where “a revelation trembled
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of the surface/depth paradigm: with no “depth,” the postmodern world cannot be interpreted 
and the underlying object (to which the signs and clues point) never emerges. In the hvperreal- 
ity of contemporary culture posited by Baudrillard, the world is saturated with signs and mes­
sages that are simulations of displaced objects that cannot be explained “in a code based on 
any logocentric paradigm of referentiality” (Duyfhuizen 82; Baudrillard, Simulacra).
More recent commentaries (O’Donnell, New Essays 11) see the novel as concerned with 
information processing, another kind of reading of the signs: Oedipa as semiotician, a postal 
system that may facilitate or hinder communication, and Nefastis’s machine, a version of Max­
well ’s demon, which Oedipa learns about when she gets lost in the Yoyodyne plant When she 
goes to Berkeley to see Nefastis, he tells her that his machine combines die physical and infor­
mational aspects of entropy, but his machine uses up a lot of energy for a small amount of work. 
Hie likeness is in the heat engine’s two-stroke cycle of expansion and compression to the bi­
nary circuitry of the computer (Hayles 113), a symmetry tiiat will metaphorically be reproduced 
in the multiple ambiguities and exclusionary choices in the novel, where entropy is manifested 
not through thermodynamics but cybernetics, hi information theory, entropy represents the 
“noise” or random errors that occur in die transmission of signals or messages (“Entropy”), apt 
for this story of confused and misinterpreted communications. Hie more information Nefastis’s 
machine seems to sort out, die more disorder seems to be created, which precisely describes 
Oedipa’s repeated experience in her attempts to sort out true from false information in the deci­
phering of the novel’s main system. As the narrator points out, in the Thirties it was discovered 
that Bolzmann’s mathematical equation of heat loss is nearly identical with Shannon’s equation 
for information loss (Stark 413). As Nefastis tells Oedipa, entropy connects both: 
“[cjommunication is the key” (105). Greater disorganization and uncertainty in an information
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system, i.e. greater entropy, actually brings greater information. In cosmological theory, models 
of the universe that do not lead to heat-death have been constructed with entropy giving it the 
capacity to renew itself (Hayles 112) and something of this sort on the socio-political level is 
suggested by die Tristero system with respect to the entropic social order of the US, which may 
not be, as I suggested above, a closed system But Oedipa’s attempt to invoke the demon in the 
box, which depends on feedback from a human “sensitive” fails, since the box is a only 
“spiritualist application” of die two laws (Johnston 65). She might be “the channel that will 
mediate die matrix of cultural information” (Duvtfhuizen 81) but the information keeps breaking 
down in its various transmissions, since “the lines of demarcation” between the transmissions 
evaporate in the proliferating coincidences she encounters, causing her mediation to fail (83, 
91).
Important in all ofPynchon’s novels, technology has both comically absurd and sinister 
aspects, as was seen with the two robots in V. who talk to Profane. The San Narciso industry 
Ycyodyne began by making gyroscopes for children’s toys and went on to develop ihem for 
guided missile systems. It contributes therefore to the culture of death and markets its destruc­
tive weapons as if they were ordinary industrial products (Slade 139).8 The bar patronized by 
Yoyodyne employees is called The Scope and features an electronic studio for its bar-room 
music. The company stockholders sing a glee song of aerospace industries at their meetings. 
Oedipa and Metzger make love while his film is running on television (Nefastis wants to have 
Oedipa while watching the news) and a rock group is rehearsing on electrified instruments; the 
sexual climax coincides with the blowing of all the iiises in die motel. Oedipa is attacked in the 
bathroom by flying gadgets, notably a can of hair spray, recent ecological villain of the assault 
on the ozone layer.
Oedipa gets her first inkling of conspiracy in The Scope where Mike Fallopian tells her 
of the reactionary Peter Pinguid Society (the first of several screwy California organizations),, 
which commemorates the (fictional) first military confrontation between the US and Russia 
during the American Civil War. Pinguid was the Confederate commander of a ship that was to 
attack California, but, typically, nobody knows whether it was a Russian or American ship that 
disappeared, a foreshadowing of the ambiguity of blame for the Cold War. Pinguid, in the 
California entrepeneurial spirit, retires to become areal-estate speculator. The Pinguid society 
suggests the delirious logic of fee real-life John Birch Society: it is so far to the right that it is 
against capitalism, since capitalism leads inevitably to socialism, which is aburd since it is 
Mane’s argument In die Scope’s bathroom, Oedipa spies die first of proliferating post-horns; 
when she witnesses the distribution of mail in the bar in the middle of the night she begins to 
become aware of the secret alternative mail-deliverv system called Tristero, of which die post- 
horn is die symbol.9
The existence of Tristero suggests what Fallopian, who is writing a book on private mail- 
systems, calls a parable of power in the governmental suppression of mail-delivery competition 
during the Civil War. Tristero is the subversive link between the espionage in V. and the 
“Firm” in the third novel, Gravity's Rainbow, international networks of domination, more sinis­
ter in their being diffuse and hard to identify, with a Burroughs-like “branch office in each of 
our brains” (qtd by Slade, “Thomas Pynchon” 215). For both Foucault and Pynchon, power is 
ubiquitous and vet elusive (Foucault Hist, o f  Sex. 192-92). In Joseph Slade’s reading, these 
multiple conspiracies are employed to “engender a sense of community and to restore a sense of 
mystery to a cultural waste-land” (211). But conspiracy is more than a medicinal antidote to 
die modernist vision of a sick modern world, since plots, counter-plots and their attendant para­
noia were, as we have seen, an integral part of the post-war American cultural climate.There is 
no need to restore mystery to the cultural waste-land if the mystery is part of the culture’s 
problem, a situation amply illustrated in the work of other novelists of the period like Gaddis, 
Burroughs, Mailer, and Barth.
Conspiracy begets paranoia Even before Oedipa becomes enmeshed in the pervasive 
systems and conspiracies of her quest, paranoia sets in. She refuses to take Dr. Hilarius’ tran­
quilizers, fearing that he wants her as part of his experiment of giving psychedelics to house­
wives. The CIA actually performed drug experiments with unknowing subjects and despite the 
Sixties’culture hero Timothy Leary, a Harvard psychologist who advised American youth to 
‘tune in, turn on, and drop out,” there was actually some suspicion among the more extreme 
leftist groups in the Sixties that drugs were a conspiracy of the government to defuse revolu­
tionary sentiment among youth (while Oedipa talks to the doctor, she sees the military draft 
poster of Uncle Sam pointing his finger and saying, <£I want you.” Hilarius’s own face resem­
bles Uncle Sam’s). Hie motel manager Miles plays in a rock group called the Paranoids. When 
Metzger appears on T.V., Oedipa thinks he may have bribed the local station to run the film as 
part of an elaborate seduction scheme; she later will come to believe feat everything that would 
follow begins logically wife this infidelity wife Metzger, a feeling of total paranoid intercon­
nectedness.
As she becomes curious about Tristero, she attends a play with Metzger, “Hie Courier’s 
Tragedy,” by a minor (fictional) Elizabethan named Wharfinger, which involves fee (historical) 
European postal monopoly Thum and Taxis. At fee end of Act ID, she hears fee name of fee 
Tristero conspiracy, which triggers the quest to determine its occurrence in fee play and fee 
signs and symbols that abound, a quest whose stylistic and narrative features resemble a story
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by Borges (Castillo 27-44).10 The play’s director, Driblette, tells her that one can assemble 
all the clues and still not discover the truth. The search for the play’s definitive text is also a 
parody of scholarship. Literary texts are to be the way of verifying the historical truth of a mail 
conspiracy, but their ambiguity itself creates an ambiguous history (Karl 361). The novel de­
lineates Oedipa’s “interpretable indeterminacy” (324), a doubt about the possibility for objec­
tive knowledge and the inability to locate the definitive text in the proliferation of historical 
detail.
The text indeed proves elusive. Wharfinger’s play turns out to be one ofBaudrillard’s 
displaced objects. There is no script for the play, only paperback copies. Checking the textual 
variant, Oedipa discovers that die line mentioning Tristero is absent and a footnote warns the 
reader that the edition containing the line is untrustworthy. The editor of the text, Emory Borz, 
now teaches (where else?) at San Narciso College, but die bookstore there that sold her her 
copy has burned down. Borz informs her there is a pornographic version of the play, with the 
missing line, in the Vatican library but it is inaccessible. Since the line has been suppressed, 
how was it included in the play on the day she saw it? Even Borz’s supposedly definitive text 
has been censored by the publisher. Borz speculates that Tristero might be connected with an­
other organization, the Scurvhamites, a Puritan sect with two branches, one of which followed 
God’s will, the other a blind automatic principle leading to death (entropy). Everyone in the 
first sect went over to the second and died They performed the play as a moral example; like 
the Pinguid society, it is an organization that intends the opposite of what it professes, hi this 
version, Tristero may be the symbol of the “other.”
The next clue that constantly recurs is that of the sinister “black riders” (borrowed from 
die bad guys in Tolkien’s Lord o f  the Rings?), which Oedipa first encounters in Wharfinger’s
commonplace book given to her by Borz, relating the playwright’s escape from an attack on a 
mail coach. An historical marker at the lagoon of Wells Fargo (the US mail service) tells of 
federal employees massacred by “masked marauders.” A certain Hernando Joaquin de Tristero 
Calavera, a possibly disinherited conspirator of the 16th century, waged a terrorist campaign, 
with men in black for night concealment, against the postal monopoly Thum and Taxis. As the 
historical record is silent, Oedipa and Borz try to reconstruct fee complex history of fee con­
spiracy; he speculates on a translation to the US, where the conspirators went underground. Hie 
evidence for this is philatelic, stamps being historical documents and another kind of text 
needing to be interpreted. Governmental issue stamps, it turns out, have been altered: Inveriar- 
ity’s valuable collection has a watermark wife a post-horn on a 1940 issue of fee Pony Express 
(a US government mail service) and fee philatelist Ghengis Cohen shows her a German stamp 
where fee bell of fee post-horn is muted, suggesting an attempt to mute or silence Thum and 
Taxis. The stamp is a counterfeit wife a black feather, which along wife other evidence suggests 
a two-hundred year postal fraud. Cohen even has a US stamp with the WASTE acronym 
spelled out
By this time, evidences of Tristero and its post-horn symbol are everywhere for her to 
see. Koteks, fee Yoyodyne engineer, was doodling it when she met him. In her nocturnal wan­
derings in San Francisco (which suggests Walpurgisnacht, Joyce’s “Nighttown,” Burroughs’s 
“Interzone”), where she hopes to “watch nothing happen,” she spots fee symbol on fee pin of a 
man in a gay bar, which he explains as the symbol of another organization, IA (Inamorati 
Anonymous), founded by a cuckholded Yoyodyne executive, a victim of corporate capitalism 
and the communications revolution (he was replaced by an IBM 7094), who in looking for rea­
sons not to kill himself noted on the letters of other would-be suicides a post-horn on the
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stamps. He resolved to found, paradoxically, a society of isolates, who would communicate 
through a postal system. In succeeding incidents, interlocking coicidences multiply. For exam­
ple, she meets Jesus Arrabal, member of the CIA (i.e.Conjuracion de Insurgentes Anarquistas) 
whom she had met in Matzatlan on a trip wife Inveriaritv, who seemed to Arrabal such a perfect 
embodiment of the capitalist enemy feat his faith in fee cause is renewed. Ihveriarity does sug­
gest the historical entrepeneur, fee “Protestant ethic incarnate” of Weber’s theory in 'the desire 
to transform nature into buildings and bureaucracies” (Slade 130).11 As such, he is relevant to 
leftists like Arrabal, but in this world of late capitalism, in which, as Galbraith argues, corpo­
rate power tends to be invisible, he represents fee evils of corporate America, fee absent center 
of a far-flung empire. In addition to Mafia connections and real-estate speculation, he turns out 
to be involved in war-profiteering in fee manufacture of cancerous cigarettes, an entrepeneur of 
death. Some human bones from fee dead bodies of American soldiers in Italy killed by fee 
Germans are supplied by fee hoodlum Tony Jaguar to Ihveriarity (who doesn’t pay) to make 
charcoal cigarette filters. The story connects with Tristero through Wharfinger’s play, which 
has a similar bone plot, and fee old man Thoth who wears a post-horn signet ring and recalls 
dreams of a grandfather feat fought false indians who used chaired bone to blacken their faces.
All this is disturbing enough, but it becomes even more so when Fallopian tells her feat 
fee whole thing may have been devised by Inveriarity as an elaborate hoax. She finds it difficult 
to believe feat such a scheme could have been invented for her, an old girlfriend who has been 
chosen merely to execute his will, but fee ramifications of the will keep expanding until fee 
“sources of evidence...include virtually every aspect of American life in fee 1960s” (Meikle 2). 
The conspiracy appears to function in opposition to everything Ihveriarity represents, and yet it 
also suggested feat he may have created or at least subsidized it (Slade 129). Every access to
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Tristero can be traced back to Inveriarity: both the theater of Driblette’s production of the play 
and the burned bookstore were owned by him, he owns Yoyodyne, he has endowed the college, 
etc.: "San Narciso had no boundaries. No one knew yet how to draw them” (Crying 178).
As evidence that Tristero is anti-corporate, underground organizations of every type 
communicate by it, like the IA and the ACDC (Alameda County Death Cult, which suggest 
Charles Manson’s “family”). Hie suggestive acronyms are both parodic of the debasement of 
language by bureaucratic organizations and indicative that language is the instrument of*sys­
temic domination, as Burroughs held. Hie central acronym W.A.S.T.E. is at first taken by 
Oedipa to be a word, “waste,” and as such referring to a society of cast-offs, misfits, drifters, 
and drop-outs from mainstream society and to the detritus produced by technology, but as acro­
nym, “a signifyer underwritten by other signifiers” (Hayles 109), it expands into other mean­
ings, including the revolutionary possibilities of Tristero’s eventual alternative to mainstream 
society: “We Await Silent Tristero’s Empire”. Hie organization holds out the possibility of 
real communication, which is so denied everywhere else in her experience, is a system that 
would rescue her from an entropic society (Stark 413). Hie excluded may have created a 
“separate, silent, unsuspected world” (Crying 125) that is not made up only of the poor and 
excluded of late capitalism and its obsession with performance and profit but of those have 
been reduced to playing their pre-assigned roles in the corporate economy. Tims, Fallopian 
thinks that the engineers, brought up on the Myth of the American Inventor, bitter at losing crea­
tive initiative in the strait-jacket of a corporation, have adhered to Tristero in silent protest: 
“Nobody wanted them to invent—only perform their little role in a design ritual, already set 
down for them in some procedures handbook” (88). The fellow conpirators do not constitute an 
underclass, or only that, but include even well-paid professionals who have also fallen victim
to the culture of efficiency and performance. The “procedures handbook” would be written in 
corporate language, a language that disguises anonymity and the routine of ritual.
Unless she is a victim of Liveriarity’s hoax (“as a pure conspiracy against someone he 
loved” 179), Oedipahas either stumbled onto this conspiracy, or is self-deceived into believ­
ing it (“crazy”), or is fantasizing the whole thing (“hallucinating”). There is a neat symmetrical 
pattern to the possibilities: real plot/fabricated plot (hoax) and self-deception/fantasy, a 
movement from the epistemoiogical to the psychological (Castillo 34). In the first pair, a con­
spiracy exists, whether Tristero or some other to make her believe in it. In the second pair, she 
is mistaken, whether rationally, concerning Tristero, or paranoically, concerning the hoax. It is 
to the point that these apparently exclusive possibilities turn out not to be the only possibilities: 
if there was only America, “the only way she could continue, and manage to be at all relevant to 
it, was as an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into some paranoia” (137). If Tristero (like 
God) doesn’t exist, she would have to invent it (Kolodny & Peters 85). To become an alien is 
to recognize her alienation, to be unfurrowed is to get out of the rut of symmetrical choices, and 
to be paranoid is to be open to new possibilities.
Paranoia when too extreme leads to a metaphysical solopsism and the denial of chance, 
and, since the paranoid creates conspiracies where none exist, to a passive determinism so total 
that action is forestalled. And yet, as suggested above, even paranoia has its uses, such as mak­
ing one aware of patterns of control. As Slade puts it: “[a]s Pynchon uses the concept, paranoia 
is a sort of holding action for the self, a means by which the individual traces the paths of force 
in the grids and systems that surround him” (Pynchon 244). Paranoia may, paradoxically, even 
be comforting, since it is the realization or discovery that, as stated in Gravity’s Rainbow (703) 
“everything is connected”, a situation that might well be preferable to an anti-paranoid world,
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“where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not many of us can bear for long?’ (GR 
434). As Tanner observes: “both the [total] presence and absence of signs is disturbing” (176) 
since one or the other would mean either a “plotted or a plotless universe” (180).12 For exam­
ple, when Oedipagoes to the ladies room at the theater during intermission, she feels threatened 
by the blankness of walls devoid of graffitti. The pervasive and often sinister presence of the 
post-horn suggests a vast conspiracy, but a total lack of signs would imply the void. A 
“recurring dilemma” for Pynchon’s characters “is that to read history for its meaning is also to 
postulate connections among events in order to make them mean something” (Hite 702-3, italics 
given).
Paranoia is also an American political and cultural style. As form of representation, it 
was first analyzed three decades ago by the liberal historian Richard Hofstadter. Examples of 
collective paranoia in post-war US history abound: atomic espionage and McCarthyism in the 
Fifties, the Kennedy assassination in the early Sixties, the Southeast Asia “domino theory,” in 
the late Sixties etc. This view of paranoia is as a form of knowledge and fear of the intercon­
nectedness of monolithic systems. It is suggested at one point in the novel that the paranoid po­
litical climate of the Fifties, during which Oedipa grew up and was educated, has adequately 
equipped her as reader of signs, if not, as middle-class housewife, for the marches and sit-ins 
of fee countercultural Sixties. Another view of paranoia, fee one in this novel, is as a secret 
knowledge feat unifies those excluded by monolithic structures. Like Slade and Tanner, 
O’Donnell also perceives paranoia as method rather than content, that is, a way of seeing real­
ity as “interconnected or networked” (“Paranoia” 182), a “hyperbolic metonymizing of reality” 
which is a “mirror-image” of the incorporalive aspects of late capitalism that Frederic Jameson 
discusses: international capital and division of labor, advanced technologies and communica-
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tion networks, etc. (Jameson, “Postmodernism” xix). Building on Foucault’s theory of the
constitution of the self, O’Donnell suggests that this pervasive cultural paranoia “arises within
the construction of the ‘knowing’ subject” within these contemporary political realities (183).
The disparate paranoid organizations and lost individuals of Crying, in this view, gain identity
as unified subjects in their perception of a powerful world:
Within the realm of the obvious [referring to Baudrillard’s “transparency prin­
ciple” in which everything is visible], saturated by information overload, the 
paranoid subject is disempowered by virtue of the all-encompassing plots and 
systems...[but] paradoxically...empowered as one in a growing army capable of 
reading the signs of these plots and power relations, not to resist or escape them 
but to formulate an ironic, streetwise attitude toward them...knowing it confers a 
kind of legitmacy upon the knower (190).
After her night-time experience, Oedipabegins to understand this about the “growing 
army” of diverse down-and-outs she meets and their connection to Tristero. Individually, she 
feels impotent and afraid to speak out against the “gutlessness” of her society, as she realizes 
when she hears the merchant of a shop dealing in Nazi regaiia announce his plans to increase 
production of swastikas (“This is America, you live in it, you let it happen,” she rebukes her­
self, 150). Tristero, however, offers an opportunity for collective action. Without forgetting its 
sinister aspects, she feels moments of optimism when she thinks of the possibilities of a new 
order. Stephen Donadio says that “paranoia is the last sense of community left us” (qtd. by 
O’Donnell, New Essays 8), the feeling that Oedipa will come to have for Tristero. Her para­
noia has taught her about patterns of control (Slade, “Pynchon” 218), but she remains uncertain, 
as Tanner says (180), whether she is developing the intricacies of paranoia or discovering 
America The two processes may in fact be the same thing.
Oedipa knows that there is a chance of the conspiracy itself being not a paranoid fantasy 
but real, and her discovery of it accidental; chance, like Fortuna in V., is a real factor. In that
case, San Narciso might be no different from any other American town, and she might have 
found Tristero “anywhere in the Republic,” as she tries to make sense of “what Inveriarity left 
behind, never suspecting that the legacy was America” (178). If the true legacy is not merely the 
forged stamps of “lot 49” to be auctioned at the end, but “America” itself, its meaning and the 
“lot” (fate) of all its people, the quest can never be completed, and so remains finally ambigu­
ous, a failed grand narrative, since the America she seeks is itself ambiguous. Like Inveriarity’s 
estate (= state?), it is vast, powerful, manipulative, and yet contains its down-and-out under­
side, the powerless and the poor, Foucault’s disenfranchised, outcast, excluded social elements. 
“How many shared Tristero’s secret?” she wonders, fantasizing about redistributing the estate 
to the nameless bums and drifters that inhabit, in Michael Harrington’s phrase of the Sixties,
“the other America”
The alternate spelling ‘Tystero” suggests Tristero’s ambiguity: both the sadness of ex­
clusion and waste, a residue of the possibility of what America might have become, and the 
terror of renewed resistance and possibility (Tanner 177). Hie US mail system represents or­
ganization, rationalization, efficiency, centralized control, official communication systems, 
while Tristero is a personal system, functioning on the margins of the official one, or even off of 
it, as fee mute in Thum and Taxis’ post-horn and fee concealed water-marks on US-issue 
stamps suggest In theories of agency that focus on how people cope wife dominant forces (as 
opposed to theories of subjectivity feat focus on fee forces of domination)—social agents are 
“creative, not so much in fee production of resources as in the use to which they put those feat 
are available to them” (Fiske 21).13 Ifthe conspirators, who “constitute the wasted energy of 
the American social machine” (Harris 95) are “a calculated withdrawal from the life of fee 
Republic, from its machinery” (Crying 124). That is, they do not engage in direct confrontation
with the goverament-it is too powerful for that--but they do not accept their situation passively 
either, making the choice to establish “an alternative culture within the interstices of the old” 
(Kolodny & Peters 82), a notion that recalls both SimmeFs spaces of resistance, which arise 
from the inability of any dominating system to achieve total control, and Foucault’s “lateral” 
relations of power, where domination is resisted at a local level in the spaces left by official 
discourses and practices. John Fiske argues, following Foucault, that official power encom­
passes both structure and practice, while popular agency, held in check in structural relations, 
works through controlling practices at a local level, a situation that forms complicit rather than 
confrontational social relations, i.e. ofthe type Tristero conspirators indulge in: ”...X number 
of Americans are truly communicating while reserving their lies, recitations of routine, and arid 
betrayals of spiritual poverty for the official government delivery service” (128).
Oedipa thinks of these excluded agents and their relation to official systems of communi­
cation, “swung among a web of telephone wires, living in the very copper rigging and secular 
miracle of communication, untroubled by the dumb voltages flickering their miles, the night 
long, in the thousands of unheard messages” (180). The system may belong to the government 
but verbal communication belongs to everyone. “She remembered drifters she had listened to, 
Americans speaking their language carefully, scholarly, as if they were in exile from some­
where else, invisible yet congruent with the cheered land she lived in” (180). The alternative 
postal system of Tristero utilizes letters, the most non-technological form of communication 
besides actual speech; it is a postal system in a world where letter-writing is almost a lost art, 
a system which, with its wino mail-carriers, “waste” baskets for mail-boxes, and misspelled 
post-marks, mocks official order and language, “words themselves traduced” (Karl 366), like 
file comically overdetermined names of the characters.
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While waiting for lot 49, Oedipa speculates on another kind of waiting, waiting like Elli­
son’s invisible man for an alternative America beyond the reduced possibilities of Inveriarity’s 
America, the America she once slept with. Her lyrical vision calls up the green promise of Jay 
Gatsby’s lost continent and the wonder at how and why it all went wrong, but it is characteristic 
of a contemporary perception that the narrowing of possibility implied by the official logic of 
information (which excludes “excluded middles,” a logical term indicating what does not be­
long in precise, Aristotelian syllogisms), is represented by the reductive binary circuitry of the 
computer:
The waiting above all; if  not for another set of possibilities to replace those that 
had conditioned the land to accept any San Narciso among its most tender flesh 
without a reflex or cry, then at least, at the very least, waiting for a symmetry of 
choices to break down, to go askew. She had heard all about excluded middles; 
they were bad shit, to be avoided; and how had it happened here, with the 
chances so good for diversity? For now it was like walking among matrices of 
a great digital computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like bal­
anced mobiles right and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hiero­
glyphic streets there would be a transcendent meaning or only the earth (181).
If, as Tristero’s motto W.AS.T.E. indicates, their conpiratorial strategy consists o f“waiting 
above all; if not for another set of possibilities... then at least..for a symmetry of choices to 
break down” (181). The either/or choice of the last sentence in the passage is implicitly de­
nied. The unresolved resolution of the novel can be seen as a refusal of the symmetrical 
“either/or” structure of the paranoid Fifties, the Communist/American alternative of McCarthy 
and Dulles and their ilk (Kolodny and Peters 79). The symmetry of choices in the novel in­
cludes the binary symmetry of the radical Manichean Scurvhamites and the 0/1 of technological 
hardware, with their reductive systems and exclusion of multiple possibilities. This would 
suggest that the members of Tristero wait for their lost inheritance, America and its original 
lost or betrayed possibilities (Harris 98): “How it had happened here?” At the very least,
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Tristero offers the possibility of “areal alternative to the exitlessness, to the absence of sur­
prise in life, that harrows the head of everybody American...” (Crying 170).
No commentators on the novel, however, seem to have been troubled by the “Empire” in 
W.AS.T.E. and the possibility of its monolithic emergence from a conspiratorial organization: 
the rise of the Soviet Union and its empire from Lenin’s oppositional organization is the most 
notable modem historical example. Thai was, to be sure, “an alternative to the political and 
economic system” of the US and historically not likely to happen there, but what Pynchon would 
seem to substitute is not another empire to replace the present one but “the idealized anarchy 
Jesus Arrabel dreams of’ (Harris 98), the radical freedom of the deaf-mutes whose convention 
dance Oedipa is swept up in, each delegate dancing to his own rhythms and somehow, miracu­
lously, not colliding with the others. The image evokes Thoreau’s radical anarchy of each man 
marching to his own drummer and a utopian society of no central control. By virtue of their very 
differentness, however, the various excluded groups would not be likely to constitute a single 
community (Johnston 67). In this reading, Crying becomes a novel of its time, reflecting the 
frustrations in the 1960s at the failure of mainstream politics to effect change and the failure of 
the utopian hopes of the counter-culture.
c.
It may be of interest at this point to briefly compare Pynchon’s Crying o f  Lot 49 with 
Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy, its exact contemporary (both published in 1966), since both novels, 
structured around a quest plot, deal with fee power of systems, conspiracies, and technology, 
but in ways that are different enough to suggest how postmodernist texts may be distinguished in 
their political perceptions. Both novels narrate the quest of a protagonist, Barth’s for personal 
identity, in a picaresque, loosely digressive mode, and Pynchon’s for a national destiny and
meaning, in a tightly organized circular pattern of repetitive images more appropriate to a para­
noid vision of society. Both novels employ the central Western myth of Oedipus, Barth parodi- 
cally, but with parallels, such as the search for origins, that go beyond parody; Pynchon, ironi­
cally, in that the protagonist’s determination does not avail her of final meaning Both novels 
are concerned with systems: in Barth’s, a humanoid computer with positive and negative func­
tions, which turns out to be penetrated by and intimately related to the protagonist In Pynchon, 
the system is an unknown quantity whose positive and negative functions remain in balance: a 
millenial conspiracy involving sinster acts of violence and transgression or an adversary of a 
potentially more dangerous system, the political and economic system of the United States.
Barth’s notion that people are literally created by a technological system suggests Fou- 
caultian notions of how they are culturally “produced.” Conspiracy in Giles is related either to 
Giles’s aim to change the computer’s destructive program or allegorically to political events of 
the time and their psychological effects, what Hofstader called the “paranoid style in American 
politics,” which sees conspiracy everywhere and so devises other, real ones, to combat them. 
Conspiracy in Crying is more harrowing for being ambiguous, and for the “fear and revulsion 
before the new and ever more systematized conditions of industrial society” evoked rather than 
allegorized (Jameson, qtd. by Berthoff42). Barth’s novel ends not ambiguously but inconclu­
sively.
While Crying is a model of concision, Barth’s Giles is a centrifugal work that attempts 
Garcia Marquez’s notion of a “total novel,” what Frederick Karl calls “a complete world 
made possible through artifact,” so all-inclusive that it transforms the Cold War of the Fifties 
into the campus revolts of die Sixties, subsuming under die reigning fiction of “campus” every­
thing in American experience (Karl 284,463), and in the process becoming either a sensational
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failure (Karl), a brilliant frivolity (Tanner), in which “the illusion of a single coherent model of 
reality being erected is constantly negated” (247), or a major fictional achievement (Scholes). 
The ‘‘frolicsome evasion” charged by Tanner (240) may be mitigated somewhat by the novel’s 
satirical devices and by Barth’s apparent desire to show up an essential gamesmanship of do­
mestic and international politics, as well as an indulgence in Barth’s own stated preference for 
fiction with “a sense of game, invention for its own sake” (Stevick 216). Here, however, Tan­
ner is surely right when he opines that Pynchon produces a serious study of consciousness in 
contemporary America, while Barth simply mocks plots at excessive length, which is ultimately 
sterile and boring since it provides no “compensating new sources of interesf ’ (180).
Crying, although it has no direct historical reference, better evokes its time and place, 
showing in the cultural perceptions of the Sixties how rationalization has eroded human rela­
tionships, post-industrialism has “overlaid fee world of nature with comprehensive artifice” 
and its networks become so pervasive that the human dimensions of the world are no longer 
comprehensible (Slade 213). Tanner’s suggestion of the characteristic feeling in contemporary 
American fiction that “[i]f there has to be a system...then I will make very sure that it is a sys­
tem of my own choosing and making” might apply to both novels, but in Barth, it seems, the 
question is of individual choice. Verbalizing is a way to live in reality even when it is inade­
quate to explain it. His heroes play with the configurations of language without really believing 
in them. Language is primary for Barth and his characters tend to take the line of the first part of 
Tanner’s statement quoted at the beginning of the Introduction to Pt II, that the unpatterned, un­
conditioned life is somehow possible. The second part of the statement, that patterns are im­
posed from without, is Pynchon’s view and seems much closer to rendering contemporary 
American experience, as the cultural condition of paranoia would suggest
»d.
To discuss Pynchon’s encyclopedic Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), which was compared by 
early critics to Joyce’s Ulysses and has been recently described as an “historical and cultural 
synthesis of western actions and fantasies” (Simon 55), in the detail with which the much 
briefer The Crying o f  Lot 49 has been treated would doubtless require a book even longer than 
the novel itself I shall therefore conclude this chapter on Pynchon with an epilogue that exam­
ines a few points in Gravity’s Rainbow relevant to my generaJ discussions of power in contem­
porary fiction, especially technological and corporate power.
Hie paranoia engendered by unknown powers in this novel is inspired by a mysterious 
conglomerate operating during and after the end of the Second World War. Called “The Firm” 
but usually identified only as ‘They,” it is feared, resented, unknown but knowing of dark se­
crets. Part of the paranoid vision is that the apparatus of war, physical and bureacratic, is 
“simply another function of the overarching industrial complex that runs the world, and that the 
war is used by the real rulers of the world as a means of redistributing raw materials, industry, 
and power” as well as making individuals more amenable to control and direction (Muste 15). 
Except for this last provision, the war itself has little to do with human beings. As the black 
Herrero leader Enzian puts it: “It means the War was never political at all, the politics was all 
theatre, all just to keep the people distracted...secretly, it was being dictated instead by the 
needs of technology...The real crises were crises of allocation and priority... among the different 
Technologies, Plastics, Electronics, Aircraft, and their needs which are understood only by the 
ruling elite” (521). It is to the point that the extraordinary rise of American corporate power 
historically corresponds to its importance in war-time productioa The Firm is thus a metaphor 
for the new power of multinationals, which was becoming manifest during the 1960s, when
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Pynchon was planning his novel. Such firms by definition go beyond national boundaries, con­
trolling information and technological networks and by extension the socio-political forces 
within them. They have taken over the old “corporate nationality” of firms like General Motors 
or US Steel, which “once incarnated fee wealth and well-being of the nation in the 1950s” 
(Wilson 223).
The national scope of Crying is accordingly expanded to the entire post-war western 
world and even beyond (African schwarzkommandos, Argentine anarchists in a stolen subma­
rine, etc.)14 and by the lack of any direct break between wartime and the immediate postwar 
period, since profit and not national goals is the only motive for such firms. Ideologies give 
way to strategic alliances with either side, and Americans and Brits, Russians and Germans 
make deals among one another: “The real business of the war is buying and selling. The mur­
dering and the violence are self-policing and can be left to non-professionals...The true war is a 
celebration of markets” (GR 105). Despite its being relegated to second place in this quote, the 
violence is hardly incidental to the business. As Slsde points out, “[sjince They include gener­
als and admirals as well as politicians on boards of directors in the interlocking companies, the 
cartels can control the actual destruction during die war, either by direct command or simply by 
exchanging the materiel of war between themselves” (Pynchon 179).
That business blurs the line between war and peace is, as we have seen, not new to Pyn­
chon. A number of novels about die Second World War have suggested that war is “a manifes­
tation of economic and social control” (Muste 15). It will be recalled, for example, that Gen­
eral Cummings in Mailer’s The Naked and the Dead wants to extend die organizational appara­
tus of war to peacetime use in pursuit of American domination, and Milo Minderbender in 
Heller’s Catch-22 disregards national conflicts to build up a transnational syndicate whose
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only goal is profit One important difference in Pynchon from these previous perceptions is the 
pervasiveness of the Firm and its essential invisibility, hi the novel, “They” are both more 
powerful and less knowable than the highly visible wartime political leaders Roosevelt, Chur­
chill, Stalin, and Hitler. As was seen with Foucault, power does not consist in a substantive 
instance or agency of sovereignty, but its mechanisms are distributed among different centers 
and not unified at a single point, such as a state: the novel’s “Rocket-City” is accordingly 
everywhere and nowhere, both fixed and flowing points of power, and a state of mind That is 
to say, ‘They” represent the institutions and methods of late capitalism but also the state of mind 
which makes it a system that is productive, unequally distributive, and destructive: ‘Taking and 
not giving back, demanding that ‘productivity’ and ‘earnings’ keep on increasing with time, the 
System removing from the rest of the World these vast quantities of energy to keep its own tiny 
desperate fraction showing a profit” (412). The disturbing contemporary notion that the victory 
of capitalism is now complete, that it cannot be destroyed precisely because of its pervasive­
ness and invisibility is foreseen in the novel by Father Rapier: “It is possible that They will not 
die. That it is now within the state of Their art to go on forever—though we, of course, will 
keep on dying as we always have. Death has been the source ofTheir power”(539). There is 
evidently an increase in pessimism between the former novel and this one. There are no viable 
alternatives offered to Their power (fee “Counterforce ” for example, fails in its mission) and 
Their control is perceived to be actually increasing, just as Foucault maintained, with the means 
of domination supplied by the developing physical and human sciences.
Historically, fee Zone suggests fee war-zone, i.e. where battles take place, of fee war 
proper, and the partitioning of Germany into zones by the Allies at fee end of fee war, as well 
as fee entire postwar western world It also shares much wife fee surreal, frontierless anarchy,
lawlessness, and menace of Burroughs’s Interzone: 'There are no zones but the Zone” (GR 
333). The Zone is both a proto-capitalist (“like the very earliest days of the mercantile sys­
tem,” 336) and late capitalist world since, as Slothrop learns, “drugs, sex, luxury items,” the 
classic currencies of war-torn zones are no longer the real currency, since “information is the 
only real medium of exchange” (258). The Zone is also “a void not yet rationalized” (Slade, 
Pynchon 204) and so a locale of possible escape or at least temporary evasion from Their sys­
tem, although Slothrop becomes the center of multiple systems of surveillance there by Them, 
who are tracking him for mysterious ends, in one instance at least, to neutralize the threat of 
Enzian’s black troops, who are building a rocket (00001) of their own. “They” may be unnamed 
Allied forces, secret organizations and spy networks, but also Russians, Germans, western cor­
porations like Shell, as well as I.G. Farben, the war-production group that totally controlled 
the German war-effort, from even before the war (GR 631). Tchitcherine posits a transnational 
“rocket-cartel,” “[a] structure cutting across every agency human and paper that ever touched it. 
Even to Russia... “Russia bought from Krupp, didn’t she, from Siemens, the IG...?” (566).
Hie Firm functions according to “a mind-set derived from rationalization” (Slade, 
“Pynchon” 214), the characteristic feature Weber identified in modem power systems, which, 
according to him, leads both to emancipation from traditional “behavior” as opposed to action 
properly speaking, and inevitably to instrumental rationality, abstr act rules, and bureaucratiza­
tion (Raynaud 1280-81), a tendency that has become even more pronounced in an era of tran­
snational business. Weber is explicitly invoked in the meditations on the postwar scene by Dr. 
Rozavolgyi on the war as a result of the “Fuhrer-principle”: “...if personalities could be re­
placed by abstractions of power, if  techniques developed by the corporations could be brought 
to bear, might not nations live rationally? one of the dearest Postwar hopes: that there should
be no room for a terrible disease like charisma” (GR 81). Weber, who was not writing from the 
post-Fascist perspective of 1945, was not nearly so afraid of charismatic leaders, since cha­
rismatic power, he believed, is inherently unstable, depending as it does on the continued belief 
in the charismatic leader. Furthermore, Weber thought charismatic figures, who had an essen­
tially irrational appeal, might alter overrationalized systems. He was correspondingly more 
wary of the inherently stable character of impersonal bureaucracratic power, precisely of the 
type the doctor thinks the new world situation calls for, but which, Pynchon suggests, may be 
worse than the disease it is supposed to cure. Hie Counterforce and other oppositional organi­
zations, which would oppose Them, fail because they too are limited by rationalizatioa This 
need not mean total control is inevitable, since entropy works on closed highly-ordered bureau­
cratic systems even more effectively than in nature. The novel shows that rationality in a world 
of chance is “absorbed into the irrational, or into forms of doom, as rapidly as it asserts itself’ 
(Karl 450). The chaos of the Zone is concomitant with the freedom from bureaucratic control 
enjoyed there (Slade 214-15). Again, as in Crying, anarchy rather than resistance seems for 
Pynchon to be the viable alternative.
The characters at the White Visitation, indulging in bizarre pseudo-scientific experiments 
“the thrust of the maniacal and irrational into logical and rational plans” (Karl 448, note), con­
stantly worry about what They know, and nearly all the huge cast of characters will each in his 
or her own way feel this power in their lives. In reoccupied France, the protagonist Tyrone 
Slothrop finds himself involved in incidents meant to confuse his identity, a process that “They” 
employ in the interest of control. As Foucault argued, the abstract conception of who we are is 
to a certain extent determined, and the power that institutions have over people comes in a large 
part from their ability to deny them their individuality. For Slothrop to claim his identity, he
must escape the systems that define him, but that turns out to be inpossible. The fragmentation, 
physical and emotional, seen in V. and Crying is carried to an extreme here with the fragmen­
ting of Slothrop’s very being at the end, and is shown at another level by the pairing and spli­
tting of various characters.
Paranoia is, as might be expected, the existential mode. Slothrop, for example, fears that 
he will be blown to bits (“just zero, just nothing”) by a rocket with his name on it, but beyond 
this specific fear (which will turn out to be justified only in reverse and in a metaphorical sen­
se, since his pursuit of the rocket leads to disintegration), a less specific paranoia cannot be 
shaken off: 'There are times when Slothrop actually can find a clutch mechanism between him 
and Their iron-cased engine far away up a power train whose shape and design he has to guess 
at...Bui he can’t fit any of it into a pattern...” (207). If the paranoid’s feeling for connectiveness 
seemingly eludes him, he does feel feat he might be controlled from without: “all his life of 
what has looked free or random is discovered to’ve been under some control, all the time...” 
(209). He is pursued by major Harvey’s gang in Germany and another group in Zurich, but are 
the two connected? The ramifications are complex and seemingly interconnected in the by now 
familiar paranoid mode.
Slothrop is part of an elaborate plot to discover what gives him the ability to detect V-2 
rocket bombs directed by the Germans onto London in the last years of the war. As with Mailer, 
sex and power tend to be linked. Slothrop’s semiotic indicator is his penis, since his erections 
correspond to the incoming rockets and his potency contrasted as a vital principal to the rock­
ets’ death principle. Slothrop, who becomes “the rocketman,” a title suggesting a comic-sfcrip 
hero, fucks nearly all the female characters, but the equation of (potent) penis and (sterile) 
penile rocket will have more negative implications, with the thrusting masculine principle when
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devoid of its biological base seen as antithetical to nature. As one character meditates: “love, 
among these men...had to do with masculine technologies, with contracts, with winning and 
losing...Beyond simple steel erections, the Rocket was an entire system won, away from the 
feminine darkness, held against the entropies of loveable but scatterbrained Mother Nature”
(GR 324). This is what Captain Blicero (“Lord of Death”), who is Lt. Weissman carried over 
from the siege party massacre in V., and here the SS coordinator of the final rocket project in 
Germany, must learn “to understand truly his manhood” (324). Weissman/Blicero is sexually 
linked to the leader of the Counterforce, the Herero chief Oberst Enzian, who had been 
Blicero’s slave-lover in Africa This is hardly a Mailer celebration of masculine virility, since 
the love triangle of rocket-Blicero-Enzian is homosexual and fetishist (and therefore sterile).
Slothrop’s peculiarity will turn out to have conditioned during his infancy by the sinister 
Pavlovian, Lazio Jamf, and financed by LG. Farben. Jampf thinks Slothrop is a threat to the 
world, perhaps because, since Slothrop reacts to the stimulus in advance, his erections are a 
reversal of the usual cause and effect relation, an analogue of the rocket itself, which explodes 
before its incoming sound is heard (Karl 448-9). Jamf, a tnie professor on the inanimate, is 
also the inventor of Imoplex G, the synthetic plastic used in the rocket As he tells his chemistry 
students: “stay behind with carbon and hydrogen [i.e. the chemistry of organic life] or move 
beyond. Silicon, boron, phosphorous...move beyond life, toward the inorganic... Here is no 
frailty, no mortality” (580). The ultimate rocket, Blicero’s 00000 “simple steel erection,” is 
Weber’s true charismatic figure (“It really did possess a Max Weber charisma,” 464), pursued 
and venerated by so many but feted in this capacity to frustrate, like the obsessed engineer 
Pokier who sacrifices his wife and daughter in a concentration camp to his transcendent vision 
of the ultimate fetish-object, or the schismatic branch of the exiled Africans ('ihe Empty Ones”)
“in love with the glamor of a whole people’s suicide” (310), devotees of‘The Doctrine of the 
Final Zero” (525), who, as victims of colonialism, prefer tribal suicide to succumbing to a 
“Christian death.” It is also, as a product of Weber’s rationalized power, the culmination of 
new technologies, ultimately sterile: designed to bring death, it is itself dead, as are those who 
are devoted to it.
The sterility of the rocket is extended to its internal parts, especially the magic plastic 
Imoplex (it is used as a wrapping for Gottfried, Blicero’s sex-slave who rides the final rocket 
in a futile attempt to give it life), “the first plastic that is actually erectile” (699, italics given), 
suggesting its substitution of living tissue, a “peculiar polymer” that can assume shapes ranging 
from rubbery amorphous to high resistance to shocks and temperatures of any kind. “Plastic” 
becomes much more than Mailer’s metaphor for the sterility of American life, although it is 
doubtless significant that the plastics that are to serve the German war machine were first de­
veloped at DuPont, an American company. The implied criticism also goes beyond the profit 
motive of Mailer’s charge (in 1959) that “the prosperity of America depends upon the produc­
tion of the means of destruction” (Advertisements 176-77). The prospect is much worse: that 
inanimate technologies have triumphed over organic nature itself (“Plasticity’s central canon: 
that chemists were no longer to be at the mercy ofNature” (299)) is a major theme in the novel 
and a tendency (cf the discussion of V.), Pynchon sees, together with colonialism, as leading to 
the culture of death: “plasticity’s victorious triad of Strength, Stability, and Whiteness..how 
often these were taken for Nazi graffitti” (250).
The culture of death means not just the products of technology, such as death-dealing 
weapons, but the rationalizing process itself that leads to inanimateness, and loss of choice, 
spontaneity and vitality. The dominance over nature of applied physics, chemistry, and mathe-
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malics in weapons technology is aided by the use of psychology for human control. It will be 
recalled that Foucault’s delineation of the development of the social sciences posited normaliz­
ing patterns of behavior for subjugating human populations with greater efficiency and less 
“cost” The two scientists interested in Slothrop and the V-2 as corroboration of their theories 
are illustrative of a science in the service of the inanaimate vs. a science more responsive to the 
complexity of life: Pointsman, aPavlovian behaviorist, and Roger Mexico, a statistician of 
random events. Mexico, whose science resides in “the domain between zero and one—the 
middle Pointsman has excluded from his persuasions—the probabilities” (GR 55) and who 
eventually abandons his research for a woman and “a kind of existential anarchy,” is obviously 
more sympathetic to Pynchon than Pointsman, who goes mad in the Zone (the contemporary 
world), where his too rigid sense of cause and effect makes no sense (Morgan 203). Pointsman 
as a principle of anti-life is also shown by the episode in which he nearly castrates Slothrop. 
Yet, Mexico and a number of other sympathetic characters who try to resist the system— 
Slothrop, Katje Borgesius, Pirate Prentice, for example—are all involved in some aspect of 
psychological warfare and serve to some extent the war-making functions of the Firm (Muste 
16). They often discover much later that they have been manipulated by 'Them” even while 
thinking they were acting independently (Slothrop) or as part of the opposition (Prentice).
The Rocket is also pursued by a number of others, each for his own reason; one character 
even thinks of it as a Text to be annotated and explicated, and there are frequent references to it 
as the “Grail,” the rocket that is the “visionary apocalyptic missile.” Like the quest objects of 
V. and Crying, it never materializes and the questers one by one burn out in the attempt The 
quest in this novel, however, is both for areal and a symbolic object, for unlike V. and 
WASTE, there is no question that real rockets exist nor that they have the power to destroy ur­
ban civilian populations (Morgan 203), like the V-2 rockets that wrought havoc and terror on 
London in 1944. At the same time, the technology that has made the rocket possible represents 
the new physics of relativity and quantum theory that envisions a world of probability, inde­
terminacy, and mathematical descriptions of tilings interconnected in space-time. The new 
physics has supplanted the older classical physics of cause and effect, the relation between 
objects and forces, which is the basis of “Theii^’ authority (Slade, Pynchon 215). Science is 
therefore not inevitably bad, since it may serve as the basis for metaphysically undermining 
Their dominance. The arc that the V-2 traces in the sky is an image of a dual function in the 
novel: its metaphysically romantic promise of an escape from gravity and the earth, and the 
inevitable return to earth as a bomb, the path tracing the parabola that so mesmerized General 
Cummings of Mailer’s first novel. The first half of the flight is, of course, illusory since it 
implies the second, but it captivates a number of people in the novel, most notably Captain 
Blicero, who make the rocket a veritable fetish object of their private and collective obses­
sions.
A rocket as a cultural icon and fetichized object is not only a product of a novelist’s 
imagination, as can be seen in the recent historical example of a president’s and the media’s 
promotion of the Patriot missile as virtual hero of the Gulf War. Flanked by two Patriots 
painted red, white, and blue. President Bush, showing a “belief in the technological sublime as 
an agent of historical redemption,” gave a speech (1991) at the Raytheon plant praising both the 
missile and its local manufacturers as patriotic (Wilson 219). Bush’s mythicizing of a techno­
logical product is even more relevant to Pynchon’s fiction in that, as it was later pointed out, 
some of the missile’s most “intelligent” components were manufactured in foreign countries. 
Bush’s oversight illustrates the obsolete notion of nationalism in the postmodern economy, “an
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international matrix of sign-flow and cash-flow that recognizes no national boundaries beyond 
increasing profits of mega-capital and the mandates of technological innovation” (Wilson 223).
NOTES
1 This description, based on the theories of mathematician Norbert Wiener and physicist Her­
bert Clausius, is summarized in Harris (77). Lord Kelvin (1852) said that the second law of 
thermodynamics is “a universal tendency to the dissipation of mechanical energy” (qtd. in 
Hayles 110). See also Koslowski (142-43).
A
Prof Sergio Bellei points out that Poe anticipated this development in his short story, “The 
Man That Was Used Up.”
Interestingly, this deaih-by-disassembly will become a feature in contemporary sci-fi films:
e.g. Alien (1979), The Terminator (1984), Robocop (1987).
4 Some critics have identified V with Robert Graves’ figure of the White Goddess, a major 
European myth of the eternal feminine. Graves is concerned in his work about the debasement 
of the myths that the White Goddess embodied and the rise of the pseudo-religions of science 
and technology (Henkle 209). As I have argued, Pynchon is himself concerned about the latter 
but his V is, if anything, a parody of Graves’ goddess and he does not advocate anything so re­
gressive as a return to the mythic.
5 These notions are important in Nabokov’s novels. The narrator of The Real Life o f  Sebastian 
Knight (who happens to be called “V”), like Stencil, discovers that his subject has assumed 
several identities (Henkle 208).
6 Petillon points out that the plot and situation of Crying—estate, cryptic will, secret society, 
etc.—closely resembles another novel, The Conversions by Harry Matthews (1962). There has 
been the usual ingenious speculation about the title. “Crying’’ and “lot” are the technical terms
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for auction announcements, as the reader learns on the last page. A lot can also be a “plot” of 
land, with the usual play on that favorite postmodernist word: the lot is a plot, “a circumscribed 
place (perhaps agameboard)” and the narrative plot is a secret plot which if revealed “will 
demonstrate only the machinations of a game” (Castillo 27). The number 49 may allude to He­
xagram 49 in the I Ching, “revolutionwhich always begins in conspiracy, or to Psalm 49: 
“one who dies shall take nothing with him,” perhaps a reference to Inveriarity. The 49th day 
after Easter on the liturgical calendar is fee day before (awaiting) Pentecost, and fee 49 days in 
fee Tibetan Book o f  the Dead, etc. (Petillon 137). Inveriarity’s name suggests Sherlock Hol­
mes’s nemesis. Dr. Moriarity, and Conan Doyle actually wrote a story (1892) called “Lot 249” 
(Meikle 287), or a portmanteau derived from “inverse rarity,” a philatelic term (Duyfhuizen 
82). All of this is compatible with Pynchon’s formidable erudition.
Prof Sergio Bellei adds feat it also suggests a universe of infinitely reversible signs, in which 
the search for origins is pointless.
* Pynchon, who started college as an engineering student, has experience wife fee military- in­
dustrial complex, having worked for Boeing aircraft in Seattle for two and a half years, writing 
technical documents (Winston 284-85).
9 In an interesting example of fee postmodernist conflation of life and art, muted post-homs 
began to appear as griffitti across fee US within a year of fee publication of Pynchon’s novel 
(Kolodny and Peters 79). This might also be a refutation of Gore Vidal’s contention feat hardly 
anyone in the country reads novels nowadays.
10 The theme also suggests Borges: fee story “fee Babylon Library,” for example, is about an 
organization called The Company. See Tanner’s discussion (45-46).
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11 Slade points out (174) that Inveriarity is the name of a village in Scotland near Dundee, seat
of the Protestant Reformation under John Knox.
12 “Chaos or totalitarian order, meaninglessness or paranoia; void or dark design—these are 
the polalrities of Thomas Pynchon’s oeuvre’’ (O’Donnell, New Essays 2).
13 Slade (139) tells of the “black box” conspiracy in the US of the late Sixties and early Seven­
ties that managed to feed off the Bell telephone monopoly: some people developed a device that 
imitated the tones that trigger telephone circuits and could thereby call anywhere in the world 
without paying fees, yet another example of fee interconnection of life and art
14 Rowe (185) says feat scholars still find precise historical details in Gravity’s Rainbow that 
are disguised as fantastic episodes.
CHAPTER 8
a
Criticism has been slow to recognize the relevance of Don DeLillo, but his work takes 
up most of the themes discussed with respect to power and postmodernism. As a novelist who 
began publishing in the early Seventies but came to academic recognition mainly in the Eight­
ies, DeLillo has arguably taken over from Pynchon as the American novelist most in tune with 
the public history of his time. He has recognized that power in the contemporary world is 
shifting and invisible; and again and again he refers to “the connections between language and 
power, and to the confusing fluidity of both” (Kucich 335). If, as Foucault has shown, those 
who control the word have the power to both undermine and construct personal and social 
identities (Poster 79-80; Guareshi et al. 15), DeLillo is concerned with resisting the tendency 
of some “languages” to usurp the free play and multiple possibilities of language, to impose a 
univocal pattern which is analogous to and complicit with political systems of control and 
domination. His novels, as we shall see, propose alternative strategies, illustrating Bakhtinian 
heteroglossia (cf. Introd. sec.H), the theory that texts produce conflicts of competing dis­
courses, which may supplement or contradict each other, be juxtaposed or interrelated 
(“Discourse in the Novel” 292).
DeLillo tries to identify the radical structural changes in our consumer/information era, 
what Jameson calls the multinational or world stage of late capitalism, “whose principle of 
structural intelligibility is for the first time virtually completely invisible to the individual 
subjects whose lives it organizes-'’ (Rev. of Names, 116). DeLillo’s “America” is populated 
not by things but by simulacra and is not so much a place as a system of codes that determine
POWER IN THE WORLD/POWER IN THE WORD: DON DEULLO
and control people’s consciousness. The postmodern metropolis is, as with Pynchon, the field 
of action: “‘Elsewhere,’” which is “mapped geographically in the popular imagination of the 
modernist era,” is mapped in DeLillo’s novels “geologically, as the subterranean segment of a 
global political and economic circuitry, the world of conspiracy” (McClure 105). What re­
sults is a generalized paranoia of a society of nearly total surveillance. As one of his charac­
ters says, “When technology reaches a certain level, people begin to feel like criminals...The 
facts about you and your whole existence have been collected” (Running Dog 93; Shapiro 
129).
In his most Pynchon-like novel, Ratner's Star (1976), which invites comparison with 
Gravity’s Rainbow, science, technology, knowledge, information glut, and corporate power 
come together in a story of a sequestered group of oddball scientists assembled to decipher a 
message from outer space.1 The promise of science-fiction gives way to the fictions of sci­
ence and the largest of several “looking-glass” inversions when it is discovered that the mes­
sage was originally sent from earth. The emphasis is “on the ungrounded nature of knowl­
edge” (Hite 719). Mathematics, which the author has called fee most secret of public com­
munications systems, is fee field of fee boy-genius protagonist who deciphers the message, the 
prediction of an unexpected eclipse from a vanished race of people. The scientists, who are 
really quirky theories expressed in extended monologues rather than communicating charac­
ters, recall Swift’s members of fee Royal Academy and their absurd experiments in the Third 
Voyage of Gulliver's Travels (Day 77). They eventually abandon interest in fee content of 
fee message to try to create a metalanguage that may control all future messages. Self- 
absorbed projects and a science in pursuit of an apolitical knowledge are exposed in fee form 
of a multinational cartel run by Elux Truxl, who wants to use advanced science to control fee
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international “money curve” and manipulate financial markets. The novel thus gives both 
analogies and mathematical and technical contexts for corporate power (Molesworth 146,
155; Cain 271).
DeLillo’s preoccupation with the mass communications media has been evident from 
his first novel, Americana (1971). As a successful New York television executive, David 
Bell (the name recalls the telephone company), is afunctional part of the communications 
network, and yet he yearns for freedom from its all-encompassing influence. Bell himself is 
shown to be entirely shaped by the media. The son of an aggressively successful advertising 
executive whose motto is “move the merch,” i.e. sell the merchandise, and who keeps an ex­
tensive film library of TV commercials he constantly views with his son. Advertising is “the 
dream of entering the third person singular,” a substitute self for the empty one people feel 
they possess. Bell first feels “the true power of the image” as a boy when he sees a larger- 
than-life Burt Lancaster on a movie screen, which forms his image of solid masculinity. Later, 
he majors in film at college and as an adult continues not only to see movies after work but 
dresses and talks like a film star, exercising Hollywood seduction routines on his girl-friends. 
His wife he visualizes as someone on TV.
Weary of the organization men at his job and their diverse power plays, he takes the op­
portunity of a location assignment to film Indians in Arizona—the west as frontier and re­
newal—to realize a personal project of filming the major moments and characters of his life 
from scripts he works up on location in Ft Curtis, his midwestem home town. Since he uses 
substitutes, actors, for his characters and film is after all a communications medium, it is to be 
doubted that he has really “escaped” fee civilization of eastern corporate life. Nor is it clear 
whether the film is to communicate anything at ail, since it seems to be made only for himself.
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both film-maker and audience. Like Jack Burden ofWarren’s All the King’s Men, Bell feels 
he has to come to grips with his guilt in relation to his dead modier and the burden of his own 
past, yet it is to the point that Bell can only do so by making a film. Hie novel, accordingly, 
examines family psychology within mass communications technology (LeClair 33). It is not 
therefore an escape from the world to self, as in so many post-war novels seen so far, but, like 
White Noise (1985), an analysis of the reaction between private consciousness and mass sys­
tems. The quasi-madness of Bell’s mother and the kinds of disturbances of the competitive 
executives in New York (to which one might compare Heller’s alienated executives in 
Something Happened), for example, are not, or not merely, private obsessions.
Bell makes the film, creates substitute images of his past, to compensate for “object- 
loss,” much like Herbert Stencil pursuing in his own way the absent V. The film is also a 
way of integrating or rather reconstructing a dispersed self (LeClair 42-3). The film as repre­
sentation is complicated by the fact that it is “seen” only through Bell’s verbal description of 
i t  via a book he is now writing, and we are reading, about his past, a removal both spaiiai (he 
writes from somewhere out of the country) and temporal (the writing takes place years after 
the film, which is itself filmed years after the events). Furthermore, the film only partially 
depicts events of Bell’s life; other events are imagined or improvised under his direction. He 
tries to use rather than escape the technology that has conditioned him and his culture.
When he goes from mid-west to far west, however, Bell finds that the competitive, hier­
archical and alienated life ofNew York television executives differs in style but not in es­
sence (i.e. drink and sex) from that of the test-drivers in Texas, and the track itself may be a 
metaphor for the executive rat-race he thinks he has left behind (LeClair 48). The track is the 
space of the automobile, the network that of television, two different commodities that have
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transformed the space of the country, ihe first literally, the second electronically (47). The 
automobile both allowed people to explore the country (Kerouac’s beats in On the Road de­
pend on cars and Bell himself is on a classic spiritual road trip of his own), and helped them 
despoil it, but television has transformed people from questing (if aggressive) agents to es­
sentially passive consumers, with its one-way and spatially intrusive (“Senders”) transmis­
sions that Burroughs saw as the essence of control. There is both an economic and a symbolic 
parallel: “the television industry produces messages the way the auto industry produces ob­
jects” (47), but communication itself is in the service of commodities since TV exists mainly 
to sell products and the commercials really take precedence over the programs, as Bell’s fa­
ther admits. Baudrillard describes the situation as the transformation of a society in which the 
mode of production is dominant to one in which the code of production becomes primary 
(Kellner 61). Hie production of signs replaces the production of objects, with a resulting loss 
of value even for the products themselves, which as far as television is concerned are inter­
changeable. It is to the point that Beil’s television program “Soliloquy,” which features peo­
ple talking about their lives, i.e. an attempt to transmit human values, was canceled. Real 
people come second to commercials, as is shown in Bell’s own family, where his fattier ig­
nores his mother but remains ever absorbed by his film-library of recorded ads.
hi White Noise (1985), the two sites of experience are die supermarket and the televi­
sion screen, which turn out to be not so different since die potential solidity of food gives way 
to the insidious chemical ingredients, the gaudy packaging and glaring advertisements of su­
permarket offerings. Both supermarket and TV screen offer representations and are princi­
pally loci of desire (Goodhart 121-22). In the novel, the culture critic Murray Siskind affirms 
the plenitude of“psychic data” in both supermarket (WN 37) and television (51). Television
is more intrusive in this novel than in Americana-, in fact, everything here is “mediated.” The 
set is constantly on in the home of Jack Gladney and his family, breaking into the family’s 
conversations, even their dreams, as when Gladney hears his daughter murmur in sleep 
‘Toyota Celica.” He sees himself watching his children sleep as “a TV moment” His son 
Heinrich plays chess by mail with a convict who killed five people after hearing voices 
speaking directly to him from TV
A favorite family activity is watching disasters—earthquakes, fires, floods, explosions; 
it seems that the representation of death on the screen has a curiously anesthetizing power, 
with mortality reduced to spectacle (Siskind, for Ills part, gives a course at the college in “car 
crash movies”). Real danger in an information culture becomes illegible since the signs are 
commodified (Shapiro 129). The constant replay of mass death serves to reduce the anxiety 
of Gladney, obsessed with his own mortality, as does the academic mastery of mass death, in 
his role as Chairman of the Department of “Hitler Studies,” but these means tend to be inef­
fective. The sheer overload of data from technological culture—TV, radio, tabloids—threatens 
not only to drown out thought but signals the presence of death that the title alludes to 
(Saltzman 808). The language of this culture tends to the condition of noise, the entropic run­
ning down of meaning into undifferentiated sameness. One may try to defect from the lack of 
differentiation, the homogenizing effects of mass culture, but defection threatens disappear­
ance (810): “What if death is nothing but sound... Uniform, white” (WN 198).
The central plot device is an ecological disaster officially designated as “The Airborne 
Toxic Event” “We need an occasional catastrophe,” a colleague tells Gladney, “to break up 
the incessant bombardment of information” (66). The disaster is real, causing the family’s 
dislocation and Gladney himself to ingest a potentially lethal dose, and yet it can be experi­
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enced only as media information, which in this culture defines the real. The event 
“resembled a national promotion for death, a multimillion dollar campaign backed by radio 
spots, heavy print and billboard, TV saturation” (158). One might expect, for example, fee 
disaster to cause medical symptoms that would then be registered and reported, but Gladney’s 
daughters keep acquiring fee symptoms described in fee previous news broadcasts. The phe­
nomenon itself undergoes a descriptive transformation feat alters its reality from an innocent- 
sounding “feathery plume” to a more ominous '"black billowing cloud” to its final status in the 
bureaucratic euphemism “airborne toxic event” As fee author has said, this is “a language 
that almost holds off reality while at fee same time trying to fit it into a formal pattern” 
(DeCurtis, “Interview” 61).
Hie characters of White Noise, as in other novels, live in a world of simulacra, a virtual 
“mediocracv” (Crowfeer 20). When Gladney and Siskind go to see fee “most photographed 
bam in America,” Siskind says feat it is impossible to see fee bam once they have seen all its 
“signs,” the roadside signs, the photos, myriad descriptions of it Yet, fee opposite of Walter 
Benjamin’s prediction has come true. The reproduction of representations has not removed 
fee aura of fee authentic, Siskind says, but helped to maintain it: every photograph actually 
reinforces fee aura, in a collective perception outside of which one cannot stand Hie ultimate 
example of fee superior reality of fee simulacrum is during fee evacuation after fee disaster.
An organization called SIMUVAC is organizing fee evacuation, which Gladney points out is, 
after all, not simulated but real An employee replies that in fact fee organization is going to 
use fee real evacuation as a “model,” i.e. a chance to rehearse fee simulation.
b.
In at least three of DeLillo’s later novels. Players, Running Dog, and Mao 11, relations 
between politics, especially terrorist politics, corporate institutions, and the media are ex­
plored. Players (1977) is not DeLillo’s investigation of ganie-theory but of an urban couple’s 
inauthentic games at work, play, and politics. Lyle Wvnant is a broker at the New York Stock 
Exchange, that is, he indulges in a form ofhigh-stakes gambling through information gathering 
and sifting. The Exchange is “sealed off from the rest of the city,” “a secret system and rite to 
outshadow the evidence of men’s senses” (132). His wife Pammy professionally pretends to 
be serious about death in written brochures at an agency for “grief management” That her 
services hardly go beyond reifying emotion for profit is shown when she herself goes numb 
with grief and guilt at the grisly suicide of Jack Laws. Significantly, she succumbs to tears 
only while watching a film on television which she recognizes as a “bogus” tear-jerker. 
Emotion can only become real in media representation. For play, the Wynants have given up 
the usual yuppie pastime of discovering out-of-the-way restaurants and settled in to the bore­
dom of TV and the charge of extra-marital sex. Lyle in front of the TV is a “channel-surfer;” 
aimlessly changing channels and ignoring content, “jerking the dial into fresh image bums” 
(16), while his wife watches her set in another room, an index of their alienation (and a denial 
of McLuhan’s electronic hearth). Lyle says he feels bored by the three-dimensional bodies of 
the theater, “real space as opposed to the manipulated depth of film” (100). They socialize 
with the gay couple Jack and Ethan via witty but edgy conversation, skirting seriousness with 
defensive moves.2
Playing goes from contemporary alienation to contemporary menace, however, with 
Lyle’s involvement in a terrorist plot to bomb the Stock Exchange. Here, again, Lyle remains a 
game-player, “[fjitting human pieces into gaps on the board,” as he himself recognizes
(Players 145). He plays at being a terrorist without thinking too much about the meanings or 
implications of his acts; he plays off Marina and Kinnear against each other and informs on 
Marina to the police after going to bed with her. IfKinnear’s allegiance is always in doubt (a 
terrorist but somehow independent of Marina and her group, or an informer who leaks infor­
mation that he calls “disinformation”), Lyle plays all sides, giving “selective” information to 
Marina, Kiimear, and Buries, who may be a CIA agent A professional sorter and emitter of 
information, Lyle plays at detection: like Pynchon’s Oedipa Maas but without her paranoid' 
vision, he attempts to interpret the plot he has become involved in and fails to comprehend the 
central truth of Kinnear, who is politically and existentially ambiguous. Lyle cannot deter­
mine who Kinnear is working for and the end of the novel finds Lyle waiting for his call, in 
which he hopes to hear secret information about Kennedy’s assassin, another unresolved 
mystery, but nothing is forthcoming. Kinnear has simply vanished and Lyle is led literally 
holding the phone, his own “barely recognizable” shape “quickly” disappearing. As with 
Kinnear, who practices looking different in front of a mirror in order to assume varied identi­
ties and cannot be pinned down politically, the self in DeLillo’s fiction remains elusive, even 
at times non-existent, a sentimental notion from the period when character at least was not yet 
commodity. Lyle’s evaporation, of course, suggests a cinematic “fade-out,” the natural end, as 
it were, of his playing movie roles, the big screen being our culture’s most powerful mirror 
(Goodheart 118).
In the prologue, in which all the characters appear in a formal, mini-version of the 
novel, the yet unnamed Wynants watch an in-flight movie on an airplane, depicting terrorists 
murdering some businessmen on a golf-course. It is to the point that the spectators do not re­
spond to it as a political act but are merely entertained by the cocktail pianist’s (Kinnear?)
playfully ironic musical commentary to fee (soundless) film. “The Movie” prologue promotes 
an expectation of terrorist violence in fee story feat follows but fee bomb-plot Lyle is in­
volved in never takes place, in the by now familiar postmodernist denial of closure for a 
novel that promotes generic expectations of a “thriller.” The conspiracy itself is ambiguous. 
The terrorists belong to no apparent organization. The CIA agent never identifies himself as 
belonging to the Agency. A man is shot at fee Exchange while Lyle still works there, but there 
are alternative versions of the murder and fee police have difficulty identifying the killer. As 
wife fee Kennedy assassination, a “second gunman” is postulated, or the victim was to have 
activated a bomb but fee attempt was aborted by a terrorist-turned-police-informer, or the ter­
rorist was going to activate a suicide-bomb and shot fee victim who attempted to abort it, etc. 
As in Libra (1988), DeLillo’s novel about fee president’s assassination, there is an overload 
of information but no definitive truth about events.
The central system in Players is not fee conspiratorial terrorists’ but their target, fee 
game of high finance, “fee idea of worldwide money” (107). As Marina puts it: “It’s this 
system feat we believe is their secret power... Currents of invisible life... bip-bip-bip, fee flow 
of electric current feat unites moneys, plural, all over fee world” (107, italics given). To at­
tack this “symbol system of advanced capitalism” and “pseudo-religion of abstract symbols” 
(LeClair 147,167), fee New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street becomes fee concrete and 
symbolic target of international finance, which has to be “shattered” before fee system, in its 
own kind of paranoia, goes '"underground” or electric, “nothing but waves and currents talking 
to each other. Spirits” (Players 109). Her co-conspirator Rafael is in tune wife this notion of 
money as contemporary religion, a “secret system and rite,” when he observes feat 
“[fjinanciers are more spiritually advanced than monks on an island”(107). The process has
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already begun, Lyle realizes, when he thinks of the money being sorted and counted within the 
Exchange, “money shrinking as it moved, beginning to evade visualization, to pass from a pa­
per existence to electronic sequences, its meaning increasingly complex, harder to name” 
(110). Lyle’s perception of money as electronic flashes recalls his television channel-surfing 
in that both are “transforming random moments of content into pleasing territorial abstrac­
tions” (16). The cultural essences of the “weightless, kinetic medium” of television and this 
new electronic form of money with no real content resemble each other and are appropriate to 
a lack of substantiality of the human self in the novel, noted above in relation to Kinnear and 
Lyle (Goodheart 119).
This concept of money mocks Talcott Parson’s attempt to equate currency as political 
power legitimized by use in a system of free exchange (Chapt. lc) or even Burroughs’s vision 
of“junk” as a palpably measurable commodity (Chapt 6b). Money itself has begun to go un­
derground, a process of de-commodification from the simple abstraction of paper for gold to 
the bips of electronic sequences. It resembles rather Foucault’s “capillary” power, running 
simultaneously through the social fabric at every point, “invisible” (as Rafael says), difficult 
to identify and pin down, and more powerful for being so, as the terrorists realize in their 
anxiety to hit its concrete center, the Stock Exchange, while it still exists. Foucaultian, too, is 
this implicit idea that late capitalism is forever ahead of his determined adversaries, counter­
ing their attacks by changing its guise, its tactics, its political and symbolic strategies.
In Sunning Dog (1987), the terrorists work for the US government and the plot centers 
on an amateur film. Rumors have been circulating for some thirty years about a mysterious 
film shot in Hitler’s Berlin bunker at the end of the war. As the erotic ait dealer Lightboume, 
a go-between for marketing the film, remarks, the Nazis put everything on film, including
atrocities they themselves committed “Film was essential to the nazi era. Myth, dreams, 
memory” (52). Hie footage allegedly shows high-ranking Nazis, Hitler himself, indulging in 
an orgy, but it eventually turns out to be just another Nazi home movie, although with the 
ironic feature of a rather avuncular Hitler imitating Chaplin of The Great Dictator (i.e. Hitler 
imitating Chaplin imitating Hitler). It turns out to be commercially useless since it does not 
reveal some ultimate monstrosity of the dictator, that is “...it does not portray the open secret 
of Hitler’s perversity in such a way that his public, historical persona and private self are one 
and the same” (O’Donnell “Obvious Paranoia” 61). While its content is unknown, however, it 
becomes a priceless commodity, like the mysterious drug in Great Jones Street, attracting the 
keen interest of a number of powerful prospective buyers. If the object of the quest turns out, 
unlike Pynchon’s ultimately unknowable objects, not unknowable but merely banal, its narra­
tive function is to unite the various strands of plot and characters who pursue it for different 
ends.
One of these, Richie Armbrister, a precocious king of pornography, represents the sin­
gle-minded devotion and deviousness of the entrepeneur but also that breed’s precarious 
situation in the contemporary world. He has “perfected the technology of smut, opening up 
channels of distribution and devising ingenious marketing schemes” (143). Armbrister has no 
interest in the film beyond its commercial marketing possibilities: “Avenues of commerce. 
That’s all he cared about. The higher things” (194). Legally, he is “hidden in a maze of pa­
per” (144), protecting himself from the law with holding companies and dummy corporations 
in several states: ‘1 don’t exist as a person. I’m not in writing anymore” (50). In his avarice, 
he resembles another prospective client, Vincent, a specialist in “acquisitions” for a Mafia 
family, but unlike Vincent, he hasn’t the security resources to guarantee his physical safety and
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has to live barricaded in a warehouse in Dallas, a reference to the Kennedy assassination. He 
is in fact obsessed with being assassinated and having his murder investigation bungled, too, 
with witnesses mysteriously disappearing, etc.
The potential buyer with the highest public profile is Lloyd Percival, a liberal US 
Senator in the process of conducting an official but confidential investigation of an organiza­
tion known as PAC/ORD, a bureaucratic coordinating arm of the whole US intelligence appa­
ratus. Specifically, Percival is trying to pin down information 011 a secret operations unit 
called Radial Matrix, a “systems planning outfit” that has great corporate success abroad and 
later cuts itself adrift from PAC/ORD to operate independently and illegally: “it was virtu­
ally unknown; there was no drift, no waste, no direct accountability” (153):
Radial Matrix was in fact a centralized funding mechanism for covert opera­
tions directed against foreign governments, against elements within foreign 
governments, and against political parties trying to gain power contrary to the 
interests of US corporations abroad. It was responsible for channeling and 
laundering funds for unlisted station personnel, indigenous agents, terrorist op­
erations, defector recruitment, political contributions, penetration of foreign 
communications networks and postal agencies (74).
This more efficiently-run, smaller-scale CIA is headed by Earl Mudger, a tough and danger­
ous type familiar from the novels of Mailer and Robert Stone; Mudger has run drugs and 
contraband in his own personal fiefdom as an independent operator in Vietnam and now ap­
plies his corporate and military skills as maverick chief of Radial Matrix. As the Senator de­
scribes him, Mudger is “the combination of business drives and lusts and impulses, with po­
lice techniques, with ultrasophisticated skills of detection, surveillance, extortion, terror, and 
the rest of it” (76). He now wants to move from systems planning into pornography.
The Senator wants the film, unlike the others, not for profit but for his extensive private 
collection of pornographic art, but as Lightboume observes, this is in a different category from
the static almost quaint erotica Percival favors, rather “innocent,” “all mass and body weight” 
(15), compared to the new style, in which “a thing isn’t fully erotic until it has the capacity to 
move,” that is, the motion picture, “[t]he image that moves” (18). Since Percival may uncover 
compromising material on Radial Matrix, Mudger has penetrated the Senator’s staff with Glen 
Selvy, who has been trained as an agent and, for this particular assignment, as a connoisseur 
of erotic art. He acts both as a “reader” (spy) of Percival for Mudger and as a confidential 
buyer of fine pornography for the Senator. Mudger wants to have the details of the Senator’s 
personal predilection to use as blackmail against him, if pressure should prove necessary. A 
radical expose magazine, Running Dog, has also got wind of the collection and wants to do a 
piece on the Senator as part of a series, as the magazine is in financial trouble and needs a 
scandal. The magazine’s reporter-writer Moll Robbins gets involved with Selvy, thinking he 
works for the Senator in some secret capacity, and Mudger puts a hit-team of Vietnamese 
rangers to “make an adjustment” (i.e. kill Selvy), thinking either that he is the source of the 
resourceful reporter’s discover/ of the collection or has tried to get hold of the film for him­
self, or even for the simple fault of Selvy’s having destroyed a listening device Radial Matrix 
installed.
The novel seethes with menace. Unlike the amateur players of Players, the characters 
tend to be ruthless, trained professionals, playing “strict, rule-governed games of power and 
profit” (LeClair 164). Their power resources are money (Armbrister) and political office 
(Percival) but also sex (Robbins, Delaney, Selvy), blackmail (Mudger, Lomax), and violence 
(Mudger, Selvy, Vincent). The second part of the novel is given over to Selvy’s skillful elu­
sion of his assassins to head back to Marathon Mines, where he first trained for die agency, to 
await his futilely heroic demise. Selvy, something of a modern Samurai, adheres monk-like to
what he calls a “routine ,” which recalls Foucault’s drill of repeated actions “to shape an 
obedient subjecf ’ for both “increased aptitude and increased domination” (Foucault, DP 129, 
138). Discipline is inculcated by repeated and precise actions, which induces a “mind-set, ail 
those mechanically performed operations of the intellect that accompanied this line of work” 
(Running Dog 81). At the Mines, he had been made an efficient killer, machine-like in his 
physical responses and, equally important for the perfectly disciplined subject, mentally un­
questioning of the power structure that trained and uses him: ‘I t  wasn’t within Selvy’s pur­
view to meditate on additional links, even when they might pertain to his own ultimate suste­
nance. Especially then. That was why the routine existed” (82). Part of the controller’s pur­
pose is that the disciplined subject is individually expendable. Selvy’s ritual death is the logi­
cal end of the process of treating the body as an object and in any case he comes to realize that 
he is just a servant of a corrupt capitalist power structure.
One of the interesting points (he novel makes about contemporary politics is the perva­
siveness of shifting allegiances and divided loyalties. Alliances tend to be tactically rather 
than ideologically produced, which tends to increase paranoia There is the overall inter­
agency power struggles of government organs we have seen as a feature of Mailer’s work: in 
this case, PAC/ORD and the Senate investigating committee. On the individual level, Selvy 
reports to Lomax, who reports to Mudger, but Lomax also seems to have connections to 
Senator Percival. Selvy spies on Percival for Lomax and Mudger, but Mudger tries to have 
him killed Lomax warns Selvy, who was his protégé, against his boss. Selvy has a sexual 
relationship with Moll but tells her nothing. As Mudger says, “Loyalties are so interwoven, 
the thing’s a game. The Senator and PAC/ORD aren’t nearly the antagonists the public be­
lieves them to be. They talk all the time. They make deals, they buy people, they sell favors. I
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doubt if Lomax knows whether he works for PAC/ORD or Lloyd Percival, ultimately” (89- 
90). The former radical Grace Delaney, editor of Running Dog, has politically turned after 
pressure from the Internal Revenue: she sleeps with Lomax, who protects her from Internal 
Revenue harassment, and as editor she turns down Moll’s piece on Radial Matrix while ad­
mitting to Lomax it was the best thing Moll had ever done. The allusion in the magazine’s title 
(“capitalist lackeys and running dogs”), while meant to be ironic in a politically hip Sixties 
way, when the magazine was a radical organ, therefore turns out to be true.3 As Lomax tells 
Delaney, the only people who still believe in what they do, “who aren’t constantly adjusting, 
constantly wavering” (220) are “the families.” This, a situation where the Mafia becomes the 
model of political and ethical integrity, is perhaps the chief irony.
Another important aspect of the novel, related to media and communications, is its de­
piction of a society of surveillance. A man in a dive where Seivy is drinking claims to be able 
to see cameras and listening devices installed by the FBI everywhere—in bars, under the seats 
of buses, etc. The man is dismissed as a paranoid drunk but the first attempt on Se Ivy’s life 
immediately ensues. As Mudger explains in another context: “Devices make us pliant. If they 
issue a printout saying we’re guilty, then we’re, guilty” (93, italics given). He himself is a 
specialist in making and using such devices. He has, for example, taped Moll’s conversation 
with Percival, which he can use against the Senator for blackmail by splicing in appropriate 
sex sounds. Although both Players and this novel suggest that images are deceptive and even 
that there may be no reality behind surfaces, but only other images displacing them, “some of 
these mediated constructions can be made substantial and used to frame us” (Johnston, 
“Generic” 271). When Mudger goes on to enumerate the various agencies and organizations 
that have recorded information (“Banks, insurance companies, credit organizations, tax exam­
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iners passport offices reporting services police agencies, intelligence gatherers,” RD 93) one 
is reminded of Foucault’s genealogies. The connection of film with Bentham’s (and Fou­
cault’s) panopticon is made explicit by Lightboume:
“Go into a bank, you’re filmed, “ he said. “Go into a department store, you’re 
filmed...Not only customers, mind you. Employees are watched too, spied on 
with hidden cameras. Drive your car anywhere. Radar, computer traffic scans. 
They’re looking into the uterus, taking pictures. Everywhere. What circles the 
earth? Spy satellites, weather balloons, U-2 aircraft What are they doing? 
Taking pictures. Putting the whole world on film” (149-50).
The film of Hitler in the privacy of sexual intimacy (which is also “public” since it is an orgy)
and in the privacy of the Berlin bunker (whose prosaic activities are already on film) is a
confirmation of the intrusion of media technology into private life (O’Donnell, “Running” 59).
As Robbins replies to Lightboume’s speech, above, “The camera’s everywhere...Even in the
bunker”(150).
c.
Media and terrorist politics come together once again in DeLillo’s latest novel, Mao 11 
(1991), which also looks at the power of charismatic figures in our century, those men, the 
author says, that are “twisted by power and who seem capable of imposing their vision on the 
world” (“Interview,” Nadotti). There is an implied parallel between the personality cults of 
the Communist leader Mao ZeDong and the Korean religious leader Reverend Moon, not so 
much in their propaganda techniques as in the nature of their appeal, the effect on the masses 
who follow them, the devotion to a belief or a cause embodied in a supreme leader. DeLillo 
does not slight the perceived personal rewards of submerging fragmented modern selves, one 
effect of which can be stated as, in the words of another novel, ‘To become a crowd is to 
keep out death” (White Noise 73), even while he makes clear the human costs. The flower- 
child Karen, for example, is both deluded and compassionate. One of the counter-culture’s
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media-directed youth that emerged from the Sixties, she tends to conflate political and relig­
ious leaders.
la Mao //, Weberian charismatic power is complicated by the story of a terrorist group 
from Beirut that holds a Swiss poet hostage as a means of making the West aware of their ex­
istence and aims. Their leader Abu Rashid uses charisma, but the violence he encourages of 
his followers to maintain his image is not concealed in the name of historical necessity, as so 
often wife cult-iigures of fee past like Stalin or Mao, but made public, even paraded, in anew 
version of what Foucault called the old power of the spectacle. In the arbitrary kidnapping or 
execution of an artist for exemplary ends, fee guilt or innocence of the victim is not in ques­
tion; his or her aura as an artist is, as it were, captured by the terrorists. In spectacles of ter­
ror like an urban bombing, not even the identity of the victims matters, i.e. unlike the old lype 
of spectacular punishment, there is nothing personal (as they say) in the choice; innocent vic­
tims will do quite as well as the notorious criminals of earlier centuries, or rather will do 
even better, since the spectacle will be directed toward the executioners rather than the vic­
tims: ‘The more heartless they [the terrorists] are, the better we see their rage” (129-30). 
Means become ends, as the usual identity of fee leader wife fee inevitable course of hi story is 
here transferred to fee violent action itself As Rashid explains: “...terror is what we use to 
give our people their place in fee world. What used to be achieved through work, we gain 
through terror. Terror makes fee future possible. All men one man. Men live in history as 
never before” (235).
The quotation suggests what is constantly and explicitly evoked in the novel: a link 
between novelist and terrorist The older view, found in James and Conrad, feat the terrorist 
is the alter-ego of the novelist (Scanlan 229) is suggested by George Haddad, fee terrorists’
intermediary in the West, who tells Gray, ‘I t ’s the novelist who understands the secret life” 
(158), and by the photo-journalist Brita, who feels as if she’s being taken to see a terrorist 
leader on her way to photograph the well-known novelist Bill Gray in his hide-out Author 
Gray, a total recluse in die manner of Thomas Pynchon, realizes that die power he has ac­
quired through anonymity is mainly due to the worn-out role he has been living, with the col­
lusion of his obsessive assistant Scott, of the old-fashioned, solitary Romantic artist He 
maintains his aura, in Benjamin’s formulation, by being unique, non-reproducible. Old and 
unable to finish his last book, which he has been revising and rewriting for over twenty years, 
perhaps because words no longer seem able to express reality, Gray consents to have his pic­
ture taken, an act that for Scott is a means of continuing to cultivate the Romantic aura, since 
the image will substitute for the work that Scott thinks will never be finished For Gray, it 
seems, die picture is an admission that the role is no longer viable and his old task of creating 
fictions of the “inner life” no longer relevant The image in the novel is emblematic of the 
omnipresence of die media through which, it seems, all reality is increasingly “mediated” The 
terrorists destroy the sense of self of the captive poet by depriving him of sense experience 
and refusing him paper and pencil, through which he might reconstruct a self through words, 
while they themselves watch a VCR. Militias in Beirut engage in anew kind of fighting by 
shooting out die images on die posters of rival group leaders.
With his image to be made public and his cover blown, Gray himself can be persuaded 
by his publisher to take part in a “media event” in an attempt to free die young poet-reading 
his poems on television—but things go awry and Gray is nearly killed in a bombing staged by 
the terrorists, i.e. for once reality substitutes for die image. The bombing jars him into action 
and he goes underground again, but without the illusions of self-importance his isolation had
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given him (and his daughter told him was often just an excuse for avoiding human involve­
ment), eventually dying on his way to meeting Rashid on a solitary mission to exchange him­
self for the poet. This attempt is both a last Romantic gesture that could mean his own execu­
tion and an illustration of the futility of such a gesture in a more prosaic and technological 
world, since he dies from injuries sustained after being hit by a car. This may be a statement 
of his own that his work is finished and perhaps of the author that the old, humanist novel is 
also quite dead. Ironically, Gray’s own personality cult arising from the anonymity of his life, 
is at the end protected and even continued by Scott’s careful and extensive archival work, the 
texts that replace their absent author, work that will be sustained perhaps indefinitely by 
monthly checks to Scott emitted by a computer.
DeLillo shows how the actions of terrorists have become the eloquent “statements” of 
the new political realities, as the old relationship of terrorist as the novelist’s alter-ego is 
transformed into fee novelist’s competitor. Gray realizes feis, as he goes from a principled 
anonymity (“The image world is corrupt, here is a man who hides his face” 36) to a grudging 
recognition of the power of fee image: '"There’s fee life and there’s fee consumer event Eve­
rything around us tends to channel our lives toward some final reality in print or in film” (43). 
But fee old link of novelist-terrorist as solitary rebel has given way “to a corporate take-over 
of art by violent people who manipulate fee media” (Scanlan 241), so feat those toting guns or 
cameras are barely distinguishable. In a kind of “zero-sum game,” where one side in a power 
struggle gains from the loss of another (cf Chapt lc), Gray says that print has been losing out 
to fee visual image, which is fee means par excellence by which the terrorist makes his state­
ment: “What terrorists gain, novelists lose. The degree to which they influence mass con­
sciousness is fee extent of our decline as shapers of sensibility and thought Hie danger they
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represent equals our own failure to be dangerous” (157). Gray thinks that Samuel Beckett 
was “the last writer to shape the way we think and see. After him, the major work involves 
mid-air explosions and crumbled buildings” (Ibid.). This is “the new tragic narrative” of the 
postmodern novelist (DeLillo once said in an interview that “the news is fiction...is the new 
narrative”), and perhaps the “only meaningful act” in “societies reduced to blur and glut” 
(Ibid.). Glutted sensibilities can only be jarred by literally explosive statements.
Yet, if DeLillo is suggesting the decline of die former power of literature to change con­
sciousness and influence events, he seems also to share Gray’s belief in the forging of mean­
ingful words to counteract the power of charismatic movements (and their simplifying slo­
gans). As Gray responds to the “historical” arguments of Haddad:
Even if I could see the need for absolute authority, my work would draw me 
away. The experience of my own consciousness tells me how autocracy fails, 
how total control wrecks the spirit, how my characters deny my efforts to own 
them completely, how I need internal dissent, self-argument, how the world 
squashes me the minute I think it’s mine” (159).
This is QGt merely the usual call for the integrity of individual consciousness against public 
reality-Gray as a radical individualist is certainly evident both in the description of his early 
work as a deeply personal vision and his chosen life of isolation-but a reminder that in re­
sponse to die realities of power the novelist’s task “depends on the acknowledgment diat there 
is a life of which we are apart” (Bradbury 1127-28). The longing of people for absolute 
authority that he is resisting, whether by Moonies or Red Guards, may be a longing for loss of 
self, but the resulting empowerment cannot, he admits, satisfy a man of his old-fashioned sen­
sibility and ultimately fulfills the will of the master. The “total politics, total authority, total 
being’ (158) Haddad calls such a commitment is not only the end of the self; it may require 
more sinister measures, for which one need not bring up the hackneyed example of the Nazis:
from the left one might reflect on certain policies of Stalin and Mao, or more recently, the 
Khymer Rouge in Cambodia, where the mass politics of orthodoxy led “logically” to geno­
cide. Mass murder, Gray tells Haddad, begins with a single hostage, “the miniaturized form. 
The first tentative rehearsal for mass terror” (163).
The question that the novel proposes of the power of literature to change minds was 
brought forward most forcefully in 1989, just two years before Mao II was published. This 
was the year of the Tienman Square massacre in Peking and the Ayatollah Khomeni’s funeral, 
both described in the novel, themselves media events and examples of the mass emotional and 
potentially violent appeals of both religion and politics. In that year, too, the Salman Rushdie 
affair, in which a novel (The Satanic Verses) found deeply offensive to certain devout mem­
bers of Islam, who put a price on the author’s head for alleged blasphemy against Islam’s sa­
cred text and its founder’s family, seemed to confirm postmodern fiction’s claim to engage 
political life and transform the world (Scanlan 231). 4 Blasphemy in the liberal cultures of the 
West hardly seems possible, since the separation of church and state and constitutional guaran­
tees of free speech have ensured that an accused blasphemer cannot legally be prosecuted. 
Furthermore, as a non-Western critic has observed, “W'estem liberal free speech has in­
scribed itself within certain self-generated limits, idealizing free expression even as it sus­
pends the material effectivity of ‘language’ in fee world” (Aravamudan 3, qtd. in Scanlan 249, 
n. 10). In a similar vein, Western writers have sometimes expressed an almost wistful envy of 
their colleagues in the formerly Communist states of Eastern Europe, where a writer could be 
imprisoned for departures from political orthodoxy. Such possibilities, however unpleasant, 
even dangerous, to fee individual author, are aback-handed tribute, as it were, to fee power of
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the word to disturb, challenge, and subvert the reigning order and thus offer a promise of re­
newal. The very fact of repression is, in this view, a guarantee of literature’s power.
The literal-minded Muslims who demonstrated against Rushdie, burned his books, 
branded him as infidel, called for his assassination, and condemned him to a life of exile, 
have in effect, by these active “statements,” not regarded Rushdie’s novel “as an inconse­
quential imaginative exercise,” just one more postmodern text dazzling jaded Western readers 
with verbal ingenuity and provocative situations, “but as a powerful expression of ideas 
deeply engaged with reality” (Scanlan 234). Furthermore, the “consumer event” that Gray 
acknowledges as what all current experience tends toward is present as well in the Rushdie 
episode. The protest demonstrations and book-bumings, even Khoumeni’s public announce­
ment of thzfatwa or righteous execution (the CIA, by contrast, would have merely sent a se­
cret squad of assassins to do the job), are eminently media events. Nothing really happens 
these days, as novelist may lament but terrorists realize, unless it is duly recorded on film. 
“The twentieth century is on film,” a character from Trie Names says, “It’s the filmed century” 
(200 italics given). If the media thus determine existence, they are doubly powerful, for they 
can both create realities and make them non-existent through selected silences (Guareshi et al. 
14).
And yet, if the novel recognizes the diminished power of literature in a media age, it 
insists on its necessity, a necessity even recognized by Haddad, who urges Gray to write 
something monumental of the order of “the little red book” of the sayings of Chairman Mao, 
quoted and waved about by the Chinese masses, an “experience of Mao” that “became uncor­
ruptible by outside forces” : in other words, a sacred text, “the unchanged narrative every 
culture needs” (162). Gray’s reply to this argument is both prosaic ("I’m not a great big vi-
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sionary, George, only a sentence-maker. Like a donut-maker, only slower,” Ibid.) and 
thoughtful (“I need internal dissent, argument,” 159). DeLillo’s resistance to the totality and 
the domination of abstractions, to the ahistorical and even sinister idea of “unchanging narra­
tives,” takes the form of a perception of the novel as essentially ambiguous, skeptical and self­
questioning, a view held by the Czech novelist Milan Kundera, by Rushdie himself, and by 
Bakhtin (Scanlan 241). Bakhtin, as we have seen, theorizes the novel as both critical and self- 
critical discourse. If power attempts to centralize language in dominant and exclusive forms, 
literature subverts this attempt through the “dialogic” of multiple voices, its “evolving het- 
eroglossia” (cf Introd. sec.n). As Rushdie puts it: “The novel has always been about the 
way in which different languages, values and narratives quarrel, and about the shifting rela­
tions between them, which are relations of power” (“Is Nothing Sacred?” 102-3, emphasis 
given). For his part, DeLillo seems to be speaking through Gray, who, dying and reflecting on 
the imprisoned poet, thinks:
When you inflict punishment on someone who is not guilty, when you fill 
rooms with innocent victims, you begin to empty the world of meaning and 
erect a separate menial state, the mind consuming what’s outside itself, replac­
ing real things with plots and fictions. One fiction taking the world narrowly 
into itself, the other fiction pushing out toward the social order, trying to unfold 
into it...This is how we reply to power and beat back our fear. By extending 
the pitch of consciousness and human possibility (200).
d.
The interlocking themes of charisma and the captive masses, public appearance and pri­
vate retreat, language and mass-mediahave also been examined in Great Jones Street (1973), 
a novel that is historically related to the late Sixties and Seventies as Mao 11 is to fee Eighties. 
Driving the plot is the quest for a secret drug (called simply the “package” or the “product”) 
entrusted to fee keeping of a burned-out rock star, Bucky Wunderlick, who at fee beginning of
the novel has gone into private retreat in a room on Great Jones Street in the Manhattan Bow­
ery. Like Glen Selvy of Running Dog, Gary Harkness of End Zone, and that archetypal 
American, Henry David Thoreau, he seeks in asceticism a way of ordering his life and simpli­
fying existence. The drug, like the Hitler film in Running Dog, is the commodity that attracts 
the desire and greed of nearly all the characters but will turn out to be disappointing. The ma­
nipulative Hanes, the underground scientist Dr. Pepper (who as sinister trickster-figure and 
master of disguises recalls characters out of Burroughs and Barth and historically the legen­
dary LSD chemist of the Sixties, Augustus Owsley HI), even Bucky’s fellow musician Azarian 
and his girl-friend Opel, all try in some way to gain control of the product and all turn out 
eventually to have connections with the conspiratorial organization that first obtained it
The desire of all these people to possess and control the drug has its analogy in Bucky’s 
manager, Globke’s, desire to get hold of his client’s secret “mountain tapes” that he hopes to 
exploit for profit (he eventually resorts to stealing them). Globke, who runs the holding com­
panies and subsidiaries subsumed under the Pvnehonean name of Transparanoia Enterprises, 
recalls Armbrister in Running Dog and other caricatures of the wheeling-dealing entrepeneur: 
‘"Nothing is too personally distasteful for me to get involved in as long as it helps create anew 
product or extends the life an existing product” (188). Living above Bucky is an eccentric, 
unpublished writer Eddie Fenig, who pursues fame and profit in the dubious literary genre of 
child porno and, when that fails in the market, the more promising one of “financial writing,” 
the “ultimate corporate fictioa” All the characters in the novel are therefore engaged in a 
pursuit of profit, except for Bucky, who seeks his Thoreauvian inner economy to oppose the 
late capitalist market economy, and, in any case, while personally wealthy, he has no access 
to money tied up in interlocking enterprises. The music business and the drug business, the
legal and illegal markets, are both suggested as enterprises that market a product of Bur­
roughs-like control that tends to deflect political dissent In Great Jones Street, the focus is, 
as LeClair sums up (89), on “mass entertainment and political organization, issues of com­
merce, conditioning, consumption and control.” Hie cultural direction is from the political 
disturbances of the late Sixties to “the dreadful cynicism, deep alienation, and desperate pri- 
vatism of the Seventies” (DeCurtis, “Product” 133).
The drug itself is worthy ofBurroughs: the “jones” of the novel’s title is junkie-slang 
for a serious habit, and the main effect of the drug is to destroy die ability of a person to speak, 
the ultimate downer, “leaving product and consumer consumed in the act of consumption” 
(LeClair 100), Li another variation on drugs and speech, die drug Dylar in White Noise has the 
effect of causing a person to be unable to distinguish words from things, a “Saussurian night­
mare” and new kind of paranoia (Saltzman 818). Speech in this novel is reduced to its termi­
nal extremes—silence and noise—and amplified in the lyrics of pop music, a tendency there­
fore toward excess or dearth. Upstairs from Buckv, for example, Fenig has truckfuls of wilt­
ing no one wants; downstairs lives a boy resembling a mutant who is speechless. Everyone 
who visits Bucky is loquacious. The pseudo-dialogue of die celebrity interview is effectively 
parodied when Bucky is interviewed by humanist intellectuals (103-7) and by a disc-jockey 
(130). Bucky, who has voluntarily lapsed into silence and is pressured into returning to 
speech through a threatened release of the tapes and a new promotional tour, will eventually 
be injected with the drug and so forcefully silenced. When he eventually recovers and begins 
to negotiate with himself a return to society, it will be through writing. A professional 
“sender” as rock musician, Bucky will become after his first silence, a “receiver,” noting and
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recording what others have said to him, before again becoming a sender in writing his mem­
oirs (LeClair 88).
The drug has been produced by one of those sinister organizations., found in both Pyn- 
chon’s and DeLillo’s fiction, that seems to be part of the opposition but works both sides, and 
which suggests the paranoid possibility that there is only one side. It may even be the case 
that the organization, the disarmingly named Happy Valley Farm Commune, is fronting for the 
government itself marketing and distributing its own product, for (it is rumored) the drug was 
originally designed by the US government to silence political dissenters (which recalls a 
paranoid fear by some Sixties radicals that drugs were actually encouraged by the govern­
ment) and may have been “stolen” from a government research office. This is more probable 
when one considers that the bad effects of the drug would not bring it any street-value, which 
suggests the Commune does not really know what it has. The “Farm Commune” is actually an 
urban group, recalling Pynchon’s Tristero in its tentacular reach and ambiguous aims. It re­
veres Bucky for his example of a “returning the idea of privacy to the idea of American life” 
(19), which would paradoxically turn privacy into amass movement and seems to parody the 
“me-decade” aspect of the 1970s, especially since the Commune pursues the capitalist dream 
of a monopolistic corner on the market Hie group turns out to be in control of most of the 
events in the novel: it owns, for example, the very room Bucky thinks he has escaped into, 
which explains why he keeps having visitors while his location is a secret
The Commune both inspires and results from paranoia Its means of power are a dis­
ciplined and ruthless organization with a “soft” front, anonymous or dissimulated action, the 
dissemination of disinformation, and, when deemed necessary, violence through its terrorist 
wing, a group of thugs called the “dog boys.” In its relentless pursuit of market control of the
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product, the Commune is the model of a private corporation, but in its secrecy and methods 
resembles a disciplined Leninist revolutionary cadre, both organizations that prefer manipula­
tion to exposure, power to fame. It eventually injects Bucky with the drug, effectively silenc­
ing him in the name of its ideology of a return to private experience, and destroys the tapes 
that would constitute his return to public life. The implication is that the Commune’s real aim 
all along has been to control him.
For Wunderlick the performer is, as suitably packaged product, the personal equivalent 
of the drug, the absent commodity people want to exploit for profit A composite of Bob Dy­
lan and Jim Morrison, perhaps others, but in any case a cultural figure at the other end of the 
spectrum from Mao IPs recluse writer Paul Gray, he is also an alternative focus of mass ado­
ration to be compared to the cult religious and political leaders of that novel. Like Gray, he 
chooses a retreat into isolation, but only when he begins to suspect that he is losing his power 
over his fans. Although as pop-idol Bucky carries his own kind of charisma so that at the be­
ginning of the novel he claims a “true fame, a devouring neon, not the somber renown of wan­
ing statesmen or chinless kings”(l), the glitter of fame is not, as he seems to recognize in this 
passage, the same thing as true power. His fans seem to control him as much as he controls 
them and he suffers from the paranoid fear that they will someday rise up and kill him. In the 
meantime, they have become subdued, expectant of his death, which, “to be authentic,” part of 
the tradition (i.e. Elvis Presley, Janice Joplin, Jimmi Hendrix, Jim Morrison), must be self- 
willed, the next logical step of fame, requisite to the myth of the authentic rock hero. With­
drawn into anonymity and lapsed into silence in his room, self-imposed isolation has ironi­
cally increased his power (‘The less you say, the more you are,” a newsman tells him, 128)
and Globke plans to bring him back with an increased market value. Even the supremely pri­
vate acts of silence and suicide have become commodities.
As rock star, mass communicator, “a channel for redistributing information” (LeClair 
95), Bucky produced music with a message in his first album, “Amerikan War Sutra,” a late 
Sixties blend of hippy culture and political protest, while the more self-referential second al­
bum, “The Diamond Stylus,” his move into the Seventies, shows an increasing concern with 
aesthetic over political themes. The third and final album, as the title song “Pee-Pee-Maw- 
Maw” indicates, abandons meaning altogether for pure sound (or “noise,” as Opel says) and 
infantile gibberish. Thus, Bucky’s personal musical development through the three albums 
parallels fee historical development of rock and roll itself from the artistic expression of re­
bellious (and proletarian) youth against fee conformity of a stifling adult culture in the Fifties, 
followed by its status as main cultural vehicle for fee Sixties’ political protest but also hippy 
“do your own thing” counter-culture, to its total co-optation by capitalist enterprise that be­
came evident then and is taken for granted nowadays. The co-opting, of course, includes the 
marketing of its artists, whose increasingly desperate posing as alternative social models 
(“the decline of rock into shock spectacle,” DeCurtis “Product” 139) can hardly disguise the 
central facts of fee musicians’ transformation into capitalist entrepreneurs administering huge 
fortunes and fee poverty of their attempts to go beyond fee creative efforts of rock’s first two 
decades.5 No longer a source of meaning or transmitter of messages, therefore, Bucky by the 
time of his retreat has become a mere product for mass consumption (96), Globke’s own 
“package,” in the form of the “Bucky Wunderlick Media Kit” In the singer’s absence, his 
manager starts rumors about him designed to sell more records.
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Watney, the English rock-star, who has accordingly abandoned music to become a rep­
resentative of a European conglomerate, explains the difference of manufactured fame and real 
power when he tells Bucky that he himself quit because he realized he was just a performing 
monkey with “no real power”:
Nothing truly moves to your sound. Nothing is shaken and bent.. You’re above 
ground, not under.. The true underground is the place where power flows. 
That’s the best-kept secret of our time...The presidents and prime-ministers are 
the ones who make the underground deals and speak the true underground id­
iom. The corporations. The military. The banks. This is the underground 
networic. This is where it happens...You’re not insulated or unaccountable the 
way a corporate force is. Your audience is not the relevant audience. It 
doesn’t make anything. It doesn’t sell to others (231-32).
This passage explains the power of the underground networks of both private corpora­
tions like the Commune and the government, refuting Bucky’s initial claim that fame is supe­
rior to political power. It suggests, especially through Watney’s own change of career, the 
cultural transformation of rock from underground force to part of the capitalist system that it 
set out to contest, and, more generally, the power of capitalism to co-opt its adversaries. It 
recalls the secret flow of money described in Players and the tentacular reach of the Firm in 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow. Finally, Watney’s insistent metaphor of where one is located, 
above or under-ground, reiterates the Foucaultian theme of power’s secret and insidious 
“capillaries,” ubiquitous and diffuse. Power as spectacle Foucault sees as less efficient in that 
it allows too many gaps wherein it does not reach and where resistance can thus take form. 
DeLillo’s novel sees the spectacle as essentially empty, where, despite Bucky’s claim to 
make “people move,” nothing is truly “moved” or “shaken,” and what is offered is the illusion 
of feme and the compensation of profits. The implication of the passage is that even states­
men, public figures who occasionally engage in displays of political hierarchy, find their es-
sential meaning in their underground activities, their secret pacts and deals by which they 
move the world.
Bucky’s final silence, this time imposed and not chosen, makes him think of “an unim­
printed level” somewhere beyond speech, a place to which he has in fact been moving of his 
own volition.6 After the drug wears off, his return to the world, like David Bell’s \n Ameri­
cana, will be negotiated through soundless language, i.e. literature, the memoirs he is writing 
that becomes the novel we are reading. Bell has given up film, Wunderlick music, for writing. 
Bucky cannot, of course, master the commodity culture, is himself consumed by it, but he is 
reborn into anew kind of language. DeLillo seems to be suggesting again the function of lit­
erature in the media age, overwhelmed as it may be by the noise. Earlier, Bucky expressed his 
media-hip contempt for the art of writing: “When people read a book... they just sit there... A 
long time ago, that was okay...Now it’s different I make people move” (105). But the power 
to make people move is precarious and uncertain, as he learns by experience with his fans, 
and, in any case, moving bodies is not moving the world, as his British rival reminds him in 
the passage just quoted. In writing, he makes a product rather than becomes one, “creating an 
object—unlike a record or the drug—that can communicate to a large crowd but silently, indi­
vidually, and wife increased complexity” (LeClair 107). Communication, not mere consump­
tion, is that which stimulates thought, response, and fee feedback he has lost wife his music.
e.
If language is fee extension of possibility for DeLillo, it can also be a tool for fee obfus­
cating discourses of power. By his second novel, End Zone (1972), DeLillo says he “began 
to suspect feat language was a subject as well an instrument in my work” (“Interview,” Le­
Clair 21). This interest has become a method, and some critics have predictably complained
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that DeLillo’s characters often talk as if they are giving a lecture, constantly offering theories, 
like Murray Siskind in White Noise, professionally involved in producing theories but also 
temperamentally adapted to it (Bawer 35-42). The characters do not talk like “real people” 
or we should probably not bother to read what they say. While DeLillo does not attempt fic­
tional realism, his ear is remarkably attuned to the American idiom, and more important theo­
retically, he is adept at using characters as vehicles for other “languages,” a tendency carried 
nearly to absurdity with the wacky scientists of Ratner’s Star, where the “think-tank” setting 
explores language not in relation to silence, as in Great Jones Street, but to the special codes 
and jargons of science and technology (Johnston 266). The ideas expressed by DeLillo’s 
characters are not related to their psychological motives nor are they necessarily consistent 
with their actions, as they would be in realist fiction. Individual subjects are not responsible 
for apprehending or creating but tend to be determined by the codes that control them or are 
mouthpieces for ideas and Bakhtin’s “interrelationships between utterances and languages.” 
Some negative criticism of DeLillo has been unable to see this, insisting on fee need for 
“plausible characters” and fee way “people really talk.” 7 The novels cannot really be defined 
by realist ideas of mimesis but by something akin to heteroglossia, ‘‘the multiplicity of social 
voices” and “fee movement of fee theme through different languages and speech types” feat 
Bakhtin thought distinctive of fee novel (Johnston 265; Bakhtin, “Discourse in Novel” 263). 
The specialized languages and professional jargons either engage in dialogue or collide wife 
one another. 2nd Zone is a particularly good case in point
All fee characters in End Zone play language games and the absent spirit of Wittgen­
stein, in fee form of a missing poster, hovers over obscure “Logos College” in the Texas des­
ert. 8 The football players communicate, or rather just “engage in wars of jargon with each
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other,” “Interview, LeClair 21), using the specialized jargon of sports but also eloquent insult 
and obscenities, platitudes and clichés, and the “fierce, alien noises” they use to psyche each 
other up before games. One practices sports commentary to a silent television set; another 
suggests he may be “speaking in tongues.” The protagonist sets himseifto mastering anew, 
difficult word every day and his sole erotic adventure takes place in the library where he is 
turned on by reading the dictionary with his girl-friend. Most curiously, the players recite 
specialized mathematical or scientific definitions of common words that come up in conver­
sation, a form of apparently irrelevant commentary that serves to pull words out their simple 
meanings in banal contexts to foreground the strangeness of language.
The protagonist, Gary Harkness, a halfback on the Logos football team, is in “exile” 
from more prestigious schools where he somehow didn’t fit in. Li his self-conscious aliena­
tion he often sounds like Camus’s Meursault but both playfully and seriously tries out his own 
variety of languages; he is often ironic, mocking pretensions and promoting ambiguity. At 
times, he seems to support and reinforce the linguistic and behavioral reductionism promoted 
by the authorities, but often he labors to contest it, as when he evades being used as propa­
ganda by fee newly hired publicity man or puts on his fellow players by inventing stories. Of 
Bobby Luke, who shows his unthinking belief in the coach by often saying he would “go 
through a brick wall” for him, Harkness shows an awareness of such reductive, and seductive, 
formulas: “Maybe the words were commissioned, as it were, by language itself ..lullabies 
processed through intricate systems... old and true, fiill of reassurance, comfort, consolation. 
Men followed such words to their death because other men before them had done the same” ( 
EZ 54). Toward the end, however, after Harkness shows his refusal to play the authorities’ 
game any more by smoking a joint and walking off the field in the season’s last game, he is
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reintegrated in the system by the coach, who names him co-captain, and he realizes his status 
as outsider has been compromised: “I was now part of the apparatus. No longer did I circle 
and watch, content enough to be outside the center and even sufficiently cunning to plan a mi­
nor raid or two” (202).
The coach, Emmet Creed, is another of DeLillo’s obsessives, a believer in moral per­
fection through the simple ascetic life, a “land-locked Aliab,” whose monomania reaches be­
yond victory in the game to some theological vision, “unfolding his life toward a single mo- 
menf ’ (54). Creed recalls the Fascist obsession with order, discipline, and purity. He has in 
any case embraced the Stoic creed of refashioning oneself in order to be worthy of leadership. 
From humble beginnings, Creed molded first himself (“Purify the will. Learn humility. Re­
strict the sense life,” he tells Harkness, 201), then a series of unpromising teams, for which he 
“became famous for creating order out of chaos” (10). As coach, Creed thinks that football 
played properly is “an interlocking of a number of systems” (199) and sees his players as in­
terlocking parts of afunctional unity, ignoring his athletic opponents and sequestering die 
athletes from the outside world (he puts canvas around the stadium to discourage spies and 
confines his players in their own dormitories), he concentrates obsessively on the team’s unity 
or “oneness,” machine-like performance in a closed “system that protects his power as a sin­
gle ruler” (LeClair 66-67).
As supreme leader, Creed requires only “obedience” and takes the lofty view of a di­
vine monarch, letting his assistant coaches mix with the players and hassle them for their mis­
takes and shortcomings while he silently observes the patterns of plays from a tower, from 
which he rarely descends. His authority comes both from this (remote but visible) physical 
presence and his control of the word: 'This was his power, to deity us the words we needed.
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He was the maker of plays, the name-giver” (EZ 135). Yet, as Harkness explains, the coach is 
not really the god-like creator such attributes suggest: “All teams run the same plays. But each 
team uses an entirely different system of naming” (118). The play “Blue turk right, double­
slot, zero snag delay,” for example, has an original, even poetic ring, but in the context of a 
game it is called on a “signal” and functions merely as a command, exacting the unhesitating 
obedience of a practiced, programmed performance. Creed’s power is not manifest in crea­
tion but implemented through discipline.
In what Tom LeClair calls this “deconstructive fable” (64), Logos suggests the central­
ity of the word. LeClair argues that Creed is the “primary voice of logocentrism,” whose 
ideal is the Derridean metaphysics of presence. Creed desires a return to the “simple Logos” 
of the college’s dead founder, a man “who believed in reason. He cherished the very word” 
(EZ 7) but, significantly, he himself was mute. Presumably, Creed will make the word be­
come flesh in the bodies of his beefy players. His stated creed of simplicity, purity, self- 
knowledge, seeks away back to the “original presence.” Walking in the Texas desert, “in the 
middle of the middle of nowhere,” a place stripped down to the perceived priorities of pres­
ence, Harkness too expresses a desire to emulate his coach in reducing a world too packed 
with meaning: ‘To begin to reword the overflowing world To subtract and disjoin. To re­
cite the alphabet To make elemental lists” (89). In this reading, the novel shows, in response 
to Creed’s linear single-mindedness, “that a quest for linguistic self-reference and simplicity 
leads to unsolvable paradoxes and arecognition of complexity” (61). DeLillo shows that the 
multiple discourses and play of language resist the “univocal pattern” from “origin to end” 
(71). The patriarchal discourse of authority (to which Harkness’s father aiso subscribes) 
permits no play with the context framing it Hie game cannot be contaminated, in Creed’s
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quest for purity, with the world outside the chalk markers of the field (“It’s just a game” he 
says, “but it’s the only game”). Power, according to Bakhtin (cf Introd. 11), attempts to cen­
tralize language in dominant and exclusive forms. In fiction, by contrast, language is trans­
formed from an “impermeable monoglossia” to an “evolving heteroglossia (“Prehistory” 61). 
Creed’s need to control discourse is monologic, a negation of dialogue; “it is univocal, di­
rect: it is the Logos, the Word of God” whose “goal is to turn the team into goal-bound ascet­
ics” like Creed himself (Osteen 148).
It is noteworthy that this novel has no single-line plot but employs a structure of circu­
larity and doubling back, with ambiguity of action as well as language. The illusion of linear­
ity given by the regular schedule of the football season is dissolved when the season ends and 
the players remain uncertain as to what to do with themselves. Harkness, who seems to have 
succumbed to Creed’s closed system by agreeing to the co-captaincv, at the end starves him­
self and is taken to the infirmary: “High fevers burned a straight channel through my brain” 
(242) are among his last words. Does the straight channel signal a final mental burn-out, or a 
linear path that is capitulation to Creed’s authority, or does his self-induced condition mean 
that he cannot fit in to the present system either, and anew cycle of removal and recommence 
is beginning? The refusal of closure is itself a denial of the single-line narrative that Creed 
throughout, and Harkness at times, have desired as the projects of their lives.
The end zone is literally the area beyond the goal line, the aim of the game, a closure in 
the satisfy ingly closed system of football, but as the author has pointed out, football is only 
one of the games in the novel, in which “fiction itself is a sort of game” (“Interview,” LeClair 
21). Creed and Harkness, and many a character in other novels, in their different ways strive 
to simplify competing discourses into a single-line narrative moving toward the end zone of
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perfect closure (Osteen 344), Creed through a return to the simple Logos, Harkness through 
attempts to drastically simplify meaning and choice. Harkness3 s roommate Bloomberg is an 
extreme example of this tendency. He tries to “walk in a perfectly straight line,” become 
“single-minded and straightforward” and “start all over with simple, declarative sen­
tences’l l  88). His isolation from and indifference to his fellows, his desire to be 
“supeirationalto “unjew” himself in Texas from guilt and the burdens of hi story (46-7), and 
his declared respect and admiration for the “systems planner,” “the management consultant,” 
and “the nuclear strategist (49) are all to the point. By contrast. Professor Zapalac, who can 
be seen as Creed’s polar opposite, does not impose or admire monologic discourses. As a 
teacher, he not only lectures but makes jokes, asks questions, mixes with his students, and gen­
erally underemphasizes his authority. Zapalac, who admits to being “ a little bit paranoid” 
(183), explicitly warns students of the militarized state. He calls the midwestem Republi­
cans, among whom he taught before, “masters of the categories of things,” who have been 
'‘raised to believe everything they’ve been told by their eiders”: “They do tilings in alpha­
betical order. They know their place” (16'4). He rejects the rigid order of patriarchal and 
authoritarian discourse for “unpredictability” and “the potential for disorganization in things 
and people” (163).
“End Zone” also alludes to Beckett’s “Endgame,” the extreme conditions of nihilism 
and death itself The players indulge in rituals of death, games like the childish “Bang, bang, 
you’re dead,” and the post-season pick-up football game in the snow where the rules keep 
simplifying into a basic one-on-one shock of bodies. The end zone is also the terminal place 
to which the slogan “Militarize” (which Harkness once saw posted or printed everywhere in 
his home-town) inexorably leads in an escalating political crisis, in a world (the early 1970s)
where the super-powers were armed to a dangerously redundant degree. Although we are 
perhaps meant to see the simplifications of Creed, Bloomberg, and Harkness as springing 
from the same ascetic impulse, Harkness’s vision goes beyond the reductive asceticism of his 
coach, which encompasses his life and his team, to the planetary level, a fantasized vision of 
the contemporary apocalypse of thermonuclear war, with which he becomes obsessed 
(Zapalac’s subject, by contrast, is “exobiology,” life on the planetary level). Harkness takes a 
course in “disaster technology” and guiltily enjoys reading about disasters. Every day he 
imagines a different city being obliterated (“Pleasure in the contemplation of millions dying 
and dead,” 21); his fantasy recalls the Gladney family’s pleasure in watching disasters on 
TV. He seems to share the bizarre contemporary fantasy of the ultimate “purification” of nu­
clear war, what Robert Jay Lifton has called the extreme “solution to death anxiety” (qtd. by 
Osteen 152).
Harkness also becomes the best student in a class on modern war designed for Air 
Force officer trainees. Although he resists being recruited for the military wing by Major 
Staley, he agrees to playing an elaborate nuclear war game with the Major in his motel room 
in the desert (which is usually the site for nuclear testing). Staley’s game is based on a geo­
political crisis situation devised by strategists like the Sixties’ “futurologist5’ Herman Kahn, 
whose notion of“thinking the unthinkable” (one of his titles) actually helped make horrendous 
situations seem thinkable and therefore almost acceptable.9 The linguist Noam Chomsky per­
haps first called attention to how our leaders learned to talk in public of operational strategies 
and global scenarios, hi one of his examples (qtd. by Williams, Problems 13), the bombing of 
refugee peasants in Vietnam can be described, in a show of procedure, as “acclerated urbani­
zation.” Whether actual military strategists in the Pentagon or conservative “think-tank” theo­
rists like Kahn, these people describe nuclear war through computer model “scenarios,” a 
practice and perception that helps disguise the reality of wholesale death and destruction, 
possibly even the end of present and future life on the planet. “Slow-motion counter-city war, 
super-ready status, collateral destruction, civilian devastation attack” (42) are subjects Hark­
ness brushes up on, while “thermal hurricane, overkill, circular error probability, post-attack 
environment, stark deterrence, dose-rate contours, kill-ratio, spasm war” (21) are phrases he 
becomes “fascinated by.” Like the electronic media, which through its repetition of disasters, 
assassinations, explosions inuring people to the reality of such events, the specialized lan­
guage, the curiously arcane and impersonal jargon of nuclear war, helps to obfuscate the hor­
rendous possibilities.10
An equation of the jargons of football and nuclear war as both discourses of games of 
power (for example, on the book jacket of End Zone) is simplistic if it implied that football is 
a type of stylized war or a manifestation of an American spirit of destruction. As Zapalac, 
who loves football, says, “I reject the notion of football as warfare. Warfare is warfare. We 
don’t need substitutes because we’ve got the real thing” (164). Football is a ritual of violence 
that can be played and replayed, while nuclear war is “its terrible obverse, an endgame that 
can never really be played at all” (Johnston 263). American football, although a systems 
game where pre-programmed plays are run by players with defined assignments (as opposed 
to soccer, where players must react spontaneously to unfolding patterns determined by the un­
predictable position of fee bail), is not, after all, a closed system, since the players must al­
ways take account of fee actions of its opponents, unlike Coach Creed, who ignores his team’s 
adversaries. Hie development of a play will therefore depend on fee reaction of the oppo­
nent’s defense, which in turn will call for unplanned response or counter-measures in an un­
folding and unpredictable situation. The system is closed only in the sense of its being con­
fined to a limited space and being allowed to work according to well-defined ruies. Despite 
Major Staley’s suggestion that future wars will be so defined, with ‘ TvibrSv s” as in a football 
game, it is virtually certain that there could be no such curb to escalating violence in a volatile 
political situation involving nuclear bombs. Nuclear war-fighting by definition defies reason.
Language is, of course, not a closed system for analogous reasons. In communication, 
an utterance stimulates a response and while the linguistic exchange is subject to certain rules 
it is unpredictable. In the novel, it is not the violence of war and football that provokes meta­
phorical comparisons but their languages. Football creates an illusion of order amid the re­
newable physical violence and chaos on the field through its language and symbols: the 
names of the plays receive their interpretation in repeatable performance. Nuclear war, how­
ever, simply impoverishes language (Johnston 263). As Harkness tells Major Staley, “there’s 
no way to express thirty million dead. No words. So certain men are recruited to reinvent the 
language” (85). Like nuclear strategy, this invented language is reductive, words designed to 
shield participants from reality: “They’re painkillers. Everything becomes abstract” (Ibid.). 
Despite Staley’s insistence on the quasi-divine omnipresence of the bomb, the atomic bomb, 
as Mark Osteen points out, eludes the metaphysics of presence because its value as a weapon 
depends on it never being used: paradoxically, it can be present in our minds only when ab­
sent; its physical presence would ensure our total absence (151). The “wars ofjargon” De- 
Lillo has applied to his players are employed by strategists to mask the unspeakable reality of 
such a war. Jargon itself becomes a weapon, a linguistic defense created to avoid thinking 
about what it might mean, a translation into “language that is always insufficient to represent a 
condition in which meaning is necessarily absent” because its users are all dead (156).
354
Language is central to The Names (1982) and, as in End Zone, can serve as a means of 
domination for the powers-tliat-be. On the positive side, as in Mao II, language can mean 
open possibility, a weapon against terrorism. Here, for example, it means the real communi­
cation of conversation, as illustrated by the Athenians among whom James Axton, the pro­
tagonist, lives. He notes how much of their lives is given over to conversation, what pleasure, 
enthusiasm, and physical contact it brings out For these people, “[conversation is life, lan­
guage is the deepest being...The talk is unconditional, the participants drawn in completely” 
(52). Axton illustrates die double function of creativity and reductiveness in his very presence 
in Greece, when he notes that Americans used to come to Greece to write and paint: “Now 
we do business” (6). It is to the point that he speaks only rudimentaiy Greek, little more than 
die tourists of whom he still feels a member.
This other side of language is shown by die occupations of Axton and his companions. 
Citing Walter Ong’s analysis of literate and preliterate societies, LeClair argues that that 
DeLillo is emphasizing “the costs of literacy” (191), a situation at odds with the reciprocal 
oraliiy displayed by the talkative Greeks. Such an interpretation may suggest the contrast 
Derrida scorns of nostalgia for the presence of the spoken word over the dead letter, but 
writing will turn out to have its place, and Ong’s theory does seem to apply to the novel. The 
technology of print is sight- rather dian sound-dominated; it “isolates and dissects” rather than 
“incorporates and unifies,” encouraging the qualities of “discreteness and analysis, original­
ity, abstraction, detachment absolutism, and possible self-destructiveness” (190-91), quali­
ties which are evident both in the personalities and occupations of the novel’s multinational 
bankers and businessmen and in the murderous actions of the bizarre cult Axton will learn 
about
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Axton himself stalled as a writer of corporate and government “institutions] litter,” one 
who in an alienated disregard of content merely engaged in cleaning up the syntactical and 
stylistic errors of a prose devised for domination. As a free-lancer, he seemed to be even 
further removed from responsibility for what he wrote, but he is now fully engaged by the 
corporate structure as a “risk analysf ’ in Greece for ihe multinational Northeast Group, for 
whom he no longer even writes, just reads reports and sends telexes. The classic American 
“innocent abroad,” he is a willing if occasionally critical corporate servant who feels be­
trayed when he eventually learns that his company has connections with the CIA and he has 
been therefore been indirectly engaged in espionage. His job consists in reviewing reports 
and analyses in order to determine what “seems likely” in volatile Near Eastern countries: 
“Collapse, overthrow, nationalization? Maybe a balance of payments problem, maybe bodies 
hurled into ditches. Whatever endangers an investment” (34). The irony of this utterance can 
be gauged when the Greek Eliades tells him that Americans learn about other countries only 
when their vital interests are threatened interests that have no relation to the needs of the 
countries themselves, since their governments seem to run on the principle of ‘Take the 
Americans’ money. Do what fee Americans tell us to do” (235). Axton’s naiveté consists in 
his thinking feat the information he gathers from private and public sources and assesses for 
fee company has no harmful political consequences, feat information is somehow independent 
of power, or rather feat the political and economic realms operate independently.
In contrast to the Greek people’s reciprocal conversation, fee corporation depends on 
one-sided abstract reports and statistical analyses, information gathered not through mutual 
intercourse and for mutual benefit but secretly, for purposes of exploitation. The analysis of 
the documents and studies of fee businessmen and bankers’ neo-colonialist project is sug­
gested to be analogous to the linguistic work of the epigrapher Rawlinson, who deciphered 
cuneiform writing: “fit together the elements of a pattern,” find a “design” that will explain 
otherwise diverse and confusing information, and, in what could be a virtual motto for colo­
nialism, “subdue and codify” (80). The implication of such apparently disinterested scien­
tific activity in colonialism, “the scientific face of imperialism” (80), is clear when Axton 
points that the British epigraphers were in fact employed by the East India Company. The 
cutting edge of British imperialism in the East, this was an organization that had acquired ex­
ceptional trade privileges for the British Crown from the Mogul emperors and when their 
power declined intervened directly in Indian affairs. As in Pynchon, the collaboration of sci­
ence and business, both technical research and the codifying properties of language, in a cul­
ture of death is questioned,: “Technicians are the infiltrators of ancient societies. They speak 
a secret language. They bring new kinds of death with them” (114). For his part, Axton enjoys 
his companions’ “technical cant,” the specialized vocabulary of the foreign bankers, busi­
nessmen, and experts, “which resonates with the power of the institutions that employ them” 
(McClure 111).
The older humanistic expatriates who sought inspiration in ancient societies for artistic 
creation have given way to these new multinational “corporate transients,” Europeans as well 
as North-Americans, but “serving the same broad ends,” (70) and forming “a subculture, busi­
ness people in transit, growing old in planes and airports” (6). Axton’s boss Rowser sums up 
the apolitical, profit-is-the-only-motive, point-of-view of these multinational servants when 
he quotes his own boss: ‘Tower works best when it doesn’t distinguish friends from enemies” 
(236), and yet the corporations must take account of local and national politics in order to 
protect both its investments and its personnel. The time frame is the end of the 1970s, during
the Iranian revolution, a situation that makes such people, with their vision of the American 
hostages in Tehran, want to be based in a less volatile area like Greece. Their personal se­
curity, however, can be compromised by nationalist terrorists. Accordingly, Rowser is ob­
sessed with secrecy—his life is “full of the ornaments of paranoia and deception” (44), and it 
is doubtless no accident that he is involved with the CIA, “that fantastically uncentered, nearly 
autonomous dissemination of misinformation, paranoia and terror” (Foster 157). As Axton 
observes: “If America is the world’s living myth, then the CIA is America’s myth. All the 
themes are there, in tiers of silence, whole bureaucracies of silence, in conspiracies 
and...brilliant betrayals” (317). One of the mythic functions of the CIA, as we have seen re­
peatedly in novels dealing directly or indirectly with fee Agency is feat it “allows us to par­
ticipate in a spectacle of violence,” since “it produces much of the violence that justifies it,” 
as is seen in fee episode at fee end of fee novel (Foster 162-63).
Rowser’s job is to sell risk (i.e. ransom) insurance coverage to multinational executives 
against kidnapping, for which he has “tons of research material on the cost-effectiveness of 
terror” (46), but risk insurance is not designed to actually stop terror or reduce risk but dis­
cover its “cost-effectiveness,” since profit, as wife other kinds of insurance, depends on fee 
fear being greater than fee actual risk. Axton, the risk-analyst, is therefore the “silent partner” 
of terrorism, since he is fee one who calculates its meaning (Foster 161). The precariousness 
of serving fee multinational corporate structure is shown in fee novel when fee banker Keller 
is shot by gunmen while jogging in fee park and Axton, who witnesses fee action, cannot be 
sure feat fee assassination attempt was not meant for himself, as unwitting but now public CIA 
spy, or that Eliades, who works for fee multinationals but is privately critical of foreign in­
volvement in his country, has not been involved. The ambiguity of fee human target further
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shows the collusion between government and capital, as well as the impersonal nature of the 
terrorist act.
The costs of literacy also affect more sympathetic characters, like Owen Brademas, 
himself a reader of inscriptions, that is, one who would make the ancient stones “speak.” 
Epigraphy, however, is a form of one-sided conversation with the dead and Owen eventually 
admits that he finds the letters more interesting in themselves than as signs of ancient cultures. 
He is, for example, indifferent to the archeological dig he supervises on a Greek island, and 
when he goes to India to read a Sanskrit epic on the wails of a rain he contents himself with 
merely admiring the script. He tells stories and offers intriguing cultural analyses, but these 
are given in monologues that preclude dialogue (during one of these discourses on language 
Axton drifts off into an erotic day-dream about his wife in the next room). Owen’s obsessive 
search for ancient esoteric scripts seems to indicate a desire to reach some definite meaning, a 
mistaken belief in the capacity of language to finally explain the world (Bryant 22). The point 
is that we no longer live in a world that can be figured out, no matter what our intelligence, 
obsession, or need, as witness Pynchon’s Oedipa Maas.
Owen’s most traumatic boyhood experience was in Kansas when he witnessed a rural 
preacher urging his parishioners to “speak in tongues,” a false example of language reciproc­
ity in a community since the languages are unintelligible babble, but what was disturbing to 
him was his inability to participate, to “loosen” his tongue. This episode is reproduced at the 
end of the novel in a chapter from the “non-fiction novel” of Axton’s precocious young son. 
Tap, in which Owen’s “tongue-tied” alter-ego cannot “yeeld” (sic) to his neighbors’ glos- 
salalia The text’s misspellings and malapropisms suggest both youthful speech and a kind of
Joycean playfulness and punning into which the over-analytical Owen cannot free himself As 
he admits to Axton, he has used language to separate himself from experience.
Owen discovers in the Greek hills, and eventually pursues to other countries, a bizarre 
alphabet cult, “abecedarians,” which provides one line of the unresolved plot. A guide says 
in explanation of the cult’s fascination with the alphabet: 'The alphabet is male and female. If 
you will know the correct order of letters, you make a world” (152), and yet the cult seeks an 
order or rightness, a “logic,” through senseless murder, a sort of linguistically-motivated ver­
sion of the murderous California‘Tamily” of Charles Manson. The cult members select a 
victim in the locale they are inhabiting, some mentally or physically deficient person, whose 
initials match the first letter of each word in the place-name of die locale, and carve or en­
grave the initials on the tool-weapon, a ritual practice that suggests voodoo or sympathetic 
magic radier than real language. Their choice of outcast victims also suggests that they are 
excessively concerned with establishing a “rightness” and order in an imperfect world. They 
co-opt words from logic like “premise” and “valid” (302) and call themselves “beginners,” 
as if seeking a fresh vision, in which they resemble Coach Creed from End Zone and odier 
misguided radical simplifiers of worldly complexity. As one of dieir spokesman says, in 
explaining why he joined die cult: “It seemed right to me...Numbers behave, words do not” 
(108). The cult evidently seeks a  pure language, something approaching the logical rigor and 
precision of mathematics, which is exactly what words, in their eminently social formation 
and development, can never achieve. The cult’s “texts” are their victims on which the abstract 
configurations of discrete letters have been written. Referentiality has been replaced with 
mere matching and the reciprocity of communication with an imposed, one-sided order 
(LeClair 192).
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The cult’s secret name may be the “Ta Onomata” (The Names), as Axton discovers 
those words painted on a rock in the Mani, in the mountains, a place inhabited by the cult, 
where, a member tells him, “it is possible for men to stop making history. We’ve invented a 
way out” (Names 209). To attempt to escape history by murder, “reify the act of murder into 
an ultimate artifact of fury against the inconsistency of the unknown” (Biyant 19) is a futile 
exercise, as another member seems to recognize at the end when the cult has nearly died out: 
“The world has become self-referring...a world in which there is no escape” (297). The 
“discreteness and analysis, originality, abstraction, detachment, absolutism, and possible self- 
destnuctiveness” of literacy are fulfilled in the cult’s acts of murder and its own demise.
When Owen first encounters these people in Greece and again later in India they ask 
him: “How many languages do you speak?,” and his answer seems to be his password for 
admittance to their presence, so that his fascination gradually becomes implication. Although 
he says that he can often see “design” where others cannot, Axton has also deciphered the al­
phabetic connection with the deaths, but Owen’s perception of design has led him at the last to 
being considered a member by the other cult members, showing how the search for presuma­
bly disinterested knowledge can become an ally of the abuse of power: he virtually lias to 
become complicit since there is no other way to carry out his inquiry and his curiosity is such 
that he does nothing to. stop die final murder (Morris 114). Similarly, the film-maker Volterra, 
who also pursues the cult, is mistaken when he thinks he can make a movie about it: “A mur­
der, pure and simple...It’11 be an essay on film, on what film is, what it means. It’ll be like 
nothing you know. Forget relationships” (199). In his quest for cinematic purity, a visual lan­
guage that can forget human relationships, Volterra too becomes complicit. He wants die cult
members to film themselves and eventually his idea is to film the actual murder from a heli­
copter.
Owen leaves the cult to retire to a small room in Lahore where Acton tracks him down 
and urges him to tell the story, somewhat relieving his guilt by oral communication. The 
“pattern” and “design” sought for by the multinationals for their own purposes is evidently a 
quality fostered by writing itself or rather the kind of writing in which the connection with a 
living or lived social history has been removed or forgotten. This is signaled earlier on in 
Owen’s case by his admission to Axton that he has lost his former scholarly interest in older 
cultures, but now sees “amysterious importance in letters as such” (35), that is, mere charac­
ters removed from any human context As a cult-member points out, “character” in Greek 
means “blade,” an instrument for inscribing or etching but here, of course, for brutal killing. 
Such detached characters are not only dead, they are death-dealing, which can be seen when 
the cult actually indulges in the act of killing, during which they speak no words but emit only 
inarticulate grunts and cries and their weapons or instruments resound with rhytlunic thuds. 
Their “subverbal form of connection is violence,” which is discrete, detached, and occa­
sional” like the communications of the multinationals, with whom they share “an urge to be 
disconnected from the ambiguities of spoken language” (LeClair 188, 193).
In contrast to Owen, Axton3 s progress through the novel can be read as a linguistic 
learning-experience, from a position of being a slave of the stasis of corporate language to a 
gradual realization of language’s artifice and an eventual understanding that words can be re­
generated and recombined for the purpose of renewal (Bryant 18), an understanding that de­
pends on the view that language is not fixed but fluid from its nature as a medium of social 
intercourse (Williams, Marxism and Lit. 37-38; Introd. sec.II). Axton shows the new under-
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standing when he questions or resists Owen’s analyses, refuses to be the writer-recorder for 
the cult, and seduces a banker’s wife by combining speech and body-language, naming the 
parts as a prelude to physically combining them. When toward the end Axton asks himself 
how one connects tilings, he answers: “Learn their names” (328). Names become not discrete 
and empty signifiers but are dissolved into their connecting function, a way of both making and 
sharing sense.
The living aspect of language as opposed to the death of empty ritual is illustrated in his 
final visit to and vision of the Acropolis, the monument to a vanished civilization, which in the 
beginning of the novel he has avoided as a timeless, pure abstraction, something too “exalted,” 
an analogue of his earlier perception of language itself When he finally walks up to the tem­
ple at the end, as opposed to viewing it from afar in its brilliant glory, he realizes that it is not 
“a relic species of dead Greece but part of the living city below if’ (330). The visitors throng 
in, speaking a variety of languages: “This is whai we bring to fee temple, not prayer or chant 
or slaughtered rams. Our offering is language” (331). He is able to do this because of his 
prior reading of his son’s zany chapter, included as an epilogue to fee novel to break up for 
the reader fee modernist closure of Axton’s discoveries and fee neat circular structure of fee 
narrative. Language is opened outward once again (Bryant 24-25). Axton is jarred by Tap’s 
inspired transformations of ordinary English: “I found these mangled words exhilarating.
He’d made them new again, made me see how they worked, what they really were. They were 
ancient tilings, secret, reshapable” (313). Language though ancient is ever renewable, fee les­
son he takes wife him in his new “seeing” of fee Parthenon. It is not only oral conversation 
feat is alive, after all; writing too can be reshapable, can rewrite reality. Indeed, it must, for 
“an individual’s life in language is not a tabula rasa” as radical beginners like fee cult would
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have it, “but as a palimpsest, already scored over and smudged by prior contact” (Bryant 26). 
Words display an inherent textuality and a messiness that ever recalls their origins and devel­
opment in social use over time.
NOTES
1 Tom LeClair, who has written the first full-length study of DeLillo’s fiction, with an inter­
pretation of the novels as “systems novels,” calls the 438 page Ratner's Star the “metasystem 
of the systems novel” (136) and compares it to the major efforts of Gaddis, Pynchon, and 
Coover, the postmodernist novelists of “excess.” For reasons of space, I shall no more than 
mention it here. DeLillo says that this work was an experiment in formal structure, with Py­
thagoras as guiding spirit and Lewis Carroirs Alice books as a structural model, the second 
part a mirror image of the first (“Interview LeClair 27). In his chapter on die novel, LeClair 
shows how the individual chapters of Ratner ys Star replicate ahistoiy of mathematics and in 
a chart (125) names the unnamed mathematicians and the relevant concepts. See also Shaub’s 
comments on systems vs. systems planning and LeClair’s occasional confusion of mystery and 
mystification (“Don DeLillo’s Systems” 130-33).
DeLillo says he began the novel with die idea of producing the “intimate, casual, off-the-cuff 
speech” between close friends and husbands and wives (DeCurtis, “Interview” 61).
3 LeClair points out (167-68) other meanings of the title: Selvy’s self-reference as an Indian 
brave with that name while escaping the hit team; Selvy’s destiny also suggests running, and 
his instructor at the Mines, Levi, says Selvy was “the best I’ve ever run,” which means both 
controlled and put physically through the paces; Selvy’s run or flight “home” from his assas­
sins can be associated with the running dog of folklore which always finds its way home. The 
dog itself recalls Pavlovian training of the sort Sel.vy receives, and to me the title of Robert
364
365
Stone’s novel. Dog Soldiers (1974), which also features aSelvy-like character, concerned 
with the purity of discipline, who returns to a training encampment to die in a final combat 
with pursuers.
4 Scanlon finds (235-36) no direct allusions to The Satanic Verses in Mao 11 but anumber of 
themes and motifs in common: the omnipresence of the electronic media and the sinister side 
of new technologies (e.g. Gray notes the potential for blowing up a building from a distant 
city), the pervasive and indiscrimate advertising for First World products in Third World 
cities (e.g. the bright red signs for “Coke IF’ in bombed-out Beirut), the centralized and char­
ismatic authority of fundamentalist religion and uncondescending portrayal of its committed 
believers (e.g. Karen), the preference for the image over the word (e.g. Scott’s aim of publish­
ing Gray’s picture but suppressing his novel).
' The current phenomenon of studio “mixing” is a good example. Old songs are pirated for 
their fragments, which are then reintegrated into a continuity of sound, the logical extreme of 
the production processing of both technology and the market and an apt symbol for the loss of 
unself-conscious spontaneity of the early years of rock. For the rock-artist as entrepeneur, 
DeCurtis (141) quotes Axl Rose, of Guns n’ Roses, who advises his would-be successors; “I 
don’t care what else you’re gonna do, if you’re gonna do art or anything, take business 
classes.”
6 DeLillo half-seriously speculated in an interview (LeClair 24) “if there is something we ha­
ven’t come across. Is there another, clearer language? Will we speak it and hear it when we 
die? Did we know it before we were born?” He goes on to say that the “untellable” suggests 
limitations, which is why there is babbling, alternate kinds of speech, and specialized lan­
guages in his novels, a point I shall take up in the next section.
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7 Bruce Bawer’s article on DeLillo is, in this respect, a monument to obtuseness, an almost 
comical catalogue of possible mis-readings and critical contradictions. For example, “In 
DeLillo’s overly diagrammatic world, savagery is the only alternative to depersonalization by 
sensoiy overload”(35). Granted that many characters react to depersonalization by violence, 
the author is hardly defending this strategy, merely suggesting one social consequence of al­
ienation.
8 DeLillo said in the LeClair interview (26) that he liked the way Wittengstein used language: 
“It’s like reading Martian...mysteriously simple and self-assured. It suggests without the 
slightest arrogance that there is no alternative to these remarks.”
9 Osteen (156) points out that the game comes directly from Kahn’s On Escalation: Meta­
phors and Scenarios (1965), a title that illustrates the notion of projected crises as language 
games.
10 As Goodheart puts it: “The apocalypse may be the dominant media trope of our time; its 
endless replay has inured us to the real suffering it might entail...Repetition wears away the 
pain. It also perfects the image or our experience of it..The event becomes aesthetic and the 
effect upon us anaesthetic” (122).
CONCLUSION
The narrative of individual experience could once, Frederic Jameson says, “map out 
larger sociai boundaries and institutions” in the era of the realist novel but at a later moment, 
especially the period of anew international order of imperialism in this century, this possi­
bility began to break down and give way to the formal experiments of modernism, hi the sec­
ond half of the century, in developments directly related to the Second World War, the restruc­
turing of older political and economic systems into late multinational capitalism must be seen 
as a separate stage, in which the newer structures have become invisible to individual sub­
jects, “expertentially absent from our daily life as the ultimate laws of Einsteinian relativity 
are from our normal dealings with Newtonian gravity on this planet” (Rev. Names 116, italics 
given). This study began with the positing of a split between private and public in the post­
war American consciousness that is for a number of reasons a consequence of this new situa­
tion. The split was manifest in post-war literacy fiction in the continued concentration of most 
serious novelists of the time on individual dilemmas in a world that had become too large and 
complex to be adequately comprehended and represented. It was as if these writers could not 
themselves comprehend the growing social and political irrelevance of the individual except 
in relation to his/her awareness of it, as displayed in existential anguish and a retreat into the 
self: in self-defeating gestures of rebellion or a self-fulfilling insistence on authenticity.
WTith notable exceptions, the public world of politics, its personalities and institutions, 
was left to popular fiction, which could not be expected to penetrate the complexities of offi­
cial power structures with anything much beyond the desire to entertain or unconsciously up­
hold the ideology of the United States as justified in its post-war role as the world’s moral 
and military policeman. The novels of the period tended to evade the situation entirely in the
above-mentioned retreat into the self or provide only the most timid responses as liberal 
novelists seemed to succumb into postwar revisionism, in which liberalism itself became 
conservative. Ulus, one has writers of political pot-boilers, such as Allen Drury, who creates 
a melodrama that unconsciously dramatizes the witch-hunting paranoia of McCarthvism by 
promoting a liberal professor to the status of someone who could make such dangerous con­
cessions to the Soviet Union as threaten not only the peace of an assumed free world but the 
existence of the much vaunted American way of life. And other, better writers who attempted 
to take on die realities of American political power in their work ended up in effect by evad­
ing them. Thus, Edwin O’Connor clouds his portrait of an old-style urban patriarchal politi­
cian by sentimentalizing his subject and effectively erasing his flagrant abuses of power, thus 
avoiding important questions of effective political rule in a democratic state.
Middle-brow intellectual Norman Mailer and high-brow critic Lionel Trilling also fail 
in dieir attempted novels of ideas to project a clear notion of how the Left might think and be­
have in the reactionaiy political climate in the 1950s, Mailer by sheer confusion and inability 
to provide a credible historical context, Trilling by idealizing the debate and steering a safe 
course through die middle of Stalinism, on one hand, and McCarthyism, on the other. Robert 
Penn Warren’s classic study of an idealist politician corrupted by the give-and-take of politi­
cal office and the delusions of Realpolitik, in die end, too, follows Trilling’s padi, canceling 
out ideological extremes in favor of a liberal consensus, in which all may be contained by the 
democratic pluralism of the US and the spiritual advances of die individual enlightened by 
suffering. As I noted at the end of Chapter 2, what is notable about all these writers is that the 
constitutional ideals which they either uncritically uphold or, more commonly in the serious 
writers, upbraid national leaders for not upholding, are repudiated in die novels. What is
common to them all is an apparent disbelief in the consensual or contractual ideas of Ameri­
can political theorists like Parsons or Arendt in favor of perceptions that political power 
works through deviousness, deceit, pressure, and even blackmail, and not the classical 
checks-and-balances, perceptions that to some extent may be justified by historical revelations 
but that also put undo emphasis on individual manipulation while continuing the tendency of 
realist fiction to psychologize individual motivations.
For Gore Vidal, whose historical fiction was examined in Chapter 3, the constitution is 
well-nigh irrelevant in discussing American power. He concentrates on the country’s power- 
elite, the men (rarely women) who attempted to shape its destiny through the sheer force of 
their personal will and for other than civic ambitions. While impressive in their historical 
detail, these novels were seen to ultimately depend on an entertaining mix of high-level gos­
sip, social satire of the wealthy, and the debunking of national icons, and they expose only in 
the older sense of exposé and of matters which one might think need little further elucidation. 
The ideal notions of Arendt, that politics is the highest human endeavor and the American 
Revolution was a collective effort to guarantee a space where freedom could occur, is absent 
in Vidal’s America, though her idea that arepublic consists of free exchange of ideas among 
equals finds a resonance there, if not in the democratic sense she intended it, for Vidal’s pow­
erful men do exchange ideas freely but only among themselves.
Vidal’s attacks, then, were seen to depend on apersonalist view of power that obfus­
cated the structural situation of unequal distribution of wealth and institutionalized injustice. 
Despite the author’s declared intention of attacking dominant economic interests as well as the 
ruling class administering those interests for their own benefit, his novels are somewhat ideal­
ized social chronicles of the rich and powerful, if  biting satires of their ideas and mores, and
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take little or no interest in the economic policies elaborated by these people and the real con­
sequences of the policies that determine the lives of the rest of the population. The whole his­
torical process tends to be banalized and socio-economic factors ignored in the interests of 
entertainment What Vidal has added to perceptions of power of the other novelists mentioned 
above is in his characters’ interest in representation—their concern for public image in the 
press and through film—and he seems to share their idea of a spectacularized power in which 
they hold sway over other people instead of exercise power within the social fabric through 
more subtle means. VidaJ’s portrait of the Hollywoodization of national politics does, how­
ever, perceive and insist on its decline into a mere “spectator sport,” so that while “American 
political life” is full of dramatic incident (mass marches, armed militias, financial scandals, to 
give some very recent examples), “Americanpolitics” is colorless and predictable, “the 
province of donors and pollsters and those pay or are paid by them” (Hitchens 23, italics 
given).
ia contrast to Vidal, who writes, it has been remarked, as if nothing has happened in 
prose fiction since the Fifties, Norman Mailer’s style is a recognition of the need for a lan­
guage adequate to large subjects. Mailer’s novels, which were examined in Chapter 4, might 
be seen as one main pole of this study, DeLillo’s being the other, as the lengthy chapters I 
have devoted to each might indicate. The model of power Mailer and the younger novelists 
emerging in the 1960s who perceived the US as a “totalitarian” state is basically a Weberian 
one: a situation, one recalls, in which one “party” is in a position to cany out its will against 
the resistance of another. In Mailer’s novels, one has, in succession, a number of such domi­
nant parties in a variety of combinations. Thus, there are, in succession, the military hierarchy 
in The Naked and the Dead), the Pentagon and the press in Armies o f  the Night, and the CIA
370
in Harlot's Ghost. That some of the dominant groups are personified in individuals suggests 
Vidal’s personalism, but it should be added that these powerful individuals tend to act as 
metaphors for institutional powers. The repression of hegemonic powers, Mailer’s notion of 
“corporation-land” a technologically sophisticated, bureaucratically managed, politically re­
pressive, and militarily dangerous state, and the fraudulent ideologies that support it, suggest a 
Marxist position of resistance, but in each case this turns out to be inapplicable, at least in the 
terms Mailer himself has established. Although in the novels the institutions are the dominant 
agent, the oppressed and resisting agent is, in each case, an individual: Hearn, “Mailer,” 
Hubbard. These characters are fully realized in contrast to their more generalized oppressors 
and they act not in the name of an oppressed class but for the personal struggle for authenticity 
and freedom so typical of the novels of Mailer’s non-politicized contemporaries.
Still, Mailer’s perceptions are valuable. He has, for example, shown the power strug­
gles of bureaucratic organizations in Naked, Armies, and Harlot, 'in Armies he has shown 
both the potential of mass-movements in resisting government and the importance of the media 
in a new politics of representation and in Harlot, he has depicted an organization dedicated to 
secrecy and covert activity with the paradoxical but declared aim of defending an “open so­
ciety.” Thus, Mailer has done much to expose and contest the contradictions of American 
power in a number of themes that postmodernist fiction takes up and develops further.
If one may risk an apparent oxymoron, the proto-postmodernism of the novelists of 
Chapter 5--Kesey, Heller, Vonnegut, and Burroughs—has also represented power in ways ba­
sically similar to Mailer’s American-totalitarianism, with visions of an oppressive, techno­
cratic managerial state whose size, social engineering, reactionary politics, and indifference 
to spiritual values threaten individual existence, autonomy, and creativity. Burroughs is ex-
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emplary in this regard, since his early fiction makes the “initial rupture between the individual 
and the threatening discourse of the state” (Federman, “Self-Reflexive” 1153). As this state­
ment implies, language is one of the agents of the system, the means by which the powers-thai- 
be hold people captive, especially through the media and their propagation of received ideas. 
Burroughs is a pioneer in these perceptions in contemporary literature and reconsiders as well 
prior thought on the connections of a dehumanized language with a rationalized Weberian bu­
reaucracy. His targets are the intellectually homogenizing force of hegemonic “one-way” 
communications systems, in which he was especially prophetic, and, less perceptively, what 
he thinks of as the Aristotelian logic of Western modes of thought. The attempt to wrench lan­
guage out of its categories, the eschewing of narrative, and the emphasis on an “allegorical 
war of control” in which individual integrity takes priority over the perception of control as a 
political aim are regressions to the modernist sensibility.
The individual is shown in the works of Burroughs and these other novelists as beset on 
ail sides by the system: in Kesey, by an institutional structure which achieves submission by 
disciplinary methods and a resort to violence when thought necessary in extreme cases. Both 
Mailer and Kesey show the brutality of the naked power Russell posits exercised on the bod­
ies of individual subjects and Arendt’s notion that strength alone is ineffective in resisting 
power. For Arendt, such systems are sustained not by power, a collective effort to solve hu­
man problems, but violence, which is always limited and inevitably calls up resistance, a per­
ception well illustrated in die novels of these writers. Kesey’s hospital may stand for the state 
itself, about which Arendt theorized, as Heller’s military structure may stand for post-war 
corporate organization, which Galbraith sought to expose as concealing its intentions and 
Heller perceived as the principle adversary of freedom: the American military at the height
of and immediately after the war as the supreme example of a bureaucratic organization in the 
service of death, the corporation as beyond any human considerations, even established no­
tions such as national boundaries, in the relentless pursuit of profit
Heller’s military, in Galbraith’s terms, is a condign instrument of government policy in 
compensatory collaboration with the manufacturing capabilities and technological develop­
ment of the corporations. Although this combination of means, along with the conditioning 
power of propaganda and effective concealment of corporate motives Galbraith also de­
scribes, has in fact augmented war-making capacities to a hitherto unknown degree. Heller’s 
concern, as is Vonnegut’s, is typically with the alienation of the individual confronting death 
and absurd situations. While Heller does effectively show the contemporary absurdity of men 
who are completely in the control of an organization they belong to but that is only intent on its 
own self-perpetuation, in both writers, as we have seen, the individual is an essentially pas­
sive element in a condition of unequal power and the larger issues suggested tend to be ab­
sorbed once again by a psychological emphasis. In this respect, it is to the point as Heller and 
Vonnegut, as well as Mailer and Kesey, show, that any resistance for the individual is politi­
cally futile, however spiritually liberating. Hie obsolete apparatus of spectacular power is 
shown, in Warren, Vidal, and Mailer as being defeated (in Mailer’s Armies by the spectacle 
itself), while postmodernist fiction seeks to show that new forms have taken hold, in secretive 
organizations such as the CIA (Mailer, Barth, Pynchon, DeLillo), and the modem corporation 
tentacled reach (Burroughs, Barth, Pynchon, DeLillo).
The political question for postmodernism is whether it is essentially a conservative re­
trenchment, as some detractors have argued, or in effect radically critical, in which contesta­
tion is central, or at least potentially subversive in its program of de-natural izing or exposing
aspects of society, as supporters have claimed. I have argued that in effect some postmod­
ernist works (DeLillo) are more effective than others (Barth), with some ambiguously so 
(Pynchon), in their radical critiques of the power relations of American society. Barth’s 
novels, examined in Chapter 6, both suggest and negate the Foucaultian theme of power’s dis­
persal in contemporary society. In The Sot-Weed Factor and even Sabbatical, secrecy at the 
upper echelons of government makes it difficult to identity who controls who, the identifica­
tion so essential to traditional leftist strategies of resistance, although in both novels the omi­
nous presence of secret government organizations eventually becomes mere background for 
the personal triumphs of questing heroes and heroines. In Giles Goat-Boy, Barth’s WESCAC 
foretells the increasingly hegemonic role of computer technology in contemporary life with the 
recognition of the beneficial as well as controlling effects of power, but the quest of the pro­
tagonist ends in a merging of the protagonist with the machine, who turns out to be his literal 
and spiritual father, to turn into a regressive Fifties’ quest for the authenticity of a beleaguered 
self, similiar to the writers of die previous chapter. Bartii is die best example of a “politically 
neutered postmodernism,” whose playfulness of language and dazzling variety of techniques 
leads not to a contestation of power, since a “lack of distance from die market place prevents 
it from claiming any special authority, or any means of making a difference in the social 
sphere,” but “to a basic refusal of seriousness” (Kucich 329).
Far from being the “classic example” of “complex poses of despair” (Kukich, Ibid.), 
Thomas Pynchon, whose novels were discussed in Chapter 7 has explored most profoundly 
the implications of Foucaultian insights. Foucault has, for diat matter, been and can be read 
pessimistically, that effective opposition to insidious and far-reaching power is doomed and 
attempts to discover truth are finally delusive. If he insists on struggle by making power
“appear” and attacking it where it is most visible, this may not be a general call to arms but at 
least recognizes the secret and pervasive aspects of power and its all-important connection 
with knowledge, which are generally ignored by previous theories if not by contemporary 
novelists like Pynchon. Hie connection of colonialism and the technology of death in V. and 
Gravity's Rainbow, the collusion of government, science and corporations in Gravity, the 
precariousness and dispersal of the self in a reifying world in V., Gravity, and the Crying o f  
Lot 49, are Foucaultian themes, but Pynchon has also touched on matters from other theoreti­
cal and fictional predecessors. Thus, for example, his examination of the networks of failed 
and successful communications in Crying, reflects one of Burroughs’s chief concerns, and the 
devious methods and growing hegemony of the corporation in Gravity, one of Galbraith’s. 
Where Weber and Foucault meet in the perception of Pynchon and other postmodernists is in 
the perception that no one specifically rules, that bureaucracies make location and responsi­
bility difficult to discover and assign, which is rather different from saying that such writing 
embraces despair and quietism. If Pynchon has shown equal adroitness at manipulating die 
postmodernist multiple languages, mixed genres, “anything goes” fictional strategies as Barth, 
he does so not in the pursuit of mystification or retreat into self One might compare Barth’s 
Giles with Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying o f  Lot 49, as I have done in Chapter 7, arguing that 
the quest in that novel is for a national destiny and meaning, in a tightly organized circular 
pattern of repetitive images more appropriate to a paranoid vision of society. Pynchon’s 
world is “shot through with intimations of conspiracies vast and pervasive enough to under­
mine the possibility that there can be anything personal or individual about identity’ (Hite
Don DeLillo, whose works are discussed in Chapter 8, is the other pole from Norman 
Mailer of important writers concerned with understanding and exposing the sites, forms, and 
machinations of power in our society, how institutions have been transformed and individuals 
been reduced by it In DeLillo’s fiction, most of the concerns with power in the contempo­
rary world reach their culmination. Here one finds the systems, both hegemonic and conspira­
torial, ofBurroughs, Vonnegut, Barth, and Pynchon, and the pervasive paranoia and underlying 
menace ofBurroughs, Pynchon, and Robert Stone, who make up what has been called “the 
paranoid school” of American fiction, of which DeLillo is the “chief shaman” (Towers 6). In 
these works, one also finds an intense preoccupation with language, its power, play, and 
abuses, that was present in most of the older writers mentioned, including the powerful lan­
guages of advertising and the mass media DeLillo’s work is in tune with both Burroughs’s 
early insights and contemporary theory in that he realizes that political conflict in the contem­
porary world is ultimately fought out in the uses of language—in ideology, cultural codes and 
representations, “rather than in overt forms of repression, in individuals, or in the shape of 
historical events” (Kucich 330), such as one finds in Mailer, Heller, Kesey, Vonnegut and 
even in Pynchon.
The Names is a case in point Language is in a sense the subject of the novel, and all the
«
characters, even the plot itself, revolve round its political uses, as DeLillo develops analogies 
between language systems and hegemonic political systems and their adversaries. Hie pro­
tagonist’s son writes anon-fictional novel with an episode about a boy who witnesses a rural 
community speaking in tongues. Tongue-tied, the boy becomes a man who becomes obsessed 
with reading the inscriptions of ancient languages and eventually with a an alphabet cult that 
links letters and murder. In the media-madness for aesthetic over ethical choice, a film-maker
wants to make a film about the cult in the act of killing. The multinational businessmen wax 
wittily about their anomalous status in an unstable political region The protagonist’s politi­
cally dubious profession of risk analyst involves decipherment of bureaucratic reports for a 
firm connected to the CIA, who uses the information for destabilizing governments unsympa­
thetic to the US’s policies furthering international capitalism and anti-leftist ideology. As 
Jameson points out in his review of the novel, none of these narrative lines takes precedence 
over any other. Although one ofDeLillo’s most conventional novels, the political is not back­
ground for the psychological, as in most conventional novels with political themes, nor are the 
characters mouthpieces of theories, as in some of his other works. The ambiguity of motive is 
paralleled by an ambiguity in narrative structure, since the expectation of finding out the solu­
tions to the assassination attempt or the outcome of the cult in the apparent genre of interna­
tional thriller are left unfulfilled. Where does power lie, how does it operate, who does it 
affect? are some of the questions raised and shown not capable of being definitively an­
swered. Language is both an agent of colonization and a means of (limited) understanding and 
liberation, but no liberal consensus works to cancel alternatives out. DeLillo, “one of the 
foremost postmodern stylists,” writes a “nuanced prose” assimilates a variety of contempo­
rary “languages,'” such as science, technology and international business, media and informa­
tion industries, as well as the musings of individuals who are involved in these areas either as 
participants or victims.
To conclude, most of these works in their own wavs have contributed to an understand-
*
ing of the complex notion of power, its forms, spaces, functions, methods, machinations, and 
abuses. As we have seen, some have reiterated reigning ideologies; others contested them in 
a variety of strategies. Between the literary text and its social context there exists what Brook
Thomas calls “a field of energy” so that history itself can be seen as a social text and ihe liter­
ary text as a social event As Raymond Williams insisted, literature reveals but also creates 
experience. The contemporary novel continues to be a valuable instrument of social percep­
tions, away to bridge the alleged gap between our private lives and public institutions.
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